Transient pseudo-NAT attacks or how NATs are even more evil than you believed
draft-dupont-transient-pseudonat-04
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Dr. Francis Dupont , Jean-Jacques Bernard | ||
Last updated | 2004-06-29 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
When a 'NAT traversal' capability is added to a class of signaling protocols which can control some traffic aggregation points, an attack based on a temporary access to the path followed by messages exists. Mobile IP [1] with NAT traversal [5] or IKE [2] with NAT traversal [6], including the IKEv2 [7] proposal, are potentially affected by this kind of attacks. This document claims this vulnerability is an intrinsic property of the NAT traversal capability, so is another point where the usage of NATs is very damaging.
Authors
Dr. Francis Dupont
Jean-Jacques Bernard
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)