@techreport{eap-psk-256-01,
    number =    {draft-eap-psk-256-01},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-eap-psk-256/01/},
    author =    {Bruno ROHEE and Emmanuel KONAN and Michael Le Clerc and Clément Devun},
    title =     {{EAP-PSK-256: A Quantum resistant version of EAP-PSK}},
    pagetotal = 45,
    year =      2026,
    month =     jun,
    day =       22,
    abstract =  {This document proposes a lightweight, quantum-resistant protocol for mutual authentication and secret key establishment based on a shared secret over a network. While the existing EAP-PSK protocol provides mutual authentication and key establishment, it faces significant limitations due to evolving security standards. EAP-PSK-256 addresses these vulnerabilities through the following rationales: * Quantum resistance: Legacy EAP-PSK uses the symmetric algorithm AES-128, which is theoretically vulnerable to Grover's cryptographic attack. This document specifies a new EAP protocol that uses quantum-resistant symmetric algorithms. * Regulatory Alignment: EAP-PSK-256 replaces the key generation mechanism used in EAP-PSK with a standardized key derivation mechanism from NIST SP800-108. * Enhanced Entropy: Unlike EAP-PSK, which relied solely on Peer randomness (RAND\_P) for session keys derivation, EAP-PSK-256 strengthens these keys by mixing entropy from both the Peer and the Server (RAND\_S). This ensures that both parties contribute to the cryptographic randomness of the session.},
}