IP Enclave Boundary Signaling
draft-ek-intarea-ip-enclave-signaling-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Erik Kline | ||
| Last updated | 2026-11-02 | ||
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draft-ek-intarea-ip-enclave-signaling-00
Network Working Group E. Kline
Internet-Draft Aalyria Technologies, Inc.
Intended status: Experimental 2 November 2026
Expires: 6 May 2027
IP Enclave Boundary Signaling
draft-ek-intarea-ip-enclave-signaling-00
Abstract
This document defines optional ICMP extension objects that a gateway
at the boundary between an IP enclave and a managed constrained long-
haul link, such as a scheduled deep-space link, can attach to
existing Destination Unreachable messages. On the unreachable errors
generated when an admitted packet cannot be forwarded because the
required link is presently unusable, the objects convey the expected
time until the link becomes usable, the time the estimate was
generated, and the expected one-way delay of the link. On the
administrative prohibition errors generated when the link's admission
policy refuses a packet, a presence-only object identifies boundary-
link admission policy as the source of the refusal. The underlying
codes retain their existing meanings, and this document requests no
new ICMP type or code. It specifies when the objects may be attached
and what they convey, not how transports, applications, or hosts
react to them; making the boundary's knowledge available to senders
is intended to enable experimentation with such reactions.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://ekline.github.io/draft-icmp-boundary-signaling/draft-ek-
intarea-ip-enclave-signaling.html. Status information for this
document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ek-
intarea-ip-enclave-signaling/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the INTAREA Working Group
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ekline/draft-icmp-boundary-signaling.
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Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Reference Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Orchestration Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4.1. Traffic Sent While the Link Is Unusable . . . . . . . 11
4.4.2. Reconsidering the Communication Mechanism . . . . . . 11
4.4.3. Traffic Denied by Link Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4.4. Plan/Reality Divergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5. Interaction of the Two Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Message Formats and Extension Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Common Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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5.2. Constrained Long-Haul Link Metadata on Destination
Unreachable Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.1. Eligible Carrier Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3. Extension Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3.1. Duration Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3.2. Generation Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3.3. Expected Time Until Link Usability . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3.4. Expected Link Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3.5. Denied by Link Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4. Object Applicability by Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6. Generation Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Receiver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.1. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.2. Consumer Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8. Legacy Host and Middlebox Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10. Experimental Status and Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10.1. Scope of the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10.2. Network Signal Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10.3. Consumer Behavior Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
10.4. Evidence for Advancement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix A. Worked Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.1. Availability Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.2. Denied by Link Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1. Introduction
Some IP enclaves are connected to the rest of a network only by
constrained long-haul links that are high-delay, periodically
disrupted, or both: deep-space links, satellite links available only
during scheduled passes, periodic store-and-forward contacts. An
administrative domain, or a set of cooperating domains, manages those
links: it knows from a contact plan or equivalent scheduling
knowledge when each link is expected to carry traffic, it enforces an
admission policy describing whose traffic each link will carry, and
it can distribute routing updates to migrate long-haul traffic onto
the best current or next link according to its policy. An IP sender
inside such an enclave may lack this knowledge. Ordinary errors do
not communicate the managed service's recovery estimate or identify
boundary-link admission as the source of a policy refusal.
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Existing Destination Unreachable messages already report the
forwarding failures that result. This document defines optional ICMP
extension objects [RFC4884] that let a gateway in such a domain
supply additional information on those messages. On the unreachable
errors generated when an admitted packet cannot be forwarded because
the required link is presently unusable, the gateway may attach the
time at which it generated the message, its estimate of the time
until the link becomes usable, and the approximate one-way delay of
the link. On the administrative prohibition errors generated when
the link's admission policy refuses a packet, it may attach a
presence-only object indicating that boundary-link admission policy,
rather than some other administrative control, was the source of the
refusal. The underlying code retains its existing meaning in every
case (Section 5.1).
This document specifies the network-layer signals: when a gateway may
attach each object, what each asserts, and its encoding. It does not
specify how a transport, application, host cache, provisioning
system, or orchestrator reacts to them. Such reactions are not
required for interoperability, and they are not merely out of scope:
a purpose of publishing the objects is to enable experimentation with
them (Section 7.2, Section 10). The availability metadata is useful
because the boundary is close and the condition is long-lived:
gateway feedback reaches senders in local round-trip times, while the
unavailability it reports lasts minutes to hours (Section 3). The
policy indication is useful for a different reason: it identifies the
source of the refusal and may prompt an application to reconsider its
configured communication options. It does not establish that a
change will succeed or that policy cannot change over time.
Where an application can learn in advance which communication
mechanisms suit a destination -- through configuration, provisioning,
DNS, or orchestration -- selecting an appropriate mechanism before
initiating unsuitable IP communication is preferable to discovering
the condition reactively. Such discovery and selection mechanisms
are out of scope for this document, which addresses only what a
gateway reports once a packet has been sent.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Enclave: an IP network whose connectivity to other networks passes
over one or more managed constrained long-haul links.
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Constrained long-haul link: a link connecting enclaves whose
usability is high-delay, scheduled, intermittent, or otherwise
restricted according to knowledge held by the managing domain, and
whose use is governed by admission policy. Ordinary transient
interface or carrier failure does not by itself make a link a
managed constrained long-haul link (Section 3).
Managed service: the domain's knowledge that a particular
constrained long-haul link, or a sequence of link opportunities,
is intended to carry particular traffic, together with the
associated schedule, admission policy, and forwarding state. A
managed service may exist while no route to its destination is
currently installed.
Orchestration function: the logical function, possibly distributed
across cooperating administrative domains and not necessarily
continuously reachable, that manages the constrained long-haul
links, distributes routing and policy updates for them, and
supplies gateways with the knowledge on which the objects in this
document are based.
Contact: an interval during which a constrained long-haul link is
planned to carry traffic between a gateway and its remote
counterpart.
Contact plan: the schedule of contacts for a link or set of links,
distributed to gateways in advance of execution. A contact plan
is one form of managed-service knowledge, not the only one.
Gateway: the router at the boundary between an enclave and a
constrained long-haul link, holding the managed-service knowledge
for that link and attaching the objects defined in this document.
Coordination scope: the set of links, routes, and admission policies
under the same orchestration function, whose current state a
gateway's assertions describe.
Disclosure scope: the administrative boundary within which the
objects are generated and within which their contents are
considered appropriate to reveal. It is at most the coordination
scope and may be narrower.
Trans-boundary traffic: traffic whose path crosses a gateway onto a
constrained long-haul link.
Admission: a gateway's determination, against local policy, that
particular traffic may use a constrained long-haul link.
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Link Condition Object: an ICMP extension object of the class defined
in Section 5.3, carrying constrained long-haul link metadata on a
Destination Unreachable message.
Carrier code: an existing Destination Unreachable code on which one
or more Link Condition Objects may be carried (Section 5.2.1).
Expected Time Until Link Usability (ETU): the gateway's estimate, at
generation of a notification, of the interval from generation
until the relevant constrained long-haul link is expected to
become usable for forwarding (Section 5.3.3).
Enclave time reference: the shared time reference, established by
the specification or provisioning of the managed deployment,
against which Generation Time is expressed (Section 5.3.2). Its
time scale, epoch, and discontinuity treatment are deployment
choices, not protocol prerequisites; UTC is one permitted choice.
3. Applicability
The mechanisms in this document apply to deployments in which one or
more constrained long-haul links connect IP enclaves, and in which
the links, the routes over them, and the admission policies governing
them are managed by a common orchestration function. When several
long-haul options exist for the same traffic, this document assumes
they participate in the same logical orchestration. This does not
require a single physical controller, a particular routing protocol,
or continuous connectivity between gateways and the controller
(Section 4.3). The objects are specified for use under a single
administrative authority or cooperating authorities sharing the
coordination and disclosure scopes defined below. [RFC8799] provides
broader context on limited-domain deployments.
Three relationships need to be kept distinct.
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The first is the timing relationship between a notifying gateway and
the senders it notifies. Let R be the round-trip time between a
sender and the gateway, D the duration of a link unavailability being
reported, and T the timescale on which the sender's transport would
otherwise detect failure. Availability metadata is useful when R is
small relative to T, so the notification arrives while the sender
still has options, and small relative to D, so the reported condition
is still in effect on arrival. In the Mars enclave of Section 4, R
is milliseconds to seconds, T is seconds to minutes, and D is minutes
to hours. When R approaches D, a notification describes a link state
that may no longer exist on arrival; gateways therefore attach
objects only into their local enclave and never across the
constrained long-haul link. This timing argument is specific to
availability metadata; a policy refusal applies regardless of current
link usability and needs no predicted outage to be worth reporting.
The second is the coordination scope: the set of links, routes, and
policies whose current state the gateway's assertions describe. A
gateway's assertions are about the applicable, current managed
service and forwarding state for the affected traffic within this
scope, not about every path that could ever exist, unprovisioned
routes, unrelated domains, or application-layer alternatives.
Equally, the failure of one local link is not a basis for an
assertion when the current managed forwarding state provides a
usable, policy-permitted alternative for that traffic.
The third is the disclosure scope: the administrative boundary within
which the objects are generated and considered appropriate to reveal.
Cooperating domains must agree on both scopes; their agreement does
not authenticate ICMP (Section 11), and a short local round-trip time
does not by itself make a network part of either scope. For
comparison of timescales only, the public Internet has sub-second
internal round-trip times relative to a link whose unavailability is
measured in minutes, but it is not thereby a cooperating or trusted
signaling domain.
The objects apply only to links whose availability and admission the
domain deliberately manages as a long-haul service. A gateway
attaches availability metadata on the basis of managed-service
knowledge about the link, never on the basis of observed local
carrier or interface state alone; a router that merely notices its
outgoing interface is down generates whatever error ordinary ICMP
rules call for and has no basis to attach Link Condition Objects to
it. How the domain acquires and distributes its knowledge is not
specified; the objects encode what the gateway is entitled to assert,
not how it learned it. The same criteria identify deployments beyond
the interplanetary case, wherever a domain manages scheduled or
intermittently available links between enclaves on the basis of
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advance knowledge. Conversely, the mechanism offers nothing on paths
that are merely lossy or congested, and high delay alone is not a
reason to generate a Destination Unreachable error when forwarding is
possible.
4. Concept of Operations
This section is informative. It describes a representative
deployment: an IP-based enclave in Mars orbit and on the Martian
surface, connected to terrestrial networks through scheduled deep-
space contacts. Host and application behaviors described here are
illustrations of what the signals make possible, not requirements
(Section 7.2).
4.1. Reference Scenario
The enclave consists of surface assets and orbiters interconnected by
conventional IP links, with propagation delays of milliseconds to low
seconds and continuous or near-continuous connectivity. Standard IP
routing and transports operate normally within it.
The enclave connects to Earth through gateway nodes on relay orbiters
equipped with deep-space links. These links are scheduled: contacts
with ground stations occur in windows determined by orbital geometry
and antenna allocation, known in advance through a contact plan.
They are high-delay: one-way light time to Earth is roughly 3 to 22
minutes. And they are policy-managed: contact capacity is allocated
to specific senders or traffic classes, and traffic outside those
allocations is not authorized to use the link.
A gateway may also offer a Bundle Protocol version 7 [RFC9171] or
application-layer gateway service that accepts traffic under its own
policy. The ICMP cases here concern packets refused or not forwarded
by the IP forwarding service; they do not describe traffic accepted
for delivery by a separate service. BP is not required for this ICMP
mechanism.
The same structure exists on the Earth side. A terrestrial sender's
traffic crosses an Earth-side gateway that holds the same contact
plan and enforces its own admission policy, and that gateway
generates the same signals toward terrestrial senders. This section
describes the Mars side for concreteness.
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4.2. Roles
Enclave hosts originate and receive application traffic. Some are
DTN-aware, running a BP agent or a stack extension that can hand
traffic to one; others are unmodified IP hosts, including legacy
instruments and commercial payloads whose stacks predate this
specification. Where a performance-enhancing proxy (PEP) terminates
transport sessions on behalf of such hosts, the PEP can consume these
signals for them, so that the mechanism's benefit need not depend on
universal host adoption.
Gateways hold the managed-service knowledge for their deep-space
links, enforce admission and precedence policy on contact capacity,
and attach the objects defined in this document: availability
metadata on the unreachable error generated when admitted trans-
boundary traffic arrives while the link is not usable, and the Denied
by Link Policy object on the administrative prohibition error
generated when traffic arrives that policy does not admit.
An orchestration function, which may be Earth-based, distributes
contact plans, routing updates, and admission policy to gateways in
advance (Section 4.3). It is intended to steer trans-boundary
traffic toward whichever gateway and link can serve it. Routing,
link, and policy updates are not installed atomically, however, and
distribution itself crosses the deep-space link; during transitions,
or when plan and reality diverge, a gateway may receive traffic that
another gateway could have served. Gateways operate autonomously
between management contacts on their most recent applicable knowledge
and omit assertions they cannot currently support (Section 6).
Intra-enclave traffic is unaffected; hosts that never originate
trans-boundary traffic need not implement the objects.
4.3. Orchestration Example
This subsection illustrates one feasible path by which a gateway
obtains the knowledge on which it bases the objects. It describes
conceptual information, not a management protocol, data model, or
scheduling algorithm; any existing management channel, controller
interface, or local provisioning may carry it.
Times in this example are expressed in the enclave time reference
(Section 5.3.2) as seconds from its epoch; the deployment has chosen
the reference, and nothing here depends on which one. The
orchestration function determines that traffic for a terrestrial
destination prefix should, for an upcoming period, leave the enclave
via a particular relay orbiter's deep-space link, whose next contact
begins at reference time 12,400 s. Allowing for antenna pointing,
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acquisition, and modem configuration, it expects the link to be ready
to forward traffic at reference time 12,520 s, and it estimates the
one-way delay over the link at that time as 20 minutes. It installs
or schedules the routing and admission policy needed for that link,
and it supplies the gateway with an associated record containing at
least:
* the traffic-to-service binding: the destination prefix and the
routing or policy context to which the record applies, associated
with the relevant link or next managed opportunity;
* a revision identifier or equivalent coherence mechanism, an
applicability period, and validity or expiry information;
* optionally, the expected data-plane-ready time, or a duration with
an explicit reference time;
* optionally, a directional one-way link-delay estimate applicable
to that opportunity; and
* the admission and disclosure policy that applies, together with
whatever local evidence the gateway has about the link's actual
usability.
Delivering this record is only part of the implementation. The
gateway's error-generation path must be able to consult it when
forwarding fails, including when the route to the destination has
been withdrawn between contacts and the failure is reported as a no-
route error. Any absolute time the controller supplies must either
be expressed in, or come with a known conversion into, the gateway's
enclave time reference (Section 5.3.2); alternatively the controller
may supply a duration anchored to a reference time the gateway can
interpret. A readiness time the gateway cannot relate to its own
reference is not a basis for ETU.
At reference time 10,000 s, a packet for the prefix arrives at the
gateway. No usable route exists, so ordinary rules produce a
Destination Unreachable error. The gateway consults its record,
finds it current and applicable, confirms the traffic is admitted,
and attaches Generation Time (10,000 s), ETU (the interval from
10,000 s to 12,520 s, 2,520,000 ms), and Expected Link Delay
(1,200,000 ms). Generation Time is the time the ICMP message was
generated, not the time the orchestrator created or distributed the
plan.
Several operational cases follow from this model, and Section 9 draws
the corresponding lessons:
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* A later plan revision selects a different link or changes the
readiness estimate. Subsequent notifications use the current
applicable information; earlier notifications cannot be recalled.
* The planned readiness time passes but acquisition fails. The
gateway does not continue reporting a countdown clamped to zero;
it either has a newly supported estimate, or it omits ETU. An
Expected Link Delay that remains valid for the selected link need
not be omitted.
* Controller connectivity is lost. A still-valid local record
remains usable unless contradicted by local evidence; when it
expires or becomes incoherent, the basis for the affected objects
is gone and they are omitted. Ordinary errors continue to be
generated.
* Routing state and metadata revisions temporarily disagree, for
instance when a route has migrated to a second gateway but the
first gateway's record has not yet been updated. The gateway
omits assertions it cannot support rather than describing a
service opportunity other than the one applicable to the traffic.
4.4. Use Cases
4.4.1. Traffic Sent While the Link Is Unusable
A surface host begins a bulk transfer toward Earth between contacts.
The first packet reaches the gateway, which drops it and returns a
Destination Unreachable error carrying an Expected Time Until Link
Usability object. From the object, the host knows that the domain
regards the path as transiently unavailable and roughly how long that
is expected to last; from the bare error alone it would know only
that the packet was not delivered. It might use the metadata to
avoid repeated attempts that would elicit the same error, and to tell
the application that the path is deferred rather than failed
(Section 7.2).
4.4.2. Reconsidering the Communication Mechanism
An application that learns, from a Link Condition Object, that its
present IP traffic will be deferred for a long interval or was
refused by boundary-link admission policy may reconsider its end-to-
end communication options. A DTN-aware host might hand the affected
traffic to its local BP agent, which originates bundles toward the
destination for forwarding during the next contact. An application
with separately provisioned knowledge of an authorized application-
layer gateway might direct its traffic there. An application with
its own delay tolerance might instead compare the expected wait
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against that tolerance and fail fast.
The object is a trigger to reconsider, not a description of the
alternatives. Configuration, discovery, or provisioning supplies the
alternative mechanism and its authorization; the object does not
prove that another mechanism exists, is admitted, or will succeed,
and it does not require the application to change anything.
4.4.3. Traffic Denied by Link Policy
A misconfigured or newly integrated payload host sends best-effort
traffic toward Earth during a contact whose capacity is allocated to
command and telemetry classes. The gateway classifies the traffic
against its local policy, which may consider DSCP, addresses,
protocol and port, or any other criteria, and drops it. Ordinary
rules and local response policy call for a Destination Unreachable,
Communication Administratively Prohibited error; the gateway attaches
the Denied by Link Policy object to it. From the object, the host
learns that the refusal came from the admission policy of the long-
haul service rather than from some other administrative control such
as a firewall; from the bare error it would know only that
communication was administratively prohibited. The object does not
say why the traffic was refused or what traffic would be admitted:
admission policy is multidimensional and local, and coaching senders
on acceptable markings would invert an admission model in which
access is granted through the control plane. The operator debugging
the flow consults the gateway's own logs and counters (Section 9);
obtaining admission is a provisioning action. The application may
reconsider its communication mechanism (Section 4.4.2).
A flow that policy admitted at contact start and later displaces in
favor of higher-precedence traffic falls under the same object.
Whether an implementation regards this internally as preemption,
resource allocation, or precedence enforcement is a matter of local
policy; the sender learns only that the traffic is not presently
admitted.
4.4.4. Plan/Reality Divergence
Notifications that conflict with the currently applicable service
expectation can be evidence of divergence between the control plane's
model and the data plane's state. Examples include ETU or ELD
reporting unavailability after expected data-plane readiness, or a
Denied by Link Policy object for traffic that installed policy should
admit. A planned contact alone does not establish readiness:
preparation may continue after contact start (Section 4.3).
Authorized traffic between contacts can legitimately elicit
availability metadata. Gateway counters provide diagnostic evidence,
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not proof of failure (Section 9).
4.5. Interaction of the Two Signals
The availability metadata and the Denied by Link Policy object answer
different questions and may both be relevant to one flow over time: a
link can be simultaneously restricted and unavailable. Admission is
evaluated first (Section 6). Traffic that would be refused
regardless of link state receives the administrative prohibition
error, optionally with the Denied by Link Policy object. ETU and ELD
are excluded as specified in Section 5.4. Generation Time without
ETU remains discouraged, not prohibited. Traffic that is admitted
but whose link is not presently usable receives the ordinary
unreachable error, optionally with availability metadata. A sender
whose denial is resolved through provisioning may then receive a
metadata-bearing unreachable error for the same flow: first become
admissible, then wait for the link.
Ordinary Destination Unreachable errors do not by themselves
establish that service is permanently absent; Section 3.2.2.1 of
[RFC1122] notes that they can result from routing transients, and
[RFC6069] has previously used them experimentally as indications of
connectivity disruption. Nor does an ordinary administrative
prohibition error identify which administrative control refused the
packet. ETU or ELD adds to an unreachable error the domain's
assertion that the failure reflects a managed transient condition of
a constrained long-haul link to which the traffic was admitted; ETU
also estimates its duration. Generation Time alone does not assert a
failure cause. The Denied by Link Policy object adds to an
administrative prohibition error the assertion that boundary-link
admission policy was the source of the refusal.
5. Message Formats and Extension Objects
This section is normative. The Link Condition Object class is shown
as TBD5 pending IANA assignment (Section 12); prior to assignment,
experiments use a locally coordinated Private Use class as described
in Section 10.1. The carrier codes of Section 5.2.1 are already
assigned, and this document requests no new ICMP type or code.
5.1. Common Message Format
The objects are carried in Destination Unreachable messages: ICMPv6
Type 1 [RFC4443] and ICMPv4 Type 3 [RFC0792]. [RFC4884] already
permits an ICMP Extension Structure on the existing Destination
Unreachable message types of both IP versions; no new type or code is
needed to carry the objects defined here. The message layout is the
extended Destination Unreachable message of [RFC4884]; this document
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adds no fields. The Length field, original-datagram truncation and
padding, extension header, and checksum rules follow Section 4 of
[RFC4884] and Section 7 of [RFC4884]. Attaching extension objects to
Destination Unreachable is an established pattern ([RFC4950],
[RFC5837], [RFC8883]).
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Unused |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ As much of the invoking packet as possible, zero-padded ~
| per Section 4 of RFC 4884 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ ICMP Extension Structure (RFC 4884) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Extended Destination Unreachable (ICMPv6 layout shown;
ICMPv4 places Length in the second octet of the second word)
The objects add to a Destination Unreachable message; they never
change what its code means. A message that carries no Link Condition
Objects, whether because the gateway attached none or because the
receiver ignores or does not process extensions, is an ordinary
Destination Unreachable message and means only what its code has
always meant. Absence of an object supplies no inference: it does
not indicate that admission succeeded or failed, that a constrained
long-haul link was or was not involved, or that any prediction
exists. A message carrying no objects defined here need not carry an
extension structure at all, and an extension structure, when present,
may also carry other independently applicable [RFC4884] objects.
Recognition of a carrier code implies nothing about extension
support; the extension structure lies beyond the portion of the
original datagram that extension-unaware receivers examine.
A receiver that processes extensions MUST ignore Link Condition
Objects with an unrecognized C-Type, and MUST process at most one
object of each C-Type per message, taking the first if several are
present. A receiver MUST ignore a Link Condition Object that is not
applicable to the received Destination Unreachable code
(Section 5.4), and MUST ignore a Link Condition Object whose Length
is not valid for its C-Type (Section 5.3). An unrecognized,
inapplicable, or invalid-length Link Condition Object does not by
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itself invalidate the underlying ICMP error; this tolerance does not
extend to malformed extension framing or an invalid extension
checksum, which are handled per [RFC4884].
5.2. Constrained Long-Haul Link Metadata on Destination Unreachable
Errors
When a gateway does not forward an otherwise admitted packet because
the constrained long-haul link required to reach its destination is
presently unusable, it generates whatever Destination Unreachable
error the ordinary rules of [RFC1812] or [RFC4443] call for,
according to its own forwarding state. This document does not change
which code is generated or when. It permits the gateway to attach
availability metadata -- the Generation Time, Expected Time Until
Link Usability, and Expected Link Delay objects -- to that error,
subject to the conditions in this section.
A gateway MAY attach availability metadata to a Destination
Unreachable message only when all of the following hold:
* the gateway holds a sufficiently current and applicable managed-
service association between the invoking traffic and a constrained
long-haul link, or next managed opportunity, within its
coordination scope;
* according to the current coordinated forwarding state, no other
policy-permitted path within the coordination scope is presently
available to serve that traffic;
* the traffic is admitted to that service;
* the link is presently unusable, and the managed-service knowledge
represents that unusability as a transient interruption of a
service that is intended to resume;
* the invoking packet was not forwarded; and
* the message's code is an eligible availability carrier code
(Section 5.2.1).
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The second condition is an assertion about the current managed
forwarding state for the affected traffic within the coordination
scope (Section 3). The transient interruption may coincide with
absence of an installed route: a domain may withdraw the route to a
destination between contacts while retaining the managed-service
knowledge that explains the failure, and the resulting no-route error
is an eligible carrier. A gateway that meets these conditions but
has no estimate to supply, or withholds estimates by policy, sends
the ordinary error without the objects; the gateway need not know
when the condition will clear.
These assertions are carried by the Expected Time Until Link
Usability and Expected Link Delay objects and attach to nothing else
(Section 5.1). A Generation Time object supplies a timestamp and is
not by itself evidence of any particular cause of failure.
5.2.1. Eligible Carrier Codes
Link Condition Objects are applicable only to the Destination
Unreachable codes listed in this section, and each object is
applicable only to the carrier group indicated (Section 5.4). Link
Condition Objects MUST NOT be attached to other Destination
Unreachable codes or to other ICMP error types. In every case the
code is selected by existing ICMP rules according to the gateway's
forwarding state and response policy; this document neither alters
that selection nor redefines any code.
5.2.1.1. Availability Carriers
The availability metadata objects (Generation Time, Expected Time
Until Link Usability, Expected Link Delay) may be carried on the
following codes.
For ICMPv6, per Section 3.1 of [RFC4443]:
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+======+=============+==========================================+
| Type | Name | Eligibility |
| 1 | | |
| Code | | |
+======+=============+==========================================+
| 0 | No route to | Eligible when the forwarding table lacks |
| | destination | a matching entry for the destination and |
| | | the gateway holds the managed-service |
| | | knowledge required by Section 5.2. |
+------+-------------+------------------------------------------+
| 3 | Address | Eligible when the gateway retains a |
| | unreachable | route whose required link is unusable |
| | | and no more specific code applies. |
| | | [RFC4443] names a link-specific problem |
| | | as an example of this code. |
+------+-------------+------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Eligible ICMPv6 Availability Carrier Codes
For ICMPv4, per Section 4.3.3.1 of [RFC1812] and Section 5.2.7.1 of
[RFC1812]:
+======+=============+=====================================+
| Type | Name | Eligibility |
| 3 | | |
| Code | | |
+======+=============+=====================================+
| 0 | Network | Eligible when ordinary forwarding |
| | unreachable | failure warrants Network |
| | | Unreachable, such as absence of any |
| | | route to the destination network. |
+------+-------------+-------------------------------------+
| 1 | Host | Eligible when ordinary forwarding |
| | unreachable | failure warrants Host Unreachable; |
| | | see the note below. |
+------+-------------+-------------------------------------+
Table 2: Eligible ICMPv4 Availability Carrier Codes
The existence of a managed service and the presence of a currently
usable forwarding-table entry are distinct. A domain may withdraw
the route to a destination between contacts while retaining knowledge
of the future service, yielding No Route or Network Unreachable; or
it may retain a route toward a presently unusable link, yielding
Address Unreachable. Both are legitimate carriers. This document
does not require a particular routing implementation, and a gateway
that would have sent a given code before implementing this
specification does not change that code because of it.
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Editor's note (IPv4 applicability, to be resolved before RFC
publication): [RFC1812]'s code-specific text ties Host Unreachable to
a destination on a directly connected network, while its general
Destination Unreachable text covers an unreachable next hop.
Implementations are known to send Host Unreachable on transit-link
failure, but that is precedent rather than mandate, and ICMPv4 has no
residual code equivalent to ICMPv6 Address Unreachable. The
retained-route, unusable-transit-link case therefore requires an
explicit IPv4 applicability clarification that this document does not
yet supply. The worked examples in Appendix A use ICMPv6 so that
their interpretation does not depend on resolving this point.
5.2.1.2. Policy Carriers
The Denied by Link Policy object may be carried on the following
codes, whose existing definitions already cover administrative
refusal of a packet:
+=========+======+======+===========================================+
| IP | Type | Code | Existing meaning |
| version | | | |
+=========+======+======+===========================================+
| IPv4 | 3 | 13 | Communication Administratively |
| | | | Prohibited (Section 5.2.7.1 of |
| | | | [RFC1812]) |
+---------+------+------+-------------------------------------------+
| IPv6 | 1 | 1 | Communication with destination |
| | | | administratively prohibited |
| | | | (Section 3.1 of [RFC4443]) |
+---------+------+------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 3: Eligible Policy Carrier Codes
[RFC4443]'s reference to a firewall filter is an example of
administrative prohibition, not an exclusive definition. The object
identifies boundary-link admission policy as the particular
administrative control that refused the packet; it does not introduce
a different meaning for the base code.
5.3. Extension Objects
The objects below share a single ICMP Extension Object class, the
Link Condition Object class (Class-Num TBD5), distinguished by
C-Type. The object header is as defined in Section 8 of [RFC4884].
No object is mandatory. Which objects a message may carry depends on
the Destination Unreachable code it reports (Section 5.4); within
that set, each object is optional and absence means only that the
gateway did not supply that information (Section 5.1). No sentinel
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values are defined for absent data. Because the class includes both
availability metadata and a policy indication, each assertion in this
document is attributed to the specific object that carries it.
Each object has exactly one valid Length: 12 octets for Generation
Time, 8 for Expected Time Until Link Usability and Expected Link
Delay, and 4 for Denied by Link Policy. A receiver MUST ignore a
Link Condition Object whose Length does not match the value for its
C-Type (Section 5.1).
The two duration objects, Expected Time Until Link Usability and
Expected Link Delay, are defined and encoded independently of the
Generation Time object. Their interpretation does not depend on the
absolute timestamp representation, so that representation could later
be revised or superseded without changing them.
5.3.1. Duration Format
Both duration objects carry an unsigned 32-bit integer count of
milliseconds. Millisecond precision is not intrinsically necessary
for every value of Expected Time Until Link Usability, but a single
representation for both duration-valued objects reduces
implementation complexity and the risk of unit-conversion errors.
[RFC4884] defines the extension object framework but no duration
datatype; the representation is defined here.
The maximum representable duration, 0xFFFFFFFF milliseconds, is
4,294,967.295 seconds, approximately 49.7 days. It is a valid finite
value, not a sentinel. If an otherwise available estimate exceeds
the maximum representable duration, the corresponding object MUST NOT
be included. No value is reserved to mean infinite, unknown, or
greater than the maximum, and no saturation is defined; absence of an
object means only that no representable estimate was supplied, and
the protocol does not distinguish an unknown estimate from one that
is known but not representable.
5.3.2. Generation Time
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length = 12 | Class-Num = | C-Type = 1 |
| | TBD5 | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Generation Time +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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Figure 2: Generation Time Object
Generation Time is the gateway's reading of the applicable enclave
time reference at the moment it generated the ICMP message. It is
the time of the notification, not the time at which any underlying
plan was created or distributed, and not an arbitrary device-local
clock.
Following the timestamp specification template of Section 3 of
[RFC8877], this document fixes the timestamp syntax and units and
leaves the remaining semantics to the deployment:
Size: 64 bits in network byte order: a 32-bit unsigned count of
whole seconds followed by a 32-bit unsigned binary fraction of a
second.
Units and resolution: seconds and 2^-32 seconds respectively; 1,000
milliseconds per second, consistent with the duration objects. No
planetary or calendar units are used on the wire.
Wraparound: the seconds field wraps every 2^32 seconds. No era
number is carried; era resolution is performed against the
applicable enclave time reference, not against an implicit wall
clock.
Epoch, time scale, and leap seconds: supplied by the enclave time
reference. The specification or provisioning of the managed
deployment MUST establish the time scale, epoch, treatment of
discontinuities such as leap seconds or clock resets, and era or
wraparound interpretation, and MUST define the relationship needed
to interpret elapsed seconds so that Generation Time can be
combined with ETU. Choosing an epoch alone does not settle time-
scale or discontinuity behavior. UTC with a conventional epoch is
one permitted choice; it is not a protocol prerequisite, and this
document does not presuppose the time scale a future deployment
will adopt.
Synchronization aspects: a receiver MAY use Generation Time for a
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calculation only when it knows the applicable enclave time
reference and can relate it to its own clock with confidence
sufficient for that calculation. A shared time-scale name alone
does not establish clock synchronization, and a common
orchestration function is not by itself evidence of a shared
reference or a known conversion; cooperating administrative
domains need one or the other before their receivers compare
timestamps. Where the reference, the conversion, the era, or the
effect of a clock discontinuity is unknown or ambiguous, the
receiver ignores Generation Time for that calculation. No
synchronization accuracy is required by this document and no
synchronization protocol is specified.
The seconds/fraction layout is the same as the 64-bit timestamp
format of Section 6 of [RFC5905], and implementations may reuse code
that handles it. Reusing the layout is separate from adopting NTP's
timestamp semantics: the NTP epoch, the UTC time scale, and NTP's era
conventions are not imported by this document, and apply only where a
deployment selects them as its enclave time reference. No time-scale
identifier or negotiation is carried in this version; the applicable
reference is established through the managed deployment context.
Reference changes and clock resets require operational handling so
that receivers do not unknowingly interpret timestamps generated
under one reference using another (Section 9).
Generation Time identifies when the notification and any estimates in
it were generated. It is principally intended to allow a receiver
that can interpret it to account for the time elapsed since an
accompanying ETU estimate was generated (Section 5.3.3). A receiver
that cannot interpret it ignores it; nothing else in the message
depends on it, it remains independently parseable, and ignoring it
does not invalidate ETU, any other applicable object, or the ordinary
ICMP error. In the absence of ETU this document defines no use for
Generation Time, so a message SHOULD NOT include Generation Time
unless it also includes ETU (Section 5.4).
5.3.3. Expected Time Until Link Usability
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length = 8 | Class-Num = | C-Type = 2 |
| | TBD5 | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Expected Time Until Link Usability |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Expected Time Until Link Usability Object
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Expected Time Until Link Usability (ETU) is the gateway's estimate,
at the moment it generated the notification, of the interval from
generation until the constrained long-haul link selected for the
invoking traffic is expected to become usable for forwarding it. It
is an unsigned 32-bit integer count of milliseconds, in the format of
Section 5.3.1. ETU refers to expected data-plane usability, not to
the start of a scheduled contact or of preparation for one.
Preparatory operations necessary to make the link usable, such as
antenna pointing, modem configuration, acquisition, synchronization,
or analogous link-establishment operations, are expected to have
completed by the end of the reported interval and are not represented
separately.
ETU is measured from notification generation, not from receipt. It
is an estimate, not a guarantee. It is not a retry interval and not
an instruction to transmit at any particular time. It does not
include Expected Link Delay, which describes traversal of the link
once usable. When ETU and Expected Link Delay appear in the same
message they MUST describe the same link or managed opportunity; a
gateway MUST NOT combine the earliest usability of one exit with the
delay of another.
ETU is meaningful on its own. A receiver that can interpret a
supplied Generation Time against the enclave time reference
(Section 5.3.2) may compute the expected usability time in that
reference as Generation Time + ETU, and may thereby account for the
time the notification spent in delivery; any era or wraparound
considerations apply only to that interpretation and are resolved
against the enclave reference. A receiver without Generation Time,
or unable to interpret it, may apply ETU from the moment of receipt.
Doing so is a conservative interpretation of the same forecast: it
expires no earlier than the forecast itself, and later by however
long the notification spent in delivery. It is not a guarantee about
the link; actual recovery may occur later than either interpretation,
or earlier. This document does not assume that ICMP delivery is
prompt.
The finite range of Section 5.3.1 provides a practical horizon for
this experimental network-layer signal. Unavailability on longer
timescales is not represented by ETU; such timescales may instead
bear on broader application, storage, provisioning, or communication-
mechanism decisions, which this document does not address.
5.3.4. Expected Link Delay
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length = 8 | Class-Num = | C-Type = 3 |
| | TBD5 | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Expected Link Delay |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Expected Link Delay Object
Expected Link Delay is the approximate one-way delay associated with
traversal of the constrained long-haul link selected for the invoking
traffic -- the link whose unavailability prevented forwarding or,
where routing has migrated the traffic, the next managed opportunity
that ETU describes -- as an unsigned 32-bit integer count of
milliseconds in the format of Section 5.3.1. It is an estimate, not
a bound; a quantity of the link, not an end-to-end path delay; and
independent of ETU and of Generation Time. This document does not
require receivers to combine it with other metadata or otherwise
compute an end-to-end delivery time; how the estimate is used is a
matter of endpoint and application policy.
For perspective only, the maximum representable duration, if it were
pure propagation delay at the speed of light in vacuum, would
correspond to a distance of approximately 1.29 x 10^12 km, roughly
1.29 trillion km. The range is therefore very large even for the
long-delay environments that motivate this document. This
observation is explanatory; Expected Link Delay remains an estimated
one-way link delay comprising whatever components contribute to it.
5.3.5. Denied by Link Policy
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length = 4 | Class-Num = | C-Type = 4 |
| | TBD5 | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Denied by Link Policy Object
The Denied by Link Policy object consists of the object header alone;
it has no payload, and its Length is exactly 4. It is carried only
on the policy carrier codes of Section 5.2.1.2.
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Its presence asserts that the invoking packet was not forwarded
because the applicable admission policy for the managed long-haul
service refused it, independently of the current usability of any
link. Presence alone supplies this classification; there is no
Boolean, denial-reason field, allocation identifier, alternate
gateway address, or retry time, and this document defines no way to
convey why the traffic was refused or what would be admitted
(Section 4.4.3). An error conveys this classification only when it
contains a valid, applicable Denied by Link Policy object; an object
of any other length does not establish it (Section 5.1), and absence
of the object does not establish that the refusal came from some
other control, that no boundary-link policy exists, or that the
application has no alternatives.
Generating the object is optional and subject to disclosure policy
(Section 6). Its presence does not promise permanent denial, prove
that waiting could never help, require the receiver to change
mechanisms, or authorize evading policy.
5.4. Object Applicability by Code
Each Link Condition Object is applicable to one group of carrier
codes, as summarized in Table 4. Availability carriers are ICMPv4
Type 3 codes 0 and 1 and ICMPv6 Type 1 codes 0 and 3
(Section 5.2.1.1); policy carriers are ICMPv4 Type 3 code 13 and
ICMPv6 Type 1 code 1 (Section 5.2.1.2).
+=====================+=================+==========================+
| Object | Availability | Policy carriers |
| | carriers | |
+=====================+=================+==========================+
| Generation Time | MAY; SHOULD NOT | SHOULD NOT; no use |
| (C-Type 1) | without ETU | defined here without ETU |
+---------------------+-----------------+--------------------------+
| Expected Time Until | MAY, subject to | MUST NOT |
| Link Usability | Section 5.2 | |
| (C-Type 2) | | |
+---------------------+-----------------+--------------------------+
| Expected Link Delay | MAY, subject to | MUST NOT |
| (C-Type 3) | Section 5.2 | |
+---------------------+-----------------+--------------------------+
| Denied by Link | MUST NOT | MAY, subject to |
| Policy (C-Type 4) | | Section 6 |
+---------------------+-----------------+--------------------------+
Table 4: Link Condition Object Applicability by Carrier Group
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A policy carrier MUST NOT carry Expected Time Until Link Usability or
Expected Link Delay: they reveal characteristics of a link to which
the invoking traffic was not admitted, and admission is evaluated
before any link state is disclosed (Section 6). An availability
carrier MUST NOT carry Denied by Link Policy. Under these rules
Denied by Link Policy is never emitted with ETU or ELD. Generation
Time may accompany it, subject to the guidance below.
Generation Time SHOULD NOT be sent without Expected Time Until Link
Usability on either carrier group, since this document defines no
other use for it and unnecessary absolute-time information should not
normally be disclosed. This is discouraged rather than inapplicable
or prohibited: a receiver that finds Generation Time without ETU
simply has no defined use for it, and experimentation or later
experience may identify one.
These are sender restrictions; receiver tolerance for inapplicable
objects is specified in Section 5.1 and does not relax them.
6. Generation Rules
The rules in this section govern gateways. General ICMP generation
rules apply in addition: Section 2.4 of [RFC4443] for ICMPv6,
including its rate-limiting requirements, and [RFC1812] for ICMPv4.
Nothing in this document permits generating an error in response to
an ICMP error, to a packet addressed to a multicast destination, or
in the other cases those documents prohibit. Nothing in this
document suppresses a Destination Unreachable error that those
documents otherwise require, and uncertainty about whether an
optional object can be supported never suppresses the underlying
error.
On receiving trans-boundary traffic, a gateway proceeds as follows:
1. Assess the current coordinated forwarding and service state for
the traffic, including whether a policy-permitted path within the
coordination scope is presently available to serve it. If so,
use that path and attach nothing.
2. Apply the long-haul service's admission policy before disclosing
any link state or prediction.
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3. If the traffic is not admitted, drop it. Where ordinary rules
and local response policy call for one, generate the appropriate
administrative prohibition error (Section 5.2.1.2); where
disclosure policy permits, attach the Denied by Link Policy
object (Section 5.4). Denial of admission to one long-haul
service does not by itself mean no policy-permitted managed
alternative exists; step 1 addresses that.
4. If the traffic is admitted but cannot be forwarded because the
selected link is presently unusable, drop it and generate the
Destination Unreachable error that ordinary ICMP rules call for.
If the conditions of Section 5.2 are satisfied and the code is an
eligible availability carrier (Section 5.2.1.1), the gateway MAY
attach Expected Time Until Link Usability, Generation Time, and
Expected Link Delay objects.
5. If the traffic is admitted and the link is usable, forward it
normally. A forwarded packet MUST NOT elicit a Destination
Unreachable error.
The restrictions in this section govern attaching Link Condition
Objects; they do not alter when ordinary Destination Unreachable
errors are generated. A gateway MUST NOT attach any Link Condition
Object whose assertion it cannot establish from a sufficiently
current and applicable association between the traffic, the managed
service, the forwarding state, the admission policy, and any
advertised prediction (Section 4.3). In particular, a gateway MUST
NOT attach availability metadata when another policy-permitted path
within the coordination scope is presently available for the traffic,
and MUST NOT attach it on the basis of observed local interface or
carrier state alone (Section 3). Whenever an object's basis is
missing, the object is withheld by policy, or an estimate is out of
range (Section 5.3.1), the gateway omits that object and sends the
ordinary error.
A gateway MUST NOT send an ETU value not derived from its current
managed-service knowledge, and MUST NOT report an expired estimate
clamped to zero. A gateway MAY send ETU without Generation Time; it
SHOULD NOT send Generation Time without ETU (Section 5.4).
Attachment of every Link Condition Object MUST be configurable per
policy. An operator MUST be able to configure, per source, prefix,
or policy class, whether an administrative prohibition error is
generated at all for refused traffic, the alternative being silent
discard, and independently whether the Denied by Link Policy object
is attached to it. An operator SHOULD be able to configure omission
of the availability metadata objects (Section 11).
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A gateway MUST NOT attach Link Condition Objects to messages sent
toward the constrained long-haul link, and MUST NOT attach them in
response to traffic arriving from it (Section 3).
ICMP delivery is unreliable and rate limited. A gateway MUST NOT
assume that a sender received any particular notification; it
generates a fresh notification, subject to rate limiting, for each
invoking packet that meets the conditions above, using its current
applicable knowledge.
7. Receiver Processing
7.1. Validation
Ordinary validation and handling of a Destination Unreachable error
are governed by the receiver's existing ICMP and transport rules;
this document does not change them, and the checks below apply only
to the objects. Disregarding an object never requires rejecting, or
changing the ordinary handling of, the base error.
Before acting on Link Condition Objects, a receiver MUST validate the
message as an ICMP error per [RFC4443] and the mitigations of
[RFC5927]: the invoking packet excerpt is matched against existing
connection or flow state, and objects on a message matching nothing
the receiver sent are disregarded. A receiver SHOULD disregard Link
Condition Objects on a message that arrives on an interface facing
outside its disclosure scope.
The carrier code does not prove that a message originated inside the
domain, and a filter that acts on Type and Code alone cannot
selectively remove Link Condition Objects without also affecting
ordinary errors of the same code. A deployment that requires
selective containment of the objects at a boundary needs extension-
aware enforcement; this document does not specify one and does not
mandate filtering of the carrier codes.
7.2. Consumer Behavior
This section is informative. This document does not specify how a
host, transport, application, or management system reacts to the
objects, and no such reaction is required for interoperability.
Receipt of an unreachable error carrying ETU or ELD informs the
receiver that the domain models the path as transiently unavailable;
ETU also indicates roughly when usability is expected. Generation
Time alone does not indicate a failure cause. Receipt of an
administrative prohibition error carrying Denied by Link Policy
informs it that boundary-link admission policy refused the traffic.
What follows are possibilities that the objects enable and that the
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experiment of Section 10 is intended to explore.
A host might record availability metadata to avoid immediately
repeating attempts likely to elicit the same error. How such state
would be keyed, how widely it would apply, how long it would live,
how it would be invalidated when the domain's knowledge changes, and
how it would interact with routing are all open questions. Because
ETU is an estimate reflecting the domain's coordinated state at
generation time, and the gateway cannot revoke a notification, any
such state is a hint and not an assurance of service at any later
time.
A transport might use the metadata as an input to its timeout and
failure decisions, for example by comparing the expected wait against
a connection's tolerance. The remote endpoint receives no
corresponding notification and continues to run its own timers, which
bounds the usefulness of waiting. No TCP or QUIC behavior is defined
here.
An application might be given the condition and its objects so that
it can defer, fail fast, or reconsider its communication mechanism
(Section 4.4.2). On learning that its present traffic was refused by
boundary-link policy, an application with separately provisioned
knowledge of an authorized application-layer gateway or bundle
service might choose that mechanism instead; the object is the
trigger to reconsider, and provisioning supplies the alternative and
its authorization. Whether an application can receive and correlate
this context at all, and whether the extra classification improves
its decisions relative to an ordinary administrative prohibition
error, are experiment questions. Whether an application interface
should be standardized is not addressed here.
Stronger reactions to unauthenticated ICMP information carry greater
risk (Section 11); which reactions are worth their risk is itself an
experiment question.
8. Legacy Host and Middlebox Behavior
Every message defined by this document is an existing Destination
Unreachable error, optionally carrying additional information, so a
stack that does not process [RFC4884] extensions handles it exactly
as it handles the same error today (Section 5.1). This document does
not promise identical behavior across stacks or that any connection
survives.
For context, Section 3.9.2.2 of [RFC9293] classifies the availability
carriers (ICMPv4 Type 3 codes 0 and 1, ICMPv6 Type 1 codes 0 and 3)
as soft errors for TCP, while noting widespread implementation
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behavior that treats soft errors as hard errors during connection
establishment; [RFC5461] documents further divergence. This
classification describes existing TCP processing; it is not the basis
on which this document selects carriers and does not define permanent
versus temporary failure. This document neither prescribes nor
relies on a particular TCP reaction to either policy carrier.
Firewalls and stateful middleboxes inside the deploying domain may
strip or discard messages carrying unfamiliar extension structures,
or may already filter some Destination Unreachable codes. This fails
safe but silently defeats the mechanism, so deployment includes
reviewing ICMP filtering policy on the paths between gateways and the
hosts they serve; [RFC4890] provides the ICMPv6 filtering framework.
Legacy hosts generate nothing new and are unaffected as senders.
9. Operational Considerations
Gateways SHOULD count generation of object-bearing Destination
Unreachable messages, including which Link Condition Objects were
included, and expose the counters through network management; counts
of the carrier codes alone do not identify this experiment's
activity, since those codes are generated for other reasons as well.
A gateway attaching Denied by Link Policy knows which policy
dimension refused the traffic even though the object does not convey
it, and MAY log or report that detail through local operational
telemetry, which is where operators debugging a refused flow should
look. This document does not prescribe a management or telemetry
mechanism. Operators can use the counters as diagnostic evidence of
possible divergence from applicable service expectations, not as
proof of failure (Section 4.4.4).
The orchestration model of Section 4.3 yields several operational
lessons. Gateways need their managed-service records to carry
revision and validity information so that stale records are
recognized rather than acted on. When a readiness estimate passes
without the link becoming usable, gateways should have a supported
new estimate or omit ETU; a countdown clamped to zero is not an
estimate. Loss of controller connectivity is expected, and a gateway
should continue to use a still-valid record until it expires or local
evidence contradicts it, while ordinary error generation continues
regardless. During routing migrations, the record consulted for a
notification must be the one applicable to the traffic's current
selected exit; describing a different opportunity is worse than
attaching nothing. Operators should expect notifications to be less
informative during transitions and after plan revisions, and should
treat that as normal rather than as a fault.
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ICMP rate limiters deserve attention at contact boundaries. When a
link becomes unusable, every active trans-boundary flow can elicit an
unreachable error within a short interval, and a token-bucket limiter
tuned for steady-state error rates may suppress most of the burst.
Because ICMP is unreliable and a gateway cannot know which
notifications were received, operators SHOULD size gateway ICMP rate
limits for the expected flow fan-out at gap onset. Hosts that act on
the metadata to avoid repeated attempts reduce the offered load that
would otherwise sustain the burst.
ETU is only as meaningful as the gateway's knowledge of the link.
Using Generation Time additionally depends on the receiver knowing
the enclave time reference and being able to relate it to its own
clock (Section 5.3.2); receivers that cannot may apply ETU from
receipt (Section 5.3.3). The deployment is responsible for
establishing and distributing the reference. When the reference
changes or a gateway's clock is reset, operators need to ensure that
receivers do not interpret timestamps generated under the old
reference using the new one; until that is assured, receivers fall
back to ignoring Generation Time. Cooperating administrative domains
need a shared reference or a known conversion before their receivers
compare timestamps; sharing an orchestration function does not by
itself provide either.
Hosts that maintain state derived from these objects SHOULD expose it
to local diagnostics, since such state changes transmission behavior
in ways otherwise invisible to troubleshooting.
10. Experimental Status and Goals
This document is published as Experimental. The objects are
specified normatively so that independent implementations
interoperate at the ICMP layer. The value of the mechanism, however,
rests on two kinds of questions that only deployment can answer:
whether gateways can generate the objects correctly and usefully, and
whether the objects let consumers make better decisions than the
ordinary unreachable or administrative prohibition error alone would
allow. Consumer behaviors are deliberately not standardized here
(Section 7.2); the experiment is intended to produce the experience
on which later specification of such behaviors might be based. An
extension object, like a new code, requires implementation support to
expose a new meaning to applications; neither inherently solves
application delivery.
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10.1. Scope of the Experiment
The experiment runs within domains meeting the criteria of Section 3:
space networking testbeds and missions, other networks with scheduled
or intermittently available managed links between enclaves, and
laboratory emulations of the same topologies. Link Condition Objects
are not intended to be exchanged across uncontrolled networks
(Section 7.1). No behavior in this document affects hosts whose
traffic never requires a trans-boundary link.
Prior to IANA assignment of the Link Condition Object class,
experiments use a class value from the Private Use range 247-255 of
the "ICMP Extension Object Classes and Class Sub-types" registry
[RFC4884], with its interpretation and scope explicitly configured
among the participants. Such a value is not globally unique, is not
a claim on any permanent assignment, and is used only within the
experiment's coordination scope. The carrier codes are already
assigned and are used as is; no experimental ICMP type or code is
involved. Interoperability reports from this phase are in scope for
the experiment.
10.2. Network Signal Evaluation
The first layer of the experiment concerns the objects themselves:
* Generation correctness: whether gateways attach each object only
under the conditions of Section 6, whether the coordination-scope
determination can be made reliably in deployed routing
architectures and during transitions, and which carrier codes
gateways actually produce for the long-haul conditions in each IP
version (Section 5.2.1).
* Distinction: whether availability metadata usefully distinguishes
managed transient unavailability from ordinary unreachable errors
of the same code, and whether the Denied by Link Policy object
usefully distinguishes boundary-link admission refusal from other
administrative prohibition (Section 4.5).
* Prediction accuracy and usefulness: how closely ETU tracks actual
link usability, how often it is available at all, how often plan
revisions or acquisition failures invalidate it, and whether
Generation Time and Expected Link Delay are populated and used.
* Orchestration feasibility: whether the information path of
Section 4.3 can be realized with existing management channels, and
whether gateways can consult applicable records on the error-
generation path, including after route withdrawal.
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* Generation rate: gateway ICMP generation rates at gap onset under
realistic fan-out, and the effect of rate limiting on which
senders receive a notification.
* Legacy and middlebox behavior: how unmodified hosts respond to
object-bearing carrier errors across the stacks present in target
environments, including embedded and flight-heritage
implementations (Section 8); and what filtering changes
deployments required, including whether middleboxes strip or
discard extension structures.
* Security and disclosure: whether the information disclosed by the
objects is operationally acceptable, whether the disclosure
controls of Section 6 are sufficient, and whether forged or stale
objects caused harm.
* Whether a coarse boundary-policy object is useful beyond the
ordinary administrative refusal, and whether experience
establishes a need for richer policy-denial metadata. This
document does not speculate about the format of any such metadata.
10.3. Consumer Behavior Exploration
The second layer concerns what receivers do with the objects. None
of these behaviors is specified here; the experiment is intended to
discover which are worthwhile:
* Whether hosts that record availability metadata to avoid repeated
attempts reduce futile retransmission and offered load during
link-unavailable periods, relative to hosts receiving the same
ordinary errors without objects, and what keying, scope, lifetime,
and invalidation rules work.
* What transport reactions are appropriate, including whether
comparing expected wait against connection tolerance is useful and
whether connections that wait survive the peer's own timers.
* Whether applications can receive and correlate the objects with
their traffic at all, and whether the Denied by Link Policy
classification improves their decisions relative to an ordinary
administrative prohibition error, including selection among
separately provisioned mechanisms such as IP transports,
application-layer gateways, and bundle services.
* Whether provisioning and orchestration systems can use the
objects, and whether divergence telemetry (Section 4.4.4) exposed
real faults ahead of existing monitoring.
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10.4. Evidence for Advancement
Later consideration of the mechanism for the standards track could be
informed by evidence of: at least two independent interoperable
implementations of the Link Condition Objects, including extension
object processing on both carrier groups; generation accuracy in at
least one operational, non-laboratory domain; usefulness of the
objects beyond the ordinary errors they ride on, with unused objects
removed rather than carried forward; manageable legacy and middlebox
behavior; acceptable security and disclosure properties; consumer
behaviors independently demonstrated to benefit from the objects,
without presupposing any one receiver strategy; and evidence that the
semantics apply across more than one class of long-haul network
without special-case changes to the wire format. Reports of failed
or inconclusive experiments are requested to the same degree as
successful ones.
11. Security Considerations
ICMP carries no authentication, and the objects are actionable by
implementations that choose to act on them, so the principal threats
are forgery by off-path attackers and information disclosure to the
senders these messages answer. The mitigations are the scoping of
Section 3, validation against sender state (Section 7.1), rate
limiting, and agreed disclosure policy among the cooperating
authorities. None of them authenticates the carrier code or the
objects; filtering and invoking-packet validation raise the cost of
injection without confining it to trusted parties, and none is
dependable across the open internet.
Three forgery cases arise. A forged ordinary Destination Unreachable
or administrative prohibition error is an existing threat with
existing mitigations ([RFC5927]); this document does not change it.
Forged availability metadata on an otherwise plausible error could
induce an implementation that acts on it to withhold trans-boundary
traffic for the advertised interval. A forged Denied by Link Policy
object could induce an application to abandon a working IP path for
another mechanism, or to conclude that provisioning is needed; this
influence on application choices is a capability beyond what forging
the bare administrative prohibition error provides. This document
does not require receivers to act on any object, and stronger
reactions to unauthenticated ICMP information carry correspondingly
greater risk; an implementation that does act should bound the effect
of any single notification, treat ETU as an estimate that may be
stale or wrong, treat Denied by Link Policy as a classification that
may be forged, and consider that the gateway cannot revoke a
notification whose basis has changed.
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Because the objects ride on ordinary codes, containing them at a
boundary requires extension-aware enforcement (Section 7.1). The
absence of Link Condition Objects from a message is not a trustworthy
indication that no long-haul condition exists (Section 5.1), since
objects may be omitted by policy, by rate limiting, by middleboxes,
or by an attacker.
The Denied by Link Policy object, although it has no payload,
discloses that boundary-link admission policy refused particular
traffic, and a gateway that attaches it is a probing oracle: an
attacker varying markings, sources, and destinations can map which
traffic the long-haul service admits, even without being told why any
particular packet was refused. Section 6 therefore requires per-
policy control over whether the object is attached and,
independently, whether the base error is generated at all; toward any
sender the operator does not trust, silent discard is the expected
posture, consistent with existing firewall practice.
The availability metadata objects disclose link schedule information,
which in some deployments is sensitive operational information.
Section 6 permits omitting them per policy; operators of such
deployments should protect the metadata as they protect the
underlying schedule. Evaluating admission before link state
(Section 6) prevents disclosure of schedule information to traffic
that would not be admitted regardless.
Ordinary ICMP generation restrictions and rate limiting (Section 2.4
of [RFC4443], [RFC1812]) apply to all of these messages. Quoting and
padding of the invoking packet and the optional objects affect
response size; a message carrying all three availability objects is
larger than a minimal Destination Unreachable error. This document
makes no claim about the absence of amplification beyond what those
restrictions provide.
12. IANA Considerations
This document requests no new ICMP type and no new Destination
Unreachable code. It requests one assignment, shown as a TBD value
throughout; no numeric value is proposed.
From the "ICMP Extension Object Classes and Class Sub-types" registry
[RFC4884]: a new class TBD5, Link Condition Object, with C-Type 1,
Generation Time; C-Type 2, Expected Time Until Link Usability; C-Type
3, Expected Link Delay; and C-Type 4, Denied by Link Policy, assigned
by this document. Further C-Types are Specification Required. The
class registry's procedure is First Come First Served for values
0-246.
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This document requests no change to the already-assigned Destination
Unreachable codes on which Link Condition Objects may be carried:
ICMPv6 Type 1 codes 0, 1, and 3, and ICMPv4 Type 3 codes 0, 1, and 13
(Section 5.2.1). Their existing meanings are unchanged.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC792, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc792>.
[RFC1812] Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, June 1995,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1812>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4443>.
[RFC4884] Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro,
"Extended ICMP to Support Multi-Part Messages", RFC 4884,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4884, April 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4884>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8877] Mizrahi, T., Fabini, J., and A. Morton, "Guidelines for
Defining Packet Timestamps", RFC 8877,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8877, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8877>.
13.2. Informative References
[RFC1122] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1122>.
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[RFC4890] Davies, E. and J. Mohacsi, "Recommendations for Filtering
ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls", RFC 4890,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4890, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4890>.
[RFC4950] Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro, "ICMP
Extensions for Multiprotocol Label Switching", RFC 4950,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4950, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4950>.
[RFC5461] Gont, F., "TCP's Reaction to Soft Errors", RFC 5461,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5461, February 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5461>.
[RFC5837] Atlas, A., Ed., Bonica, R., Ed., Pignataro, C., Ed., Shen,
N., and JR. Rivers, "Extending ICMP for Interface and
Next-Hop Identification", RFC 5837, DOI 10.17487/RFC5837,
April 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5837>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5905>.
[RFC5927] Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5927, July 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5927>.
[RFC6069] Zimmermann, A. and A. Hannemann, "Making TCP More Robust
to Long Connectivity Disruptions (TCP-LCD)", RFC 6069,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6069, December 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6069>.
[RFC8799] Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet
Protocols", RFC 8799, DOI 10.17487/RFC8799, July 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8799>.
[RFC8883] Herbert, T., "ICMPv6 Errors for Discarding Packets Due to
Processing Limits", RFC 8883, DOI 10.17487/RFC8883,
September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8883>.
[RFC9171] Burleigh, S., Fall, K., and E. Birrane, III, "Bundle
Protocol Version 7", RFC 9171, DOI 10.17487/RFC9171,
January 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9171>.
[RFC9293] Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)",
STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293>.
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Appendix A. Worked Examples
A.1. Availability Metadata
Times in this example are expressed in the enclave time reference
(Section 5.3.2) as seconds from its epoch. A gateway whose deep-
space link is presently unusable receives an IPv6 packet for a trans-
boundary destination at reference time 10,000 s. According to its
current coordinated forwarding state, no other policy-permitted path
within the coordination scope is available for the traffic. The
packet is admitted under the service's policy. The gateway retains a
route toward the destination, but the next hop over the deep-space
link is unusable; under Section 3.1 of [RFC4443] this is a link-
specific problem not covered by another code, so the gateway
generates ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable, Code 3 (Address
unreachable). Its managed-service record (Section 4.3) shows the
link expected to be ready to forward at reference time 12,520 s, and
its one-way delay estimate for the link is 20 minutes, so it attaches
three Link Condition Objects. The Class-Num octet of each is TBD5
and is omitted from the listing.
+===============+========+========+============+===================+
| Object | C-Type | Length | Wire value | Decoded |
+===============+========+========+============+===================+
| Generation | 1 | 12 | 0x00002710 | 10,000 s in the |
| Time | | | 0x00000000 | enclave reference |
+---------------+--------+--------+------------+-------------------+
| Expected Time | 2 | 8 | 0x002673C0 | 2,520,000 ms (42 |
| Until Link | | | | min) |
| Usability | | | | |
+---------------+--------+--------+------------+-------------------+
| Expected Link | 3 | 8 | 0x00124F80 | 1,200,000 ms (20 |
| Delay | | | | min) |
+---------------+--------+--------+------------+-------------------+
Table 5: Availability Metadata Example
The Generation Time seconds word is 10,000 and the fraction word is
zero. ETU is the interval from reference time 10,000 s to 12,520 s.
If this deployment had chosen UTC as its enclave time reference, the
seconds word would instead be the corresponding count of seconds from
the epoch the deployment specified; that is the deployment's choice
and is not required by this document.
Had the gateway attached no objects, or had the receiver not
processed them, the message would be an ordinary Address Unreachable
error (Section 5.1).
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A receiver that processes the objects but does not know the enclave
time reference, cannot relate it to its own clock, or did not receive
Generation Time needs no timestamp arithmetic: it knows that, as of
generation, the link was expected to become usable in 42 minutes, and
it may apply that interval from the moment of receipt. If the
notification spent time in delivery, this interpretation expires
later than the original forecast; it remains a conservative reading
of the same forecast, not a guarantee, and the link may in fact
become usable later than either.
A receiver that knows the enclave time reference and can relate it to
its own clock may compute Generation Time + ETU = 12,520 s and, on
receiving the message at reference time 10,003 s, understand that
about 2,517 s remain, subject to its own clock uncertainty and to the
accuracy of the forecast. Had the gateway instead generated a
notification at 10,003 s against the same forecast, that notification
would carry Generation Time 10,003 s and ETU 2,517,000 ms: ETU is
recomputed for each notification from the current reference time, not
copied from the plan.
Either receiver might, as a matter of local policy, use the 20-minute
link delay estimate in deciding whether the destination suits its
traffic once the link is usable (Section 7.2).
A.2. Denied by Link Policy
The same gateway, during an active contact, receives an IPv6 packet
whose traffic class is not admitted by the service's policy. It
drops the packet. Local response policy calls for an error, so it
generates ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable, Code 1 (Communication with
destination administratively prohibited), and, disclosure policy
permitting, attaches a single Link Condition Object:
+=======================+========+========+=========+
| Object | C-Type | Length | Payload |
+=======================+========+========+=========+
| Denied by Link Policy | 4 | 4 | none |
+-----------------------+--------+--------+---------+
Table 6: Denied by Link Policy Example
The object occupies one 32-bit word: Length 0x0004, Class-Num TBD5,
C-Type 0x04. It is preceded by the [RFC4884] extension header and by
the invoking packet, padded to at least 128 octets. No Expected Time
Until Link Usability or Expected Link Delay is attached, and
Generation Time is omitted because no ETU accompanies it.
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A receiver that processes the object learns that boundary-link
admission policy refused the traffic and may, for instance,
reconsider its communication mechanism (Section 4.4.2). A receiver
that ignores extensions, or that disregards the object, has an
ordinary administrative prohibition error and nothing more
(Section 5.1).
Acknowledgments
The author used AI-assisted tooling in preparing this document,
including drafting and editing text and converting it to the
kramdown-rfc source format. All technical content, design decisions,
and the final text are the responsibility of the author.
Author's Address
Erik Kline
Aalyria Technologies, Inc.
Email: ek.ietf@gmail.com
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