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IP Enclave Boundary Signaling
draft-ek-intarea-ip-enclave-signaling-00

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Author Erik Kline
Last updated 2026-11-02
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draft-ek-intarea-ip-enclave-signaling-00
Network Working Group                                           E. Kline
Internet-Draft                                Aalyria Technologies, Inc.
Intended status: Experimental                            2 November 2026
Expires: 6 May 2027

                     IP Enclave Boundary Signaling
                draft-ek-intarea-ip-enclave-signaling-00

Abstract

   This document defines optional ICMP extension objects that a gateway
   at the boundary between an IP enclave and a managed constrained long-
   haul link, such as a scheduled deep-space link, can attach to
   existing Destination Unreachable messages.  On the unreachable errors
   generated when an admitted packet cannot be forwarded because the
   required link is presently unusable, the objects convey the expected
   time until the link becomes usable, the time the estimate was
   generated, and the expected one-way delay of the link.  On the
   administrative prohibition errors generated when the link's admission
   policy refuses a packet, a presence-only object identifies boundary-
   link admission policy as the source of the refusal.  The underlying
   codes retain their existing meanings, and this document requests no
   new ICMP type or code.  It specifies when the objects may be attached
   and what they convey, not how transports, applications, or hosts
   react to them; making the boundary's knowledge available to senders
   is intended to enable experimentation with such reactions.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at
   https://ekline.github.io/draft-icmp-boundary-signaling/draft-ek-
   intarea-ip-enclave-signaling.html.  Status information for this
   document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ek-
   intarea-ip-enclave-signaling/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the INTAREA Working Group
   mailing list (mailto:int-area@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/int-area/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/ekline/draft-icmp-boundary-signaling.

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Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Concept of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Reference Scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Orchestration Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.4.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.4.1.  Traffic Sent While the Link Is Unusable . . . . . . .  11
       4.4.2.  Reconsidering the Communication Mechanism . . . . . .  11
       4.4.3.  Traffic Denied by Link Policy . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.4.4.  Plan/Reality Divergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.5.  Interaction of the Two Signals  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Message Formats and Extension Objects . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.1.  Common Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

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     5.2.  Constrained Long-Haul Link Metadata on Destination
           Unreachable Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.2.1.  Eligible Carrier Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.3.  Extension Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       5.3.1.  Duration Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       5.3.2.  Generation Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       5.3.3.  Expected Time Until Link Usability  . . . . . . . . .  21
       5.3.4.  Expected Link Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.3.5.  Denied by Link Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     5.4.  Object Applicability by Code  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   6.  Generation Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   7.  Receiver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     7.1.  Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     7.2.  Consumer Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   8.  Legacy Host and Middlebox Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   9.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   10. Experimental Status and Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     10.1.  Scope of the Experiment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     10.2.  Network Signal Evaluation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     10.3.  Consumer Behavior Exploration  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     10.4.  Evidence for Advancement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   Appendix A.  Worked Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     A.1.  Availability Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     A.2.  Denied by Link Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39

1.  Introduction

   Some IP enclaves are connected to the rest of a network only by
   constrained long-haul links that are high-delay, periodically
   disrupted, or both: deep-space links, satellite links available only
   during scheduled passes, periodic store-and-forward contacts.  An
   administrative domain, or a set of cooperating domains, manages those
   links: it knows from a contact plan or equivalent scheduling
   knowledge when each link is expected to carry traffic, it enforces an
   admission policy describing whose traffic each link will carry, and
   it can distribute routing updates to migrate long-haul traffic onto
   the best current or next link according to its policy.  An IP sender
   inside such an enclave may lack this knowledge.  Ordinary errors do
   not communicate the managed service's recovery estimate or identify
   boundary-link admission as the source of a policy refusal.

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   Existing Destination Unreachable messages already report the
   forwarding failures that result.  This document defines optional ICMP
   extension objects [RFC4884] that let a gateway in such a domain
   supply additional information on those messages.  On the unreachable
   errors generated when an admitted packet cannot be forwarded because
   the required link is presently unusable, the gateway may attach the
   time at which it generated the message, its estimate of the time
   until the link becomes usable, and the approximate one-way delay of
   the link.  On the administrative prohibition errors generated when
   the link's admission policy refuses a packet, it may attach a
   presence-only object indicating that boundary-link admission policy,
   rather than some other administrative control, was the source of the
   refusal.  The underlying code retains its existing meaning in every
   case (Section 5.1).

   This document specifies the network-layer signals: when a gateway may
   attach each object, what each asserts, and its encoding.  It does not
   specify how a transport, application, host cache, provisioning
   system, or orchestrator reacts to them.  Such reactions are not
   required for interoperability, and they are not merely out of scope:
   a purpose of publishing the objects is to enable experimentation with
   them (Section 7.2, Section 10).  The availability metadata is useful
   because the boundary is close and the condition is long-lived:
   gateway feedback reaches senders in local round-trip times, while the
   unavailability it reports lasts minutes to hours (Section 3).  The
   policy indication is useful for a different reason: it identifies the
   source of the refusal and may prompt an application to reconsider its
   configured communication options.  It does not establish that a
   change will succeed or that policy cannot change over time.

   Where an application can learn in advance which communication
   mechanisms suit a destination -- through configuration, provisioning,
   DNS, or orchestration -- selecting an appropriate mechanism before
   initiating unsuitable IP communication is preferable to discovering
   the condition reactively.  Such discovery and selection mechanisms
   are out of scope for this document, which addresses only what a
   gateway reports once a packet has been sent.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Enclave:  an IP network whose connectivity to other networks passes
      over one or more managed constrained long-haul links.

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   Constrained long-haul link:  a link connecting enclaves whose
      usability is high-delay, scheduled, intermittent, or otherwise
      restricted according to knowledge held by the managing domain, and
      whose use is governed by admission policy.  Ordinary transient
      interface or carrier failure does not by itself make a link a
      managed constrained long-haul link (Section 3).

   Managed service:  the domain's knowledge that a particular
      constrained long-haul link, or a sequence of link opportunities,
      is intended to carry particular traffic, together with the
      associated schedule, admission policy, and forwarding state.  A
      managed service may exist while no route to its destination is
      currently installed.

   Orchestration function:  the logical function, possibly distributed
      across cooperating administrative domains and not necessarily
      continuously reachable, that manages the constrained long-haul
      links, distributes routing and policy updates for them, and
      supplies gateways with the knowledge on which the objects in this
      document are based.

   Contact:  an interval during which a constrained long-haul link is
      planned to carry traffic between a gateway and its remote
      counterpart.

   Contact plan:  the schedule of contacts for a link or set of links,
      distributed to gateways in advance of execution.  A contact plan
      is one form of managed-service knowledge, not the only one.

   Gateway:  the router at the boundary between an enclave and a
      constrained long-haul link, holding the managed-service knowledge
      for that link and attaching the objects defined in this document.

   Coordination scope:  the set of links, routes, and admission policies
      under the same orchestration function, whose current state a
      gateway's assertions describe.

   Disclosure scope:  the administrative boundary within which the
      objects are generated and within which their contents are
      considered appropriate to reveal.  It is at most the coordination
      scope and may be narrower.

   Trans-boundary traffic:  traffic whose path crosses a gateway onto a
      constrained long-haul link.

   Admission:  a gateway's determination, against local policy, that
      particular traffic may use a constrained long-haul link.

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   Link Condition Object:  an ICMP extension object of the class defined
      in Section 5.3, carrying constrained long-haul link metadata on a
      Destination Unreachable message.

   Carrier code:  an existing Destination Unreachable code on which one
      or more Link Condition Objects may be carried (Section 5.2.1).

   Expected Time Until Link Usability (ETU):  the gateway's estimate, at
      generation of a notification, of the interval from generation
      until the relevant constrained long-haul link is expected to
      become usable for forwarding (Section 5.3.3).

   Enclave time reference:  the shared time reference, established by
      the specification or provisioning of the managed deployment,
      against which Generation Time is expressed (Section 5.3.2).  Its
      time scale, epoch, and discontinuity treatment are deployment
      choices, not protocol prerequisites; UTC is one permitted choice.

3.  Applicability

   The mechanisms in this document apply to deployments in which one or
   more constrained long-haul links connect IP enclaves, and in which
   the links, the routes over them, and the admission policies governing
   them are managed by a common orchestration function.  When several
   long-haul options exist for the same traffic, this document assumes
   they participate in the same logical orchestration.  This does not
   require a single physical controller, a particular routing protocol,
   or continuous connectivity between gateways and the controller
   (Section 4.3).  The objects are specified for use under a single
   administrative authority or cooperating authorities sharing the
   coordination and disclosure scopes defined below.  [RFC8799] provides
   broader context on limited-domain deployments.

   Three relationships need to be kept distinct.

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   The first is the timing relationship between a notifying gateway and
   the senders it notifies.  Let R be the round-trip time between a
   sender and the gateway, D the duration of a link unavailability being
   reported, and T the timescale on which the sender's transport would
   otherwise detect failure.  Availability metadata is useful when R is
   small relative to T, so the notification arrives while the sender
   still has options, and small relative to D, so the reported condition
   is still in effect on arrival.  In the Mars enclave of Section 4, R
   is milliseconds to seconds, T is seconds to minutes, and D is minutes
   to hours.  When R approaches D, a notification describes a link state
   that may no longer exist on arrival; gateways therefore attach
   objects only into their local enclave and never across the
   constrained long-haul link.  This timing argument is specific to
   availability metadata; a policy refusal applies regardless of current
   link usability and needs no predicted outage to be worth reporting.

   The second is the coordination scope: the set of links, routes, and
   policies whose current state the gateway's assertions describe.  A
   gateway's assertions are about the applicable, current managed
   service and forwarding state for the affected traffic within this
   scope, not about every path that could ever exist, unprovisioned
   routes, unrelated domains, or application-layer alternatives.
   Equally, the failure of one local link is not a basis for an
   assertion when the current managed forwarding state provides a
   usable, policy-permitted alternative for that traffic.

   The third is the disclosure scope: the administrative boundary within
   which the objects are generated and considered appropriate to reveal.
   Cooperating domains must agree on both scopes; their agreement does
   not authenticate ICMP (Section 11), and a short local round-trip time
   does not by itself make a network part of either scope.  For
   comparison of timescales only, the public Internet has sub-second
   internal round-trip times relative to a link whose unavailability is
   measured in minutes, but it is not thereby a cooperating or trusted
   signaling domain.

   The objects apply only to links whose availability and admission the
   domain deliberately manages as a long-haul service.  A gateway
   attaches availability metadata on the basis of managed-service
   knowledge about the link, never on the basis of observed local
   carrier or interface state alone; a router that merely notices its
   outgoing interface is down generates whatever error ordinary ICMP
   rules call for and has no basis to attach Link Condition Objects to
   it.  How the domain acquires and distributes its knowledge is not
   specified; the objects encode what the gateway is entitled to assert,
   not how it learned it.  The same criteria identify deployments beyond
   the interplanetary case, wherever a domain manages scheduled or
   intermittently available links between enclaves on the basis of

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   advance knowledge.  Conversely, the mechanism offers nothing on paths
   that are merely lossy or congested, and high delay alone is not a
   reason to generate a Destination Unreachable error when forwarding is
   possible.

4.  Concept of Operations

   This section is informative.  It describes a representative
   deployment: an IP-based enclave in Mars orbit and on the Martian
   surface, connected to terrestrial networks through scheduled deep-
   space contacts.  Host and application behaviors described here are
   illustrations of what the signals make possible, not requirements
   (Section 7.2).

4.1.  Reference Scenario

   The enclave consists of surface assets and orbiters interconnected by
   conventional IP links, with propagation delays of milliseconds to low
   seconds and continuous or near-continuous connectivity.  Standard IP
   routing and transports operate normally within it.

   The enclave connects to Earth through gateway nodes on relay orbiters
   equipped with deep-space links.  These links are scheduled: contacts
   with ground stations occur in windows determined by orbital geometry
   and antenna allocation, known in advance through a contact plan.
   They are high-delay: one-way light time to Earth is roughly 3 to 22
   minutes.  And they are policy-managed: contact capacity is allocated
   to specific senders or traffic classes, and traffic outside those
   allocations is not authorized to use the link.

   A gateway may also offer a Bundle Protocol version 7 [RFC9171] or
   application-layer gateway service that accepts traffic under its own
   policy.  The ICMP cases here concern packets refused or not forwarded
   by the IP forwarding service; they do not describe traffic accepted
   for delivery by a separate service.  BP is not required for this ICMP
   mechanism.

   The same structure exists on the Earth side.  A terrestrial sender's
   traffic crosses an Earth-side gateway that holds the same contact
   plan and enforces its own admission policy, and that gateway
   generates the same signals toward terrestrial senders.  This section
   describes the Mars side for concreteness.

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4.2.  Roles

   Enclave hosts originate and receive application traffic.  Some are
   DTN-aware, running a BP agent or a stack extension that can hand
   traffic to one; others are unmodified IP hosts, including legacy
   instruments and commercial payloads whose stacks predate this
   specification.  Where a performance-enhancing proxy (PEP) terminates
   transport sessions on behalf of such hosts, the PEP can consume these
   signals for them, so that the mechanism's benefit need not depend on
   universal host adoption.

   Gateways hold the managed-service knowledge for their deep-space
   links, enforce admission and precedence policy on contact capacity,
   and attach the objects defined in this document: availability
   metadata on the unreachable error generated when admitted trans-
   boundary traffic arrives while the link is not usable, and the Denied
   by Link Policy object on the administrative prohibition error
   generated when traffic arrives that policy does not admit.

   An orchestration function, which may be Earth-based, distributes
   contact plans, routing updates, and admission policy to gateways in
   advance (Section 4.3).  It is intended to steer trans-boundary
   traffic toward whichever gateway and link can serve it.  Routing,
   link, and policy updates are not installed atomically, however, and
   distribution itself crosses the deep-space link; during transitions,
   or when plan and reality diverge, a gateway may receive traffic that
   another gateway could have served.  Gateways operate autonomously
   between management contacts on their most recent applicable knowledge
   and omit assertions they cannot currently support (Section 6).

   Intra-enclave traffic is unaffected; hosts that never originate
   trans-boundary traffic need not implement the objects.

4.3.  Orchestration Example

   This subsection illustrates one feasible path by which a gateway
   obtains the knowledge on which it bases the objects.  It describes
   conceptual information, not a management protocol, data model, or
   scheduling algorithm; any existing management channel, controller
   interface, or local provisioning may carry it.

   Times in this example are expressed in the enclave time reference
   (Section 5.3.2) as seconds from its epoch; the deployment has chosen
   the reference, and nothing here depends on which one.  The
   orchestration function determines that traffic for a terrestrial
   destination prefix should, for an upcoming period, leave the enclave
   via a particular relay orbiter's deep-space link, whose next contact
   begins at reference time 12,400 s.  Allowing for antenna pointing,

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   acquisition, and modem configuration, it expects the link to be ready
   to forward traffic at reference time 12,520 s, and it estimates the
   one-way delay over the link at that time as 20 minutes.  It installs
   or schedules the routing and admission policy needed for that link,
   and it supplies the gateway with an associated record containing at
   least:

   *  the traffic-to-service binding: the destination prefix and the
      routing or policy context to which the record applies, associated
      with the relevant link or next managed opportunity;

   *  a revision identifier or equivalent coherence mechanism, an
      applicability period, and validity or expiry information;

   *  optionally, the expected data-plane-ready time, or a duration with
      an explicit reference time;

   *  optionally, a directional one-way link-delay estimate applicable
      to that opportunity; and

   *  the admission and disclosure policy that applies, together with
      whatever local evidence the gateway has about the link's actual
      usability.

   Delivering this record is only part of the implementation.  The
   gateway's error-generation path must be able to consult it when
   forwarding fails, including when the route to the destination has
   been withdrawn between contacts and the failure is reported as a no-
   route error.  Any absolute time the controller supplies must either
   be expressed in, or come with a known conversion into, the gateway's
   enclave time reference (Section 5.3.2); alternatively the controller
   may supply a duration anchored to a reference time the gateway can
   interpret.  A readiness time the gateway cannot relate to its own
   reference is not a basis for ETU.

   At reference time 10,000 s, a packet for the prefix arrives at the
   gateway.  No usable route exists, so ordinary rules produce a
   Destination Unreachable error.  The gateway consults its record,
   finds it current and applicable, confirms the traffic is admitted,
   and attaches Generation Time (10,000 s), ETU (the interval from
   10,000 s to 12,520 s, 2,520,000 ms), and Expected Link Delay
   (1,200,000 ms).  Generation Time is the time the ICMP message was
   generated, not the time the orchestrator created or distributed the
   plan.

   Several operational cases follow from this model, and Section 9 draws
   the corresponding lessons:

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   *  A later plan revision selects a different link or changes the
      readiness estimate.  Subsequent notifications use the current
      applicable information; earlier notifications cannot be recalled.

   *  The planned readiness time passes but acquisition fails.  The
      gateway does not continue reporting a countdown clamped to zero;
      it either has a newly supported estimate, or it omits ETU.  An
      Expected Link Delay that remains valid for the selected link need
      not be omitted.

   *  Controller connectivity is lost.  A still-valid local record
      remains usable unless contradicted by local evidence; when it
      expires or becomes incoherent, the basis for the affected objects
      is gone and they are omitted.  Ordinary errors continue to be
      generated.

   *  Routing state and metadata revisions temporarily disagree, for
      instance when a route has migrated to a second gateway but the
      first gateway's record has not yet been updated.  The gateway
      omits assertions it cannot support rather than describing a
      service opportunity other than the one applicable to the traffic.

4.4.  Use Cases

4.4.1.  Traffic Sent While the Link Is Unusable

   A surface host begins a bulk transfer toward Earth between contacts.
   The first packet reaches the gateway, which drops it and returns a
   Destination Unreachable error carrying an Expected Time Until Link
   Usability object.  From the object, the host knows that the domain
   regards the path as transiently unavailable and roughly how long that
   is expected to last; from the bare error alone it would know only
   that the packet was not delivered.  It might use the metadata to
   avoid repeated attempts that would elicit the same error, and to tell
   the application that the path is deferred rather than failed
   (Section 7.2).

4.4.2.  Reconsidering the Communication Mechanism

   An application that learns, from a Link Condition Object, that its
   present IP traffic will be deferred for a long interval or was
   refused by boundary-link admission policy may reconsider its end-to-
   end communication options.  A DTN-aware host might hand the affected
   traffic to its local BP agent, which originates bundles toward the
   destination for forwarding during the next contact.  An application
   with separately provisioned knowledge of an authorized application-
   layer gateway might direct its traffic there.  An application with
   its own delay tolerance might instead compare the expected wait

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   against that tolerance and fail fast.

   The object is a trigger to reconsider, not a description of the
   alternatives.  Configuration, discovery, or provisioning supplies the
   alternative mechanism and its authorization; the object does not
   prove that another mechanism exists, is admitted, or will succeed,
   and it does not require the application to change anything.

4.4.3.  Traffic Denied by Link Policy

   A misconfigured or newly integrated payload host sends best-effort
   traffic toward Earth during a contact whose capacity is allocated to
   command and telemetry classes.  The gateway classifies the traffic
   against its local policy, which may consider DSCP, addresses,
   protocol and port, or any other criteria, and drops it.  Ordinary
   rules and local response policy call for a Destination Unreachable,
   Communication Administratively Prohibited error; the gateway attaches
   the Denied by Link Policy object to it.  From the object, the host
   learns that the refusal came from the admission policy of the long-
   haul service rather than from some other administrative control such
   as a firewall; from the bare error it would know only that
   communication was administratively prohibited.  The object does not
   say why the traffic was refused or what traffic would be admitted:
   admission policy is multidimensional and local, and coaching senders
   on acceptable markings would invert an admission model in which
   access is granted through the control plane.  The operator debugging
   the flow consults the gateway's own logs and counters (Section 9);
   obtaining admission is a provisioning action.  The application may
   reconsider its communication mechanism (Section 4.4.2).

   A flow that policy admitted at contact start and later displaces in
   favor of higher-precedence traffic falls under the same object.
   Whether an implementation regards this internally as preemption,
   resource allocation, or precedence enforcement is a matter of local
   policy; the sender learns only that the traffic is not presently
   admitted.

4.4.4.  Plan/Reality Divergence

   Notifications that conflict with the currently applicable service
   expectation can be evidence of divergence between the control plane's
   model and the data plane's state.  Examples include ETU or ELD
   reporting unavailability after expected data-plane readiness, or a
   Denied by Link Policy object for traffic that installed policy should
   admit.  A planned contact alone does not establish readiness:
   preparation may continue after contact start (Section 4.3).
   Authorized traffic between contacts can legitimately elicit
   availability metadata.  Gateway counters provide diagnostic evidence,

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   not proof of failure (Section 9).

4.5.  Interaction of the Two Signals

   The availability metadata and the Denied by Link Policy object answer
   different questions and may both be relevant to one flow over time: a
   link can be simultaneously restricted and unavailable.  Admission is
   evaluated first (Section 6).  Traffic that would be refused
   regardless of link state receives the administrative prohibition
   error, optionally with the Denied by Link Policy object.  ETU and ELD
   are excluded as specified in Section 5.4.  Generation Time without
   ETU remains discouraged, not prohibited.  Traffic that is admitted
   but whose link is not presently usable receives the ordinary
   unreachable error, optionally with availability metadata.  A sender
   whose denial is resolved through provisioning may then receive a
   metadata-bearing unreachable error for the same flow: first become
   admissible, then wait for the link.

   Ordinary Destination Unreachable errors do not by themselves
   establish that service is permanently absent; Section 3.2.2.1 of
   [RFC1122] notes that they can result from routing transients, and
   [RFC6069] has previously used them experimentally as indications of
   connectivity disruption.  Nor does an ordinary administrative
   prohibition error identify which administrative control refused the
   packet.  ETU or ELD adds to an unreachable error the domain's
   assertion that the failure reflects a managed transient condition of
   a constrained long-haul link to which the traffic was admitted; ETU
   also estimates its duration.  Generation Time alone does not assert a
   failure cause.  The Denied by Link Policy object adds to an
   administrative prohibition error the assertion that boundary-link
   admission policy was the source of the refusal.

5.  Message Formats and Extension Objects

   This section is normative.  The Link Condition Object class is shown
   as TBD5 pending IANA assignment (Section 12); prior to assignment,
   experiments use a locally coordinated Private Use class as described
   in Section 10.1.  The carrier codes of Section 5.2.1 are already
   assigned, and this document requests no new ICMP type or code.

5.1.  Common Message Format

   The objects are carried in Destination Unreachable messages: ICMPv6
   Type 1 [RFC4443] and ICMPv4 Type 3 [RFC0792].  [RFC4884] already
   permits an ICMP Extension Structure on the existing Destination
   Unreachable message types of both IP versions; no new type or code is
   needed to carry the objects defined here.  The message layout is the
   extended Destination Unreachable message of [RFC4884]; this document

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   adds no fields.  The Length field, original-datagram truncation and
   padding, extension header, and checksum rules follow Section 4 of
   [RFC4884] and Section 7 of [RFC4884].  Attaching extension objects to
   Destination Unreachable is an established pattern ([RFC4950],
   [RFC5837], [RFC8883]).

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |     Code      |            Checksum           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Length     |                    Unused                     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~   As much of the invoking packet as possible, zero-padded    ~
   |   per Section 4 of RFC 4884                                  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~              ICMP Extension Structure (RFC 4884)              ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Figure 1: Extended Destination Unreachable (ICMPv6 layout shown;
        ICMPv4 places Length in the second octet of the second word)

   The objects add to a Destination Unreachable message; they never
   change what its code means.  A message that carries no Link Condition
   Objects, whether because the gateway attached none or because the
   receiver ignores or does not process extensions, is an ordinary
   Destination Unreachable message and means only what its code has
   always meant.  Absence of an object supplies no inference: it does
   not indicate that admission succeeded or failed, that a constrained
   long-haul link was or was not involved, or that any prediction
   exists.  A message carrying no objects defined here need not carry an
   extension structure at all, and an extension structure, when present,
   may also carry other independently applicable [RFC4884] objects.
   Recognition of a carrier code implies nothing about extension
   support; the extension structure lies beyond the portion of the
   original datagram that extension-unaware receivers examine.

   A receiver that processes extensions MUST ignore Link Condition
   Objects with an unrecognized C-Type, and MUST process at most one
   object of each C-Type per message, taking the first if several are
   present.  A receiver MUST ignore a Link Condition Object that is not
   applicable to the received Destination Unreachable code
   (Section 5.4), and MUST ignore a Link Condition Object whose Length
   is not valid for its C-Type (Section 5.3).  An unrecognized,
   inapplicable, or invalid-length Link Condition Object does not by

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   itself invalidate the underlying ICMP error; this tolerance does not
   extend to malformed extension framing or an invalid extension
   checksum, which are handled per [RFC4884].

5.2.  Constrained Long-Haul Link Metadata on Destination Unreachable
      Errors

   When a gateway does not forward an otherwise admitted packet because
   the constrained long-haul link required to reach its destination is
   presently unusable, it generates whatever Destination Unreachable
   error the ordinary rules of [RFC1812] or [RFC4443] call for,
   according to its own forwarding state.  This document does not change
   which code is generated or when.  It permits the gateway to attach
   availability metadata -- the Generation Time, Expected Time Until
   Link Usability, and Expected Link Delay objects -- to that error,
   subject to the conditions in this section.

   A gateway MAY attach availability metadata to a Destination
   Unreachable message only when all of the following hold:

   *  the gateway holds a sufficiently current and applicable managed-
      service association between the invoking traffic and a constrained
      long-haul link, or next managed opportunity, within its
      coordination scope;

   *  according to the current coordinated forwarding state, no other
      policy-permitted path within the coordination scope is presently
      available to serve that traffic;

   *  the traffic is admitted to that service;

   *  the link is presently unusable, and the managed-service knowledge
      represents that unusability as a transient interruption of a
      service that is intended to resume;

   *  the invoking packet was not forwarded; and

   *  the message's code is an eligible availability carrier code
      (Section 5.2.1).

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   The second condition is an assertion about the current managed
   forwarding state for the affected traffic within the coordination
   scope (Section 3).  The transient interruption may coincide with
   absence of an installed route: a domain may withdraw the route to a
   destination between contacts while retaining the managed-service
   knowledge that explains the failure, and the resulting no-route error
   is an eligible carrier.  A gateway that meets these conditions but
   has no estimate to supply, or withholds estimates by policy, sends
   the ordinary error without the objects; the gateway need not know
   when the condition will clear.

   These assertions are carried by the Expected Time Until Link
   Usability and Expected Link Delay objects and attach to nothing else
   (Section 5.1).  A Generation Time object supplies a timestamp and is
   not by itself evidence of any particular cause of failure.

5.2.1.  Eligible Carrier Codes

   Link Condition Objects are applicable only to the Destination
   Unreachable codes listed in this section, and each object is
   applicable only to the carrier group indicated (Section 5.4).  Link
   Condition Objects MUST NOT be attached to other Destination
   Unreachable codes or to other ICMP error types.  In every case the
   code is selected by existing ICMP rules according to the gateway's
   forwarding state and response policy; this document neither alters
   that selection nor redefines any code.

5.2.1.1.  Availability Carriers

   The availability metadata objects (Generation Time, Expected Time
   Until Link Usability, Expected Link Delay) may be carried on the
   following codes.

   For ICMPv6, per Section 3.1 of [RFC4443]:

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     +======+=============+==========================================+
     | Type | Name        | Eligibility                              |
     |    1 |             |                                          |
     | Code |             |                                          |
     +======+=============+==========================================+
     |    0 | No route to | Eligible when the forwarding table lacks |
     |      | destination | a matching entry for the destination and |
     |      |             | the gateway holds the managed-service    |
     |      |             | knowledge required by Section 5.2.       |
     +------+-------------+------------------------------------------+
     |    3 | Address     | Eligible when the gateway retains a      |
     |      | unreachable | route whose required link is unusable    |
     |      |             | and no more specific code applies.       |
     |      |             | [RFC4443] names a link-specific problem  |
     |      |             | as an example of this code.              |
     +------+-------------+------------------------------------------+

            Table 1: Eligible ICMPv6 Availability Carrier Codes

   For ICMPv4, per Section 4.3.3.1 of [RFC1812] and Section 5.2.7.1 of
   [RFC1812]:

       +======+=============+=====================================+
       | Type | Name        | Eligibility                         |
       |    3 |             |                                     |
       | Code |             |                                     |
       +======+=============+=====================================+
       |    0 | Network     | Eligible when ordinary forwarding   |
       |      | unreachable | failure warrants Network            |
       |      |             | Unreachable, such as absence of any |
       |      |             | route to the destination network.   |
       +------+-------------+-------------------------------------+
       |    1 | Host        | Eligible when ordinary forwarding   |
       |      | unreachable | failure warrants Host Unreachable;  |
       |      |             | see the note below.                 |
       +------+-------------+-------------------------------------+

           Table 2: Eligible ICMPv4 Availability Carrier Codes

   The existence of a managed service and the presence of a currently
   usable forwarding-table entry are distinct.  A domain may withdraw
   the route to a destination between contacts while retaining knowledge
   of the future service, yielding No Route or Network Unreachable; or
   it may retain a route toward a presently unusable link, yielding
   Address Unreachable.  Both are legitimate carriers.  This document
   does not require a particular routing implementation, and a gateway
   that would have sent a given code before implementing this
   specification does not change that code because of it.

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   Editor's note (IPv4 applicability, to be resolved before RFC
   publication): [RFC1812]'s code-specific text ties Host Unreachable to
   a destination on a directly connected network, while its general
   Destination Unreachable text covers an unreachable next hop.
   Implementations are known to send Host Unreachable on transit-link
   failure, but that is precedent rather than mandate, and ICMPv4 has no
   residual code equivalent to ICMPv6 Address Unreachable.  The
   retained-route, unusable-transit-link case therefore requires an
   explicit IPv4 applicability clarification that this document does not
   yet supply.  The worked examples in Appendix A use ICMPv6 so that
   their interpretation does not depend on resolving this point.

5.2.1.2.  Policy Carriers

   The Denied by Link Policy object may be carried on the following
   codes, whose existing definitions already cover administrative
   refusal of a packet:

   +=========+======+======+===========================================+
   | IP      | Type | Code | Existing meaning                          |
   | version |      |      |                                           |
   +=========+======+======+===========================================+
   | IPv4    |    3 |   13 | Communication Administratively            |
   |         |      |      | Prohibited (Section 5.2.7.1 of            |
   |         |      |      | [RFC1812])                                |
   +---------+------+------+-------------------------------------------+
   | IPv6    |    1 |    1 | Communication with destination            |
   |         |      |      | administratively prohibited               |
   |         |      |      | (Section 3.1 of [RFC4443])                |
   +---------+------+------+-------------------------------------------+

                   Table 3: Eligible Policy Carrier Codes

   [RFC4443]'s reference to a firewall filter is an example of
   administrative prohibition, not an exclusive definition.  The object
   identifies boundary-link admission policy as the particular
   administrative control that refused the packet; it does not introduce
   a different meaning for the base code.

5.3.  Extension Objects

   The objects below share a single ICMP Extension Object class, the
   Link Condition Object class (Class-Num TBD5), distinguished by
   C-Type.  The object header is as defined in Section 8 of [RFC4884].
   No object is mandatory.  Which objects a message may carry depends on
   the Destination Unreachable code it reports (Section 5.4); within
   that set, each object is optional and absence means only that the
   gateway did not supply that information (Section 5.1).  No sentinel

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   values are defined for absent data.  Because the class includes both
   availability metadata and a policy indication, each assertion in this
   document is attributed to the specific object that carries it.

   Each object has exactly one valid Length: 12 octets for Generation
   Time, 8 for Expected Time Until Link Usability and Expected Link
   Delay, and 4 for Denied by Link Policy.  A receiver MUST ignore a
   Link Condition Object whose Length does not match the value for its
   C-Type (Section 5.1).

   The two duration objects, Expected Time Until Link Usability and
   Expected Link Delay, are defined and encoded independently of the
   Generation Time object.  Their interpretation does not depend on the
   absolute timestamp representation, so that representation could later
   be revised or superseded without changing them.

5.3.1.  Duration Format

   Both duration objects carry an unsigned 32-bit integer count of
   milliseconds.  Millisecond precision is not intrinsically necessary
   for every value of Expected Time Until Link Usability, but a single
   representation for both duration-valued objects reduces
   implementation complexity and the risk of unit-conversion errors.
   [RFC4884] defines the extension object framework but no duration
   datatype; the representation is defined here.

   The maximum representable duration, 0xFFFFFFFF milliseconds, is
   4,294,967.295 seconds, approximately 49.7 days.  It is a valid finite
   value, not a sentinel.  If an otherwise available estimate exceeds
   the maximum representable duration, the corresponding object MUST NOT
   be included.  No value is reserved to mean infinite, unknown, or
   greater than the maximum, and no saturation is defined; absence of an
   object means only that no representable estimate was supplied, and
   the protocol does not distinguish an unknown estimate from one that
   is known but not representable.

5.3.2.  Generation Time

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |         Length = 12           |  Class-Num =  |  C-Type = 1   |
   |                               |     TBD5      |               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                       Generation Time                         +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

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                      Figure 2: Generation Time Object

   Generation Time is the gateway's reading of the applicable enclave
   time reference at the moment it generated the ICMP message.  It is
   the time of the notification, not the time at which any underlying
   plan was created or distributed, and not an arbitrary device-local
   clock.

   Following the timestamp specification template of Section 3 of
   [RFC8877], this document fixes the timestamp syntax and units and
   leaves the remaining semantics to the deployment:

   Size:  64 bits in network byte order: a 32-bit unsigned count of
      whole seconds followed by a 32-bit unsigned binary fraction of a
      second.

   Units and resolution:  seconds and 2^-32 seconds respectively; 1,000
      milliseconds per second, consistent with the duration objects.  No
      planetary or calendar units are used on the wire.

   Wraparound:  the seconds field wraps every 2^32 seconds.  No era
      number is carried; era resolution is performed against the
      applicable enclave time reference, not against an implicit wall
      clock.

   Epoch, time scale, and leap seconds:  supplied by the enclave time
      reference.  The specification or provisioning of the managed
      deployment MUST establish the time scale, epoch, treatment of
      discontinuities such as leap seconds or clock resets, and era or
      wraparound interpretation, and MUST define the relationship needed
      to interpret elapsed seconds so that Generation Time can be
      combined with ETU.  Choosing an epoch alone does not settle time-
      scale or discontinuity behavior.  UTC with a conventional epoch is
      one permitted choice; it is not a protocol prerequisite, and this
      document does not presuppose the time scale a future deployment
      will adopt.

   Synchronization aspects:  a receiver MAY use Generation Time for a

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      calculation only when it knows the applicable enclave time
      reference and can relate it to its own clock with confidence
      sufficient for that calculation.  A shared time-scale name alone
      does not establish clock synchronization, and a common
      orchestration function is not by itself evidence of a shared
      reference or a known conversion; cooperating administrative
      domains need one or the other before their receivers compare
      timestamps.  Where the reference, the conversion, the era, or the
      effect of a clock discontinuity is unknown or ambiguous, the
      receiver ignores Generation Time for that calculation.  No
      synchronization accuracy is required by this document and no
      synchronization protocol is specified.

   The seconds/fraction layout is the same as the 64-bit timestamp
   format of Section 6 of [RFC5905], and implementations may reuse code
   that handles it.  Reusing the layout is separate from adopting NTP's
   timestamp semantics: the NTP epoch, the UTC time scale, and NTP's era
   conventions are not imported by this document, and apply only where a
   deployment selects them as its enclave time reference.  No time-scale
   identifier or negotiation is carried in this version; the applicable
   reference is established through the managed deployment context.
   Reference changes and clock resets require operational handling so
   that receivers do not unknowingly interpret timestamps generated
   under one reference using another (Section 9).

   Generation Time identifies when the notification and any estimates in
   it were generated.  It is principally intended to allow a receiver
   that can interpret it to account for the time elapsed since an
   accompanying ETU estimate was generated (Section 5.3.3).  A receiver
   that cannot interpret it ignores it; nothing else in the message
   depends on it, it remains independently parseable, and ignoring it
   does not invalidate ETU, any other applicable object, or the ordinary
   ICMP error.  In the absence of ETU this document defines no use for
   Generation Time, so a message SHOULD NOT include Generation Time
   unless it also includes ETU (Section 5.4).

5.3.3.  Expected Time Until Link Usability

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          Length = 8           |  Class-Num =  |  C-Type = 2   |
   |                               |     TBD5      |               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |              Expected Time Until Link Usability               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 3: Expected Time Until Link Usability Object

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   Expected Time Until Link Usability (ETU) is the gateway's estimate,
   at the moment it generated the notification, of the interval from
   generation until the constrained long-haul link selected for the
   invoking traffic is expected to become usable for forwarding it.  It
   is an unsigned 32-bit integer count of milliseconds, in the format of
   Section 5.3.1.  ETU refers to expected data-plane usability, not to
   the start of a scheduled contact or of preparation for one.
   Preparatory operations necessary to make the link usable, such as
   antenna pointing, modem configuration, acquisition, synchronization,
   or analogous link-establishment operations, are expected to have
   completed by the end of the reported interval and are not represented
   separately.

   ETU is measured from notification generation, not from receipt.  It
   is an estimate, not a guarantee.  It is not a retry interval and not
   an instruction to transmit at any particular time.  It does not
   include Expected Link Delay, which describes traversal of the link
   once usable.  When ETU and Expected Link Delay appear in the same
   message they MUST describe the same link or managed opportunity; a
   gateway MUST NOT combine the earliest usability of one exit with the
   delay of another.

   ETU is meaningful on its own.  A receiver that can interpret a
   supplied Generation Time against the enclave time reference
   (Section 5.3.2) may compute the expected usability time in that
   reference as Generation Time + ETU, and may thereby account for the
   time the notification spent in delivery; any era or wraparound
   considerations apply only to that interpretation and are resolved
   against the enclave reference.  A receiver without Generation Time,
   or unable to interpret it, may apply ETU from the moment of receipt.
   Doing so is a conservative interpretation of the same forecast: it
   expires no earlier than the forecast itself, and later by however
   long the notification spent in delivery.  It is not a guarantee about
   the link; actual recovery may occur later than either interpretation,
   or earlier.  This document does not assume that ICMP delivery is
   prompt.

   The finite range of Section 5.3.1 provides a practical horizon for
   this experimental network-layer signal.  Unavailability on longer
   timescales is not represented by ETU; such timescales may instead
   bear on broader application, storage, provisioning, or communication-
   mechanism decisions, which this document does not address.

5.3.4.  Expected Link Delay

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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          Length = 8           |  Class-Num =  |  C-Type = 3   |
   |                               |     TBD5      |               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                     Expected Link Delay                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                    Figure 4: Expected Link Delay Object

   Expected Link Delay is the approximate one-way delay associated with
   traversal of the constrained long-haul link selected for the invoking
   traffic -- the link whose unavailability prevented forwarding or,
   where routing has migrated the traffic, the next managed opportunity
   that ETU describes -- as an unsigned 32-bit integer count of
   milliseconds in the format of Section 5.3.1.  It is an estimate, not
   a bound; a quantity of the link, not an end-to-end path delay; and
   independent of ETU and of Generation Time.  This document does not
   require receivers to combine it with other metadata or otherwise
   compute an end-to-end delivery time; how the estimate is used is a
   matter of endpoint and application policy.

   For perspective only, the maximum representable duration, if it were
   pure propagation delay at the speed of light in vacuum, would
   correspond to a distance of approximately 1.29 x 10^12 km, roughly
   1.29 trillion km.  The range is therefore very large even for the
   long-delay environments that motivate this document.  This
   observation is explanatory; Expected Link Delay remains an estimated
   one-way link delay comprising whatever components contribute to it.

5.3.5.  Denied by Link Policy

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          Length = 4           |  Class-Num =  |  C-Type = 4   |
   |                               |     TBD5      |               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                   Figure 5: Denied by Link Policy Object

   The Denied by Link Policy object consists of the object header alone;
   it has no payload, and its Length is exactly 4.  It is carried only
   on the policy carrier codes of Section 5.2.1.2.

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   Its presence asserts that the invoking packet was not forwarded
   because the applicable admission policy for the managed long-haul
   service refused it, independently of the current usability of any
   link.  Presence alone supplies this classification; there is no
   Boolean, denial-reason field, allocation identifier, alternate
   gateway address, or retry time, and this document defines no way to
   convey why the traffic was refused or what would be admitted
   (Section 4.4.3).  An error conveys this classification only when it
   contains a valid, applicable Denied by Link Policy object; an object
   of any other length does not establish it (Section 5.1), and absence
   of the object does not establish that the refusal came from some
   other control, that no boundary-link policy exists, or that the
   application has no alternatives.

   Generating the object is optional and subject to disclosure policy
   (Section 6).  Its presence does not promise permanent denial, prove
   that waiting could never help, require the receiver to change
   mechanisms, or authorize evading policy.

5.4.  Object Applicability by Code

   Each Link Condition Object is applicable to one group of carrier
   codes, as summarized in Table 4.  Availability carriers are ICMPv4
   Type 3 codes 0 and 1 and ICMPv6 Type 1 codes 0 and 3
   (Section 5.2.1.1); policy carriers are ICMPv4 Type 3 code 13 and
   ICMPv6 Type 1 code 1 (Section 5.2.1.2).

   +=====================+=================+==========================+
   | Object              | Availability    | Policy carriers          |
   |                     | carriers        |                          |
   +=====================+=================+==========================+
   | Generation Time     | MAY; SHOULD NOT | SHOULD NOT; no use       |
   | (C-Type 1)          | without ETU     | defined here without ETU |
   +---------------------+-----------------+--------------------------+
   | Expected Time Until | MAY, subject to | MUST NOT                 |
   | Link Usability      | Section 5.2     |                          |
   | (C-Type 2)          |                 |                          |
   +---------------------+-----------------+--------------------------+
   | Expected Link Delay | MAY, subject to | MUST NOT                 |
   | (C-Type 3)          | Section 5.2     |                          |
   +---------------------+-----------------+--------------------------+
   | Denied by Link      | MUST NOT        | MAY, subject to          |
   | Policy (C-Type 4)   |                 | Section 6                |
   +---------------------+-----------------+--------------------------+

      Table 4: Link Condition Object Applicability by Carrier Group

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   A policy carrier MUST NOT carry Expected Time Until Link Usability or
   Expected Link Delay: they reveal characteristics of a link to which
   the invoking traffic was not admitted, and admission is evaluated
   before any link state is disclosed (Section 6).  An availability
   carrier MUST NOT carry Denied by Link Policy.  Under these rules
   Denied by Link Policy is never emitted with ETU or ELD.  Generation
   Time may accompany it, subject to the guidance below.

   Generation Time SHOULD NOT be sent without Expected Time Until Link
   Usability on either carrier group, since this document defines no
   other use for it and unnecessary absolute-time information should not
   normally be disclosed.  This is discouraged rather than inapplicable
   or prohibited: a receiver that finds Generation Time without ETU
   simply has no defined use for it, and experimentation or later
   experience may identify one.

   These are sender restrictions; receiver tolerance for inapplicable
   objects is specified in Section 5.1 and does not relax them.

6.  Generation Rules

   The rules in this section govern gateways.  General ICMP generation
   rules apply in addition: Section 2.4 of [RFC4443] for ICMPv6,
   including its rate-limiting requirements, and [RFC1812] for ICMPv4.
   Nothing in this document permits generating an error in response to
   an ICMP error, to a packet addressed to a multicast destination, or
   in the other cases those documents prohibit.  Nothing in this
   document suppresses a Destination Unreachable error that those
   documents otherwise require, and uncertainty about whether an
   optional object can be supported never suppresses the underlying
   error.

   On receiving trans-boundary traffic, a gateway proceeds as follows:

   1.  Assess the current coordinated forwarding and service state for
       the traffic, including whether a policy-permitted path within the
       coordination scope is presently available to serve it.  If so,
       use that path and attach nothing.

   2.  Apply the long-haul service's admission policy before disclosing
       any link state or prediction.

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   3.  If the traffic is not admitted, drop it.  Where ordinary rules
       and local response policy call for one, generate the appropriate
       administrative prohibition error (Section 5.2.1.2); where
       disclosure policy permits, attach the Denied by Link Policy
       object (Section 5.4).  Denial of admission to one long-haul
       service does not by itself mean no policy-permitted managed
       alternative exists; step 1 addresses that.

   4.  If the traffic is admitted but cannot be forwarded because the
       selected link is presently unusable, drop it and generate the
       Destination Unreachable error that ordinary ICMP rules call for.
       If the conditions of Section 5.2 are satisfied and the code is an
       eligible availability carrier (Section 5.2.1.1), the gateway MAY
       attach Expected Time Until Link Usability, Generation Time, and
       Expected Link Delay objects.

   5.  If the traffic is admitted and the link is usable, forward it
       normally.  A forwarded packet MUST NOT elicit a Destination
       Unreachable error.

   The restrictions in this section govern attaching Link Condition
   Objects; they do not alter when ordinary Destination Unreachable
   errors are generated.  A gateway MUST NOT attach any Link Condition
   Object whose assertion it cannot establish from a sufficiently
   current and applicable association between the traffic, the managed
   service, the forwarding state, the admission policy, and any
   advertised prediction (Section 4.3).  In particular, a gateway MUST
   NOT attach availability metadata when another policy-permitted path
   within the coordination scope is presently available for the traffic,
   and MUST NOT attach it on the basis of observed local interface or
   carrier state alone (Section 3).  Whenever an object's basis is
   missing, the object is withheld by policy, or an estimate is out of
   range (Section 5.3.1), the gateway omits that object and sends the
   ordinary error.

   A gateway MUST NOT send an ETU value not derived from its current
   managed-service knowledge, and MUST NOT report an expired estimate
   clamped to zero.  A gateway MAY send ETU without Generation Time; it
   SHOULD NOT send Generation Time without ETU (Section 5.4).

   Attachment of every Link Condition Object MUST be configurable per
   policy.  An operator MUST be able to configure, per source, prefix,
   or policy class, whether an administrative prohibition error is
   generated at all for refused traffic, the alternative being silent
   discard, and independently whether the Denied by Link Policy object
   is attached to it.  An operator SHOULD be able to configure omission
   of the availability metadata objects (Section 11).

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   A gateway MUST NOT attach Link Condition Objects to messages sent
   toward the constrained long-haul link, and MUST NOT attach them in
   response to traffic arriving from it (Section 3).

   ICMP delivery is unreliable and rate limited.  A gateway MUST NOT
   assume that a sender received any particular notification; it
   generates a fresh notification, subject to rate limiting, for each
   invoking packet that meets the conditions above, using its current
   applicable knowledge.

7.  Receiver Processing

7.1.  Validation

   Ordinary validation and handling of a Destination Unreachable error
   are governed by the receiver's existing ICMP and transport rules;
   this document does not change them, and the checks below apply only
   to the objects.  Disregarding an object never requires rejecting, or
   changing the ordinary handling of, the base error.

   Before acting on Link Condition Objects, a receiver MUST validate the
   message as an ICMP error per [RFC4443] and the mitigations of
   [RFC5927]: the invoking packet excerpt is matched against existing
   connection or flow state, and objects on a message matching nothing
   the receiver sent are disregarded.  A receiver SHOULD disregard Link
   Condition Objects on a message that arrives on an interface facing
   outside its disclosure scope.

   The carrier code does not prove that a message originated inside the
   domain, and a filter that acts on Type and Code alone cannot
   selectively remove Link Condition Objects without also affecting
   ordinary errors of the same code.  A deployment that requires
   selective containment of the objects at a boundary needs extension-
   aware enforcement; this document does not specify one and does not
   mandate filtering of the carrier codes.

7.2.  Consumer Behavior

   This section is informative.  This document does not specify how a
   host, transport, application, or management system reacts to the
   objects, and no such reaction is required for interoperability.
   Receipt of an unreachable error carrying ETU or ELD informs the
   receiver that the domain models the path as transiently unavailable;
   ETU also indicates roughly when usability is expected.  Generation
   Time alone does not indicate a failure cause.  Receipt of an
   administrative prohibition error carrying Denied by Link Policy
   informs it that boundary-link admission policy refused the traffic.
   What follows are possibilities that the objects enable and that the

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   experiment of Section 10 is intended to explore.

   A host might record availability metadata to avoid immediately
   repeating attempts likely to elicit the same error.  How such state
   would be keyed, how widely it would apply, how long it would live,
   how it would be invalidated when the domain's knowledge changes, and
   how it would interact with routing are all open questions.  Because
   ETU is an estimate reflecting the domain's coordinated state at
   generation time, and the gateway cannot revoke a notification, any
   such state is a hint and not an assurance of service at any later
   time.

   A transport might use the metadata as an input to its timeout and
   failure decisions, for example by comparing the expected wait against
   a connection's tolerance.  The remote endpoint receives no
   corresponding notification and continues to run its own timers, which
   bounds the usefulness of waiting.  No TCP or QUIC behavior is defined
   here.

   An application might be given the condition and its objects so that
   it can defer, fail fast, or reconsider its communication mechanism
   (Section 4.4.2).  On learning that its present traffic was refused by
   boundary-link policy, an application with separately provisioned
   knowledge of an authorized application-layer gateway or bundle
   service might choose that mechanism instead; the object is the
   trigger to reconsider, and provisioning supplies the alternative and
   its authorization.  Whether an application can receive and correlate
   this context at all, and whether the extra classification improves
   its decisions relative to an ordinary administrative prohibition
   error, are experiment questions.  Whether an application interface
   should be standardized is not addressed here.

   Stronger reactions to unauthenticated ICMP information carry greater
   risk (Section 11); which reactions are worth their risk is itself an
   experiment question.

8.  Legacy Host and Middlebox Behavior

   Every message defined by this document is an existing Destination
   Unreachable error, optionally carrying additional information, so a
   stack that does not process [RFC4884] extensions handles it exactly
   as it handles the same error today (Section 5.1).  This document does
   not promise identical behavior across stacks or that any connection
   survives.

   For context, Section 3.9.2.2 of [RFC9293] classifies the availability
   carriers (ICMPv4 Type 3 codes 0 and 1, ICMPv6 Type 1 codes 0 and 3)
   as soft errors for TCP, while noting widespread implementation

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   behavior that treats soft errors as hard errors during connection
   establishment; [RFC5461] documents further divergence.  This
   classification describes existing TCP processing; it is not the basis
   on which this document selects carriers and does not define permanent
   versus temporary failure.  This document neither prescribes nor
   relies on a particular TCP reaction to either policy carrier.

   Firewalls and stateful middleboxes inside the deploying domain may
   strip or discard messages carrying unfamiliar extension structures,
   or may already filter some Destination Unreachable codes.  This fails
   safe but silently defeats the mechanism, so deployment includes
   reviewing ICMP filtering policy on the paths between gateways and the
   hosts they serve; [RFC4890] provides the ICMPv6 filtering framework.
   Legacy hosts generate nothing new and are unaffected as senders.

9.  Operational Considerations

   Gateways SHOULD count generation of object-bearing Destination
   Unreachable messages, including which Link Condition Objects were
   included, and expose the counters through network management; counts
   of the carrier codes alone do not identify this experiment's
   activity, since those codes are generated for other reasons as well.
   A gateway attaching Denied by Link Policy knows which policy
   dimension refused the traffic even though the object does not convey
   it, and MAY log or report that detail through local operational
   telemetry, which is where operators debugging a refused flow should
   look.  This document does not prescribe a management or telemetry
   mechanism.  Operators can use the counters as diagnostic evidence of
   possible divergence from applicable service expectations, not as
   proof of failure (Section 4.4.4).

   The orchestration model of Section 4.3 yields several operational
   lessons.  Gateways need their managed-service records to carry
   revision and validity information so that stale records are
   recognized rather than acted on.  When a readiness estimate passes
   without the link becoming usable, gateways should have a supported
   new estimate or omit ETU; a countdown clamped to zero is not an
   estimate.  Loss of controller connectivity is expected, and a gateway
   should continue to use a still-valid record until it expires or local
   evidence contradicts it, while ordinary error generation continues
   regardless.  During routing migrations, the record consulted for a
   notification must be the one applicable to the traffic's current
   selected exit; describing a different opportunity is worse than
   attaching nothing.  Operators should expect notifications to be less
   informative during transitions and after plan revisions, and should
   treat that as normal rather than as a fault.

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   ICMP rate limiters deserve attention at contact boundaries.  When a
   link becomes unusable, every active trans-boundary flow can elicit an
   unreachable error within a short interval, and a token-bucket limiter
   tuned for steady-state error rates may suppress most of the burst.
   Because ICMP is unreliable and a gateway cannot know which
   notifications were received, operators SHOULD size gateway ICMP rate
   limits for the expected flow fan-out at gap onset.  Hosts that act on
   the metadata to avoid repeated attempts reduce the offered load that
   would otherwise sustain the burst.

   ETU is only as meaningful as the gateway's knowledge of the link.
   Using Generation Time additionally depends on the receiver knowing
   the enclave time reference and being able to relate it to its own
   clock (Section 5.3.2); receivers that cannot may apply ETU from
   receipt (Section 5.3.3).  The deployment is responsible for
   establishing and distributing the reference.  When the reference
   changes or a gateway's clock is reset, operators need to ensure that
   receivers do not interpret timestamps generated under the old
   reference using the new one; until that is assured, receivers fall
   back to ignoring Generation Time.  Cooperating administrative domains
   need a shared reference or a known conversion before their receivers
   compare timestamps; sharing an orchestration function does not by
   itself provide either.

   Hosts that maintain state derived from these objects SHOULD expose it
   to local diagnostics, since such state changes transmission behavior
   in ways otherwise invisible to troubleshooting.

10.  Experimental Status and Goals

   This document is published as Experimental.  The objects are
   specified normatively so that independent implementations
   interoperate at the ICMP layer.  The value of the mechanism, however,
   rests on two kinds of questions that only deployment can answer:
   whether gateways can generate the objects correctly and usefully, and
   whether the objects let consumers make better decisions than the
   ordinary unreachable or administrative prohibition error alone would
   allow.  Consumer behaviors are deliberately not standardized here
   (Section 7.2); the experiment is intended to produce the experience
   on which later specification of such behaviors might be based.  An
   extension object, like a new code, requires implementation support to
   expose a new meaning to applications; neither inherently solves
   application delivery.

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10.1.  Scope of the Experiment

   The experiment runs within domains meeting the criteria of Section 3:
   space networking testbeds and missions, other networks with scheduled
   or intermittently available managed links between enclaves, and
   laboratory emulations of the same topologies.  Link Condition Objects
   are not intended to be exchanged across uncontrolled networks
   (Section 7.1).  No behavior in this document affects hosts whose
   traffic never requires a trans-boundary link.

   Prior to IANA assignment of the Link Condition Object class,
   experiments use a class value from the Private Use range 247-255 of
   the "ICMP Extension Object Classes and Class Sub-types" registry
   [RFC4884], with its interpretation and scope explicitly configured
   among the participants.  Such a value is not globally unique, is not
   a claim on any permanent assignment, and is used only within the
   experiment's coordination scope.  The carrier codes are already
   assigned and are used as is; no experimental ICMP type or code is
   involved.  Interoperability reports from this phase are in scope for
   the experiment.

10.2.  Network Signal Evaluation

   The first layer of the experiment concerns the objects themselves:

   *  Generation correctness: whether gateways attach each object only
      under the conditions of Section 6, whether the coordination-scope
      determination can be made reliably in deployed routing
      architectures and during transitions, and which carrier codes
      gateways actually produce for the long-haul conditions in each IP
      version (Section 5.2.1).

   *  Distinction: whether availability metadata usefully distinguishes
      managed transient unavailability from ordinary unreachable errors
      of the same code, and whether the Denied by Link Policy object
      usefully distinguishes boundary-link admission refusal from other
      administrative prohibition (Section 4.5).

   *  Prediction accuracy and usefulness: how closely ETU tracks actual
      link usability, how often it is available at all, how often plan
      revisions or acquisition failures invalidate it, and whether
      Generation Time and Expected Link Delay are populated and used.

   *  Orchestration feasibility: whether the information path of
      Section 4.3 can be realized with existing management channels, and
      whether gateways can consult applicable records on the error-
      generation path, including after route withdrawal.

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   *  Generation rate: gateway ICMP generation rates at gap onset under
      realistic fan-out, and the effect of rate limiting on which
      senders receive a notification.

   *  Legacy and middlebox behavior: how unmodified hosts respond to
      object-bearing carrier errors across the stacks present in target
      environments, including embedded and flight-heritage
      implementations (Section 8); and what filtering changes
      deployments required, including whether middleboxes strip or
      discard extension structures.

   *  Security and disclosure: whether the information disclosed by the
      objects is operationally acceptable, whether the disclosure
      controls of Section 6 are sufficient, and whether forged or stale
      objects caused harm.

   *  Whether a coarse boundary-policy object is useful beyond the
      ordinary administrative refusal, and whether experience
      establishes a need for richer policy-denial metadata.  This
      document does not speculate about the format of any such metadata.

10.3.  Consumer Behavior Exploration

   The second layer concerns what receivers do with the objects.  None
   of these behaviors is specified here; the experiment is intended to
   discover which are worthwhile:

   *  Whether hosts that record availability metadata to avoid repeated
      attempts reduce futile retransmission and offered load during
      link-unavailable periods, relative to hosts receiving the same
      ordinary errors without objects, and what keying, scope, lifetime,
      and invalidation rules work.

   *  What transport reactions are appropriate, including whether
      comparing expected wait against connection tolerance is useful and
      whether connections that wait survive the peer's own timers.

   *  Whether applications can receive and correlate the objects with
      their traffic at all, and whether the Denied by Link Policy
      classification improves their decisions relative to an ordinary
      administrative prohibition error, including selection among
      separately provisioned mechanisms such as IP transports,
      application-layer gateways, and bundle services.

   *  Whether provisioning and orchestration systems can use the
      objects, and whether divergence telemetry (Section 4.4.4) exposed
      real faults ahead of existing monitoring.

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10.4.  Evidence for Advancement

   Later consideration of the mechanism for the standards track could be
   informed by evidence of: at least two independent interoperable
   implementations of the Link Condition Objects, including extension
   object processing on both carrier groups; generation accuracy in at
   least one operational, non-laboratory domain; usefulness of the
   objects beyond the ordinary errors they ride on, with unused objects
   removed rather than carried forward; manageable legacy and middlebox
   behavior; acceptable security and disclosure properties; consumer
   behaviors independently demonstrated to benefit from the objects,
   without presupposing any one receiver strategy; and evidence that the
   semantics apply across more than one class of long-haul network
   without special-case changes to the wire format.  Reports of failed
   or inconclusive experiments are requested to the same degree as
   successful ones.

11.  Security Considerations

   ICMP carries no authentication, and the objects are actionable by
   implementations that choose to act on them, so the principal threats
   are forgery by off-path attackers and information disclosure to the
   senders these messages answer.  The mitigations are the scoping of
   Section 3, validation against sender state (Section 7.1), rate
   limiting, and agreed disclosure policy among the cooperating
   authorities.  None of them authenticates the carrier code or the
   objects; filtering and invoking-packet validation raise the cost of
   injection without confining it to trusted parties, and none is
   dependable across the open internet.

   Three forgery cases arise.  A forged ordinary Destination Unreachable
   or administrative prohibition error is an existing threat with
   existing mitigations ([RFC5927]); this document does not change it.
   Forged availability metadata on an otherwise plausible error could
   induce an implementation that acts on it to withhold trans-boundary
   traffic for the advertised interval.  A forged Denied by Link Policy
   object could induce an application to abandon a working IP path for
   another mechanism, or to conclude that provisioning is needed; this
   influence on application choices is a capability beyond what forging
   the bare administrative prohibition error provides.  This document
   does not require receivers to act on any object, and stronger
   reactions to unauthenticated ICMP information carry correspondingly
   greater risk; an implementation that does act should bound the effect
   of any single notification, treat ETU as an estimate that may be
   stale or wrong, treat Denied by Link Policy as a classification that
   may be forged, and consider that the gateway cannot revoke a
   notification whose basis has changed.

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   Because the objects ride on ordinary codes, containing them at a
   boundary requires extension-aware enforcement (Section 7.1).  The
   absence of Link Condition Objects from a message is not a trustworthy
   indication that no long-haul condition exists (Section 5.1), since
   objects may be omitted by policy, by rate limiting, by middleboxes,
   or by an attacker.

   The Denied by Link Policy object, although it has no payload,
   discloses that boundary-link admission policy refused particular
   traffic, and a gateway that attaches it is a probing oracle: an
   attacker varying markings, sources, and destinations can map which
   traffic the long-haul service admits, even without being told why any
   particular packet was refused.  Section 6 therefore requires per-
   policy control over whether the object is attached and,
   independently, whether the base error is generated at all; toward any
   sender the operator does not trust, silent discard is the expected
   posture, consistent with existing firewall practice.

   The availability metadata objects disclose link schedule information,
   which in some deployments is sensitive operational information.
   Section 6 permits omitting them per policy; operators of such
   deployments should protect the metadata as they protect the
   underlying schedule.  Evaluating admission before link state
   (Section 6) prevents disclosure of schedule information to traffic
   that would not be admitted regardless.

   Ordinary ICMP generation restrictions and rate limiting (Section 2.4
   of [RFC4443], [RFC1812]) apply to all of these messages.  Quoting and
   padding of the invoking packet and the optional objects affect
   response size; a message carrying all three availability objects is
   larger than a minimal Destination Unreachable error.  This document
   makes no claim about the absence of amplification beyond what those
   restrictions provide.

12.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests no new ICMP type and no new Destination
   Unreachable code.  It requests one assignment, shown as a TBD value
   throughout; no numeric value is proposed.

   From the "ICMP Extension Object Classes and Class Sub-types" registry
   [RFC4884]: a new class TBD5, Link Condition Object, with C-Type 1,
   Generation Time; C-Type 2, Expected Time Until Link Usability; C-Type
   3, Expected Link Delay; and C-Type 4, Denied by Link Policy, assigned
   by this document.  Further C-Types are Specification Required.  The
   class registry's procedure is First Come First Served for values
   0-246.

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   This document requests no change to the already-assigned Destination
   Unreachable codes on which Link Condition Objects may be carried:
   ICMPv6 Type 1 codes 0, 1, and 3, and ICMPv4 Type 3 codes 0, 1, and 13
   (Section 5.2.1).  Their existing meanings are unchanged.

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0792]  Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
              RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC792, September 1981,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc792>.

   [RFC1812]  Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
              RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, June 1995,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1812>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4443]  Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
              Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
              Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
              RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4443>.

   [RFC4884]  Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro,
              "Extended ICMP to Support Multi-Part Messages", RFC 4884,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4884, April 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4884>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8877]  Mizrahi, T., Fabini, J., and A. Morton, "Guidelines for
              Defining Packet Timestamps", RFC 8877,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8877, September 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8877>.

13.2.  Informative References

   [RFC1122]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1122>.

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   [RFC4890]  Davies, E. and J. Mohacsi, "Recommendations for Filtering
              ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls", RFC 4890,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4890, May 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4890>.

   [RFC4950]  Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro, "ICMP
              Extensions for Multiprotocol Label Switching", RFC 4950,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4950, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4950>.

   [RFC5461]  Gont, F., "TCP's Reaction to Soft Errors", RFC 5461,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5461, February 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5461>.

   [RFC5837]  Atlas, A., Ed., Bonica, R., Ed., Pignataro, C., Ed., Shen,
              N., and JR. Rivers, "Extending ICMP for Interface and
              Next-Hop Identification", RFC 5837, DOI 10.17487/RFC5837,
              April 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5837>.

   [RFC5905]  Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
              "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
              Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5905>.

   [RFC5927]  Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5927, July 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5927>.

   [RFC6069]  Zimmermann, A. and A. Hannemann, "Making TCP More Robust
              to Long Connectivity Disruptions (TCP-LCD)", RFC 6069,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6069, December 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6069>.

   [RFC8799]  Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet
              Protocols", RFC 8799, DOI 10.17487/RFC8799, July 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8799>.

   [RFC8883]  Herbert, T., "ICMPv6 Errors for Discarding Packets Due to
              Processing Limits", RFC 8883, DOI 10.17487/RFC8883,
              September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8883>.

   [RFC9171]  Burleigh, S., Fall, K., and E. Birrane, III, "Bundle
              Protocol Version 7", RFC 9171, DOI 10.17487/RFC9171,
              January 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9171>.

   [RFC9293]  Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)",
              STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293>.

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Appendix A.  Worked Examples

A.1.  Availability Metadata

   Times in this example are expressed in the enclave time reference
   (Section 5.3.2) as seconds from its epoch.  A gateway whose deep-
   space link is presently unusable receives an IPv6 packet for a trans-
   boundary destination at reference time 10,000 s.  According to its
   current coordinated forwarding state, no other policy-permitted path
   within the coordination scope is available for the traffic.  The
   packet is admitted under the service's policy.  The gateway retains a
   route toward the destination, but the next hop over the deep-space
   link is unusable; under Section 3.1 of [RFC4443] this is a link-
   specific problem not covered by another code, so the gateway
   generates ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable, Code 3 (Address
   unreachable).  Its managed-service record (Section 4.3) shows the
   link expected to be ready to forward at reference time 12,520 s, and
   its one-way delay estimate for the link is 20 minutes, so it attaches
   three Link Condition Objects.  The Class-Num octet of each is TBD5
   and is omitted from the listing.

   +===============+========+========+============+===================+
   | Object        | C-Type | Length | Wire value | Decoded           |
   +===============+========+========+============+===================+
   | Generation    |      1 |     12 | 0x00002710 | 10,000 s in the   |
   | Time          |        |        | 0x00000000 | enclave reference |
   +---------------+--------+--------+------------+-------------------+
   | Expected Time |      2 |      8 | 0x002673C0 | 2,520,000 ms (42  |
   | Until Link    |        |        |            | min)              |
   | Usability     |        |        |            |                   |
   +---------------+--------+--------+------------+-------------------+
   | Expected Link |      3 |      8 | 0x00124F80 | 1,200,000 ms (20  |
   | Delay         |        |        |            | min)              |
   +---------------+--------+--------+------------+-------------------+

                  Table 5: Availability Metadata Example

   The Generation Time seconds word is 10,000 and the fraction word is
   zero.  ETU is the interval from reference time 10,000 s to 12,520 s.
   If this deployment had chosen UTC as its enclave time reference, the
   seconds word would instead be the corresponding count of seconds from
   the epoch the deployment specified; that is the deployment's choice
   and is not required by this document.

   Had the gateway attached no objects, or had the receiver not
   processed them, the message would be an ordinary Address Unreachable
   error (Section 5.1).

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   A receiver that processes the objects but does not know the enclave
   time reference, cannot relate it to its own clock, or did not receive
   Generation Time needs no timestamp arithmetic: it knows that, as of
   generation, the link was expected to become usable in 42 minutes, and
   it may apply that interval from the moment of receipt.  If the
   notification spent time in delivery, this interpretation expires
   later than the original forecast; it remains a conservative reading
   of the same forecast, not a guarantee, and the link may in fact
   become usable later than either.

   A receiver that knows the enclave time reference and can relate it to
   its own clock may compute Generation Time + ETU = 12,520 s and, on
   receiving the message at reference time 10,003 s, understand that
   about 2,517 s remain, subject to its own clock uncertainty and to the
   accuracy of the forecast.  Had the gateway instead generated a
   notification at 10,003 s against the same forecast, that notification
   would carry Generation Time 10,003 s and ETU 2,517,000 ms: ETU is
   recomputed for each notification from the current reference time, not
   copied from the plan.

   Either receiver might, as a matter of local policy, use the 20-minute
   link delay estimate in deciding whether the destination suits its
   traffic once the link is usable (Section 7.2).

A.2.  Denied by Link Policy

   The same gateway, during an active contact, receives an IPv6 packet
   whose traffic class is not admitted by the service's policy.  It
   drops the packet.  Local response policy calls for an error, so it
   generates ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable, Code 1 (Communication with
   destination administratively prohibited), and, disclosure policy
   permitting, attaches a single Link Condition Object:

           +=======================+========+========+=========+
           | Object                | C-Type | Length | Payload |
           +=======================+========+========+=========+
           | Denied by Link Policy |      4 |      4 | none    |
           +-----------------------+--------+--------+---------+

                   Table 6: Denied by Link Policy Example

   The object occupies one 32-bit word: Length 0x0004, Class-Num TBD5,
   C-Type 0x04.  It is preceded by the [RFC4884] extension header and by
   the invoking packet, padded to at least 128 octets.  No Expected Time
   Until Link Usability or Expected Link Delay is attached, and
   Generation Time is omitted because no ETU accompanies it.

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   A receiver that processes the object learns that boundary-link
   admission policy refused the traffic and may, for instance,
   reconsider its communication mechanism (Section 4.4.2).  A receiver
   that ignores extensions, or that disregards the object, has an
   ordinary administrative prohibition error and nothing more
   (Section 5.1).

Acknowledgments

   The author used AI-assisted tooling in preparing this document,
   including drafting and editing text and converting it to the
   kramdown-rfc source format.  All technical content, design decisions,
   and the final text are the responsibility of the author.

Author's Address

   Erik Kline
   Aalyria Technologies, Inc.
   Email: ek.ietf@gmail.com

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