End-to-End Identity Important in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
draft-elwell-sip-e2e-identity-important-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | John Elwell | ||
| Last updated | 2009-02-25 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document surveys existing mechanisms in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for identifying and authenticating the source of a SIP request (or caller identification). It describes how identification and authentication are not always end-to-end and the problems that this can lead to, particularly since media security based on techniques such as DTLS-SRTP is dependent on end-to-end authenticated identification of parties. This work is being discussed on the sip@ietf.org mailing list.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)