Enhanced XML Digital Signature Algorithm to Mitigate Wrapping Attacks
draft-enhanced-xml-digital-signature-algorithm-00

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IETF                                                      Jitendra Kumar
Internet-Draft                                          Balaji Rajendran
Intended status: Experimental                           Bindhumadhava BS
Expires: July 13, 2019                                   C-DAC Bangalore
                                                         January 9, 2019

 Enhanced XML Digital Signature Algorithm to Mitigate Wrapping Attacks
           draft-enhanced-xml-digital-signature-algorithm-00

Abstract

   XML signature standard as described in [RFC3275] and defined by IETF/
   W3C references or identifies signed elements by their unique
   identities in the given XML document.  Hence, signed XML elements can
   be shifted from one location to another location in a XML
   document,and still, it does not have any effect on its ability to
   verify its signature.  This flexibility paves the way for an attacker
   to tweak original XML message without getting noticed by the
   receiver.  This document proposes to use absolute XPath as an
   "Positional Token" and modifies existing XML Digital Signature
   algorithm to overcome the XML Signature wrapping/rewriting attacks on
   XML ignatures.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 13, 2019.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Jitendra Kumar, et al.    Expires July 13, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title               January 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  XML Digital Signature structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Suggested Modified Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Algorithm for signing SOAP Request  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Algorithm for verification of Signature . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.1.  Verifying SignedInfo Element Digest with Decrypted
               Digest from SignatureValue element  . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Simple Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Algorithm Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Mitigation of XML Signature wrapping attacks  . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Mitigation of XML elements jumbling type of wrapping
           attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Many researchers have shown that even a signed SOAP messages are
   vulnerable to interception and further manipulation of its content.
   McIntosh and Austel (described in wrapping_attack [wrapping_attack])
   have illustrated that a SOAP message content, protected by an XML
   Digital Signature, as specified in WS-Security(refer, WS-Security
   [WS-Security]) can be forged without invalidating the signature.
   These attacks are termed as XML Signature wrapping attacks or XML
   rewriting attacks.These types of attacks are possible because the XML
   Digital Signature refers to a signed element in XML document in a way
   that does not take care of its location inside the XML document into
   consideration.Attackers inject additional nodes replacing signed
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