@techreport{etienne-ripv2-auth-flaws-00,
    number =    {draft-etienne-ripv2-auth-flaws-00},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-etienne-ripv2-auth-flaws/00/},
    author =    {Jerome Etienne},
    title =     {{Flaws in RIPv2 packet's authentication}},
    pagetotal = 13,
    year =      2001,
    month =     may,
    day =       1,
    abstract =  {The current strongest authentication method for RIPv2 (RFC2453{[}6{]}) is the MD5 authentication (RFC2082{[}5{]}) which uses shared secret key to authenticate the packets. This memo explains the different security flaws we found in the anti-replay and the MACs calculation. The second part presents practical exploitations of these weaknesses: an attacker directly connected to a link, can (i) break neighborhood, (ii) flap routes and (iii) inject obsolete routes.},
}