Usecases definition for IoT DDoS attacks prevention
draft-faibish-iot-ddos-usecases-00

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Last updated 2019-07-07
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TEEP WG                                                       S. Faibish
Internet-Draft                                                  Dell EMC
Intended status: Informational                              July 7, 2019
Expires: January 7, 2020

           Usecases definition for IoT DDoS attacks prevention
                   draft-faibish-iot-ddos-usecases-00

Abstract

   This document specifies several usecases related to the different 
   ways IoT devices are exploited by malicious adversaries to 
   instantiate Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks. The 
   attacks are generted from IoT devices that have no proper protection 
   against generating unsolicited communication messages targeting a 
   certain network and creating large amounts of network traffic. The 
   attackers take advantage of breaches in the configuration data in 
   unprotected IoT devices exploited for DDoS attacks. The attackers 
   take advantage of the IoT devices that can send network packets 
   that were generated by malicious code that interacts with an OS 
   implementation that runs on the IoT devices. The prupose of this 
   draft is to prsent possible IoT DDoS usecases that need to be 
   prevented by TEE. The major enabler of such attacks is related to 
   IoT devices that have no OS or unprotected EE OS and run
   code that is downloaded to them from the TA and modified by 
   man-in-the-middle that inserts malicious code in the OS. 

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Faibish                   Expires January 7, 2020             [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Usecases definition for IoT DDoS attacks     July 2019 
  

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Usecases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1. Upgradable OS less IoT devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2. IoT devices connected to a gateway server  . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3. Smart IoT devices with full OS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   Applications executing in an IoT device are exposed to many different
   attacks intended to compromise the execution of the application, or
   reveal the data upon which those applications are operating. The 
   problem is more acute for IoT devices that run low level of OS or no 
   OS at all and have limited ability to prevent malicious network 
   traffic leading to DDoS. These attacks increase with the number of 
   applications running on the device, with such other applications 
   coming from potentially untrustworthy sources or due to 
   man-in-the-middle mangling with the application code inserting 
   random packets in the communication of the IoT back to operator.  
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