Test Tools for IoT DDoS vulnerability scanning
draft-faibish-iot-ddos-usecases-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Sorin Faibish  , Mashruf Chowdhury 
Last updated 2020-12-21
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TEEP WG                                                       S. Faibish
Internet-Draft                                   Independent Contributor
Intended status: Informational                           M. K. Chowdhury
Expires: June 21, 2021                                   Deloitte Canada
                                                       December 21, 2020

               Test Tools for IoT DDoS vulnerability scanning
                   draft-faibish-iot-ddos-usecases-04
Abstract

   This document specifies several usecases related to the different
   ways IoT devices are exploited by malicious adversaries to
   instantiate Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks. The
   attacks are generted from IoT devices that have no proper protection
   against generating unsolicited communication messages targeting a
   certain network and creating large amounts of network traffic. The
   attackers take advantage of breaches in the configuration data in
   unprotected IoT devices exploited for DDoS attacks. The attackers
   take advantage of the IoT devices that can send network packets
   that were generated by malicious code that interacts with an OS
   implementation that runs on the IoT devices. The prupose of this
   draft is to present possible IoT DDoS usecases that need to be
   prevented by TEE. The major enabler of such attacks is related to
   IoT devices that have no OS or unprotected EE OS and run
   code that is downloaded to them from the TA and modified by
   man-in-the-middle that inserts malicious code in the OS. This draft
   adds list of MUD files for most IoT devices.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 21, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Faibish             Expires June 21, 2021                     [Page 1]
 
Internet-Draft   Usecases definition for IoT DDoS attacks December 2020

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Usecases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1. Upgradable OS less IoT devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2. IoT devices connected to a gateway server  . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3. Smart IoT devices with full OS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7. References   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Problems with IoT devices arise from the fact that manufacturers
   ship their devices with almost no security measures and the
   companies that buy these IoT devices don't have proper
   visibility/understanding of their networks with these new products.
   Applications executing in an IoT device are exposed to many different
   attacks intended to compromise the execution of the application, or
   reveal the data upon which those applications are operating. The
   problem is more acute for IoT devices that run low level of OS or no
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