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DIEM Architecture
draft-fainchtein-diem-architecture-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Rahel Fainchtein , Allison Mankin
Last updated 2026-11-02
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draft-fainchtein-diem-architecture-00
Network Working Group                                   R. A. Fainchtein
Internet-Draft                                                   JHU/APL
Intended status: Informational                                 A. Mankin
Expires: 6 May 2027                                Packet Clearing House
                                                         2 November 2026

                           DIEM Architecture
                 draft-fainchtein-diem-architecture-00

Abstract

   TODO Abstract

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at
   https://rahelFain.github.io/Diem-Architecture/draft-Fainchtein-DIEM-
   Architecture.html.  Status information for this document may be found
   at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fainchtein-diem-
   architecture/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/rahelFain/Diem-Architecture.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  DNS Structures of Digital Emblems . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Zone Cut Structure for Digital Emblems  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Digital Emblem Naming Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Authentication and DNSSEC Architecture of DE's  . . . . . . .   4
   8.  Emblems that are not Fully Contained in DNS . . . . . . . . .   5
   9.  Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     9.1.  DNS Contained Emblem Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     9.2.  External DE Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   10. Use of IANA Registries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   11. Architecture for Authorizing Entities . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     11.1.  Validation Procedure of ExtraZonal Authorization . . . .   6
     11.2.  Revoking Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   This document presents a DNS and DNSSEC forward architecture.  That
   is, it assumes DNSSEC is required and defines an architecture in
   which different components or building blocks can be combined to
   achieve the needs of a particular use case, but where all of them are
   primarily realized using DNS and employ DNSSEC signing and
   validation.  For each building block or set of blocks introduced we
   reference the set of requirements it meets and identify other blocks
   with which it would likely be used or implemented.  This is intended
   to enable the construction of Digital Emblems that accommodate
   various granularity and temporality requirements.  Note:Digital
   Emblem protocols that do not use/require DNSSEC signing and
   validation thereof should specify how they handle emblem validation

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   (to the extent required for their intended use cases).  Among the
   variations discussed in this document are cases where

   *  All of the DE's key information provided within DNS ();

   *  DE uses DNS pointers to resources outside of DNS that contain the
      emblem's key information (Section 8);

   *  DE primarily consists of a single RR (Section 4);

   *  DE consists of a bundle of separated RR's (RRSet) where each RR
      contains one or more pieces of the DE's core information ();

   (Note:This list is not intended to be all inclusive.)

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Assumptions

   This document presents a DNS and DNSSEC forward architecture.  That
   is, it assumes DNSSEC is required and defines an architecture in
   which different components are primarily realized using DNS and
   DNSSEC. * Cryptographic validation of Digital Emblems is required and
   is performed using DNSSEC. * Given the use of DNSSEC, all cases must
   meet the assured response requirement and a baseline version of
   consistent content outlined in [USE_CASES] Section 3.2.2.  We discuss
   this in more detail and present a mechanism for supporting selective
   disclosure in Section 5.

4.  DNS Structures of Digital Emblems

   Decisions have to be made when designing the protocol and applying it
   for a given use case.  Generally speaking we recommend using a
   configuration that simplifies discovery and record maintenance but
   offer considerations for other approaches.

   *  Single RR w/everything vs multi RR/RRSet with each RR containing
      one or more pieces of core information

   *  Type(s) of RR(s) used within the Digital Emblem

      -  TXT vs no TXT

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5.  Zone Cut Structure for Digital Emblems

   Since we assume the use of DNSSEC, or rather that all RRs/RRsets
   making up a digital emblem are DNSSEC signed, the authoritative
   server cannot deny the existence of any associated RRs/RRsets.  As
   such, the only way to selectively disclose information within a
   digital emblem is for the authoritative server to hold two versions
   of any RRs that contain sensitive information or pointers thereto.
   Specifically:

   *  One that contains the sensitive information or pointers thereto
      (hidden RR).  The hidden RR should only be presented if mutual
      authentication succeeds, and the requestor identity's membership
      in the set of authorized identities can be verified.  Moreover,
      given the sensitivity of its contents, the hidden RR should be
      encrypted.

   *  One of the same type and for the same FQDN that only includes the
      basic and/or non-sensitive emblem information (default RR).  This
      version of the RR should be returned by the Authoratative server
      if mutual authentication is not used, or if the requester's
      identity and/or authorization to see the sensitive content cannot
      be verified.

   It is recommended that only RRtype(s) where the default RR does not
   indicate that sensitive details have been redacted or intentionally
   excluded from its contents be chosen.

6.  Digital Emblem Naming Structure

   To ensure Digital Emblems and all of their associated records can be
   realized, underscored naming of attribute leaves [RFC8552] should be
   used.  Specifically, we propose the use of following underscored
   attribute names:

   *  _diem to denote a Digital Emblem.

   *  _authorizers as a subdomain of _diem (i.e. _authorizers._diem) to
      denote the set of authorizers for a Digital Emblem.

   *  etc As noted in Section 10, the standardization of these
      attributes and of their associated RRtypes will require
      registration in the appropriate IANA registry.

7.  Authentication and DNSSEC Architecture of DE's

   TODO

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8.  Emblems that are not Fully Contained in DNS

   TODO

9.  Discovery

9.1.  DNS Contained Emblem Discovery

9.2.  External DE Discovery

10.  Use of IANA Registries

   If the use of underscored attribute leaves proposed in Section 6 is
   to be adopted, all underscored names and their associated RRtypes
   will need to be added to the appropriate registry.  (TODO: Update if
   consensus to use underscored naming is reached, remove otherwise.)

11.  Architecture for Authorizing Entities

   ~~~ goat
   {::include diagrams/Authorizers_Pt2-auth.svg}
   ~~~
   {: #authStruct title="Authorization by an External Entity"}

   Digital Emblems that require authorization from one or more entities
   outside of their zone should include an _Authorizers_ field
   indicating the full list of entities that have authorized the
   issuance and use of a Digital Emblem.  As illustrated in the figure
   above, each authorizer entry should contain the following fields.

   *  The Authorizer's common name (<AUTH_NAME>);

   *  The Authorizer's FQDN (<AUTH_FQDN>);And

   *  A collision resistant hash of all constraints the Authorizer has
      put on their authorization of the Digital Emblem, accompanied by a
      version number associated with the constraint set signed by the
      Authorizer (signed(HASH(constraints))).

   To enable this the Authorizer publishes a DNSSEC signed authorization
   RR/RRset at the subdomain <DE_Name>.authorized.<AUTH_FQDN>.  Within
   the RR/RRset they publish the version number of the current
   constraint set as well as the start and end date indicating the
   timeframe over which their authorization is valid.  The authorizer
   then computes the hash of their constraints and signs over this, the
   constraint version number and the start and end dates of their
   authorization.  To finalize the authorization, the authorizer sends
   the signed constraints hash and versioning metadata to the bearer,

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   who then uses this to update the set of authorizers within the
   Digital Emblem.  Note:To ease transitions from one set of constraints
   to another, or to handle reissuance of the authorization upon its
   expiration, Authorizers may host multiple authorization RRs/RRsets
   for the same emblem.

11.1.  Validation Procedure of ExtraZonal Authorization

   To validate an emblem that is authorized by an external Authorizer,
   the validator must ensure that all of the following conditions hold:

   1.  DNSSEC validation of all RRs/RRsets within the Digital Emblem
       succeeds.

   2.  The emblem is authorized by an authorizer the validator trusts.

   3.  An Authorization RR/RRset exists at
       <DE_Name>.authorized.<TRUSTED_AUTH_FQDN>, where
       <TRUSTED_AUTH_FQDN> is the FQDN of the trusted Authorizer.

   4.  At least one authorization RR/RRset at
       <DE_Name>.authorized.<TRUSTED_AUTH_FQDN> can be validated.  That
       is:

       *  DNSSEC validation of the RR/RRset succeeds;

       *  The version number noted in the Digital Emblem's authorizer
          record matches the constraint set version number;

       *  The validity period of the authorization record has begun but
          not ended;

       *  The Digital Emblem's use and/or claims comply with all of the
          constraints noted in the constraint set;And

       *  The Hash of the constraint set and signature over it match
          those provided in the Digital Emblem's authorizer record.

   If any of the conditions are not met, validation of the Digital
   Emblem has failed and the validator MUST reject it.

11.2.  Revoking Authorization

   Based on the procedures described in Section 11 and Section 11.1, an
   Authorizer can revoke their authorization of a Digital Emblem by
   removing the authorization RR(s)/RRset(s) located at
   <DE_Name>.authorized.<AUTH_FQDN>.

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12.  Security Considerations

   TODO Security

13.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [CHARTER]  "Digital Emblems", 27 May 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-diem/01/>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033>.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4034>.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4035>.

   [RFC6840]  Weiler, S., Ed. and D. Blacka, Ed., "Clarifications and
              Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)", RFC 6840,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6840, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6840>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8552]  Crocker, D., "Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource
              Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves",
              BCP 222, RFC 8552, DOI 10.17487/RFC8552, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8552>.

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   [RFC9364]  Hoffman, P., "DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)", BCP 237,
              RFC 9364, DOI 10.17487/RFC9364, February 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9364>.

   [USE_CASES]
              "Digital Emblems - Use Cases and Requirements", 6 July
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-diem-
              requirements/>.

14.2.  Informative References

   [DANCE-CLIENT-AUTH]
              "TLS Client Authentication via DANE TLSA records", 28
              October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
              ietf-dance-client-auth/>.

Acknowledgments

   TODO acknowledge.

Authors' Addresses

   Rahel A. Fainchtein
   JHU/APL
   Email: rahel.fainchtein@jhuapl.edu

   Allison Mankin
   Packet Clearing House
   Email: allison@pch.net

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