Public Key Checking Protocol
draft-farrell-kc-01
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Stephen Farrell | ||
Last updated | 2012-08-21 (Latest revision 2012-02-18) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Some asymmetric key generation implementations do not use sufficient randomness giving rise to a number of bad public keys, for example with known factors, being used on the Internet. This memo specifies [[for now: just outlines]] an experimental protocol that could be used by a private key holder to talk to a responder that knows the values of (some of) those bad keys that have been seen in the wild. The protocol only allows a holder of the relevant private key to request information, as doing otherwise could weaken the overall security of the Internet and also considers confidentiality and privacy as important requirements, as information that a given bad public key is associated with a particular identifier could also weaken the security of the Internet.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)