Signed Memory Projection Records for Verifiable AI Context Delivery
draft-ferro-schrock-memory-projection-record-00
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draft-ferro-schrock-memory-projection-record-00
Network Working Group A. Ferro
Internet-Draft ApertoMemory
Intended status: Experimental I. Schrock
Expires: 30 January 2027 EMILIA Protocol, Inc.
29 July 2026
Signed Memory Projection Records for Verifiable AI Context Delivery
draft-ferro-schrock-memory-projection-record-00
Abstract
Encrypted and signed memory objects can establish source integrity,
authorship, and read-time trust without establishing which exact
bytes a memory adapter selected and delivered to a downstream AI
system. This document specifies a provider-neutral signed Memory
Projection Record. The record commits to the recall request and
selection policy, the read-time keyring snapshot, the ordered source
objects and exact context fragments delivered, the complete
projection bytes, and summarized exclusions. It deliberately does
not claim that a model received, used, or weighted the projection,
that an action was authorized, or that an outcome occurred.
ApertoMemory is one source profile; other memory formats can use the
same projection boundary.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 January 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Scope and Nonclaims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Memory Projection Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Identity and Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Selection Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Delivered Entries and Projection Bytes . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Canonicalization and Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Producer Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Verifier Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Composition with Downstream Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
15. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
A memory-object format and a context-delivery record answer different
questions. A memory-object format can prove that an object verified
under a key accepted at read time. It does not, by itself, identify
the set, order, framing, or exact bytes selected for a particular AI
request. Conversely, a projection record cannot repair invalid
source provenance. It can only preserve the source decision and bind
it to the bytes emitted by a named adapter.
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This document defines the join between those layers. A projection
producer signs one closed record after the projection bytes and their
ordered fragments are finalized. A verifier recomputes the source-
object, fragment, and complete-projection commitments and verifies
the adapter signature under a relying-party-pinned key. The
resulting fact is narrow: the producer attests that it emitted the
committed projection under the committed selection context.
The source memory profile remains authoritative for its own object,
cryptographic, trust, authorship, and custody semantics. In
particular, ApertoMemory [I-D.ferro-apertomemory] remains
authoritative for sealed Memory Objects and its read-time trust
derivation. This document does not redefine those semantics. It
defines a joint, provider-neutral artifact above that boundary.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Scope and Nonclaims
A conforming Memory Projection Record establishes all of the
following:
* the adapter identity and pinned signing key used to produce the
record;
* commitments to the recall request, selection policy, source-
profile trust snapshot, and framing profile;
* the ordered list of source objects selected, with the trust and
authorship results supplied by the source profile;
* the exact bytes of each framed context fragment and of the
complete emitted projection; and
* the number of objects excluded for each closed exclusion reason.
A projection record does not establish transport receipt, insertion
into a model context window, model use or weighting, action linkage,
action authorization, execution, or outcome. A downstream system MAY
bind the projection digest into a separate request, authorization, or
outcome protocol. Such a binding is outside this document.
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3. Terminology
Source profile The independently governed memory format and
verification rules from which object identity, trust, authorship,
and custody facts are derived.
Projection producer The adapter that selects source objects, frames
exact context fragments, constructs the complete projection, and
signs the Memory Projection Record.
Projection The exact byte string emitted by the producer for
downstream context delivery.
Context fragment The exact framed bytes contributed by one selected
source object at one position in the projection.
Trust snapshot A commitment to the source-profile trust state used
when the selection decision was made. For ApertoMemory this is a
read-time keyring snapshot, because trust is derived rather than
stored in the object.
b64u Unpadded base64url encoding as defined in Section 5 of
[RFC4648].
4. Memory Projection Record
MEMORY-PROJECTION-RECORD-v1 is a closed I-JSON object [RFC7493]. The
top-level members are shown below. Member order in a JSON
serialization has no significance. Unknown members MUST be refused
until a later version defines an extension mechanism.
{
"@version": "MEMORY-PROJECTION-RECORD-v1",
"source_profile": "draft-ferro-apertomemory-02",
"projection_id": "urn:memory-projection:example:1234",
"created_at": "2026-07-29T17:00:01.000Z",
"adapter": {
"id": "urn:memory-adapter:example:1",
"key_id": "adapter-key-2026-07"
},
"selection_context": {
"recall_request_digest": "sha256:...",
"selection_policy_digest": "sha256:...",
"trust_snapshot_digest": "sha256:...",
"trust_evaluated_at": "2026-07-29T17:00:00.000Z",
"context_frame_profile": "urn:context-frame:example:v1"
},
"delivered": [
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{
"position": 0,
"object": {
"format_version": 2,
"sealed_object_digest": "sha256:..."
},
"context_fragment_digest": "sha256:...",
"derived_trust": "trusted",
"authorship": "attested",
"author_key_id_b64u": "0FMJy9O1Xzs",
"custody_present": true
}
],
"exclusions": {
"total": 2,
"by_reason": {
"authentication_failed": 1,
"schema_invalid": 0,
"policy_filtered": 0,
"context_limit": 1
}
},
"projection": {
"encoding": "utf-8",
"byte_length": 314,
"digest": "sha256:..."
},
"nonclaims": {
"model_use": "NOT_ESTABLISHED",
"action_linkage": "NOT_ESTABLISHED",
"action_authorization": "NOT_ESTABLISHED",
"execution_outcome": "NOT_ESTABLISHED"
},
"proof": {
"alg": "Ed25519",
"key_id": "adapter-key-2026-07",
"signature_b64u": "..."
}
}
4.1. Identity and Time
@version MUST equal MEMORY-PROJECTION-RECORD-v1. projection_id MUST
be a globally unique URI. created_at and trust_evaluated_at MUST be
UTC timestamps conforming to [RFC3339]. adapter.id identifies the
producer; adapter.key_id selects a key from relying-party policy.
proof.key_id MUST equal adapter.key_id.
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The relying party MUST set a maximum acceptable interval between
trust_evaluated_at, created_at, and its verification time. A valid
signature does not make a stale trust decision current.
4.2. Selection Context
recall_request_digest is SHA-256 over the exact request bytes under a
profile that defines their serialization. selection_policy_digest is
SHA-256 over the exact policy bytes that determined eligibility,
filtering, ordering, and limits. trust_snapshot_digest is SHA-256
over the source-profile-defined trust snapshot. context_frame_profile
names the deterministic transformation from one opened source object
and its labels to one context fragment.
The cleartext request, policy, and trust snapshot need not be carried
in the record. A verifier that relies on any of them MUST possess
the exact bytes and their applicable serialization profiles and MUST
recompute the corresponding digest.
4.3. Delivered Entries and Projection Bytes
delivered is an array in projection order. position MUST equal the
zero-based array index and MUST NOT repeat. sealed_object_digest is
SHA-256 over the exact complete source-object bytes as supplied,
without parsing or reserialization. format_version is interpreted
only by the named source profile.
context_fragment_digest is SHA-256 over the exact bytes of the
fragment emitted for that entry, including framing labels,
separators, and line endings. The complete projection is the
bytewise concatenation of those fragments in ascending position.
projection.byte_length and projection.digest MUST equal the length
and SHA-256 digest of that complete byte string. This version
supports only UTF-8 projection bytes; projection.encoding MUST equal
utf-8.
derived_trust, authorship, author_key_id_b64u, and custody_present
preserve the source-profile result used at selection time. They MUST
NOT be recomputed under rules invented by the projection producer.
For an ApertoMemory source, the source profile remains solely
authoritative for those values. Unverified content MUST use
authorship unknown and a null author key. Attested authorship
requires custody_present true.
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4.4. Exclusions
exclusions.total MUST equal the sum of the closed by_reason counters.
authentication_failed counts objects refused by source
authentication; schema_invalid counts source objects the source
profile refuses; policy_filtered counts otherwise valid objects
excluded by policy; and context_limit counts otherwise eligible
objects omitted due to a projection limit. A producer MUST NOT map
an unknown reason into a semantically different counter. This
version does not disclose excluded object identifiers, reducing
correlation and content-oracle risk.
5. Canonicalization and Signature
Every member except proof is inside the signature boundary. The
producer removes proof, canonicalizes the remaining object with JCS
[RFC8785], prefixes the following UTF-8 domain string and one zero
octet, and signs the resulting bytes with Ed25519 [RFC8032]:
MEMORY-PROJECTION-RECORD-v1\0 || JCS(record without proof)
proof.alg MUST equal Ed25519. signature_b64u is the unpadded
base64url encoding [RFC4648] of the 64-byte signature. The public
key MUST come from relying-party policy or an authenticated key-
distribution mechanism outside the record. A key carried with the
record is not a trust anchor.
6. Producer Algorithm
1. Open and verify candidate objects using their native source
profile. Record the trust snapshot and evaluation time.
2. Commit to the recall request and complete selection policy before
selecting objects.
3. Apply authentication, schema, policy, ordering, and size rules.
Count every excluded candidate under exactly one exclusion
reason.
4. Construct each final context fragment, hash its exact bytes, and
append its entry in order. After this step the fragments MUST
NOT be mutated without rebuilding the record.
5. Concatenate the fragments, compute projection.byte_length and
projection.digest, construct the nonclaims, and sign the closed
record.
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6. Return or make available the projection bytes and record as one
logical result. A failure after signing but before downstream
delivery MUST NOT be reported as proof that a model received the
bytes.
7. Verifier Algorithm
1. Require the exact top-level and nested member sets defined by
this version. Validate types, enumerations, timestamps, and
digest syntax.
2. Resolve adapter.key_id under relying-party policy, verify that it
is current for created_at, and verify the Ed25519 signature over
the domain-separated JCS bytes.
3. Enforce freshness policy for created_at and trust_evaluated_at
and reject a duplicate projection_id when policy requires single
use.
4. If relying on the request, policy, or trust snapshot, recompute
its digest under the named profile.
5. Verify each exact source-object digest under its native source
profile. Preserve, rather than reinterpret, the native trust,
authorship, and custody result.
6. Require sequential positions. Recompute every fragment digest
from the exact fragment bytes, concatenate those bytes in order,
and verify the complete length and digest.
7. Verify that exclusions.total equals the sum of the closed reason
counters and that all four nonclaims equal NOT_ESTABLISHED.
A verifier MUST refuse mutation, omission, duplication, or reordering
of a delivered entry; a fragment or projection mismatch; an unpinned,
expired, or compromised adapter key; a stale trust evaluation; a
count mismatch; an unknown field; an altered nonclaim; or an invalid
signature.
8. Composition with Downstream Systems
A downstream protocol may bind projection.digest and projection_id
into a model invocation, action proposal, authorization, admission
decision, execution receipt, or outcome record. That downstream
protocol is authoritative for its own semantics. The Memory
Projection Record MUST remain valid and useful without requiring any
particular agent, authorization, or outcome framework.
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EMILIA Trusted Context, AEC, Gate, and Outcome Binding are one
consumer profile. They may use the projection as one evidence leg
and independently bind the actual action and consequence. They are
not part of the neutral projection-record wire format and do not
authorize changes to the source profile or projection record.
9. Security Considerations
A signed projection can preserve poisoned content with high
integrity. Producers MUST therefore apply the native source profile
fail closed and MUST keep unverified content distinguishable from
self or trusted content. The projection signature proves an adapter
statement, not the correctness of a memory, trust policy, keyring,
framing policy, or model behavior.
Stable object identifiers and excluded-object lists create
correlation and membership oracles. This version commits to exact
source bytes and carries aggregate exclusion counts rather than
cleartext source identifiers. Deployments SHOULD use pairwise
adapter identifiers where appropriate and SHOULD minimize retention
of request, policy, and projection material.
Replay can cause an old but valid projection to be applied under a
new request. Relying parties MUST enforce freshness and SHOULD
register projection_id atomically when single use is required. A
stale or revoked source keyring, adapter key, or policy MUST NOT be
made current merely by replaying a valid historical signature.
10. Privacy Considerations
Memory projections can contain highly sensitive personal facts and
can reveal selection behavior even when source objects remain
encrypted. Records SHOULD carry commitments rather than cleartext
requests, policies, trust snapshots, or excluded identifiers. The
projection bytes SHOULD be disclosed only to the intended downstream
recipient. Logs SHOULD avoid storing raw projection or fragment
bytes unless operationally required.
11. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
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12. Implementation Status
An Apache-2.0 executable discussion profile [AMEM-EMILIA-INTEROP]
currently implements AMEM-PROJECTION-RECORD-v0. It signs the ordered
projection with Ed25519, verifies exact sealed-object, fragment, and
complete-projection digests, preserves ApertoMemory read-time trust
and custody results, and exercises positive and hostile mutation
vectors. The implementation uses the domain AMEM-EMILIA-PROJECTION-
RECORD-v0 and marks each record as discussion input rather than
ApertoMemory conformance.
The v0 executable profile is implementation input to this -00. It is
not asserted to conform to MEMORY-PROJECTION-RECORD-v1 until the
neutral field set, domain string, and reciprocal tests in this
document are implemented and independently reviewed. ApertoMemory
and EMILIA have independently reproduced five source-fact cases from
the ApertoMemory reference implementation and matched their exact
source-object digests and native trust, authorship, signer, author,
and custody results. That bounded check is not blanket conformance
and establishes none of the nonclaims in Section 2.
13. Acknowledgments
The authors thank Matteo Clementel for his review and contributions
to the memory-projection boundary.
14. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC7493] Bray, T., Ed., "The I-JSON Message Format", RFC 7493,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7493, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7493>.
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[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
15. Informative References
[AMEM-EMILIA-INTEROP]
Schrock, I., "ApertoMemory / EMILIA Memory-to-Action
Composition Profile", July 2026, <https://github.com/
emilia-protocol/emilia-protocol/tree/main/interop/
apertomemory-emilia>.
[I-D.ferro-apertomemory]
Ferro, A., "The ApertoMemory Format: Portable, Client-
Side-Encrypted AI Memory", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ferro-apertomemory-02, 22 July 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ferro-
apertomemory/>.
Authors' Addresses
Andrea Ferro
ApertoMemory
Email: irn@irn3.com
Iman Schrock
EMILIA Protocol, Inc.
United States of America
Email: team@emiliaprotocol.ai
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