OAuth 2.0 Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPoP)
draft-fett-oauth-dpop-03
Web Authorization Protocol D. Fett
Internet-Draft yes.com
Intended status: Standards Track B. Campbell
Expires: May 2, 2020 Ping Identity
J. Bradley
Yubico
T. Lodderstedt
yes.com
M. Jones
Microsoft
D. Waite
Ping Identity
October 30, 2019
OAuth 2.0 Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer
(DPoP)
draft-fett-oauth-dpop-03
Abstract
This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0
tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level.
This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access
and refresh tokens.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 2, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Fett, et al. Expires May 2, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft OAuth DPoP October 2019
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Main Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. DPoP Proof JWTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Checking DPoP Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Token Request (Binding Tokens to a Public Key) . . . . . . . 7
6. Resource Access (Proof of Possession for Access Tokens) . . . 8
7. Public Key Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. DPoP Proof Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Signed JWT Swapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.3. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.4. Message Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values
Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
[I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls] describes methods to bind (sender-constrain)
access tokens using mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS)
authentication with X.509 certificates.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] provides mechanisms to sender-
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