Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)
draft-fiebig-security-acme-00

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2019-07-22 (latest revision 2019-01-11)
Replaces draft-fiebig-acme-esecacme
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-fiebig-security-acme-00.txt

Abstract

Most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued via the ACME protocol. Recently, several attacks against domain validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after-free and (forced) on-path attacks. These attacks can often be mitigated by (selectively) requiring additional challenges, such as DNS validation, proof of ownership of a prior certificate, and by being more diligent in operating a certificate authority. This document provides a list of currently known attacks and describes mitigations and operational procedures to prevent issuing a certificate to an unauthorized party.

Authors

Tobias Fiebig (t.fiebig@tudelft.nl)
Kevin Borgolte (kevin@iseclab.org)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)