@techreport{fiebig-security-acme-01,
    number =    {draft-fiebig-security-acme-01},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fiebig-security-acme/01/},
    author =    {Tobias Fiebig and Kevin Borgolte},
    title =     {{Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)}},
    pagetotal = 10,
    year =      2019,
    month =     sep,
    day =       9,
    abstract =  {Most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued via the ACME protocol. Recently, several attacks against domain validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after-free and (forced) on-path attacks. These attacks can often be mitigated by (selectively) requiring additional challenges, such as DNS validation, proof of ownership of a prior certificate, and by being more diligent in operating a certificate authority. This document provides a list of currently known attacks and describes mitigations and operational procedures to prevent issuing a certificate to an unauthorized party.},
}