NTRU Key Encapsulation
draft-fluhrer-cfrg-ntru-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Scott Fluhrer , Michael Prorock , Sofia Celi , John Gray | ||
| Last updated | 2023-11-06 (Latest revision 2023-05-02) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This draft documents NTRU as a post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) scheme. The NTRU method from KEM is believed to be IPR free and cryptographically sound for both classical and post- quantum threat environments. NIST has run a competition to select post-quantum primitives and preliminary selected Kyber for standarization as a KEM. Kyber unfortunately has plausible patent claims against it and there are currently undisclosed agreements with the patent holders and NIST. It is unknown whether those agreements would be universally acceptable; if not, there will be organizations for which Kyber is unusable until the patents expire. This lack of clarity around licensing or other restrictions on Kyber has provided the motivation to author this draft. This document does not define any new cryptography, only describes an existing cryptographic system.
Authors
Scott Fluhrer
Michael Prorock
Sofia Celi
John Gray
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)