Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2
draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (ipsecme WG)
Last updated 2017-04-19
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Internet Engineering Task Force                               S. Fluhrer
Internet-Draft                                                 D. McGrew
Intended status: Informational                             P. Kampanakis
Expires: October 21, 2017                                  Cisco Systems
                                                          April 19, 2017

                  Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2
                       draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-04

Abstract

   The possibility of quantum computers pose a serious challenge to
   cryptography algorithms widely today.  IKEv2 is one example of a
   cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications
   today could decrypt them at a later time when a quantum computer is
   available.  It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support
   quantum secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to
   happen in the near term.  To address this problem before then, this
   document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant
   to a Quantum Computer, by using preshared keys.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Fluhrer, et al.         Expires October 21, 2017                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       Postquantum Security for IKEv2           April 2017

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  PPK ID format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  PPK Distribution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Upgrade procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.2.  Informational References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Discussion and Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   It is an open question whether or not it is feasible to build a
   quantum computer (and if so, when might one be implemented), but if
   it is, many of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols currently
   in use would be insecure.  A quantum computer would be able to solve
   DH and ECDH problems, and this would imply that the security of
   existing IKEv2 systems would be compromised.  IKEv1 when used with
   strong preshared keys is not vulnerable to quantum attacks, because
   those keys are one of the inputs to the key derivation function.  If
   the preshared key has sufficient entropy and the PRF, encryption and
   authentication transforms are postquantum secure, then the resulting
   system is believed to be quantum resistant, that is, believed to be
   invulnerable to an attacker with a Quantum Computer.

   This document describes a way to extend IKEv2 to have a similar
   property; assuming that the two end systems share a long secret key,
   then the resulting exchange is quantum resistant.  By bringing
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