Implementing RPKI-based origin validation one country at a time. The Ecuadorian case study.
draft-fmejia-opsec-origin-a-country-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Fabian Mejia , Roque Gagliano , Alvaro Retana , Carlos M. Martínez , Gerardo Rada | ||
| Last updated | 2015-09-04 (Latest revision 2015-03-03) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
One possible deployment strategy for BGP origin validation based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is the construction of islands of trust. This document describes the authors' experience deploying and maintaining a BGP origin validation island of trust in Ecuador.
Authors
Fabian Mejia
Roque Gagliano
Alvaro Retana
Carlos M. Martínez
Gerardo Rada
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)