Implementing RPKI-based origin validation one country at a time. The Ecuadorian case study.
draft-fmejia-opsec-origin-a-country-02
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2015-09-04 (latest revision 2015-03-03) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
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https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-fmejia-opsec-origin-a-country-02.txt
Abstract
One possible deployment strategy for BGP origin validation based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is the construction of islands of trust. This document describes the authors' experience deploying and maintaining a BGP origin validation island of trust in Ecuador.
Authors
Fabian Mejia
(fabian@aeprovi.org.ec)
Roque Gagliano
(rogaglia@cisco.com)
Alvaro Retana
(aretana@cisco.com)
Carlos MartÃnez
(carlos@lacnic.net)
Gerardo Rada
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)