Route Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Danny McPherson  , Shane Amante  , Eric Osterweil 
Last updated 2013-05-11 (latest revision 2012-11-07)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Secure Inter-Domain Routing working group during routing security requirements discussions and subsequent specification.


Danny McPherson (
Shane Amante (
Eric Osterweil (

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)