Route Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
draft-foo-sidr-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-02
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Danny McPherson , Shane Amante , Eric Osterweil | ||
| Last updated | 2013-05-11 (latest revision 2012-11-07) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-foo-sidr-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-02.txt
Abstract
This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Secure Inter-Domain Routing working group during routing security requirements discussions and subsequent specification.
Authors
Danny McPherson
(dmcpherson@verisign.com)
Shane Amante
(shane@level3.net)
Eric Osterweil
(eosterweil@verisign.com)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)