Route Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
draft-foo-sidr-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Danny R. McPherson , Shane Amante , Eric Osterweil | ||
| Last updated | 2013-05-11 (Latest revision 2012-11-07) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Secure Inter-Domain Routing working group during routing security requirements discussions and subsequent specification.
Authors
Danny R. McPherson
Shane Amante
Eric Osterweil
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)