Route Leak Attacks Against BGPSEC
draft-foo-sidr-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-01
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Danny R. McPherson , Shane Amante | ||
| Last updated | 2012-05-19 (Latest revision 2011-11-16) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Secure Inter-Domain Routing working group during routing security requirements discussions and subsequent specification.
Authors
Danny R. McPherson
Shane Amante
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)