Requirements for Message Access Control
draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-00
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Active Internet-Draft (individual)
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Trevor Freeman
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Jim Schaad
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Patrick Patterson
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2012-03-05
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Network Working Group T. Freeman
Internet-Draft Microsoft Corp.
Intended status: Informational J. Schaad
Expires: September 6, 2012 Soaring Hawk Consulting
P. Patterson
Carillon Information Security Inc
March 5, 2012
Requirements for Message Access Control
draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-00
Abstract
There are many situations where organizations want to protect
information with robust access control, either for implementation of
intellectual property right protections, enforcement of information
contractual confidentiality agreements or because of externally
imposed legal regulations. The Enhanced Security Services (ESS) for
S/MIME defines an access control mechanism which is enforced by the
recipient's client after decryption of the message. The ESS mechanism
therefore is dependent on the correct access policy configuration of
every recipient's client. This mechanism also provides full access to
the data to all recipients prior to the access control check, this is
considered to be inadequate for due to the difficulty in
demonstrating policy compliance.
This document lays out the deficiencies of the current ESS security
label, and presents requirements for new model for doing access
control to messages where the access check is performed prior to
message content decryption. This new model also does not require
policy configuration on the client to simplify deployment and
compliance verification.
The proposed model additionally provides a method where non-X.509
certificate credentials can be used for encryption/decryption of
S/MIME messages.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Freeman, et al. Expires September 6, 2012 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Requirements for Message Access Control March 5, 2012
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 20, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Freeman, et al. Expires September 6, 2012 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Requirements for Message Access Control March 5, 2012
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Data Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Encrypted E-Mail Using Web-based Credentials . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. ESS Security Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Access Control and the Web . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3. Information Asset Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. Authentication Assurance Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3. Use Case Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 Consumer to Consumer Secure Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2. Business to Consumer Secure Email . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3 Business to Business Ad-Hoc Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4 Business to Business Regulated Email . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5 Delegation of Access to Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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