BRSKI over IEEE 802.11
draft-friel-brski-over-802dot11-00

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Last updated 2018-03-02
Replaced by draft-friel-anima-brski-over-802dot11
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Network Working Group                                           O. Friel
Internet-Draft                                                   E. Lear
Intended status: Standards Track                             M. Pritikin
Expires: September 3, 2018                                         Cisco
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                          March 02, 2018

                         BRSKI over IEEE 802.11
                   draft-friel-brski-over-802dot11-00

Abstract

   This document outlines the challenges associated with implementing
   Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures over IEEE 802.11 and
   IEEE 802.1x networks.  Multiple options are presented for discovering
   and authenticating to the correct IEEE 802.11 SSID.  This initial
   draft is a discussion document and no final recommendations are made
   on the recommended approaches to take.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 3, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

Friel, et al.           Expires September 3, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 BRSKI-WIFI                     March 2018

   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Potential SSID Discovery Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Incorrect SSID Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Well-known BRSKI SSID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  802.11aq  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  802.11u NAI Realm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.5.  802.11u Interworking Information - Internet . . . . . . .   7
     2.6.  Define new 802.11u Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.7.  Wi-Fi Protected Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.8.  Wi-Fi Device Provisioning Profile . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Potential Authentication Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  SSID Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  IP Address Assignment Considerations  . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  Unauthenticated Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI  . . . .  10
     3.4.  PSK Pre-BRSKI and 802.1X EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI . . . . . . .  10
     3.5.  802.1X EAP-TLS Pre-BRSKI and 802.1X EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI  .  11
     3.6.  New 802.1X EAP-BRSKI mechanism  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  802.11 Primer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     A.1.  802.11i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     A.2.  802.11u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] describes how a device can
   bootstrap against a local network using an Initial Device Identity
   X.509 [IEEE802.1AR] IDevID certificate that is pre-installed by the
   vendor on the device in order to obtain an [IEEE802.1AR] LDevID.  The
   BRSKI flow assumes the device can obtain an IP address, and thus
   assumes the device has already connected to the local network.
   Further, the draft states that BRSKI use of IDevIDs:

      allows for alignment with 802.1X network access control methods,
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