Support of asynchronous Enrollment in BRSKI
draft-fries-anima-brski-async-enroll-00

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Last updated 2019-03-11
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ANIMA WG                                                        S. Fries
Internet-Draft                                              H. Brockhaus
Intended status: Standards Track                                 Siemens
Expires: September 12, 2019                                      E. Lear
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                          March 11, 2019

              Support of asynchronous Enrollment in BRSKI
                draft-fries-anima-brski-async-enroll-00

Abstract

   This document discusses the enhancement of automated bootstrapping of
   a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI) to operate in domains
   featuring no or only timely limited connectivity to backend services
   offering enrollment functionality like a Public Key Infrastructure
   (PKI).  In the context of deploying new devices the design of BRSKI
   allows for online (synchronous object exchange) and offline
   interactions (asynchronous object exchange) with a manufacturer's
   authorization service.  It utilizes a self-contained voucher to
   transport the domain credentials as a signed object to establish an
   initial trust between the pledge and the deployment domain.  The
   currently supported enrollment protocol for request and distribution
   of deployment domain specific device certificates provides only
   limited support for asynchronous PKI interactions.  This memo
   motivates support of self-contained objects also for certificate
   management by using an abstract notation to allow off-site operation
   of PKI services, with only limited connectivity to the pledge
   deployment domain.  This addresses specifically scenarios, in which
   the deployment domain of a pledge does not perform the final
   authorization of a certification request and rather delegates this
   decision to an operator backend.  The goal is to enable the usage of
   existing and potentially new PKI protocols supporting self-
   containment for certificate management.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Fries, et al.          Expires September 12, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                  BRSKI-AE                      March 2019

   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

Copyright Notice

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Supported environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Application Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.1.  Rolling stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.2.  Building automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.3.  Substation automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.4.  Electric vehicle charging infrastructure  . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Requirements for asynchronous operation . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Secure Imprinting using Vouchers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Addressing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Pledge - Registrar discovery and voucher exchange . . . .  12
     5.2.  Registrar - MASA voucher exchange . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.3.  Pledge - Registrar - RA/CA certificate enrollment . . . .  14
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
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