@techreport{fujiwara-dnsop-fragment-attack-01,
    number =    {draft-fujiwara-dnsop-fragment-attack-01},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fujiwara-dnsop-fragment-attack/01/},
    author =    {Kazunori Fujiwara},
    title =     {{Measures against cache poisoning attacks using IP fragmentation in DNS}},
    pagetotal = 13,
    year =      2019,
    month =     mar,
    day =       1,
    abstract =  {Researchers proposed practical DNS cache poisoning attacks using IP fragmentation. This document shows feasible and adequate measures at full-service resolvers and authoritative servers against these attacks. To protect resolvers from these attacks, avoid fragmentation (limit requestor's UDP payload size to 1220/1232), drop fragmented UDP DNS responses and use TCP at resolver side. To make a domain name robust against these attacks, limit EDNS0 Responder's maximum payload size to 1220, set DONTFRAG option to DNS response packets and use good random fragmentation ID at authoritative server side.},
}