Application Layer Security for CoAP using the (D)TLS Record Layer
draft-garcia-core-app-layer-sec-with-dtls-record-00

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CoRE Working Group                                             D. Garcia
Internet-Draft                                                 S. Matheu
Intended status: Experimental                                   R. Marin
Expires: June 9, 2017                               University of Murcia
                                                        December 6, 2016

   Application Layer Security for CoAP using the (D)TLS Record Layer
          draft-garcia-core-app-layer-sec-with-dtls-record-00

Abstract

   This document briefly describes an idea to provide Application-Layer
   Security for CoAP using (D)TLS Record Layer, assuming it is operative
   in two CoAP endpoints.

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Garcia, et al.            Expires June 9, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-DraftApplication Layer Security for CoAP using (D)December 2016

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Application Layer Security for CoAP with (D)TLS Record
       Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  CoAP Fields to protect  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Processing a CoAP message with the (D)TLS Record  . . . . . .   3
   4.  Bootstrapping the (D)TLS Record Layer for Application
       Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   Secure communications in constrained scenarios is subject of current
   interest since the restrictions in those kinds of networks motivates
   rethinking the solutions that up to now have been used in networks
   that do not suffer from very stringent requirements.  (D)TLS
   [RFC6347][RFC5246] is a standard proposed to secure the
   communications of CoAP and suitable for end-to-end communications
   unless a CoAP proxy participates in the communication.  To overcome
   this problem [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] propose Object Security
   for CoAP (OSCOAP) to allow end-to-end security between two CoAP
   endpoints in case of a CoAP proxy intermediating between them.

   In this document we explore that possibility of providing CoAP
   security at application layer, assuming a (D)TLS Record Layer is
   operative (i.e. have the required keys) in both CoAP endpoints.  One
   possibility to "activate" the (D)TLS Record Layer is running (D)TLS
   handshake over CoAP, as mentioned in CoDTLS
   [I-D.schmertmann-dice-codtls].  Other (more challenging) options are
   discussed in [I-D.bhattacharyya-dice-less-on-coap]

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Application Layer Security for CoAP with (D)TLS Record Protocol

   To achieve application layer security using the (D)TLS Record, we
   assume the (D)TLS [RFC6347] [RFC5246] Record layer is already
   activated, using a protocol such as CoDTLS
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