Neighbor Discovery Enhancements for DOS mititgation
draft-gashinsky-6man-v6nd-enhance-00

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Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2012-07-11 (latest revision 2012-01-08)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gashinsky-6man-v6nd-enhance-00.txt

Abstract

In IPv4, subnets are generally small, made just large enough to cover the actual number of machines on the subnet. In contrast, the default IPv6 subnet size is a /64, a number so large it covers trillions of addresses, the overwhelming number of which will be unassigned. Consequently, simplistic implementations of Neighbor Discovery can be vulnerable to denial of service attacks whereby they attempt to perform address resolution for large numbers of unassigned addresses. Such denial of attacks can be launched intentionally (by an attacker), or result from legitimate operational tools that scan networks for inventory and other purposes. As a result of these vulnerabilities, new devices may not be able to "join" a network, it may be impossible to establish new IPv6 flows, and existing ipv6 transported flows may be interrupted. This document describes possible modifications to the traditional [RFC4861] neighbor discovery protocol for improving the resilience of the neighbor discovery process as well as an alternative method for maintaining ND caches.

Authors

Warren Kumari (warren@kumari.net)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)