Publishing End-Site Prefix Lengths
draft-gasser-opsawg-prefix-lengths-02
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (opsawg WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Oliver Gasser , Randy Bush , Massimo Candela , Russ Housley | ||
| Last updated | 2024-11-18 (Latest revision 2024-11-04) | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Candidate for WG Adoption | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-gasser-opsawg-prefix-lengths-02
Network Working Group O. Gasser
Internet-Draft IPinfo
Intended status: Standards Track R. Bush
Expires: 8 May 2025 IIJ Research & Arrcus
M. Candela
NTT
R. Housley
Vigil Security
4 November 2024
Publishing End-Site Prefix Lengths
draft-gasser-opsawg-prefix-lengths-02
Abstract
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
Specification Language (RPSL) inetnum: class to refer specifically to
prefixlen comma-separated values (CSV) data files and describes an
optional scheme that uses the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) to authenticate the prefixlen data files.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 May 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. prefixlen Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Fetching prefixlen Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Authenticating prefixlen Data (Optional) . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction
Internet service providers (ISPs) delegate IP addresses or entire IP
prefixes to their users. Similarly, cloud providers assign customers
who use their services such as virtual machines a prefix of a
specific size. Therefore, there are countless variations of
different end-site prefix length present in the Internet. Currently,
there is no easy way for content providers to know the end-site
prefix size of someone accessing their service. Knowing the correct
end-site's prefix size has multiple implications such as:
* Blocklisting/throttling: In IPv4, IP addresses can be blocked at
different prefix levels, such as /24 or /32. In IPv6 on the other
hand, blocking at e.g. the /64 level could lead to overblocking
(throwing multiple VMs from different users into the same bucket),
while blocking at the e.g. /128 level would lead to filling up
space in the blocklist pretty quickly. The same applies to
throttling. [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-addressing] recently also raised
this issue.
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* Rate limiting/CAPTCHAs: A similar issue arises on the Web, where
"close" prefixes might be thrown together (e.g. in the same /56,
even though the ISP hands out /64s), which leads to people
"jointly" running into rate limits and then either being blocked
from a service or having to solve annoying CAPTCHAs.
* Geolocation: Getting the right prefix size for IPv6 geolocation is
similarly hard. If you aggregate too little, you throw together
different clients in different locations, and if you aggregate too
much, you fill up the geolocation database with unnecessary
entries.
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2725] inetnum: class to refer
specifically to prefixlen data files and how to use them. In all
places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed [RFC4012].
The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and
certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database
classes.
An optional means for authenticating prefixlen data is also defined
in Section 6.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. prefixlen Files
prefixlen files are CSV (Comma Separated Values) [RFC4180] files in
UTF-8 [RFC3629] text format; not HTML, richtext, or other formats.
Lines MUST be delimited by a line break (CRLF), and blank lines MUST
be ignored. Text from a '#' character to the end of the current line
MUST be treated as a comment only and is similarly ignored. The
first field of each non-ignored line specifies the prefix in question
and the second field the end-site prefix length within that prefix as
an integer.
If an ISP delegates /56 IPv6 prefixes of the 2001:db8::/32 range, and
/32 IPv4 prefixes (i.e. a single IPv4 address) of the 192.0.2.0/24
range to its customers, it would create a prefix length file
containing the following example entries:
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2001:db8::/32,56
192.0.2.0/24,32
If a cloud provider assigns /120 IPv6 prefixes to each customer VM
and a /64 prefix to premium customers, it would create a prefix
length file containing the following example entries:
2001:db8::/32,120
2001:db8:abcd::/48,64
Note that the second entry in the above example is a subprefix of the
first entry. Therefore, longest prefix matching has to be taken into
account when parsing prefixlen files.
prefixlen files can also be used to signal the presence of Carrier-
Grade NAT (CGN) [RFC6598] networks. This is especially useful for
cases where multiple end-sites behind a CGN accessing a service at
the same time might run into rate limiting issues by service
providers. In case a prefixlen file signals the presence of a CGN,
service providers can treat these prefixes in a way that rate limits
are not triggered. To signal the presence of a CGN, a prefixlen file
contains a prefix length field larger than the most specific prefix
sizes, i.e., 32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6. Specifically, the prefix
length field value is specified as prefix_length +
log_2(number_of_cgn_end_sites). For example, a CGN prefix
192.0.2.0/24 containing 65,536 end sites would lead to a prefix
length value of 24 + log_2(65536) = 24 + 16 = 40 and is specified as
follows:
192.0.2.0/24,40
Duplicate prefix entries MUST be considered an error, and consumer
implementations SHOULD log the repeated entries for further
administrative review. Publishers SHOULD take measures to ensure
there is one and only one entry per prefix.
Content providers and other parties who wish to differentiate
services based on end site prefixes need to find the relevant
prefixlen data. In Section 4, this document specifies how to find
the relevant prefixlen file given an IP address.
prefixlen data for large providers with significant horizontal scale
and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be
even larger if an unsigned prefixlen file combines data for many
prefixes, if dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc.
This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly
authenticate the data in the prefixlen files.
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4. inetnum: Class
The original RPSL specifications starting with [RIPE81], [RIPE181],
and a trail of subsequent documents were written by the RIPE
community. The IETF standardized RPSL in [RFC2622] and [RFC4012].
Since then, it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the
Regional Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE [RIPE-DB].
At the time of publishing this document, change control of RPSL
effectively lies in the operator community.
The RPSL, and [RFC2725] and [RFC4012] used by the Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs), specify the inetnum: database class. Each of
these objects describes an IP address range and its attributes. The
inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on the address space.
Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL prefixlen:
attribute in the inetnum: class. Absent implementation of the
prefixlen: attribute in a particular RIR database, this document
defines the syntax of a prefixlen remarks: attribute, which contains
an HTTPS URL of a prefixlen file. The format of the inetnum:
prefixlen remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks:
Prefixlen ", where the token "prefixlen" MUST be case sensitive,
followed by a URL that will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single
prefixlen file.
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
remarks: Prefixlen https://example.com/prefixlen
While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant
parties, we specify that a proper prefixlen: attribute in the
inetnum: class MUST be "prefixlen:" and MUST be followed by a single
URL that will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single prefixlen
file.
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
prefixlen: https://example.com/prefixlen
The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication, integrity,
and confidentiality for the fetched prefixlen file. However, the
WebPKI can not provide authentication of IP address space assignment.
In contrast, the RPKI (see [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP
space assignment; see optional authentication in Section 6.
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In addition to publishing the location of prefixlen files in WHOIS
with the prefixlen: or remarks: approaches, there is currently a
proposal being discussed to introduce a new RPSL attribute of type
extref: for generic external references
[I-D.ymbk-opsawg-rpsl-extref]. With this extref approach a prefixlen
can be referenced as follows:
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
extref: Prefixlen https://example.com/prefixlen
Until all producers of inetnum: objects, i.e., the RIRs, state that
they have migrated to supporting a prefixlen: or extref: attribute,
consumers looking at inetnum: objects to find prefixlen URLs MUST be
able to consume the remarks:, prefixlen:, and extref: forms.
The migration not only implies that the RIRs support the prefixlen:
or extref: attributes, but that all registrants have migrated any
inetnum: objects from remarks: to prefixlen: or extref: attributes.
Any particular inetnum: object SHOULD have, at most, one prefixlen
reference, whether a remarks:, extref:, or prefixlen: attribute when
it is implemented. As the remarks: form can not be formally checked
by the RIR, this can not be formally enforced. A prefixlen: or
extref: attribute is preferred, of course, if the RIR supports it.
If there is more than one type of attribute in the inetnum: object,
the prefixlen: or extref: attributes MUST be used.
For inetnum:s covering the same address range, a signed prefixlen
file MUST be preferred over an unsigned file. If none are signed, or
more than one is signed, the (signed) inetnum: with the most recent
last-modified: attribute MUST be preferred.
If a prefixlen file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP address
space, there are likely to be prefixlen references from multiple
inetnum: objects. Files with prefixlen references from multiple
inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing procedure in
Section 6.
An unsigned, and only an unsigned, prefixlen file MAY be referenced
by multiple inetnum:s and MAY contain prefixes from more than one
registry.
When fetching, the most specific inetnum: object with a prefixlen
reference MUST be used.
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It is significant that prefixlen data may have finer granularity than
the inetnum: that refers to them. For example, an inetnum: object
for an address range P could refer to a prefixlen file in which P has
been subdivided into one or more longer prefixes.
5. Fetching prefixlen Data
This document is to provides a guideline for how interested parties
should fetch and read prefixlen files.
To minimize the load on RIRs' WHOIS [RFC3912] services, the RIR's FTP
[RFC0959] services SHOULD be used for large-scale access to gather
inetnum:s with prefixlen references. This uses efficient bulk access
instead of fetching via brute-force search through the IP space.
On the other hand, RIRs are converging on RDAP support which includes
geofeed data, see [I-D.ietf-regext-rdap-geofeed]. It is hoped that
this will be extended, or generalized, to support prefixlen data.
When reading data from an unsigned prefixlen file, one MUST ignore
data outside the referring inetnum: object's address range. This is
to avoid importing data about ranges not under the control of the
operator. Note that signed files MUST only contain prefixes within
the referring inetnum:'s range as mandated in Section 6.
If prefixlen files are fetched, other prefix length information from
the inetnum: MUST be ignored.
Given an address range of interest, the most specific inetnum: object
with a prefixlen reference MUST be used to fetch the prefixlen file.
For example, if the fetching party finds the following inetnum:
objects:
inetnum: 192.0.0.0/22 # example
remarks: Prefixlen https://example.com/prefixlen_1
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
remarks: Prefixlen https://example.com/prefixlen_2
An application looking for prefixlen data for 192.0.2.0/29, MUST
ignore data in prefixlen_1 because 192.0.2.0/29 is within the more
specific 192.0.2.0/24 inetnum: covering that address range and that
inetnum: does have a prefixlen reference.
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6. Authenticating prefixlen Data (Optional)
The question arises whether a particular prefixlen [RFC8805] data set
is valid, i.e., is authorized by the "owner" of the IP address space
and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: that points to the
prefixlen [RFC8805] file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the
RPSL in some repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An
approach where RPSL was signed per [RFC7909] would be good, except it
would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair
number of them.
The remainder of this section specifies an optional authenticator for
the prefixlen data set that follows the Signed Object Template for
the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6488].
A single optional authenticator MAY be appended to a prefixlen
[RFC8805] file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed
by the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for a covering
address range. The following format bundles the relevant RPKI
certificate with a signature over the prefixlen text.
The canonicalization procedure converts the data from their internal
character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding,
and the <CRLF> sequence MUST be used to denote the end of each line
of text. A blank line is represented solely by the <CRLF> sequence.
For robustness, any non-printable characters MUST NOT be changed by
canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT appear at the end of
the file. That is, the file must not end with multiple consecutive
<CRLF> sequences. Any end-of-file marker used by an operating system
is not considered to be part of the file content. When present, such
end-of-file markers MUST NOT be covered by the digital signature.
If the authenticator is not in the canonical form described above,
then, the authenticator is invalid.
Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file
canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is
used to create a detached DER-encoded signature that is then Base64
encoded with padding (as defined in Section 4 of [RFC4648]) and line
wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. The same digest algorithm MUST be
used for calculating the message digest of the content being signed,
which is the prefixlen file, and for calculating the message digest
on the SignerInfo SignedAttributes [RFC8933]. The message digest
algorithm identifier MUST appear in both the CMS SignedData
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo
DigestAlgorithmIdentifier [RFC5652]. The RPKI certificate covering
the prefixlen inetnum: object's address range is included in the CMS
SignedData certificates field [RFC5652].
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The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes
in the signed prefixlen file. If not, the authenticator is invalid.
The signing certificate MUST NOT include the Autonomous System
Identifier Delegation certificate extension [RFC3779]. If it is
present, the authenticator is invalid.
As with many other RPKI signed objects, the IP Address Delegation
certificate extension MUST NOT use the "inherit" capability defined
in Section 2.2.3.5 of [RFC3779]. If "inherit" is used, the
authenticator is invalid.
An IP Address Delegation extension using "inherit" would complicate
processing. The implementation would have to build the certification
path from the end-entity to the trust anchor, then validate the path
from the trust anchor to the end-entity, and then the parameter would
have to be remembered when the validated public key was used to
validate a signature on a CMS object. Having to remember things from
certification path validation for use with CMS object processing
would be quite complex and error prone. And, the certificates do not
get that much bigger by repeating the information.
An address range A "covers" address range B if the range of B is
identical to or a subset of A. "Address range" is used here because
inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on Classless
Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [RFC4632] prefix boundaries, while those
of the lines in a prefixlen file do align.
The Certification Authority (CA) SHOULD sign only one prefixlen file
with each generated private key and SHOULD generate a new key pair
for each new version of a perticular prefixlen file. The CA MUST
generate a new End Entity (EE) certificate for each signing of a
particular prefixlen file. An associated EE certificate used in this
fashion is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate (see Section 3 of
[RFC6487]).
Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and
getting the department that controls the private key (which might be
stored in a Hardware Security Module (HSM)) to generate the CMS
signature is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the other
hand, verifying the signature has no similar complexity; the
certificate, which is validated in the RPKI, contains the needed
public key. The RPKI trust anchors for the RIRs are available to the
party performing signature validation. Validation of the CMS
signature over the prefixlen file involves:
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1. Obtaining the signer's certificate from the CMS SignedData
CertificateSet [RFC5652]. The certificate SubjectKeyIdentifier
extension [RFC5280] MUST match the SubjectKeyIdentifier in the
CMS SignerInfo SignerIdentifier [RFC5652]. If the key
identifiers do not match, then validation MUST fail.
2. Validating the signer's certificate MUST ensure that it is part
of the current [RFC9286] manifest and that all resources are
covered by the RPKI certificate.
3. Construct and validate the certification path for the signer's
certificate. All of the needed certificates are expected to be
readily available in the RPKI repository. The certification path
MUST be valid according to the validation algorithm in [RFC5280]
and the additional checks specified in [RFC3779] associated with
the IP Address Delegation certificate extension and the
Autonomous System Identifier Delegation certificate extension.
If certification path validation is unsuccessful, then validation
MUST fail.
4. Validating the CMS SignedData as specified in [RFC5652] using the
public key from the validated signer's certificate. If the
signature validation is unsuccessful, then validation MUST fail.
5. Confirming that the eContentType object identifier (OID) is id-
ct-prefixlenCSVwithCRLF (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD). This OID
MUST appear within both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo
object and the ContentType signed attribute in the signerInfo
object (see [RFC6488]).
6. Verifying that the IP Address Delegation certificate extension
[RFC3779] covers all of the address ranges of the prefixlen file.
If all of the address ranges are not covered, then validation
MUST fail.
All of the above steps MUST be successful to consider the prefixlen
file signature as valid.
The authenticator MUST be hidden as a series of "#" comments at the
end of the prefixlen file. The following simple example is
cryptographically incorrect:
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# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
# MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
# IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
...
# imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa
# O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk=
# End Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
A correct and full example is in Appendix A.
The CMS signature does not cover the signature lines.
The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:" MUST be
present as shown in the example. The RPKI Signature's IP address
range MUST match that of the prefixlen URL in the inetnum: that
points to the prefixlen file.
7. Operational Considerations
To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to
register the location of their prefixlen file needs to coordinate
with their Regional Internet Registry (RIR) or National Internet
Registry (NIR) and/or any provider Local Internet Registry (LIR) that
has assigned address ranges to them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for
assignees to create and maintain inetnum: objects. They also provide
means of assigning or sub-assigning IP address resources and allowing
the assignee to create WHOIS data, including inetnum: objects,
thereby referring to prefixlen files.
The prefixlen files MUST be published via and fetched using HTTPS
[RFC9110].
When using data from a prefixlen file, one MUST ignore data outside
the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range.
If and only if the prefixlen file is not signed per Section 6, then
multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same prefixlen file, and
the consumer MUST use only lines in the prefixlen file where the
prefix is covered by the address range of the inetnum: object's URL
it has followed.
If the prefixlen file is signed, and the signer's certificate
changes, the signature in the prefixlen file MUST be updated.
It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose. To
dedicate a signing private key for signing a prefixlen file, an RPKI
Certification Authority (CA) may issue a subordinate certificate
exclusively for the purpose shown in Appendix A.
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Harvesting and publishing aggregated prefixlen data outside of the
RPSL model should be avoided as it can have the effect that more
specifics from one aggregatee could undesirably affect the less
specifics of a different aggregatee. Moreover, publishing aggregated
prefixlen data prevents the reader of the data to perform the checks
described in Section 5 and Section 6.
An anonymized version of bulk WHOIS data is openly available for all
RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for
users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved
with extra RDAP effort. There is open-source code to pass over such
data across all RIRs, collect all prefixlen references, and process
them [PREFIXLEN-FINDER].
To prevent undue load on RPSL and prefixlen servers, entity-fetching
prefixlen data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do frequent real-time
lookups. prefixlen servers SHOULD send an HTTP Expires header
[RFC7234] to signal when prefixlen data should be refetched. As the
data change very infrequently, in the absence of such an HTTP Header
signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more frequently than weekly. It
would be polite not to fetch at magic times such as midnight UTC, the
first of the month, etc., because too many others are likely to do
the same.
8. Implementation Status
At the time of publishing this document, the prefixlen: attribute in
inetnum objects has not yet been implemented by any RIR database.
Registrants in databases which do not yet support the prefixlen:
attribute are using the remarks:, or equivalent, attribute.
At the time of publishing this document, the registry data published
by ARIN are not the same RPSL as that of the other registries (see
[RFC7485] for a survey of the WHOIS Tower of Babel); therefore, when
fetching from ARIN via FTP [RFC0959], WHOIS [RFC3912], the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) [RFC9082], etc., the
"NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum", and the
"Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks".
[rpki-client] can be used to authenticate a signed prefixlen file.
9. Security Considerations
The consumer of prefixlen data SHOULD fetch and process the data
themselves. Importing datasets produced and/or processed by a third-
party places significant trust in the third-party.
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As mentioned in Section 6, some RPSL repositories have weak, if any,
authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to
malicious prefixlen files. Section 6 suggests an unfortunately
complex method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI.
For example, if an inetnum: for a wide address range (e.g., a /16)
points to an RPKI-signed prefixlen file, a customer or attacker could
publish an unsigned equal or narrower (e.g., a /24) inetnum: in a
WHOIS registry that has weak authorization, abusing the rule that the
most-specific inetnum: object with a prefixlen reference MUST be
used.
If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied, but
of course that is not happening anytime soon.
The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers
due to too-frequent queries. Usually, they throttle by the querying
IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be
deployed by prefixlen file servers.
As prefixlen files disclose which parts of a prefix belong to an end
site, attackers could better focus DDoS traffic towards a website
hosted by a cloud provider by overwhelming only IP addresses from
that specific end site. Furthermore, information collected from
prefixlen files could allow for more targeted IPv6 scanning/
reconnaisance, where scanners (be it benevolent or malicious ones)
can target specific sub-prefixes which they deem more interesting.
10. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in
the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:
Description OID Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
id-ct-prefixlenCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD]
In the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) in the Structure of Management Information
(SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations) registry group located at:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/ there is no existing
registration for prefixlen files yet. On publication of this
document, that reference needs to be changed to the new [ RFC-to-be
].
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11. Acknowledgments
Thanks to the authors of [RFC8805], [RFC9092], and [RFC9632] and the
folk they acknowledge from whom ideas and text have been liberally
expropriated.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2622] Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D.,
Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra,
"Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2622>.
[RFC2725] Villamizar, C., Alaettinoglu, C., Meyer, D., and S.
Murphy, "Routing Policy System Security", RFC 2725,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2725, December 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2725>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky,
"Routing Policy Specification Language next generation
(RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4012>.
[RFC4180] Shafranovich, Y., "Common Format and MIME Type for Comma-
Separated Values (CSV) Files", RFC 4180,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4180, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4180>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W.
Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation
Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.
[RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[RFC9286] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 9286, DOI 10.17487/RFC9286, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286>.
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12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-addressing]
Gont, F. and G. Gont, "Implications of IPv6 Addressing on
Security Operations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-addressing-00, 2 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsec-
ipv6-addressing-00>.
[I-D.ietf-regext-rdap-geofeed]
Singh, J. and T. Harrison, "An RDAP Extension for Geofeed
Data", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
regext-rdap-geofeed-08, 18 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-regext-
rdap-geofeed-08>.
[I-D.ymbk-opsawg-rpsl-extref]
Bush, R., "Generalized RPSL External Reference", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ymbk-opsawg-rpsl-extref-
01, 21 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ymbk-opsawg-
rpsl-extref-01>.
[INET6NUM] RIPE NCC, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", October
2019, <https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-documentation/
rpsl-object-types/4-2-descriptions-of-primary-
objects/4-2-3-description-of-the-inet6num-object>.
[INETNUM] RIPE NCC, "Description of the INETNUM Object", June 2020,
<https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-documentation/
rpsl-object-types/4-2-descriptions-of-primary-
objects/4-2-4-description-of-the-inetnum-object>.
[PREFIXLEN-FINDER]
"prefixlen-finder", commit 5f557a4, June 2021,
<https://github.com/massimocandela/prefixlen-finder>.
[RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912>.
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[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft
Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5485>.
[RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.
[RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.
[RFC7485] Zhou, L., Kong, N., Shen, S., Sheng, S., and A. Servin,
"Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects",
RFC 7485, DOI 10.17487/RFC7485, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7485>.
[RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy
Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7909>.
[RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.
[RFC9092] Bush, R., Candela, M., Kumari, W., and R. Housley,
"Finding and Using Geofeed Data", RFC 9092,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9092, July 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9092>.
[RFC9632] Bush, R., Candela, M., Kumari, W., and R. Housley,
"Finding and Using Geofeed Data", RFC 9632,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9632, August 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9632>.
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[RIPE-DB] RIPE NCC, "RIPE Database Documentation",
<https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-
documentation>.
[RIPE181] RIPE NCC, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In A
Routing Registry", October 1994,
<https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-181>.
[RIPE81] RIPE NCC, "Representation Of IP Routing Policies In The
RIPE Database", February 1993,
<https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-081>.
[rpki-client]
Snijders, J., "Example on how to use rpki-client to
authenticate a signed prefixlen", September 2023,
<https://sobornost.net/~job/
using_prefixlen_authenticators.txt>.
Appendix A. Example
This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) signed by the trust anchor, a CA
certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, a CRL signed by the CA,
an end-entity certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the
prefixlen, and a detached signature.
The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As
usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4
address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all Autonomous Systam
(AS) numbers.
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIEQTCCAymgAwIBAgIUEggycNoFVRjAuN/Fw7URu0DEZNAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MTkyMDMzMzlaFw0zMzA5
MTYyMDMzMzlaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDQprR+g/i4JyObVURTp1JpGM23vGPyE5fDKFPqV7rw
M1Amm7cnew66U02IzV0X5oiv5nSGfRX5UxsbR+vwPBMceQyDgS5lexFiv4fB/Vjf
DT2qX/UjsLL9QOeaSOh7ToJSLjmtpa0D9iz7ful3hdxRjpMMZiE/reX9/ymdpW/E
dg0F6+T9WGZE1miPeIjl5OZwnmLHCftkN/aaYk1iPNjNniHYIOjC1jSpABmoZyTj
sgrwLE2F1fIRkVkwASqToq/D5v9voXaYYaXUNJb4H/5wenRuvT5O/n6PXh70rMQy
F5yzLs96ytxqg5gGX9kabVnvxFU8nHfPa0rhlwfTJnljAgMBAAGjggGHMIIBgzAd
BgNVHQ4EFgQUwL1SXb7SeLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUwL1SXb7S
eLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw
GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI
KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4
YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u
ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4
YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD
AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwIQYIKwYBBQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA////
/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAa9eLY9QAmnlZOIyOzbpta5wqcOUQV/yR7o/0
1zkEZaSavKBt19lMK6AXZurx1T5jyjIwG7bEtZZThjtH2m80V5kc2tsFjSq/yp7N
JBclMHVd3tXse9If3nXYF4bxRIcir1lXlAbYN+Eo1U3i5qJO+fxouzt7Merk2Dih
nsenTeXKzN7tfmuCYZZHCC8viCoJWdH+o1uRM4TiQApZsUJ8sF4TABrrRJmA/Ed5
v0CTBbgqTx7yg0+VarFLPdnjYgtpoCJqwE2C1UpX15rZSaLVuGXtbwXd/cHEg5vF
W6QTsMeMQFEUa6hkicDGtxLTUdhckBgmCGoF2nlZii5f1BTWAg==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The CRL issued by the trust anchor.
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate
grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two
AS numbers (64496 and 64497).
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The CRL issued by the CA.
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
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The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate
grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24).
Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for prefixlen data
signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the end-entity
certificate.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For
brevity, the other two certificates are not.
0 1110: SEQUENCE {
4 830: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 20: INTEGER
: 27 AD 39 40 83 D7 F2 B5 B9 9B 86 70 C7 75 B2 B9
: 6E E1 66 F0
35 13: SEQUENCE {
37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
48 0: NULL
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: }
50 51: SEQUENCE {
52 49: SET {
54 47: SEQUENCE {
56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
61 40: PrintableString
: '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642'
: }
: }
: }
103 30: SEQUENCE {
105 13: UTCTime 23/09/2023 15:55:38 GMT
120 13: UTCTime 19/07/2024 15:55:38 GMT
: }
135 51: SEQUENCE {
137 49: SET {
139 47: SEQUENCE {
141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
146 40: PrintableString
: '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187'
: }
: }
: }
188 290: SEQUENCE {
192 13: SEQUENCE {
194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
205 0: NULL
: }
207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
212 266: SEQUENCE {
216 257: INTEGER
: 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8
: 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65
: B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE
: 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13
: 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37
: 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE
: E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED
: 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89
: F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E
: 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19
: BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65
: 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28
: 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9
: 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A
: 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41
: FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C
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: EB
477 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
482 352: [3] {
486 348: SEQUENCE {
490 29: SEQUENCE {
492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
499 20: OCTET STRING
: 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB
: F0 53 A1 87
: }
: }
521 31: SEQUENCE {
523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
530 22: SEQUENCE {
532 20: [0]
: 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97
: B3 77 86 42
: }
: }
: }
554 14: SEQUENCE {
556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
564 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
566 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits
: '1'B (bit 0)
: }
: }
570 24: SEQUENCE {
572 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
577 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
580 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
582 12: SEQUENCE {
584 10: SEQUENCE {
586 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2)
: }
: }
: }
: }
596 97: SEQUENCE {
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598 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
603 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
605 88: SEQUENCE {
607 86: SEQUENCE {
609 84: [0] {
611 82: [0] {
613 80: [6]
: 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
: '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
695 108: SEQUENCE {
697 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
707 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
709 94: SEQUENCE {
711 92: SEQUENCE {
713 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
723 80: [6]
: 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
: '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer'
: }
: }
: }
: }
805 31: SEQUENCE {
807 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7)
817 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
820 16: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
822 14: SEQUENCE {
824 12: SEQUENCE {
826 2: OCTET STRING 00 01
830 6: SEQUENCE {
832 4: BIT STRING
: '010000000000000000000011'B
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
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: }
: }
838 13: SEQUENCE {
840 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
851 0: NULL
: }
853 257: BIT STRING
: 97 1B 76 E4 55 1E 7B 4F AE 0A 27 53 1F EE 29 EC
: 0B 77 BB 69 DC 80 77 06 4E C6 A0 DD 47 28 3E 37
: 04 FC 8D 49 81 02 51 BB D4 E2 33 88 8D 07 50 BB
: 2D B7 5D D7 7D 60 31 D9 62 2F 91 90 DC FE 10 7C
: A9 DF 92 E3 D1 E9 2D 55 F2 CB AA E9 94 F5 29 04
: 72 2C 9C 7E 10 F8 03 37 6A DB FE 28 E2 D1 33 8A
: E9 12 8F 34 17 46 95 75 4B 8E D8 78 C7 FB AE D4
: EE 15 E7 81 8B 12 10 C0 3D 00 BC 21 49 B9 8A 7B
: 4B FC 7C 75 33 5C 76 A6 D3 7F FA 3E 47 0F 75 D4
: 5D DD F1 D7 7C A2 B3 AB BB E7 C9 DB 03 B3 43 E3
: 42 4D 84 61 B9 24 D1 90 80 37 21 2F 82 10 CC 88
: 72 94 C3 42 F9 B2 94 8B 2C 8C 1F 3D CC AA 85 40
: 92 52 01 F3 A2 16 51 CB FB D8 C7 A4 AB E8 B8 E9
: 3F F0 DD 19 DA 1A 7E 31 ED 10 09 72 D5 49 5B 0D
: DE E5 83 2B 16 74 1C BA E6 86 3A CD 10 72 8C 56
: EC 18 B8 5B B1 20 F1 F2 B5 7D DF DF E9 F8 D9 F7
: }
To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity
private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are
not.
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-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF),
yields the following detached CMS signature.
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# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24
# MIIGQAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGMTCCBi0CAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
# IhvcNAQkQAS+gggRaMIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZv
# AwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR
# TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA3MTkx
# NTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM
# 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT
# QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg
# tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm
# r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha
# FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG
# zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ
# ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R
# wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI
# wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR
# 0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvc
# nkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmww
# bAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUFBzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXB
# sZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRT
# I5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcBBwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAA
# jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAlxt25FUee0+uCidTH+4p7At3u2ncgHcGTsag
# 3UcoPjcE/I1JgQJRu9TiM4iNB1C7Lbdd131gMdliL5GQ3P4QfKnfkuPR6S1V8su
# q6ZT1KQRyLJx+EPgDN2rb/iji0TOK6RKPNBdGlXVLjth4x/uu1O4V54GLEhDAPQ
# C8IUm5intL/Hx1M1x2ptN/+j5HD3XUXd3x13yis6u758nbA7ND40JNhGG5JNGQg
# DchL4IQzIhylMNC+bKUiyyMHz3MqoVAklIB86IWUcv72Mekq+i46T/w3RnaGn4x
# 7RAJctVJWw3e5YMrFnQcuuaGOs0QcoxW7Bi4W7Eg8fK1fd/f6fjZ9zGCAaowggG
# mAgEDgBSRRlKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhk
# iG9w0BCQMxDQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIzMDkyMzE1N
# TUzOFowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4Vt
# BHypfcEWMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAKZND7pKdVdfpB6zaJN89wTt+sXd0io
# 0WULMc+o6gRJFt3wmKNW2nYPrDbocJ+Q/rDMGxbp4QetJ0MQtn1+AYAS8v5jPDO
# 4a63U4/mJ2D3wSnQsDP0lUVknqRzfnS66HgHqiOVdHB0U+OnMEJuqHNTLx0dknb
# L3zwxyDJTHdo+dMB0U9xdcjwpsPM3xqg57EXj5EIQK5JbardXCjrsysAnEdktUY
# oyayGNbbQelANYJcOmuHhSXArR+qqzvNP2MDRqqKEcpd65YW6FSnqlVMIBH2M3P
# D2F0p3sdm4IeGAZWaERVB4AXO1PUFDNdhamr4XpIwqIoAig7xiLm7j8qu5Oc=
# End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24
Authors' Addresses
Oliver Gasser
IPinfo
Email: oliver@ipinfo.io
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Randy Bush
IIJ Research & Arrcus
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
Massimo Candela
NTT
Siriusdreef 70-72
2132 WT Hoofddorp
Netherlands
Email: massimo@ntt.net
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
516 Dranesville Road
Herndon, VA 20170
United States of America
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
Gasser, et al. Expires 8 May 2025 [Page 28]