An Analysis of ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification
draft-geng-sidrops-aspa-analysis-02
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Nan Geng , Mingqing(Michael) Huang , Yangyang Wang | ||
| Last updated | 2025-08-25 (Latest revision 2025-02-20) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) is very helpful in detecting and mitigating route leaks (valley-free violations) and a majority of forged-origin hijacks. This document does an analysis on ASPA-based AS_PATH verification to help people understand its strengths and deficiencies, and some potential directions of enhancing ASPA are provided.
Authors
Nan Geng
Mingqing(Michael) Huang
Yangyang Wang
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)