The STRIDE towards IPv6: A Threat Model for IPv6 Transition Technologies
draft-georgescu-opsec-ipv6-trans-tech-threat-model-00

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Internet Engineering Task Force                        M. Georgescu, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     NAIST
Intended status: Informational                            March 21, 2016
Expires: September 22, 2016

The STRIDE towards IPv6: A Threat Model for IPv6 Transition Technologies
         draft-georgescu-opsec-ipv6-trans-tech-threat-model-00

Abstract

   This document provides a structured approach for analyzing the
   threats associated with the various IPv6 transition technologies
   specified by the IETF.  The threat model is built around the
   established STRIDE threat classification and is aimed at existing
   IPv6 transition technologies, as well as their future developments.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Georgescu              Expires September 22, 2016               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        IPv6 Trans Tech Threat Model            March 2016

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Generic Categories of IPv6 Transition Technologies  . . .   3
   4.  Building The Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Establish the function  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Identify the generic category . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.3.  Decompose the technology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.4.  Identify the threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.4.1.  STRIDE-DFD Assoctiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.4.2.  Level of Trust  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.4.3.  Documenting the Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.4.4.  Complex Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.5.  Review, Repeat and Validate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Dual Stack Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Establish the Function  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Identify the Generic Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  Decompose the Technology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.4.  Identify the threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.4.1.  STRIDE-DFD Assoctiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.4.2.  From Trust to Likelihood  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.4.3.  Documenting the Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.4.4.  Complex Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.5.  Review, Repeat and Validate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Single Translation Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Decompose the Technology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  Identify the threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Double Translation Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  Decompose the Technology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.2.  Identify the threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  Encapsulation Threat Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.1.  Decompose the Technology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.2.  Identify the threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
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