Restoration Evidence Records for AI Agent Incident Response
draft-gilda-audit-restoration-evidence-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Sankalp Gilda | ||
| Last updated | 2026-11-01 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-gilda-audit-restoration-evidence-00
Network Working Group S. Gilda
Internet-Draft 2 November 2026
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 6 May 2027
Restoration Evidence Records for AI Agent Incident Response
draft-gilda-audit-restoration-evidence-00
Abstract
When an AI agent system is stopped, restricted or has its credentials
revoked during an incident, someone later decides whether it may run
again. Incident response guidance asks for that decision to be
documented with the risk that remains, but no format says what the
record must contain for a party outside the deploying organization to
check it. This document defines five record types for that purpose:
an incident action authorization, a revocation sweep, a re-enable
decision, a joint authority assignment for incidents that span
organizations, and a revocation boundary report. Each is an in-toto
Statement carried in a DSSE envelope, uses the canonical form of the
agent audit record, and is checked by ordered rules with a named
reason for each failure. A bundle rule set binds a re-enable
decision to the records it cites, by digest. A published conformance
corpus carries a reject member for every rule that a member can
force.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gilda-audit-restoration-
evidence/.
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Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Relationship to the agent audit record . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Common Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Statement and envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Common predicate members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Closed values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Rule order and verdicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Record Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. R1: Incident action authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. R2: Revocation sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. R3: Re-enable decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. R4: Joint authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.5. RB: Revocation boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Bundles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. A signature authenticates an assertion, not its truth . . 18
7.2. Absence is not read as a value . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. Revocation reach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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7.4. Work in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.5. Authority that outlives a pause . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.6. Approver independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.7. Predecessor digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10. Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12. Mapping to the AUDIT Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . 21
13. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
14. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction
The agent audit record [AUDIT-RECORD] records one authorization
decision and its observed effect. An incident adds decisions that
record does not carry: who authorized a pause or a revocation, which
credentials the revocation reached, who decided that the stopped
system may resume and on what evidence, and, when two organizations
are involved, which of them may act on which asset. These decisions
are made over time, by different parties, and they refer to one
another. The proposed charter of the AUDIT working group
[AUDIT-CHARTER] names "authorization state over time" among the
things its data models should represent; this document covers that
state for the period from containment to restoration. Section 11 of
[AIMS] likewise requires durable audit logs covering "authorization
decisions and subsequent remediations" and leaves their form open;
the records here give the remediation half a form.
Incident response guidance asks for these decisions and leaves their
form open. NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 [NIST-SP-800-61R3] has handlers
work with system owners to confirm restoration (RC.RP-04) and
declares the end of recovery "based on criteria" (RC.RP-06). NIST SP
800-184 [NIST-SP-800-184] describes restored assets being validated
"before receiving approval to restore network operations"
(Section 6.2.2) without naming the approver. The NIST, NSA and CISA
Key Practices for incidents in agent training and evaluation
[KEY-PRACTICES] ask that containment layers be shown working before
agents restart (7.3), that new controls be shown to catch a replay of
the incident (7.4), and that the recovery decision be documented with
the remaining risks (7.5). None of these texts says what that
documentation must contain for a party that trusts neither the agent
nor its operator to check it.
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This document fixes that record. It defines five predicate types and
the rules a reader applies to each, and a set of rules for a bundle
of records that together support one re-enable decision. It
specifies no admission policy: whether a given decision is enough to
let a system run again is the relying party's own policy, written
against these records.
The goals are:
* to name, in each decision, the parties who held each role and the
kind of grant each authorizer acted on, so that "the team decided"
becomes a statement someone can be held to;
* to make a revocation's reach visible from the record alone, so
that a claim wider than the evidence is refused;
* to make an omitted restart condition distinguishable from one the
decision-maker chose not to address;
* to bind a restart decision to the authorization and revocation
records it rests on, by digest, so the chain can be checked
offline.
1.1. Relationship to the agent audit record
This document uses the canonical form, statement shape and envelope
of [AUDIT-RECORD] and does not amend it. The predicate type of that
document is frozen (Section 8 of [AUDIT-RECORD]), so the record types
defined here are separate predicate types and do not extend it. A
re-enable decision (R3) MAY cite an agent audit record as evidence by
its digest (Section 5.3), which is how an enforced action and the
decision that authorized resuming it are joined.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Terminology
Containment: An action that limits what an agent system can do while
an incident is handled: a pause, a restriction of a credential,
permission or tool, or an isolation of channels.
Restoration: The decision to end a containment wholly or in part.
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It is separate from containment and from remediation and does not
follow from either.
Producer: The party that signs a record.
Reader: A party that checks a record against this document.
Relying party: A party that decides what to do on the basis of a
checked record, under its own admission policy.
Bundle: One re-enable decision record together with every record it
names as a predecessor, recursively, and any joint authority or
revocation boundary record the producer adds.
Closed value: A value drawn from a set this document or [VOCABULARY]
enumerates. A value outside the set makes the record malformed.
4. Common Structure
4.1. Statement and envelope
A record is an in-toto Statement v1 [IN-TOTO] carried in a DSSE
envelope [DSSE]. The statement MUST have exactly the members _type,
subject, predicateType and predicate. _type MUST be https://in-
toto.io/Statement/v1, and predicateType MUST be one of the five URIs
of Section 5.
Statements are I-JSON [RFC7493] and are canonicalized as in
Section 4.1 of [AUDIT-RECORD], using JCS [RFC8785]. A duplicate
member at any depth makes the statement malformed. Times are RFC
3339 [RFC3339] UTC times to whole seconds and are compared as
instants.
A member this document does not define for a type MUST be refused.
This departs from the in-toto parsing rule that consumers ignore
unknown fields: a revision that adds a member publishes it under a
new predicate type URI (Section 9), so a reader of a v1 type never
meets a member it has not been told how to read.
Each subject member carries a digest holding only sha256. What the
digest is taken over is stated for each type.
4.2. Common predicate members
Every predicate defined here carries these members:
incident: An object with issuer, an https URL naming who assigns the
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identifier; id, a non-empty string; and, optionally, related, a
list of further {issuer, id} pairs naming the same incident in
another organization's records. This is the term
incident_identifier of [VOCABULARY].
producer: An object with id, an https URL naming the signing party.
issuedAt: The time the record was issued.
registryDigest: An object with sha256, the SHA-256 of the exact
bytes of the [VOCABULARY] registry the record's closed values are
expressed in.
doesNotAssert: A list of non-empty strings, each stating something
the producer says the record does not claim. The list MAY be
empty; the member MUST NOT be absent.
Where a type uses it, predecessors is a list of {predicateType,
digest} naming earlier records of this document, where digest holds
the sha256 of the predecessor statement's bytes exactly as carried in
its DSSE payload.
4.3. Closed values
The values of response_function, pause_hold, restoration_decision,
revocation_state, intent_binding, independence_basis and
set_sufficiency are those of the registry whose digest is
1c5ff80bd97237a603afc402db692ffe5abe15e4a7f9eca13f20068ada347fdc,
published under https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/registry/
with the file name sha256-, then the digest, then .yaml. Values that
a section of this document lists itself are closed by this document.
A reader MUST refuse a value outside a closed set and MUST NOT ignore
the member. Registration in [VOCABULARY] gives a value its identity;
which values a member accepts is set by this document alone.
4.4. Rule order and verdicts
Each type has an ordered rule table. A reader applies the rules in
order and reports the first that fails, with its reason code. Rules
1 to 3 are the same for every type:
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+===+================================+=============================+
| # | Rule | Code |
+===+================================+=============================+
| 1 | The statement has the shape of | statement-malformed |
| | Section 4.1 and the predicate | |
| | type of this section | |
+---+--------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| 2 | The predicate has exactly its | predicate-malformed |
| | members, each well formed | |
+---+--------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| 3 | Every closed value is in its | closed-vocabulary-violation |
| | set | |
+---+--------------------------------+-----------------------------+
Table 1
A record that passes every rule of its type is accepted with the
verdict named for the type. Two readers that apply this document
reach the same verdict and the same first failing reason on the same
bytes; the conformance corpus (Section 10) tests that.
5. Record Types
The five predicate type URIs are:
https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
incident-action-authorization
https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
revocation-sweep
https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
re-enable-decision
https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
joint-authority
https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
revocation-boundary
Each URI is the common prefix on the first line followed directly by
the type name on the second, with no space or line break.
5.1. R1: Incident action authorization
An R1 records who authorized one incident response action, which role
each named party held, on what kind of grant the authorizer acted,
and whether the authority was committed before the action ran.
The subject is the operation authorized: one or more members, each
the SHA-256 of the operation's declared description.
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The predicate carries the common members and:
action: functions, a non-empty sorted list of response_function
values (monitoring_increase, restriction, isolation, pause,
remediation, restoration); targets, a non-empty list of {id}
naming the agents, tools, routes or credentials acted on; and
inducedEffects, which is one of {"declared": "listed", "items":
[...]}, {"declared": "none_observed", "observation": {"sha256":
...}} or {"declared": "unknown"}. A credential revocation is
recorded as restriction, and its reach as an R2.
parties: A non-empty list of {id, roles, authorityBasis?,
independenceBasis?}. roles is a non-empty sorted list drawn from
advised, authorized, executed and accountable. One party MAY hold
several roles. authorityBasis is one of role_grant,
policy_preauthorized, contract_third_party, executive_approval and
unknown, and MUST be present on every party holding authorized.
independenceBasis is an independence_basis value.
authorizedAt, notAfter: When the authority was given, and when it
lapses.
executedAt: Optional. When the action ran.
intentBinding: An intent_binding value: committed_before_execution
or asserted_after_execution.
pause: Optional. {hold, holdProof}, where hold is a pause_hold value
and holdProof is {sha256} of the observation that established it.
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+====+============================+===============================+
| # | Rule | Code |
+====+============================+===============================+
| 4 | At least one party holds | no-authorizer |
| | authorized | |
+----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
| 5 | At least one party holds | no-accountable-party |
| | accountable | |
+----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
| 6 | Every party holding | authority-basis-missing |
| | authorized carries | |
| | authorityBasis | |
+----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
| 7 | authorizedAt is not after | authorization-window-inverted |
| | notAfter | |
+----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
| 8 | When intentBinding is | intent-not-committed-before |
| | committed_before_execution | |
| | and executedAt is present, | |
| | executedAt is not before | |
| | authorizedAt | |
+----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
| 9 | When executedAt is | authorization-expired |
| | present, it is not after | |
| | notAfter | |
+----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
| 10 | inducedEffects declared | induced-effects-unobserved |
| | none_observed carries | |
| | observation | |
+----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
Table 2
A record passing every rule is accepted as authorization-recorded. A
reader MUST NOT read an absent authorityBasis as role_grant; the
value for not knowing is unknown.
5.2. R2: Revocation sweep
An R2 records which credentials of a declared population were revoked
during an incident, which were not, and how far the producer claims
the sweep reaches.
The subject is the population manifest: one member, the SHA-256 of
the list of credential identifiers the sweep was run over.
Identifiers are opaque names; they MUST NOT be secrets, hashes of
secrets or key fingerprints.
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The predicate carries the common members, predecessors (at least one
R1, the authorization of the sweep), and:
population: credentials, a non-empty, sorted, duplicate-free list of
identifiers.
partition: A list of {state, credentials} parts, state one of
revoked, retained and unassessed.
revocations: One entry per revoked credential: credential;
revokedAt; evidence, a resource descriptor {digest, uri?,
mediaType?} of the deny record or policy change; and
relyingParties, a list of {id, state} with state a
revocation_state value (issued, enforced_observed,
use_after_revocation, not_established).
coverage: claim, one of complete_verified, issued_after_only,
partial and unknown; and issuedAfter, a time, present when claim
is issued_after_only.
+===+==============================+==============================+
| # | Rule | Code |
+===+==============================+==============================+
| 4 | The parts are disjoint and | denominator-union-mismatch |
| | their union equals | |
| | population.credentials | |
+---+------------------------------+------------------------------+
| 5 | revocations names exactly | revocation-entries-mismatch |
| | the credentials of the | |
| | revoked part | |
+---+------------------------------+------------------------------+
| 6 | complete_verified is claimed | coverage-claim-exceeds-proof |
| | only when every credential | |
| | is in the revoked part | |
+---+------------------------------+------------------------------+
| 7 | issued_after_only carries | coverage-claim-incomplete |
| | issuedAfter | |
+---+------------------------------+------------------------------+
Table 3
A record passing every rule is accepted as sweep-recorded. An honest
partial or issued_after_only sweep is well formed. Whether a relying
party admits a system restored under it is that party's policy.
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5.3. R3: Re-enable decision
An R3 records one decision about whether a stopped or restricted
agent system may run again: the outcome, the scope restored, who
approved it and on what independence, and, for every kind of evidence
incident guidance asks a restart to show, either the digest of what
was shown or an explicit statement that it was not addressed.
The subject is the configuration restored: one or more members, each
the SHA-256 of a baseline (model weights, harness code, container
image, tool configuration).
The predicate carries the common members, predecessors (at least one
record of this document), and:
restoration: decision, a restoration_decision value (resume_full,
resume_staged, remain_restricted, not_established); and
restoredScope, present when decision is resume_staged: {agents,
tools, routes, credentials}, each a sorted list of identifiers, at
least one non-empty.
approvers: A list of {id, roles, independenceBasis}, with roles as
in R1 and independenceBasis an independence_basis value
(independent_sources, subject_supplied, undeclared).
setSufficiency: The producer's own set_sufficiency judgment of the
evidence below: sufficient, insufficient or not_assessed.
evidence: An object with exactly the sixteen slots of the table
below. Each slot is either a resource descriptor, {"digest":
{"sha256": ...}} with optional uri and mediaType as in the in-toto
ResourceDescriptor, or {"notAddressed": "<reason>"} with a non-
empty reason. A slot MAY point at an attestation the producer
already emits, including an agent audit record [AUDIT-RECORD].
+=========================+=======================+===============+
| Slot | What it holds | Where |
| | | guidance asks |
| | | for it |
+=========================+=======================+===============+
| actorObjective | the adversary's | SP 800-184 |
| | objective, or | Sec. 2.3.4 |
| | confirmation it is | |
| | not apparent | |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| persistence | persistence | SP 800-184 |
| | mechanisms | Sec. 2.3.4 |
| | understood, or non- | |
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| | persistence confirmed | |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| rootCause | root cause remediated | SP 800-61r3 |
| | before production use | RC.RP-05 |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| affectedScope | affected hosts, | SP 800-61r3 |
| | services and similar | RS.MI-02; Key |
| | agents identified | Practices 6.3 |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| assetIntegrity | restoration assets | SP 800-61r3 |
| | checked before use | RC.RP-03; SP |
| | | 800-53 CP- |
| | | 10(4) |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| restoredAssetsClean | restored assets free | SP 800-61r3 |
| | of indicators and of | RC.RP-05; SP |
| | the original weakness | 800-184 Sec. |
| | | 6.2.2 |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| containmentReproof | monitors, logging, | Key Practices |
| | egress, shutdown and | 7.3 |
| | permissions shown | |
| | working | |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| incidentReplay | new controls shown to | Key Practices |
| | catch a replay of the | 7.4 |
| | incident | |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| restoreOrder | dependency order of | SP 800-61r3 |
| | the restoration | RC.RP-04 |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| postRestartMonitoring | monitoring that | SP 800-61r3 |
| | detects recurrence | RC.RP-04; SP |
| | | 800-184 Sec. |
| | | 6.2.3 |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| exclusiveControl | exclusive control of | SP 800-184 |
| | the environment re- | Sec. 6.2.3 |
| | established | |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| controlsNotDegraded | controls not degraded | SP 800-53 |
| | by the restoration | CP-2 |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| residualRisk | the remaining risk, | Key Practices |
| | stated and accepted | 7.5; SP |
| | | 800-61r3 |
| | | RC.RP-06 |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
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| seniorApproval | senior approval, | Key Practices |
| | informed by outside | 2.6 |
| | assessment where used | |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| multiPartyAuthorization | more than one person | AWS Agentic |
| | authorized the | AI Lens BP04 |
| | restart | |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
| ownerConfirmation | the system or asset | SP 800-61r3 |
| | owner confirmed the | RC.RP-04 |
| | restoration | |
+-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
Table 4: Evidence slots of a re-enable decision
The guidance is cited from [NIST-SP-800-61R3], [NIST-SP-800-184],
[NIST-SP-800-53R5], [KEY-PRACTICES] and [AWS-AGENTIC-LENS].
+===+===========================+===========================+
| # | Rule | Code |
+===+===========================+===========================+
| 4 | evidence carries every | evidence-slot-missing |
| | slot, and no other | |
+---+---------------------------+---------------------------+
| 5 | Every notAddressed reason | evidence-slot-unexplained |
| | is non-empty | |
+---+---------------------------+---------------------------+
| 6 | approvers is non-empty | no-approver |
| | and at least one approver | |
| | holds authorized | |
+---+---------------------------+---------------------------+
| 7 | resume_staged carries | partial-without-scope |
| | restoredScope with at | |
| | least one identifier | |
+---+---------------------------+---------------------------+
| 8 | resume_full carries no | full-with-scope |
| | restoredScope | |
+---+---------------------------+---------------------------+
Table 5
A record passing every rule is accepted as decision-recorded. The
slots record what a decision cites. Which slots a relying party
requires to carry a digest, and what it does with a notAddressed
slot, is its own admission policy. A record that omits a slot is
malformed; a record that declares a slot not addressed says so in a
form the relying party can refuse.
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5.4. R4: Joint authority
An R4 records, for an incident that crosses organizations, which
party may act on which asset, under what kind of grant, and which
indicators the parties share. Restart conditions in incident
guidance assume one owner of the restored asset; when an agent
operated by one organization affects infrastructure run by another,
an R4 names the owners and the assignment, so each party's R1 and R3
records can be read against it.
The subject is the shared indicator set: one member, the SHA-256 of
the canonical list of shared indicators.
The predicate carries the common members and:
sharedIndicators: A non-empty sorted list of {sha256} digests of
indicators both parties hold.
parties: At least two entries {id, organization, correlationId,
authorityBasis, assets}, authorityBasis as in R1 and assets a
sorted list of asset identifiers the party may act on.
actions: Optional. A list of {party, asset, record} naming actions
already taken, where record is {sha256} of the R1 statement that
authorized the action.
+===+============================+===============================+
| # | Rule | Code |
+===+============================+===============================+
| 4 | Every party carries | authority-basis-missing |
| | authorityBasis | |
+---+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
| 5 | The parties belong to at | single-organization |
| | least two organizations | |
+---+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
| 6 | Every action names a party | party-acts-outside-assignment |
| | in parties and an asset in | |
| | that party's assets | |
+---+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
Table 6
A record passing every rule is accepted as assignment-recorded. A
record co-signed by every party (several DSSE signatures over one
payload) is stronger than one signed by one party, and the envelope
shows which it is.
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5.5. RB: Revocation boundary
Revoking a credential stops new work from starting under it. It does
not by itself stop work already in flight from committing its effect
afterwards. An RB reports, for one declared sink and one test
window, whether any effect from an in-flight task committed at that
sink's declared commit boundary after the revocation took effect. It
states an outcome and requires no mechanism.
The subject is the test plan: one member, the SHA-256 of the declared
sink and window.
The predicate carries the common members, optional predecessors, and:
sink: {id, kind, commitBoundary}. kind is one of database,
filesystem, http_endpoint, subprocess, queue and other.
commitBoundary is a non-empty string saying at which point an
effect counts as committed.
observer: {id, vantage}, vantage one of sink_side and agent_side.
revocation: credential, an opaque identifier; effectiveAt, when the
revocation took effect at its authority; and timeSource, a non-
empty string naming the clock.
window: {start, end}.
counts: Non-negative integers attempts, inFlightAtRevocation,
postRevocationCommits, replaysAttempted and replaysCommitted.
exclusions: A list of {count, reason}, each reason non-empty, for
attempts left out of the counts.
result: One of no_post_revocation_commit_observed,
post_revocation_commit_observed and not_established.
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+=+====================================+===========================+
|#| Rule | Code |
+=+====================================+===========================+
|4| window.start is not after | revocation-outside-window |
| | effectiveAt, and effectiveAt is | |
| | not after window.end | |
+-+------------------------------------+---------------------------+
|5| inFlightAtRevocation does not | counts-inconsistent |
| | exceed attempts, | |
| | postRevocationCommits does not | |
| | exceed inFlightAtRevocation, and | |
| | replaysCommitted does not exceed | |
| | replaysAttempted | |
+-+------------------------------------+---------------------------+
|6| result is | result-contradicts-counts |
| | post_revocation_commit_observed | |
| | exactly when postRevocationCommits | |
| | or replaysCommitted is positive, | |
| | unless result is not_established | |
+-+------------------------------------+---------------------------+
|7| no_post_revocation_commit_observed | observer-not-at-sink |
| | requires a sink_side observer | |
+-+------------------------------------+---------------------------+
Table 7
A record passing every rule is accepted as boundary-recorded. One
record covers one sink; a claim about several sinks is several
records.
6. Bundles
A re-enable decision is rarely checkable alone: it rests on the
authorizations and revocations before it. A restoration evidence
bundle is one R3 together with every record its predecessors name,
recursively, and any R4 or RB the producer adds. A reader checks a
bundle in this order and reports the first failure:
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+====+===========================+=============================+
| # | Rule | Code |
+====+===========================+=============================+
| B1 | Every record in the | the record's own code |
| | bundle conforms to its | |
| | own type | |
+----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B2 | Every predecessor digest | predecessor-not-carried |
| | resolves to exactly one | |
| | record carried in the | |
| | bundle | |
+----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B3 | The record a digest | predecessor-type-mismatch |
| | resolves to has the | |
| | predicateType the | |
| | reference names | |
+----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B4 | No record names itself, | predecessor-cycle |
| | directly or through other | |
| | records, as its | |
| | predecessor | |
+----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B5 | Every record names the | incident-mismatch |
| | same incident, by | |
| | incident or by one of its | |
| | related pairs | |
+----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B6 | No record's issuedAt is | predecessor-issued-later |
| | earlier than that of a | |
| | record it names as a | |
| | predecessor | |
+----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B7 | Every credential an R3 | restored-credential-unswept |
| | restores in | |
| | restoredScope.credentials | |
| | appears in some R2 in the | |
| | bundle | |
+----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
Table 8
A bundle passing every rule is reported as bundle-consistent. That
verdict says the records agree with each other. It does not say
whether the relying party should admit the decision.
A relying party's admission policy is written against a consistent
bundle. For example, a policy can require that every restored
credential lie in the revoked part of an R2 whose coverage.claim is
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complete_verified, that containmentReproof and incidentReplay carry
digests, and that at least one approver with independent_sources hold
authorized. Such a policy is outside this document.
7. Security Considerations
7.1. A signature authenticates an assertion, not its truth
Every record here is a statement by its producer. A conforming
record is complete and internally consistent; it is not evidence that
the authority named was held, that the action ran as described, that
the cited evidence shows what its slot names, or that resuming was
safe. The value of the format is that a false statement is
attributable to a named signer and that an omission is visible, not
that falsehood is prevented.
7.2. Absence is not read as a value
An absent authorityBasis is not role_grant, an omitted evidence slot
is malformed rather than satisfied, and a claim of no induced effects
requires the observation that looked. Each of these closes a way for
a record to look complete because it says less. A reader that
supplies a default for an absent member defeats the format.
7.3. Revocation reach
A revocation sweep that claims more than its partition shows is
refused (R2 rule 6). A sweep that honestly reports issued_after_only
or partial is well formed, and a relying party that admits a restart
under it accepts that credentials issued earlier, or outside the
revoked part, may still be live. The relyingParties states
distinguish a revocation that was issued from one a relying party was
observed to enforce; use_after_revocation exists so that a use after
revocation can be recorded rather than omitted.
7.4. Work in flight
Revocation does not stop work that is already in flight from
committing. An RB with a sink_side observer reports whether that
happened at one sink in one window. A zero count bounds a rate for
that sink and window; it is not a guarantee for other sinks or
windows. An agent-side observer cannot support
no_post_revocation_commit_observed (RB rule 7), because the agent
process cannot see the sink's committed state.
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7.5. Authority that outlives a pause
An R1 authorization carries notAfter. A relying party that admits
actions under an R1 after a pause and restart SHOULD check notAfter
against the restart, and SHOULD require a fresh R1 for any action
after an R3, so that a permit issued before the pause is not reused
after it.
7.6. Approver independence
independenceBasis is the producer's statement. A relying party that
requires independence SHOULD require independent_sources and SHOULD
resolve the named approver itself. An approver who also stopped the
system and approves its restart is recordable; whether that is
acceptable is admission policy.
7.7. Predecessor digests
Predecessors are named by the SHA-256 of the statement bytes as
carried in the DSSE payload. A reader MUST hash those bytes, not a
re-serialization, since a re-serialization that differs in member
order or number form changes the digest.
8. Privacy Considerations
Records name parties by identifier and may name natural persons as
authorizers, approvers or accountable parties. Producers SHOULD use
role or account identifiers where a person's name is not needed by
the relying party, and SHOULD state in doesNotAssert what a
distributed record deliberately omits.
Credential identifiers in an R2 or RB are opaque names. They MUST
NOT carry secrets, hashes of secrets or key fingerprints, because a
record may travel to parties not entitled to the credential.
Evidence slots and indicator sets are bound by digest and not
carried. A record can therefore travel to a party entitled to check
the decision without carrying the forensic material the decision
rests on; that party resolves a digest only if it needs the content.
Shared indicators in an R4 are digests for the same reason: the
record shows the parties hold the same indicators without disclosing
them to a reader that does not.
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9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions. Each predicate type is a URI
under a namespace the author controls and requires no registration to
be used, consistent with the in-toto Attestation Framework's
treatment of predicate type identifiers [IN-TOTO].
A record carries its predicate type inside the bytes its producer
signed. A later revision of this document MUST NOT move a URI once
records carrying it exist, since moving it invalidates every
signature over them. A change to what a record of a type must carry,
including a member or a closed value added, is published under a new
URI with v1 read as v2, and a record valid under a v1 URI stays valid
under every later revision that keeps that URI.
10. Conformance
A conforming producer emits records that meet every MUST of Section 4
and of the section of each type it emits. A conforming reader
applies the rule order of Section 4.4 to each record and the order of
Section 6 to each bundle, and reports the first failing reason code.
A reader is not described as conforming to this revision unless it
reaches the verdict and the reason its manifest declares on every
member of the vectors-restart-records family of release 0.31.2 of
[VECTORS]. That family carries 57 members, 15 to accept and 42 to
reject, with corpus digest
5b7f58c91b517bd7c96dcccdef0d827a4f730fd4a650b4992b362bb9925cae29.
Each reject member changes exactly one value of an accepting control,
and the rule it names is the first that fails. Three rules have no
member, and the manifest lists each with its reason: rule 3 of R4 and
of RB, which carry no registry-defined value, and bundle rule B4,
which would need a SHA-256 fixed point to force. Passing the corpus
is necessary and not sufficient; those three rules are checked by
reading them.
A document that references this one normatively SHOULD name the
revision it relies on and MAY name a release of [VECTORS] as its
conformance test. The five predicate type URIs, the reason codes,
and the section anchors common, rule-order, r1, r2, r3, r4, rb and
bundles are stable across revisions and may be referenced by name.
11. Implementation Status
Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before
publication.
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This section records the status of known implementations at the time
of writing, following [RFC7942]. Listing an implementation here does
not imply endorsement by the IETF.
[VECTORS] is an open conformance corpus licensed under Apache-2.0.
Its vectors-restart-records family publishes the members of
Section 10 with a checker that uses only the Python standard library,
and JSON Schemas for the five types that check shape and closed
values. From the source of release 0.31.2:
git clone --branch v0.31.2 \
https://github.com/probityai/agent-evidence-vectors
cd agent-evidence-vectors
python3 vectors-restart-records/check_vectors.py
On release 0.31.2 the run reports that all 57 members agree with the
manifest. The checker also takes one record (--record) or one bundle
directory (--bundle) and prints the verdict and the first failing
reason. The repository's Go reader, built from the same release (go
build ./cmd/aee-verify, then aee-verify vectors-restart-records),
reports the same: 57 members, 15 accepted and 42 rejected, each as
the manifest declares.
12. Mapping to the AUDIT Problem Statement
The AUDIT BoF request [AUDIT-BOFREQ] and the proposed charter
[AUDIT-CHARTER] name problems a data model should address. This
document addresses three of them for the period from containment to
restoration:
* Authorization state over time: R1 records each authorization with
its window, R2 the revocation of credentials and its reach, R3 the
decision that ends a containment, and the bundle rules bind them
in order by digest and time.
* References to the identities of participating entities: R1 and R3
name each party with its role and its authority basis, and R4
names the organizations and the assets each may act on.
* Verification by a party that trusts neither the agent nor its
operator: every record is signed, every closed value is fail-
closed, and every rule has a reason code a second reader
reproduces.
Action provenance for each enforced request is the subject of
[AUDIT-RECORD]; an R3 cites such records by digest. Policy models,
admission policy and retention periods are left to other work.
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13. Normative References
[AUDIT-RECORD]
Gilda, S., "An Audit Record Format for AI Agent
Authorization Decisions", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03, 29 October
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gilda-
audit-agent-audit-record-03>.
[DSSE] Secure Systems Lab, "Dead Simple Signing Envelope", 2026,
<https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse>.
[IN-TOTO] in-toto, "in-toto Attestation Framework Specification",
2026, <https://github.com/in-
toto/attestation/blob/main/spec/README.md>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.
[RFC7493] Bray, T., Ed., "The I-JSON Message Format", RFC 7493,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7493, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7493>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.
[VECTORS] agent-evidence-vectors contributors, "agent-evidence-
vectors: conformance vectors for agent evidence records,
release 0.31.2", 2026, <https://github.com/probityai/
agent-evidence-vectors/tree/v0.31.2/vectors-restart-
records>.
[VOCABULARY]
agent-evidence-vocabulary contributors, "agent-evidence-
vocabulary: a closed term registry", 2026,
<https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/>.
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14. Informative References
[AIMS] Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B.,
Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management
System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
wimse-aims-00, 15 September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
aims-00>.
[AUDIT-BOFREQ]
Kuehlewind, M., "AUDIT - Agent Use of Delegation and
Interaction Traceability", 8 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bofreq-kuhlewind-audit-
agent-use-of-delegation-and-interaction-traceability/>.
[AUDIT-CHARTER]
AUDIT BoF proponents, "Agent Use of Delegation and
Interaction Traceability (AUDIT) Working Group Charter
(proposed)", 2026, <https://github.com/mirjak/audit-bof-
preparation/blob/main/audit-charter.md>.
[AWS-AGENTIC-LENS]
Amazon Web Services, "AGENTSEC07-BP04, Agentic AI Lens,
AWS Well-Architected Framework", 2026,
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/
agentic-ai-lens/agentsec07-bp04.html>.
[KEY-PRACTICES]
NIST Center for AI Standards and Innovation, NSA, and
CISA, "Key Practices for Incident Readiness and Response
in Super Intelligence Training and Evaluation", 16 October
2026.
[NIST-SP-800-53R5]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Security
and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and
Organizations", NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev. 5,
September 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5>.
[NIST-SP-800-61R3]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Incident
Response Recommendations and Considerations for
Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community
Profile", NIST Special Publication 800-61 Rev. 3, April
2025, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r3>.
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[NIST-SP-800-184]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Guide for
Cybersecurity Event Recovery", NIST Special
Publication 800-184, December 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-184>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
Document History
-00: Initial version. Defines five record types and the bundle
rules; the predicate type URIs are those published with release
0.31.2 of the conformance corpus.
Acknowledgments
The evidence slots of the re-enable decision follow the restart
conditions of NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, NIST SP 800-184, NIST SP 800-53
Rev. 5, the NIST, NSA and CISA Key Practices of October 2026, and the
AWS Agentic AI Lens.
Author's Address
Sankalp Gilda
Email: sankalp.gilda@gmail.com
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