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Restoration Evidence Records for AI Agent Incident Response
draft-gilda-audit-restoration-evidence-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Sankalp Gilda
Last updated 2026-11-01
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draft-gilda-audit-restoration-evidence-00
Network Working Group                                           S. Gilda
Internet-Draft                                           2 November 2026
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: 6 May 2027

      Restoration Evidence Records for AI Agent Incident Response
               draft-gilda-audit-restoration-evidence-00

Abstract

   When an AI agent system is stopped, restricted or has its credentials
   revoked during an incident, someone later decides whether it may run
   again.  Incident response guidance asks for that decision to be
   documented with the risk that remains, but no format says what the
   record must contain for a party outside the deploying organization to
   check it.  This document defines five record types for that purpose:
   an incident action authorization, a revocation sweep, a re-enable
   decision, a joint authority assignment for incidents that span
   organizations, and a revocation boundary report.  Each is an in-toto
   Statement carried in a DSSE envelope, uses the canonical form of the
   agent audit record, and is checked by ordered rules with a named
   reason for each failure.  A bundle rule set binds a re-enable
   decision to the records it cites, by digest.  A published conformance
   corpus carries a reject member for every rule that a member can
   force.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gilda-audit-restoration-
   evidence/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the AUDIT Birds of a
   Feather mailing list (mailto:audit@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/audit/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/audit/.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Relationship to the agent audit record  . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Common Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Statement and envelope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Common predicate members  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  Closed values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Rule order and verdicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Record Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  R1: Incident action authorization . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  R2: Revocation sweep  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  R3: Re-enable decision  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.4.  R4: Joint authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.5.  RB: Revocation boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Bundles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.1.  A signature authenticates an assertion, not its truth . .  18
     7.2.  Absence is not read as a value  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.3.  Revocation reach  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

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     7.4.  Work in flight  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.5.  Authority that outlives a pause . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.6.  Approver independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.7.  Predecessor digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   8.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   10. Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   11. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   12. Mapping to the AUDIT Problem Statement  . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   13. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   14. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Document History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

1.  Introduction

   The agent audit record [AUDIT-RECORD] records one authorization
   decision and its observed effect.  An incident adds decisions that
   record does not carry: who authorized a pause or a revocation, which
   credentials the revocation reached, who decided that the stopped
   system may resume and on what evidence, and, when two organizations
   are involved, which of them may act on which asset.  These decisions
   are made over time, by different parties, and they refer to one
   another.  The proposed charter of the AUDIT working group
   [AUDIT-CHARTER] names "authorization state over time" among the
   things its data models should represent; this document covers that
   state for the period from containment to restoration.  Section 11 of
   [AIMS] likewise requires durable audit logs covering "authorization
   decisions and subsequent remediations" and leaves their form open;
   the records here give the remediation half a form.

   Incident response guidance asks for these decisions and leaves their
   form open.  NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 [NIST-SP-800-61R3] has handlers
   work with system owners to confirm restoration (RC.RP-04) and
   declares the end of recovery "based on criteria" (RC.RP-06).  NIST SP
   800-184 [NIST-SP-800-184] describes restored assets being validated
   "before receiving approval to restore network operations"
   (Section 6.2.2) without naming the approver.  The NIST, NSA and CISA
   Key Practices for incidents in agent training and evaluation
   [KEY-PRACTICES] ask that containment layers be shown working before
   agents restart (7.3), that new controls be shown to catch a replay of
   the incident (7.4), and that the recovery decision be documented with
   the remaining risks (7.5).  None of these texts says what that
   documentation must contain for a party that trusts neither the agent
   nor its operator to check it.

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   This document fixes that record.  It defines five predicate types and
   the rules a reader applies to each, and a set of rules for a bundle
   of records that together support one re-enable decision.  It
   specifies no admission policy: whether a given decision is enough to
   let a system run again is the relying party's own policy, written
   against these records.

   The goals are:

   *  to name, in each decision, the parties who held each role and the
      kind of grant each authorizer acted on, so that "the team decided"
      becomes a statement someone can be held to;

   *  to make a revocation's reach visible from the record alone, so
      that a claim wider than the evidence is refused;

   *  to make an omitted restart condition distinguishable from one the
      decision-maker chose not to address;

   *  to bind a restart decision to the authorization and revocation
      records it rests on, by digest, so the chain can be checked
      offline.

1.1.  Relationship to the agent audit record

   This document uses the canonical form, statement shape and envelope
   of [AUDIT-RECORD] and does not amend it.  The predicate type of that
   document is frozen (Section 8 of [AUDIT-RECORD]), so the record types
   defined here are separate predicate types and do not extend it.  A
   re-enable decision (R3) MAY cite an agent audit record as evidence by
   its digest (Section 5.3), which is how an enforced action and the
   decision that authorized resuming it are joined.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Terminology

   Containment:  An action that limits what an agent system can do while
      an incident is handled: a pause, a restriction of a credential,
      permission or tool, or an isolation of channels.

   Restoration:  The decision to end a containment wholly or in part.

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      It is separate from containment and from remediation and does not
      follow from either.

   Producer:  The party that signs a record.

   Reader:  A party that checks a record against this document.

   Relying party:  A party that decides what to do on the basis of a
      checked record, under its own admission policy.

   Bundle:  One re-enable decision record together with every record it
      names as a predecessor, recursively, and any joint authority or
      revocation boundary record the producer adds.

   Closed value:  A value drawn from a set this document or [VOCABULARY]
      enumerates.  A value outside the set makes the record malformed.

4.  Common Structure

4.1.  Statement and envelope

   A record is an in-toto Statement v1 [IN-TOTO] carried in a DSSE
   envelope [DSSE].  The statement MUST have exactly the members _type,
   subject, predicateType and predicate. _type MUST be https://in-
   toto.io/Statement/v1, and predicateType MUST be one of the five URIs
   of Section 5.

   Statements are I-JSON [RFC7493] and are canonicalized as in
   Section 4.1 of [AUDIT-RECORD], using JCS [RFC8785].  A duplicate
   member at any depth makes the statement malformed.  Times are RFC
   3339 [RFC3339] UTC times to whole seconds and are compared as
   instants.

   A member this document does not define for a type MUST be refused.
   This departs from the in-toto parsing rule that consumers ignore
   unknown fields: a revision that adds a member publishes it under a
   new predicate type URI (Section 9), so a reader of a v1 type never
   meets a member it has not been told how to read.

   Each subject member carries a digest holding only sha256.  What the
   digest is taken over is stated for each type.

4.2.  Common predicate members

   Every predicate defined here carries these members:

   incident:  An object with issuer, an https URL naming who assigns the

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      identifier; id, a non-empty string; and, optionally, related, a
      list of further {issuer, id} pairs naming the same incident in
      another organization's records.  This is the term
      incident_identifier of [VOCABULARY].

   producer:  An object with id, an https URL naming the signing party.

   issuedAt:  The time the record was issued.

   registryDigest:  An object with sha256, the SHA-256 of the exact
      bytes of the [VOCABULARY] registry the record's closed values are
      expressed in.

   doesNotAssert:  A list of non-empty strings, each stating something
      the producer says the record does not claim.  The list MAY be
      empty; the member MUST NOT be absent.

   Where a type uses it, predecessors is a list of {predicateType,
   digest} naming earlier records of this document, where digest holds
   the sha256 of the predecessor statement's bytes exactly as carried in
   its DSSE payload.

4.3.  Closed values

   The values of response_function, pause_hold, restoration_decision,
   revocation_state, intent_binding, independence_basis and
   set_sufficiency are those of the registry whose digest is
   1c5ff80bd97237a603afc402db692ffe5abe15e4a7f9eca13f20068ada347fdc,
   published under https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/registry/
   with the file name sha256-, then the digest, then .yaml.  Values that
   a section of this document lists itself are closed by this document.

   A reader MUST refuse a value outside a closed set and MUST NOT ignore
   the member.  Registration in [VOCABULARY] gives a value its identity;
   which values a member accepts is set by this document alone.

4.4.  Rule order and verdicts

   Each type has an ordered rule table.  A reader applies the rules in
   order and reports the first that fails, with its reason code.  Rules
   1 to 3 are the same for every type:

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   +===+================================+=============================+
   | # | Rule                           | Code                        |
   +===+================================+=============================+
   | 1 | The statement has the shape of | statement-malformed         |
   |   | Section 4.1 and the predicate  |                             |
   |   | type of this section           |                             |
   +---+--------------------------------+-----------------------------+
   | 2 | The predicate has exactly its  | predicate-malformed         |
   |   | members, each well formed      |                             |
   +---+--------------------------------+-----------------------------+
   | 3 | Every closed value is in its   | closed-vocabulary-violation |
   |   | set                            |                             |
   +---+--------------------------------+-----------------------------+

                                 Table 1

   A record that passes every rule of its type is accepted with the
   verdict named for the type.  Two readers that apply this document
   reach the same verdict and the same first failing reason on the same
   bytes; the conformance corpus (Section 10) tests that.

5.  Record Types

   The five predicate type URIs are:

   https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
     incident-action-authorization
   https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
     revocation-sweep
   https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
     re-enable-decision
   https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
     joint-authority
   https://probityai.github.io/agent-evidence-vectors/predicate/v1/
     revocation-boundary

   Each URI is the common prefix on the first line followed directly by
   the type name on the second, with no space or line break.

5.1.  R1: Incident action authorization

   An R1 records who authorized one incident response action, which role
   each named party held, on what kind of grant the authorizer acted,
   and whether the authority was committed before the action ran.

   The subject is the operation authorized: one or more members, each
   the SHA-256 of the operation's declared description.

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   The predicate carries the common members and:

   action:  functions, a non-empty sorted list of response_function
      values (monitoring_increase, restriction, isolation, pause,
      remediation, restoration); targets, a non-empty list of {id}
      naming the agents, tools, routes or credentials acted on; and
      inducedEffects, which is one of {"declared": "listed", "items":
      [...]}, {"declared": "none_observed", "observation": {"sha256":
      ...}} or {"declared": "unknown"}. A credential revocation is
      recorded as restriction, and its reach as an R2.

   parties:  A non-empty list of {id, roles, authorityBasis?,
      independenceBasis?}. roles is a non-empty sorted list drawn from
      advised, authorized, executed and accountable.  One party MAY hold
      several roles. authorityBasis is one of role_grant,
      policy_preauthorized, contract_third_party, executive_approval and
      unknown, and MUST be present on every party holding authorized.
      independenceBasis is an independence_basis value.

   authorizedAt, notAfter:  When the authority was given, and when it
      lapses.

   executedAt:  Optional.  When the action ran.

   intentBinding:  An intent_binding value: committed_before_execution
      or asserted_after_execution.

   pause:  Optional. {hold, holdProof}, where hold is a pause_hold value
      and holdProof is {sha256} of the observation that established it.

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    +====+============================+===============================+
    | #  | Rule                       | Code                          |
    +====+============================+===============================+
    | 4  | At least one party holds   | no-authorizer                 |
    |    | authorized                 |                               |
    +----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
    | 5  | At least one party holds   | no-accountable-party          |
    |    | accountable                |                               |
    +----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
    | 6  | Every party holding        | authority-basis-missing       |
    |    | authorized carries         |                               |
    |    | authorityBasis             |                               |
    +----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
    | 7  | authorizedAt is not after  | authorization-window-inverted |
    |    | notAfter                   |                               |
    +----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
    | 8  | When intentBinding is      | intent-not-committed-before   |
    |    | committed_before_execution |                               |
    |    | and executedAt is present, |                               |
    |    | executedAt is not before   |                               |
    |    | authorizedAt               |                               |
    +----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
    | 9  | When executedAt is         | authorization-expired         |
    |    | present, it is not after   |                               |
    |    | notAfter                   |                               |
    +----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
    | 10 | inducedEffects declared    | induced-effects-unobserved    |
    |    | none_observed carries      |                               |
    |    | observation                |                               |
    +----+----------------------------+-------------------------------+

                                  Table 2

   A record passing every rule is accepted as authorization-recorded.  A
   reader MUST NOT read an absent authorityBasis as role_grant; the
   value for not knowing is unknown.

5.2.  R2: Revocation sweep

   An R2 records which credentials of a declared population were revoked
   during an incident, which were not, and how far the producer claims
   the sweep reaches.

   The subject is the population manifest: one member, the SHA-256 of
   the list of credential identifiers the sweep was run over.
   Identifiers are opaque names; they MUST NOT be secrets, hashes of
   secrets or key fingerprints.

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   The predicate carries the common members, predecessors (at least one
   R1, the authorization of the sweep), and:

   population:  credentials, a non-empty, sorted, duplicate-free list of
      identifiers.

   partition:  A list of {state, credentials} parts, state one of
      revoked, retained and unassessed.

   revocations:  One entry per revoked credential: credential;
      revokedAt; evidence, a resource descriptor {digest, uri?,
      mediaType?} of the deny record or policy change; and
      relyingParties, a list of {id, state} with state a
      revocation_state value (issued, enforced_observed,
      use_after_revocation, not_established).

   coverage:  claim, one of complete_verified, issued_after_only,
      partial and unknown; and issuedAfter, a time, present when claim
      is issued_after_only.

    +===+==============================+==============================+
    | # | Rule                         | Code                         |
    +===+==============================+==============================+
    | 4 | The parts are disjoint and   | denominator-union-mismatch   |
    |   | their union equals           |                              |
    |   | population.credentials       |                              |
    +---+------------------------------+------------------------------+
    | 5 | revocations names exactly    | revocation-entries-mismatch  |
    |   | the credentials of the       |                              |
    |   | revoked part                 |                              |
    +---+------------------------------+------------------------------+
    | 6 | complete_verified is claimed | coverage-claim-exceeds-proof |
    |   | only when every credential   |                              |
    |   | is in the revoked part       |                              |
    +---+------------------------------+------------------------------+
    | 7 | issued_after_only carries    | coverage-claim-incomplete    |
    |   | issuedAfter                  |                              |
    +---+------------------------------+------------------------------+

                                  Table 3

   A record passing every rule is accepted as sweep-recorded.  An honest
   partial or issued_after_only sweep is well formed.  Whether a relying
   party admits a system restored under it is that party's policy.

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5.3.  R3: Re-enable decision

   An R3 records one decision about whether a stopped or restricted
   agent system may run again: the outcome, the scope restored, who
   approved it and on what independence, and, for every kind of evidence
   incident guidance asks a restart to show, either the digest of what
   was shown or an explicit statement that it was not addressed.

   The subject is the configuration restored: one or more members, each
   the SHA-256 of a baseline (model weights, harness code, container
   image, tool configuration).

   The predicate carries the common members, predecessors (at least one
   record of this document), and:

   restoration:  decision, a restoration_decision value (resume_full,
      resume_staged, remain_restricted, not_established); and
      restoredScope, present when decision is resume_staged: {agents,
      tools, routes, credentials}, each a sorted list of identifiers, at
      least one non-empty.

   approvers:  A list of {id, roles, independenceBasis}, with roles as
      in R1 and independenceBasis an independence_basis value
      (independent_sources, subject_supplied, undeclared).

   setSufficiency:  The producer's own set_sufficiency judgment of the
      evidence below: sufficient, insufficient or not_assessed.

   evidence:  An object with exactly the sixteen slots of the table
      below.  Each slot is either a resource descriptor, {"digest":
      {"sha256": ...}} with optional uri and mediaType as in the in-toto
      ResourceDescriptor, or {"notAddressed": "<reason>"} with a non-
      empty reason.  A slot MAY point at an attestation the producer
      already emits, including an agent audit record [AUDIT-RECORD].

    +=========================+=======================+===============+
    | Slot                    | What it holds         | Where         |
    |                         |                       | guidance asks |
    |                         |                       | for it        |
    +=========================+=======================+===============+
    | actorObjective          | the adversary's       | SP 800-184    |
    |                         | objective, or         | Sec. 2.3.4    |
    |                         | confirmation it is    |               |
    |                         | not apparent          |               |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | persistence             | persistence           | SP 800-184    |
    |                         | mechanisms            | Sec. 2.3.4    |
    |                         | understood, or non-   |               |

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    |                         | persistence confirmed |               |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | rootCause               | root cause remediated | SP 800-61r3   |
    |                         | before production use | RC.RP-05      |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | affectedScope           | affected hosts,       | SP 800-61r3   |
    |                         | services and similar  | RS.MI-02; Key |
    |                         | agents identified     | Practices 6.3 |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | assetIntegrity          | restoration assets    | SP 800-61r3   |
    |                         | checked before use    | RC.RP-03; SP  |
    |                         |                       | 800-53 CP-    |
    |                         |                       | 10(4)         |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | restoredAssetsClean     | restored assets free  | SP 800-61r3   |
    |                         | of indicators and of  | RC.RP-05; SP  |
    |                         | the original weakness | 800-184 Sec.  |
    |                         |                       | 6.2.2         |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | containmentReproof      | monitors, logging,    | Key Practices |
    |                         | egress, shutdown and  | 7.3           |
    |                         | permissions shown     |               |
    |                         | working               |               |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | incidentReplay          | new controls shown to | Key Practices |
    |                         | catch a replay of the | 7.4           |
    |                         | incident              |               |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | restoreOrder            | dependency order of   | SP 800-61r3   |
    |                         | the restoration       | RC.RP-04      |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | postRestartMonitoring   | monitoring that       | SP 800-61r3   |
    |                         | detects recurrence    | RC.RP-04; SP  |
    |                         |                       | 800-184 Sec.  |
    |                         |                       | 6.2.3         |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | exclusiveControl        | exclusive control of  | SP 800-184    |
    |                         | the environment re-   | Sec. 6.2.3    |
    |                         | established           |               |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | controlsNotDegraded     | controls not degraded | SP 800-53     |
    |                         | by the restoration    | CP-2          |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | residualRisk            | the remaining risk,   | Key Practices |
    |                         | stated and accepted   | 7.5; SP       |
    |                         |                       | 800-61r3      |
    |                         |                       | RC.RP-06      |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+

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    | seniorApproval          | senior approval,      | Key Practices |
    |                         | informed by outside   | 2.6           |
    |                         | assessment where used |               |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | multiPartyAuthorization | more than one person  | AWS Agentic   |
    |                         | authorized the        | AI Lens BP04  |
    |                         | restart               |               |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+
    | ownerConfirmation       | the system or asset   | SP 800-61r3   |
    |                         | owner confirmed the   | RC.RP-04      |
    |                         | restoration           |               |
    +-------------------------+-----------------------+---------------+

              Table 4: Evidence slots of a re-enable decision

   The guidance is cited from [NIST-SP-800-61R3], [NIST-SP-800-184],
   [NIST-SP-800-53R5], [KEY-PRACTICES] and [AWS-AGENTIC-LENS].

       +===+===========================+===========================+
       | # | Rule                      | Code                      |
       +===+===========================+===========================+
       | 4 | evidence carries every    | evidence-slot-missing     |
       |   | slot, and no other        |                           |
       +---+---------------------------+---------------------------+
       | 5 | Every notAddressed reason | evidence-slot-unexplained |
       |   | is non-empty              |                           |
       +---+---------------------------+---------------------------+
       | 6 | approvers is non-empty    | no-approver               |
       |   | and at least one approver |                           |
       |   | holds authorized          |                           |
       +---+---------------------------+---------------------------+
       | 7 | resume_staged carries     | partial-without-scope     |
       |   | restoredScope with at     |                           |
       |   | least one identifier      |                           |
       +---+---------------------------+---------------------------+
       | 8 | resume_full carries no    | full-with-scope           |
       |   | restoredScope             |                           |
       +---+---------------------------+---------------------------+

                                  Table 5

   A record passing every rule is accepted as decision-recorded.  The
   slots record what a decision cites.  Which slots a relying party
   requires to carry a digest, and what it does with a notAddressed
   slot, is its own admission policy.  A record that omits a slot is
   malformed; a record that declares a slot not addressed says so in a
   form the relying party can refuse.

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5.4.  R4: Joint authority

   An R4 records, for an incident that crosses organizations, which
   party may act on which asset, under what kind of grant, and which
   indicators the parties share.  Restart conditions in incident
   guidance assume one owner of the restored asset; when an agent
   operated by one organization affects infrastructure run by another,
   an R4 names the owners and the assignment, so each party's R1 and R3
   records can be read against it.

   The subject is the shared indicator set: one member, the SHA-256 of
   the canonical list of shared indicators.

   The predicate carries the common members and:

   sharedIndicators:  A non-empty sorted list of {sha256} digests of
      indicators both parties hold.

   parties:  At least two entries {id, organization, correlationId,
      authorityBasis, assets}, authorityBasis as in R1 and assets a
      sorted list of asset identifiers the party may act on.

   actions:  Optional.  A list of {party, asset, record} naming actions
      already taken, where record is {sha256} of the R1 statement that
      authorized the action.

    +===+============================+===============================+
    | # | Rule                       | Code                          |
    +===+============================+===============================+
    | 4 | Every party carries        | authority-basis-missing       |
    |   | authorityBasis             |                               |
    +---+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
    | 5 | The parties belong to at   | single-organization           |
    |   | least two organizations    |                               |
    +---+----------------------------+-------------------------------+
    | 6 | Every action names a party | party-acts-outside-assignment |
    |   | in parties and an asset in |                               |
    |   | that party's assets        |                               |
    +---+----------------------------+-------------------------------+

                                 Table 6

   A record passing every rule is accepted as assignment-recorded.  A
   record co-signed by every party (several DSSE signatures over one
   payload) is stronger than one signed by one party, and the envelope
   shows which it is.

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5.5.  RB: Revocation boundary

   Revoking a credential stops new work from starting under it.  It does
   not by itself stop work already in flight from committing its effect
   afterwards.  An RB reports, for one declared sink and one test
   window, whether any effect from an in-flight task committed at that
   sink's declared commit boundary after the revocation took effect.  It
   states an outcome and requires no mechanism.

   The subject is the test plan: one member, the SHA-256 of the declared
   sink and window.

   The predicate carries the common members, optional predecessors, and:

   sink:  {id, kind, commitBoundary}. kind is one of database,
      filesystem, http_endpoint, subprocess, queue and other.
      commitBoundary is a non-empty string saying at which point an
      effect counts as committed.

   observer:  {id, vantage}, vantage one of sink_side and agent_side.

   revocation:  credential, an opaque identifier; effectiveAt, when the
      revocation took effect at its authority; and timeSource, a non-
      empty string naming the clock.

   window:  {start, end}.

   counts:  Non-negative integers attempts, inFlightAtRevocation,
      postRevocationCommits, replaysAttempted and replaysCommitted.

   exclusions:  A list of {count, reason}, each reason non-empty, for
      attempts left out of the counts.

   result:  One of no_post_revocation_commit_observed,
      post_revocation_commit_observed and not_established.

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   +=+====================================+===========================+
   |#| Rule                               | Code                      |
   +=+====================================+===========================+
   |4| window.start is not after          | revocation-outside-window |
   | | effectiveAt, and effectiveAt is    |                           |
   | | not after window.end               |                           |
   +-+------------------------------------+---------------------------+
   |5| inFlightAtRevocation does not      | counts-inconsistent       |
   | | exceed attempts,                   |                           |
   | | postRevocationCommits does not     |                           |
   | | exceed inFlightAtRevocation, and   |                           |
   | | replaysCommitted does not exceed   |                           |
   | | replaysAttempted                   |                           |
   +-+------------------------------------+---------------------------+
   |6| result is                          | result-contradicts-counts |
   | | post_revocation_commit_observed    |                           |
   | | exactly when postRevocationCommits |                           |
   | | or replaysCommitted is positive,   |                           |
   | | unless result is not_established   |                           |
   +-+------------------------------------+---------------------------+
   |7| no_post_revocation_commit_observed | observer-not-at-sink      |
   | | requires a sink_side observer      |                           |
   +-+------------------------------------+---------------------------+

                                 Table 7

   A record passing every rule is accepted as boundary-recorded.  One
   record covers one sink; a claim about several sinks is several
   records.

6.  Bundles

   A re-enable decision is rarely checkable alone: it rests on the
   authorizations and revocations before it.  A restoration evidence
   bundle is one R3 together with every record its predecessors name,
   recursively, and any R4 or RB the producer adds.  A reader checks a
   bundle in this order and reports the first failure:

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     +====+===========================+=============================+
     | #  | Rule                      | Code                        |
     +====+===========================+=============================+
     | B1 | Every record in the       | the record's own code       |
     |    | bundle conforms to its    |                             |
     |    | own type                  |                             |
     +----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
     | B2 | Every predecessor digest  | predecessor-not-carried     |
     |    | resolves to exactly one   |                             |
     |    | record carried in the     |                             |
     |    | bundle                    |                             |
     +----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
     | B3 | The record a digest       | predecessor-type-mismatch   |
     |    | resolves to has the       |                             |
     |    | predicateType the         |                             |
     |    | reference names           |                             |
     +----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
     | B4 | No record names itself,   | predecessor-cycle           |
     |    | directly or through other |                             |
     |    | records, as its           |                             |
     |    | predecessor               |                             |
     +----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
     | B5 | Every record names the    | incident-mismatch           |
     |    | same incident, by         |                             |
     |    | incident or by one of its |                             |
     |    | related pairs             |                             |
     +----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
     | B6 | No record's issuedAt is   | predecessor-issued-later    |
     |    | earlier than that of a    |                             |
     |    | record it names as a      |                             |
     |    | predecessor               |                             |
     +----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+
     | B7 | Every credential an R3    | restored-credential-unswept |
     |    | restores in               |                             |
     |    | restoredScope.credentials |                             |
     |    | appears in some R2 in the |                             |
     |    | bundle                    |                             |
     +----+---------------------------+-----------------------------+

                                 Table 8

   A bundle passing every rule is reported as bundle-consistent.  That
   verdict says the records agree with each other.  It does not say
   whether the relying party should admit the decision.

   A relying party's admission policy is written against a consistent
   bundle.  For example, a policy can require that every restored
   credential lie in the revoked part of an R2 whose coverage.claim is

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   complete_verified, that containmentReproof and incidentReplay carry
   digests, and that at least one approver with independent_sources hold
   authorized.  Such a policy is outside this document.

7.  Security Considerations

7.1.  A signature authenticates an assertion, not its truth

   Every record here is a statement by its producer.  A conforming
   record is complete and internally consistent; it is not evidence that
   the authority named was held, that the action ran as described, that
   the cited evidence shows what its slot names, or that resuming was
   safe.  The value of the format is that a false statement is
   attributable to a named signer and that an omission is visible, not
   that falsehood is prevented.

7.2.  Absence is not read as a value

   An absent authorityBasis is not role_grant, an omitted evidence slot
   is malformed rather than satisfied, and a claim of no induced effects
   requires the observation that looked.  Each of these closes a way for
   a record to look complete because it says less.  A reader that
   supplies a default for an absent member defeats the format.

7.3.  Revocation reach

   A revocation sweep that claims more than its partition shows is
   refused (R2 rule 6).  A sweep that honestly reports issued_after_only
   or partial is well formed, and a relying party that admits a restart
   under it accepts that credentials issued earlier, or outside the
   revoked part, may still be live.  The relyingParties states
   distinguish a revocation that was issued from one a relying party was
   observed to enforce; use_after_revocation exists so that a use after
   revocation can be recorded rather than omitted.

7.4.  Work in flight

   Revocation does not stop work that is already in flight from
   committing.  An RB with a sink_side observer reports whether that
   happened at one sink in one window.  A zero count bounds a rate for
   that sink and window; it is not a guarantee for other sinks or
   windows.  An agent-side observer cannot support
   no_post_revocation_commit_observed (RB rule 7), because the agent
   process cannot see the sink's committed state.

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7.5.  Authority that outlives a pause

   An R1 authorization carries notAfter.  A relying party that admits
   actions under an R1 after a pause and restart SHOULD check notAfter
   against the restart, and SHOULD require a fresh R1 for any action
   after an R3, so that a permit issued before the pause is not reused
   after it.

7.6.  Approver independence

   independenceBasis is the producer's statement.  A relying party that
   requires independence SHOULD require independent_sources and SHOULD
   resolve the named approver itself.  An approver who also stopped the
   system and approves its restart is recordable; whether that is
   acceptable is admission policy.

7.7.  Predecessor digests

   Predecessors are named by the SHA-256 of the statement bytes as
   carried in the DSSE payload.  A reader MUST hash those bytes, not a
   re-serialization, since a re-serialization that differs in member
   order or number form changes the digest.

8.  Privacy Considerations

   Records name parties by identifier and may name natural persons as
   authorizers, approvers or accountable parties.  Producers SHOULD use
   role or account identifiers where a person's name is not needed by
   the relying party, and SHOULD state in doesNotAssert what a
   distributed record deliberately omits.

   Credential identifiers in an R2 or RB are opaque names.  They MUST
   NOT carry secrets, hashes of secrets or key fingerprints, because a
   record may travel to parties not entitled to the credential.

   Evidence slots and indicator sets are bound by digest and not
   carried.  A record can therefore travel to a party entitled to check
   the decision without carrying the forensic material the decision
   rests on; that party resolves a digest only if it needs the content.
   Shared indicators in an R4 are digests for the same reason: the
   record shows the parties hold the same indicators without disclosing
   them to a reader that does not.

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9.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.  Each predicate type is a URI
   under a namespace the author controls and requires no registration to
   be used, consistent with the in-toto Attestation Framework's
   treatment of predicate type identifiers [IN-TOTO].

   A record carries its predicate type inside the bytes its producer
   signed.  A later revision of this document MUST NOT move a URI once
   records carrying it exist, since moving it invalidates every
   signature over them.  A change to what a record of a type must carry,
   including a member or a closed value added, is published under a new
   URI with v1 read as v2, and a record valid under a v1 URI stays valid
   under every later revision that keeps that URI.

10.  Conformance

   A conforming producer emits records that meet every MUST of Section 4
   and of the section of each type it emits.  A conforming reader
   applies the rule order of Section 4.4 to each record and the order of
   Section 6 to each bundle, and reports the first failing reason code.

   A reader is not described as conforming to this revision unless it
   reaches the verdict and the reason its manifest declares on every
   member of the vectors-restart-records family of release 0.31.2 of
   [VECTORS].  That family carries 57 members, 15 to accept and 42 to
   reject, with corpus digest
   5b7f58c91b517bd7c96dcccdef0d827a4f730fd4a650b4992b362bb9925cae29.
   Each reject member changes exactly one value of an accepting control,
   and the rule it names is the first that fails.  Three rules have no
   member, and the manifest lists each with its reason: rule 3 of R4 and
   of RB, which carry no registry-defined value, and bundle rule B4,
   which would need a SHA-256 fixed point to force.  Passing the corpus
   is necessary and not sufficient; those three rules are checked by
   reading them.

   A document that references this one normatively SHOULD name the
   revision it relies on and MAY name a release of [VECTORS] as its
   conformance test.  The five predicate type URIs, the reason codes,
   and the section anchors common, rule-order, r1, r2, r3, r4, rb and
   bundles are stable across revisions and may be referenced by name.

11.  Implementation Status

   Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before
   publication.

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   This section records the status of known implementations at the time
   of writing, following [RFC7942].  Listing an implementation here does
   not imply endorsement by the IETF.

   [VECTORS] is an open conformance corpus licensed under Apache-2.0.
   Its vectors-restart-records family publishes the members of
   Section 10 with a checker that uses only the Python standard library,
   and JSON Schemas for the five types that check shape and closed
   values.  From the source of release 0.31.2:

   git clone --branch v0.31.2 \
       https://github.com/probityai/agent-evidence-vectors
   cd agent-evidence-vectors
   python3 vectors-restart-records/check_vectors.py

   On release 0.31.2 the run reports that all 57 members agree with the
   manifest.  The checker also takes one record (--record) or one bundle
   directory (--bundle) and prints the verdict and the first failing
   reason.  The repository's Go reader, built from the same release (go
   build ./cmd/aee-verify, then aee-verify vectors-restart-records),
   reports the same: 57 members, 15 accepted and 42 rejected, each as
   the manifest declares.

12.  Mapping to the AUDIT Problem Statement

   The AUDIT BoF request [AUDIT-BOFREQ] and the proposed charter
   [AUDIT-CHARTER] name problems a data model should address.  This
   document addresses three of them for the period from containment to
   restoration:

   *  Authorization state over time: R1 records each authorization with
      its window, R2 the revocation of credentials and its reach, R3 the
      decision that ends a containment, and the bundle rules bind them
      in order by digest and time.

   *  References to the identities of participating entities: R1 and R3
      name each party with its role and its authority basis, and R4
      names the organizations and the assets each may act on.

   *  Verification by a party that trusts neither the agent nor its
      operator: every record is signed, every closed value is fail-
      closed, and every rule has a reason code a second reader
      reproduces.

   Action provenance for each enforced request is the subject of
   [AUDIT-RECORD]; an R3 cites such records by digest.  Policy models,
   admission policy and retention periods are left to other work.

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13.  Normative References

   [AUDIT-RECORD]
              Gilda, S., "An Audit Record Format for AI Agent
              Authorization Decisions", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03, 29 October
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gilda-
              audit-agent-audit-record-03>.

   [DSSE]     Secure Systems Lab, "Dead Simple Signing Envelope", 2026,
              <https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse>.

   [IN-TOTO]  in-toto, "in-toto Attestation Framework Specification",
              2026, <https://github.com/in-
              toto/attestation/blob/main/spec/README.md>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
              Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.

   [RFC7493]  Bray, T., Ed., "The I-JSON Message Format", RFC 7493,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7493, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7493>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8785]  Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
              Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.

   [VECTORS]  agent-evidence-vectors contributors, "agent-evidence-
              vectors: conformance vectors for agent evidence records,
              release 0.31.2", 2026, <https://github.com/probityai/
              agent-evidence-vectors/tree/v0.31.2/vectors-restart-
              records>.

   [VOCABULARY]
              agent-evidence-vocabulary contributors, "agent-evidence-
              vocabulary: a closed term registry", 2026,
              <https://w3id.org/agent-evidence/vocab/v1/>.

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14.  Informative References

   [AIMS]     Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B.,
              Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management
              System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              wimse-aims-00, 15 September 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              aims-00>.

   [AUDIT-BOFREQ]
              Kuehlewind, M., "AUDIT - Agent Use of Delegation and
              Interaction Traceability", 8 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bofreq-kuhlewind-audit-
              agent-use-of-delegation-and-interaction-traceability/>.

   [AUDIT-CHARTER]
              AUDIT BoF proponents, "Agent Use of Delegation and
              Interaction Traceability (AUDIT) Working Group Charter
              (proposed)", 2026, <https://github.com/mirjak/audit-bof-
              preparation/blob/main/audit-charter.md>.

   [AWS-AGENTIC-LENS]
              Amazon Web Services, "AGENTSEC07-BP04, Agentic AI Lens,
              AWS Well-Architected Framework", 2026,
              <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/
              agentic-ai-lens/agentsec07-bp04.html>.

   [KEY-PRACTICES]
              NIST Center for AI Standards and Innovation, NSA, and
              CISA, "Key Practices for Incident Readiness and Response
              in Super Intelligence Training and Evaluation", 16 October
              2026.

   [NIST-SP-800-53R5]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Security
              and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and
              Organizations", NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev. 5,
              September 2020,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5>.

   [NIST-SP-800-61R3]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Incident
              Response Recommendations and Considerations for
              Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community
              Profile", NIST Special Publication 800-61 Rev. 3, April
              2025, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r3>.

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   [NIST-SP-800-184]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Guide for
              Cybersecurity Event Recovery", NIST Special
              Publication 800-184, December 2016,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-184>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.

Document History

   -00: Initial version.  Defines five record types and the bundle
   rules; the predicate type URIs are those published with release
   0.31.2 of the conformance corpus.

Acknowledgments

   The evidence slots of the re-enable decision follow the restart
   conditions of NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, NIST SP 800-184, NIST SP 800-53
   Rev. 5, the NIST, NSA and CISA Key Practices of October 2026, and the
   AWS Agentic AI Lens.

Author's Address

   Sankalp Gilda
   Email: sankalp.gilda@gmail.com

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