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Validation of Neighbor Discovery Source Link-Layer Address (SLLA) and Target Link-layer Address (TLLA) options

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Expired & archived
Authors Fernando Gont , Ron Bonica , Will (Shucheng) LIU
Last updated 2014-08-18 (Latest revision 2014-02-14)
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:


This memo documents two scenarios in which an on-link attacker emits a crafted IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) packet that poisons its victim's neighbor cache. In the first scenario, the attacker causes a victim to map a local IPv6 address to a local router's own link- layer address. In the second scenario, the attacker causes the victim to map a unicast IP address to a link layer broadcast address. In both scenarios, the attacker can exploit the poisoned neighbor cache to perform a subsequent forwording-loop attack, thus potentially causing a Denial of Service. Finally, this memo specifies simple validations that the recipient of an ND message can execute in order to protect itself against the above-mentioned threats.


Fernando Gont
Ron Bonica
Will (Shucheng) LIU

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)