@techreport{gont-6man-lla-opt-validation-00,
    number =    {draft-gont-6man-lla-opt-validation-00},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gont-6man-lla-opt-validation/00/},
    author =    {Fernando Gont and Ron Bonica and Will (Shucheng) LIU},
    title =     {{Validation of Neighbor Discovery Source Link-Layer Address (SLLA) and Target Link-layer Address (TLLA) options}},
    pagetotal = 10,
    year =      2014,
    month =     feb,
    day =       14,
    abstract =  {This memo documents two scenarios in which an on-link attacker emits a crafted IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) packet that poisons its victim's neighbor cache. In the first scenario, the attacker causes a victim to map a local IPv6 address to a local router's own link- layer address. In the second scenario, the attacker causes the victim to map a unicast IP address to a link layer broadcast address. In both scenarios, the attacker can exploit the poisoned neighbor cache to perform a subsequent forwording-loop attack, thus potentially causing a Denial of Service. Finally, this memo specifies simple validations that the recipient of an ND message can execute in order to protect itself against the above-mentioned threats.},
}