@techreport{gont-6man-lla-opt-validation-00, number = {draft-gont-6man-lla-opt-validation-00}, type = {Internet-Draft}, institution = {Internet Engineering Task Force}, publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force}, note = {Work in Progress}, url = {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gont-6man-lla-opt-validation/00/}, author = {Fernando Gont and Ron Bonica and Will (Shucheng) LIU}, title = {{Validation of Neighbor Discovery Source Link-Layer Address (SLLA) and Target Link-layer Address (TLLA) options}}, pagetotal = 10, year = 2014, month = feb, day = 14, abstract = {This memo documents two scenarios in which an on-link attacker emits a crafted IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) packet that poisons its victim's neighbor cache. In the first scenario, the attacker causes a victim to map a local IPv6 address to a local router's own link- layer address. In the second scenario, the attacker causes the victim to map a unicast IP address to a link layer broadcast address. In both scenarios, the attacker can exploit the poisoned neighbor cache to perform a subsequent forwording-loop attack, thus potentially causing a Denial of Service. Finally, this memo specifies simple validations that the recipient of an ND message can execute in order to protect itself against the above-mentioned threats.}, }