Defeating Attacks which employ Forged ICMPv4/ICMPv6 Error Messages
draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-03
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2018-01-04 (latest revision 2017-07-03) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
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https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-03.txt
Abstract
Over the years, a number of attack vectors that employ forged ICMPv4/ ICMPv6 error messages have been disclosed and exploited in the wild. The aforementioned attack vectors do not require that the source address of the packets be forged, but do require that the addresses of the IPv4/IPv6 packet embedded in the ICMPv4/ICMPv6 payload be forged. This document discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to mitigate attacks that use forged addresses in the IPv4/IPv6 packet embedded in an ICMPv4/ICMPv6 payload.
Authors
Fernando Gont
(fgont@si6networks.com)
Ray Hunter
(v6ops@globis.net)
Jeroen Massar
(jeroen@massar.ch)
Will LIU
(liushucheng@huawei.com)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)