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Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Attacks which employ Forged ICMP/ ICMPv6 Error Messages

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
Authors Fernando Gont , Ray Hunter , Jeroen Massar , Will (Shucheng) LIU
Last updated 2015-03-01 (Latest revision 2014-08-28)
RFC stream (None)
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:


Over the years, a number of attack vectors that employ forged ICMP/ ICMPv6 error messages have been disclosed and exploited in the wild. The aforementioned attack vectors do not require that the source address of the packets be forged, but do require that the addresses of the IP/IPv6 packet embedded in the ICMP/ICMPv6 payload be forged. This document discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to mitigate attacks that use forged addresses in the IP/IPv6 packet embedded in an ICMP/ICMPv6 payload. This advice is in line with the recommendations in BCP38.


Fernando Gont
Ray Hunter
Jeroen Massar
Will (Shucheng) LIU

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)