Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Attacks which employ Forged ICMP/ ICMPv6 Error Messages
draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00

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Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2015-03-01 (latest revision 2014-08-28)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-00.txt

Abstract

Over the years, a number of attack vectors that employ forged ICMP/ ICMPv6 error messages have been disclosed and exploited in the wild. The aforementioned attack vectors do not require that the source address of the packets be forged, but do require that the addresses of the IP/IPv6 packet embedded in the ICMP/ICMPv6 payload be forged. This document discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to mitigate attacks that use forged addresses in the IP/IPv6 packet embedded in an ICMP/ICMPv6 payload. This advice is in line with the recommendations in BCP38.

Authors

Fernando Gont (fgont@si6networks.com)
Ray Hunter (v6ops@globis.net)
Jeroen Massar (jeroen@massar.ch)
Will LIU (liushucheng@huawei.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)