@techreport{gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-03,
    number =    {draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-03},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering/03/},
    author =    {Fernando Gont and Ray Hunter and Jeroen Massar and Will (Shucheng) LIU},
    title =     {{Defeating Attacks which employ Forged ICMPv4/ICMPv6 Error Messages}},
    pagetotal = 10,
    year =      2017,
    month =     jul,
    day =       3,
    abstract =  {Over the years, a number of attack vectors that employ forged ICMPv4/ ICMPv6 error messages have been disclosed and exploited in the wild. The aforementioned attack vectors do not require that the source address of the packets be forged, but do require that the addresses of the IPv4/IPv6 packet embedded in the ICMPv4/ICMPv6 payload be forged. This document discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to mitigate attacks that use forged addresses in the IPv4/IPv6 packet embedded in an ICMPv4/ICMPv6 payload.},
}