Mitigating Teredo Rooting Loop Attacks
draft-gont-teredo-loops-00
Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
---|---|---|---|
Author | Fernando Gont | ||
Last updated | 2012-07-13 (Latest revision 2012-01-10) | ||
Stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats |
Expired & archived
plain text
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bibtex
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Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of
the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-teredo-loops-00.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-teredo-loops-00.txt
Abstract
Recently, a number of routing loop vulnerabilities were discovered in the Teredo mechanism, which typically result in a Denial of Service of the involved systems, possibly also affecting the intervening networks. This document describes a number of security checks that can be performed by Teredo hosts and Teredo servers such that these vulnerabilities are eliminated.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)