Mitigating Teredo Rooting Loop Attacks
draft-gont-teredo-loops-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2012-07-13 (latest revision 2012-01-10) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of
the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-teredo-loops-00.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-teredo-loops-00.txt
Abstract
Recently, a number of routing loop vulnerabilities were discovered in the Teredo mechanism, which typically result in a Denial of Service of the involved systems, possibly also affecting the intervening networks. This document describes a number of security checks that can be performed by Teredo hosts and Teredo servers such that these vulnerabilities are eliminated.
Authors
Fernando Gont (fernando@gont.com.ar)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)