IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) Evasion
draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-evasion-01
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Fernando Gont | ||
| Last updated | 2011-06-07 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) mechanism is commonly employed to mitigate attack vectors based on forged ICMPv6 Router Advertisement messages. Many existing IPv6 deployments rely on RA- Guard as the first line of defense against the aforementioned attack vectors. This document describes possible ways in which current RA- Guard implementations can be circumvented, and discusses possible mitigations.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)