IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) Evasion
draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-evasion-01

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2011-06-07
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-evasion-01.txt

Abstract

The IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) mechanism is commonly employed to mitigate attack vectors based on forged ICMPv6 Router Advertisement messages. Many existing IPv6 deployments rely on RA- Guard as the first line of defense against the aforementioned attack vectors. This document describes possible ways in which current RA- Guard implementations can be circumvented, and discusses possible mitigations.

Authors

Fernando Gont (fernando@gont.com.ar)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)