IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) Evasion
draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-evasion-01
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2011-06-07 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
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https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-evasion-01.txt
Abstract
The IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) mechanism is commonly employed to mitigate attack vectors based on forged ICMPv6 Router Advertisement messages. Many existing IPv6 deployments rely on RA- Guard as the first line of defense against the aforementioned attack vectors. This document describes possible ways in which current RA- Guard implementations can be circumvented, and discusses possible mitigations.
Authors
Fernando Gont (fernando@gont.com.ar)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)