Data Center use of Static Diffie-Hellman in TLS 1.3
draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01

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Network Working Group                                           M. Green
Internet-Draft                              Cryptography Engineering LLC
Intended status: Standards Track                                R. Droms
Expires: January 4, 2018                            Interisle Consulting
                                                              R. Housley
                                                     Vigil Security, LLC
                                                               P. Turner
                                                                  Venafi
                                                               S. Fenter
                                                            July 3, 2017

          Data Center use of Static Diffie-Hellman in TLS 1.3
                 draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01

Abstract

   Unlike earlier versions of TLS, current drafts of TLS 1.3 have
   instead adopted ephemeral-mode Diffie-Hellman and elliptic-curve
   Diffie-Hellman as the primary cryptographic key exchange mechanism
   used in TLS.  This document describes an optional configuration for
   TLS servers that allows for the use of a static Diffie-Hellman
   private key for all TLS connections made to the server.  Passive
   monitoring of TLS connections can be enabled by installing a
   corresponding copy of this key in each monitoring device.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Green, et al.            Expires January 4, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft  Data Center use of Static Diffie-Hellman       July 2017

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  ASN.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Enterprise Out-of-band TLS Decryption Architecture  . . . . .   4
   3.  Enterprise Requirements for Passive (out-of-band) TLS
       Decryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Summary of the Existing Diffie-Hellman Handshake  . . . . . .   6
   5.  Using static (EC)DHE on the server  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Key Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  TLS Static DH Key (TSK) Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.1.  Key Push  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Key Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Alternative Solutions for Enterprise Monitoring and
       Troubleshooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Weaknesses of Alternative Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   12. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   13. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Unlike earlier versions of TLS, current drafts of TLS 1.3
   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] do not provide support for the RSA handshake --
   and have instead adopted ephemeral-mode Diffie-Hellman (DHE) and
   elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) as the primary cryptographic
   key exchange mechanism used in TLS.

   While ephemeral (EC) Diffie-Hellman is in nearly all ways an
   improvement over the TLS RSA handshake, the use of these mechanisms
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