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Elliptic Curve-Based Certificateless Signatures for Identity-Based Encryption (ECCSI)
draft-groves-eccsi-01

Discuss


Yes

(Tim Polk)

No Objection

(Adrian Farrel)
(Dan Romascanu)
(Gonzalo Camarillo)
(Robert Sparks)
(Ron Bonica)
(Stewart Bryant)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 01 and is now closed.

Lars Eggert Former IESG member
Discuss
Discuss [Treat as non-blocking comment] (2011-02-03) Unknown
 DISCUSS: This is from the sec-dir review:

> This document is unusual
> for the IETF, in that it defines a new cryptographic algorithm, which
> we normally don't do.  While there is no particular reason not to
> publish it here, I would be wary of using this algorithm in any IETF
> protocol until it has seen extensive review by the cryptographic
> community.  It looks to me like it should work, but I am not a
> cryptographer and may well have missed an obvious flaw.

 Do we need an IESG note on this document? It seems like an IETF
 last call doesn't really help much if we don't have the expertise in the
 community. Why is this being published via the IETF stream?


Sean Turner Former IESG member
(was No Objection, Discuss) Yes
Yes (2011-11-12) Unknown

Tim Polk Former IESG member
Yes
Yes () Unknown

                            
Adrian Farrel Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Alexey Melnikov Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2011-02-03) Unknown
The "||" convention needs to be explained early in the document.

SHA-256 needs a reference.
Dan Romascanu Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Gonzalo Camarillo Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2011-02-03) Unknown
Ari Keränen's review noted the following:

2. Architecture

   Before verification of any Signatures, members of the user community
   are supplied with the KPAK.  The supply of the KPAK MUST be
   authenticated by the KMS and this authentication MUST be verified by
   each member of the user community.

What must the members exactly verify? That the KPAK was authenticated by the KMS? Every member does this separately?


   In the description of the algorithms in this document, it is assumed
   that there is one KPA,

First instance of KPA; needs to be expanded. Or should that be KMS?Ss
Ralph Droms Former IESG member
(was Discuss, No Objection) No Objection
No Objection (2011-02-02) Unknown
A minor suggestion - it would help avoid confusion through
interpretation of different textual descriptions in section 3 to
take out the informal description of integer representation
as an octet string and use just the pointer to [P1363].  The
informal use of octet string might also be cleaned up a little
to clarify that they are all indicating the use of the
representation in [P1363].

Robert Sparks Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Ron Bonica Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2011-02-01) Unknown
  Please consider the comments from the Gen-ART Review by Francis Dupont
  on 13-JAN-2011.  You can found the review at:

    http://www.softarmor.com/rai/temp-gen-art/
    draft-groves-eccsi-00-dupont.txt
Stewart Bryant Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown