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Route Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Expired & archived
Authors Danny R. McPherson , Shane Amante , Eric Osterweil
Last updated 2013-06-21 (Latest revision 2012-12-18)
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:


This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Secure Inter-Domain Routing working group during routing security requirements discussions and subsequent specification.


Danny R. McPherson
Shane Amante
Eric Osterweil

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)