Route Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
draft-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Danny R. McPherson , Shane Amante , Eric Osterweil | ||
Last updated | 2013-06-21 (Latest revision 2012-12-18) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Secure Inter-Domain Routing working group during routing security requirements discussions and subsequent specification.
Authors
Danny R. McPherson
Shane Amante
Eric Osterweil
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)