Double Nonce Derive Key AES-GCM (DNDK-GCM)
draft-gueron-cfrg-dndkgcm-00
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Shay Gueron | ||
| Last updated | 2024-10-17 (Latest revision 2024-04-15) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document specifies an authenticated encryption algorithm called Double Nonce Derive Key AES-GCM (DNDK-GCM) that operates with a 32- byte root key and encrypts with a 24-byte random nonce, and optionally provides for key commitment. Encryption takes the root key and a random nonce, derives a fresh encryption key and a key commitment value, invokes AES-GCM with the derived key and a 12-byte zero nonce, and outputs the ciphertext, authentication tag and the key commitment value. The low collision probability with 24-byte random nonces extends the lifetime of the root key and this supports processing up to 2^64 bytes under one root key. DNDK-GCM involves a small overhead compared to using AES-GCM directly, and its security relies only on the standard assumption on AES as a pseudorandom permutation.
Authors
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