DDoS mitigation offload usecase and YANG module expansion in signal channel
draft-h-dots-mitigation-offload-expansion-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-10-14
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
DOTS                                                          Y. Hayashi
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Experimental                               K. Nishizuka
Expires: April 18, 2019                               NTT Communications
                                                        October 15, 2018

  DDoS mitigation offload usecase and YANG module expansion in signal
                                channel
              draft-h-dots-mitigation-offload-expansion-00

Abstract

   This document describes a DDoS Mitigation offload usecase and an
   expansion of the YANG module in the DOTS signal channel for
   mitigating DDoS attack traffic correctly with general routers or
   switches.  The proposed usecase and YANG module enhance DOTS
   capability to send attacker information and enable service providers
   to mitigate DDoS attack traffic by using general routers or switches
   in their intra-domain NW.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

Hayashi & Nishizuka      Expires April 18, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft  draft-h-dots-mitigation-offload-expansion   October 2018

   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  DDoS Mitigation Offload Usecase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Expansion of DOTS Signal Channel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Expansion of YANG Module of DOTS Signal Channel . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Expansion of Mapping Parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   Volume based distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks such as DNS
   amplification attacks are threats for internet service providers
   because of their impact on network services.  When such attacks
   occur, service providers have to mitigate them immediately to protect
   or recover their service.  Therefore, for the service providers to
   immediately protect their network services from DDoS attacks, DDoS
   mitigation needs to be automated.  To automate DDoS attack
   mitigation, it is desirable that multi-vendor elements concerned with
   DDoS attack detection, mitigation and so on collaborate.

   On the other hand, the number of DDoS Mitigation Systems (DMS) that
   can be deployed in a service providers network is limited due to
   equipment cost.  Thus, DMS's utilization rate can reach maximum
   capacity soon when the volume of DDoS attacks is enormous.  When the
   rate reaches maximum capacity, the network needs to offload
   mitigation action from the DMS to cost-effective network devices such
   as switches and routers.

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a protocol to standardize real-
   time signaling, threat-handling requests, and data between the multi-
   vendor elements [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].  This document describes
   an automated DDoS Mitigation offload usecase inherited from a DOTS
   usecase [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases], which enables cost-effective DDoS
Show full document text