Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I: Architecture Guide
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15
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draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15
Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft ThresholdSecrets.com
Intended status: Informational 2 November 2020
Expires: 6 May 2021
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I: Architecture Guide
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15
Abstract
The Mathematical Mesh is a Threshold Key Infrastructure that makes
computers easier to use by making them more secure. Application of
threshold cryptography to key generation and use enables users to
make use of public key cryptography across multiple devices with
minimal impact on the user experience.
This document provides an overview of the Mesh data structures,
protocols and examples of its use.
[Note to Readers] Discussion of this draft takes place on the
MATHMESH mailing list (mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.
This document is also available online at
http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
architecture.html.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2021.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. The Device Management Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Exchange of trusted credentials. . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Application configuration management . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4. The Mesh as platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.5. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6. Enterprise Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. User Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Creating a Mesh Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.1. Encrypting and Decrypting files. . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.2. Catalogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. Adding devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.1. Decrypting files on the new device . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2.2. Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3.1. Contact exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.2. Confirmation service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.4. Encryption Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5. Escrow and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.6. Future Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.6.1. Synchronous Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.6.2. Social Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5. Mesh Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1. Best Practice by Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2. Multi-Level Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3. Threshold Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4. Threshold Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.5. Threshold Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.6. Data At Rest Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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5.6.1. DARE Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.6.2. Dare Container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.7. Uniform Data Fingerprints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.7.1. Friendly Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.7.2. Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locators . . . . . . 32
5.7.3. Secure Internet Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.8. Personal Key Escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6. Mesh Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.1. Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.1.1. Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.1.2. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.1.3. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2. Stores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2.1. Catalogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.2.2. Spools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.3. Mesh Service Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.3.1. Protocol Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.4. The Threshold Catalog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.5. Mesh Messaging Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.6. Using the Mesh with Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.6.1. Future Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1. Introduction
The Mathematical Mesh (Mesh) is a Threshold Key Infrastructure (TKI)
that uses cryptography to make computers easier to use. This
document describes version 3.0 of the Mesh architecture and
protocols.
In 1977, Public Key cryptography laid out a powerful proposition: If
Alice and Bob have private keys on their devices and each knows the
public key of the other, Alice and Bob can communicate with
confidentiality and integrity. The realization of this proposition
at Internet scale was vested in a technology called Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) whose principal function is to provide a
trustworthy means by which Alice and Bob can discover each other's
public key.
Yet despite the power of PKI, Internet security remains a work in
progress. While PKI has proved an effective means of authenticating
services to users, attempts to apply PKI to the equally important
task of authenticating users to services and securing data at rest
have been confined to the margins. One critical reason for that
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failure is that _Public_ Key Infrastructure has only provided
effective tools for managing _public_ keys. If we are to achieve
comprehensive Internet security, we must provide every user with the
ability to manage private keys across their devices with zero effort
on their part.
Threshold cryptography is a sub-field of public key cryptography that
defines operations on cryptographic keys, including operations on
private keys. Threshold cryptography allows Key generation and key
use operations may be split between multiple devices. These tools
make zero effort management of private keys practical.
The Mesh is a TKI that addresses the three principal concerns that
have proved obstacles to the use of end-to-end security in computer
applications:
* Device management.
* Exchange of trusted credentials.
* Application configuration management.
The infrastructure developed to address these original motivating
concerns can be used to facilitate deployment and use of existing
security protocols (OpenPGP, S/MIME, SSH) and as a platform for
building end-to-end secure network applications. Current Mesh
applications include:
* Multi-factor authentication and confirmation
* Credential management
* Bookmark/Citation management
* Task and workflow management
A core principle of the design of the Mesh is _autonomy_. That is
each user has full control over their digital environment and is
their own source of authority. They may choose to delegate that
authority to another to act on their behalf (i.e. a Trusted Third
Party) and they may choose to surrender parts of that authority to
others (e.g. an employer) without surrendering their autonomy.
Delegation of authority is always for limited times and limited
purposes.
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Thus, from the user's point of view, the Mesh is divided into two
parts: The part of the Mesh that belongs to them and everything else.
As with the Internet, which is a network of networks, a Mesh of
Meshes has certain properties that are similar to those of its
constituent parts and some that are quite different.
This document is not normative. It provides an overview of the Mesh
comprising a description of the architecture, and a discussion of
typical use cases and requirements. The remainder of the document
series provides a summary of the principal components of the Mesh
architecture and their relationship to each other.
Normative descriptions of the individual Mesh encodings, data
structures and protocols are provided in separate documents
addressing each component in turn.
The currently available Mesh document series comprises:
I. Architecture (This document.) Provides an overview of the Mesh
as a system and the relationship between its constituent parts.
II. Uniform Data Fingerprint [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]. Describe
s the UDF format used to represent cryptographic nonces, keys and
content digests in the Mesh and the use of Encrypted Authenticated
Resource Locators (EARLs) and Strong Internet Names (SINs) that
build on the UDF platform.
III. Data at Rest Encryption [draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare]. Describ
es the cryptographic message and append-only sequence formats used
in Mesh applications and the Mesh Service protocol.
IV. Schema Reference [draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema]. Describes the
syntax and semantics of Mesh Profiles, Container Entries and Mesh
Messages and their use in Mesh Applications.
V. Protocol Reference [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]. Describes
the Mesh Service Protocol.
VI Mesh Discovery Service [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery]. Descri
bes the Mesh Discovery Service that supports mapping of Mesh names
to the corresponding Mesh Service Provider.
VII. Security Considerations [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security] Desc
ribes the security considerations for the Mesh protocol suite.
VIII Cryptographic Algorithms
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography]. Describes the recommended and
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required algorithm suites for Mesh applications and the
implementation of the multi-party cryptography techniques used in
the Mesh.
The following documents describe technologies that are used in the
Mesh but do not form part of the Mesh specification suite:
IX. The Trust Mesh [draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust]. Describes the
social work factor metric used to evaluate the effectiveness of
different approaches to exchange of credentials between users and
organizations in various contexts and argues for a hybrid approach
taking advantage of direct trust, Web of Trust and Trusted Third
Party models to provide introductions.
JSON-BCD Encoding [draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd]. Describes extensions
to the JSON serialization format to allow direct encoding of
binary data (JSON-B), compressed encoding (JSON-C) and extended
binary data encoding (JSON-D). Each of these encodings is a
superset of the previous one so that JSON-B is a superset of JSON,
JSON-C is a superset of JSON-B and JSON-D is a superset of JSON-C.
DNS Web Service Discovery
[draft-hallambaker-web-service-discovery]. Describes the means by
which prefixed DNS SRV and TXT records are used to perform
discovery of Web Services.
Threshold Modes in Elliptic Curves [draft-hallambaker-threshold]. De
scribes threshold key generation and key agreement operations for
the Ed25519, Ed448, X25519 and X448 elliptic curves.
Threshold Signatures in Elliptic Curves
[draft-hallambaker-threshold-sigs]. Describes creation of threshold
signatures using the Ed25519 and Ed448 elliptic curves.
The following documents describe aspects of the Mesh Reference
implementation:
Mesh Developer [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]. Describes the
reference code distribution license terms, implementation status
and currently supported functions.
Mesh Platform [draft-hallambaker-mesh-platform]. Describes how
platform specific functionality such as secure key storage and
trustworthy computing features are employed in the Mesh.
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2. Definitions
This section presents the related specifications and standards on
which the Mesh is built, the terms that are used as terms of art
within the Mesh protocols and applications and the terms used as
requirements language.
2.1. Related Specifications
Besides the documents that form the Mesh core, the Mesh makes use of
many existing Internet standards, including:
Cryptographic Algorithms The RECOMMENDED and REQUIRED cryptographic
algorithms for Mesh implementations are specified in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography].
In addition, Mesh Devices used to administer non-Mesh applications
must support the cryptographic algorithm suites specified by the
application.
Transport All Mesh Services make use of multiple layers of security.
Protection against traffic analysis and metadata attacks are
provided by use of Transport Layer Security [RFC5246]. At
present, the HTTP/1.1 [RFC7231] protocol is used to provide
framing of transaction messages.
Encoding All Mesh protocols and data structures are expressed in the
JSON data model and all Mesh applications accept data in standard
JSON encoding [RFC7159]. The JOSE Signature [RFC7515] and
Encryption [RFC7516] standards are used as the basis for object
signing and encryption.
2.2. Defined Terms
TBS
2.3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.4. Implementation Status
The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
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The examples in this document were created on 11/2/2020 4:47:04 PM.
Out of 51 examples, 16 failed.
3. Requirements
The Mathematical Mesh (Mesh) is a Threshold Key Infrastructure that
uses cryptography to make computers easier to use.
For several decades, it has been widely noted that most users are
either unwilling or unable to make even the slightest efforts to
protect their security, still less those of other parties. Yet
despite this observation being widespread, the efforts of the IT
security community have largely focused on changing this user
behavior rather that designing applications that respect it. Real
users have real work to do and have neither the time nor the
inclination to use tools that will negatively impact their
performance.
The Mesh is based on the principle that if the Internet is to be
secure, if must become effortless to use applications securely.
Rather than beginning the design process by imagining all the
possible modes of attack and working out how to address these as best
as possible without unnecessary inconvenience to the user, we must
reverse the question and ask how much security can be provided
without requiring any effort whatsoever from the user. This
principle is called*Zero Effort Security*.
Today's technology requires users to put their trust in an endless
variety of devices, software and services they cannot fully
understand let alone control. Even the humble television of the 20th
century has been replaced by a 'smart' TV with 15 million lines of
code whose undeclared capabilities may well include placing the room
in which it is placed under continuous audio and video surveillance.
Every technology deployment by necessity requires some degree of
trust on the owner/user's part. But this trust should not compromise
the user's autonomy. Delegation of trust should be limited and
subject to accountability. If manufacturers continue to fail in this
regard, they risk a backlash in which users seek to restore their
rights through litigation, legislation or worst of all, simply not
buying more technology that they have learned to distrust through
their own experience.
The Mesh is based on the principle of radical distrust, that is, if a
party is capable of defecting, we assume that they will. As the
Russian proverb goes: ???????, ?? ????????: trust, but verify.
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In the 1990s, the suggestion that 'hackers' might seek to make
financial gains from their activities was denounced as 'fear-
mongering'. The suggestion that email or anonymous currencies might
be abused received a similar response. Today malware, ransomware and
spam have become so ubiquitous that they are no longer news unless
the circumstances are particularly egregious. In 1949, Edward A.
Murphy Jr. proposed his now eponymous law which states, 'Anything
that can go wrong will go wrong'. We must now apply a similar
principle to Internet security: 'Anything that can be made to go
wrong is already being made to go wrong and will only get worse until
something is done to stop it.'
We must dispense with the notion that it is improper or impolite to
question the good faith of technology suppliers of any kind whether
they be manufacturers, service providers, software authors or
reviewers. Modern supply chains are complex, typically involving
hundreds if not thousands of potential points of deliberate or
accidental compromise. The technology provider who relies on the
presumption of good faith on their part risks serious damage to their
reputation when others assert that a capability added to their
product may have malign uses.
Radical distrust means that we apply the principles of least
principle and accountability at every level to the design of the
Mesh:
* Cryptographic keys installed in a product during manufacture are
only used for the limited purpose of putting that device under
control of the user.
* Cryptographic keys and assertions related to management of devices
are only visible to the user they belong to and are never exposed
to external parties.
* Mesh Accounts belong to and are under control of the user they
belong to and not the Mesh Service provider which the user can
change at will with minimal inconvenience.
* Mesh Services do not have access to the plaintext of any Mesh
Messages or Mesh Catalog data except for the threshold catalog
used by the service as the source of access control policy.
* All Mesh Messages are subject to access control by both the
inbound and outbound Mesh Service to mitigate messaging abuse.
Security is risk management and not the elimination of all
possibility of any risk. Radical distrust means that we raise the
bar for attackers to the point where for most attackers the risk is
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greater than the reward. It does not demand that we immediately
address every issue with perfection or delay deployment of
technologies that are capable of controlling _many_ risks until we
have achieved the control of _every_ risk.
In addition to distrusting technology providers the Mesh Architecture
allows the user to limit the degree of trust they place in
themselves. In the real world, devices are lost or stolen, passwords
and activation codes are forgotten, natural or man-made catastrophes
cause property and data to be lost. The Mesh permits but does not
require use of escrow techniques that allow recovery from such
situations.
3.1. The Device Management Challenge
Existing PKIs were developed in an era when the 'personal computer'
was still coming into being. Only a small number of people owned a
computer and an even smaller number owned more than one. In these
circumstances, it arguably sufficed to provision a user with a single
private key on the single device they were likely to use.
Today, computers are ubiquitous and a typical home in the developed
world contains several hundred of which a dozen or more may have some
form of network access. The modern consumer faces a problem of
device management that is considerably more complex than the IT
administrator of a small business might have faced in the 1990s but
without any of the network management tools such an administrator
would expect to have available.
One important consequence of the proliferation of devices is that
end-to-end security is no longer sufficient. To be acceptable to
users, a system must be ends-to-ends secure. That is, a user must be
able to read their encrypted email message on their laptop, tablet,
phone, or watch with exactly the same ease of use as if the mail were
unencrypted. A cryptographic security control that impedes the user
is a control that is not going to be used.
Each personal Mesh contains a device catalog in which the
cryptographic credentials and device specific application
configurations for each connected device are stored.
Management of the device catalog is restricted to a subset of devices
that the owner of the Mesh has specifically authorized for that
purpose as administration devices. Only a device with access to a
duly authorized administration key can add or remove devices from a
personal Mesh.
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3.2. Exchange of trusted credentials.
One of the most challenging, certainly the most contentious issues in
PKI is the means by which cryptographic credentials are published and
validated. Here there are two different challenges.
Developing an infrastructure that provides a mapping to a
cryptographic key from a name that serves no other purpose than
identifying the key is relatively easy. Developing an infrastructure
that maps existing names with semantics that are already established
is considerably harder.
The Mesh does not attempt to impose criteria for accepting
credentials as valid as no such set of criteria can be comprehensive.
Rather the Mesh provides an internal trust infrastructure that makes
use of a _direct trust_ model similar to that of PGP fingerprints to
which external names may be mapped using whatever validation criteria
users consider are appropriate to the purpose for which they intend
to use them.
The principles of providing extended trust management in the Mesh are
further described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust].
3.3. Application configuration management
Configuration of cryptographic applications is typically worse than
an afterthought. Configuration of one popular mail user agent to use
S/MIME security requires 17 steps to be performed using four separate
application programs. And since S/MIME certificates expire, the user
is required to repeat these steps every few years. Contrary to the
public claims made by one major software vendor it is not necessary
to perform 'usability testing' to recognize abject stupidity.
Rather than writing down configuration steps and giving them to the
user, we should turn them into code and give them to a machine.
Users should never be required to do the work of the machine. Nor
should any programmer be allowed to insult the user by casting their
effort aside and requiring it to be re-entered.
While most computer professionals who are required to do such tasks
on a regular basis will create a tool for the purpose, most users do
not have that option. And of those who do write their own tools,
only a few have the time and the knowledge to do the job without
introducing security vulnerabilities.
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3.4. The Mesh as platform
Meeting the core objectives of the Mesh required new naming,
communication and cryptographic capabilities provided to be
developed. These capabilities may in turn be used to develop new
end-to-end secure applications.
For example, the Mesh Catalogs used to maintain collections of device
descriptions, bookmarks, credentials, etc. might be used in an
electronic records infrastructure to maintain chain of custody of
digital evidence.
3.5. Security
The Mesh is designed to provide the greatest practical level of
security that does not detract from the user experience. The usual
CIA triad is considered:
Confidentiality The confidentiality of user content should be
protected at all times and against all unauthorized parties
including their MSP.
Reasonable efforts should be taken to protect user data against
traffic analysis and metadata attacks. It is not necessary to
consider disclosure of this information to MSPs. Metadata must be
shielded from external parties but controls to prevent traffic
analysis may be left to implementers.
Integrity The design should consider unauthorized modification of
data to be at least as serious as disclosure.
Availability The design should consider loss of data likely to be at
least as serious as disclosure.
In addition to protecting the user's data, the Mesh is designed to
protect the user's autonomy. While the use of any electronic device
or service entails a degree of trust, the user should have the right
to decide which devices and which service providers to trust and to
have the practical ability to revoke that trust at any time they
choose.
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3.6. Enterprise Deployment
Development of PKI has traditionally focused on the needs of large
enterprises. The Mesh is focused on the individual user. While this
change of focus is in part a recognition of the need to reverse the
traditional bias, it is also a recognition of the fact that we must
understand the needs of the individual user before attempting to
understand the additional needs of an enterprise IT department
serving a large number of users.
4. User Experience
This section describes the Mesh in use. These _use cases_ described
here are re-visited in the companion Mesh Schema Reference
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema] and Mesh Protocol Reference
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol] with further details and additional
examples.
For clarity and compactness of exposition, these use cases are
illustrated using the command line tool _meshman_, a tool that makes
the cryptographic operations explicit. This does not represent the
ideal user experience in which Zero-effort security is achieved.
Such a user experience requires that the Mesh operations be
seamlessly integrated into the user's applications so that instead of
using the meshman tool to encrypt or decrypt document, the word
processor application itself would be extended to read and write
documents encrypted in the DARE format.
4.1. Creating a Mesh Account
From the user's perspective, their personal Mesh consists of a
collection of devices that communicate seamlessly and securely
through a Mesh account serviced by a Mesh Service Provider (MSP).
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 1
As with an email service provider, the user is only likely to be
aware of their interactions with their MSP in the case of a service
interruption. As far as the user is concerned the data is replicated
across their devices automatically unless there is a problem.
While the term 'account' is used because it is the term a user is
familiar with that most closely describes its functions, Mesh
accounts are different from traditional Internet accounts in one
important respect: In order to realize the principle of 'autonomy',
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Mesh accounts are created by and _belong to_ the user and not the
service provider. Should a serious problem occur, a user may opt to
change their MSP. But unlike a changing an SMTP email provider, this
change is made seamless and cost free.
Another important difference between the Mesh and SMTP is that all
Mesh data is encrypted end to end. The MSP does not have access to
any user content and does not have access to any user meta-data
except that which is strictly necessary to service the account.
The only Mesh catalogs associated with a Mesh account that can be
read by an MSP are the Access Catalog which serves as the basis for
specifying and enforcing access control policy on the resources
associated with the account and the Publications Catalog which is an
index of encrypted data published through the account.
To create a Mesh account, the user need only specify the account name
and the initial MSP:
The user specifies the initial account address to be used
(alice@example.com). Use of this address is of course dependent on
authorization by the Mesh Service Provider (example.com) and is
likely to require authentication and possibly payment.
Alice> account create alice@example.com
Account=MCQ4-CSYK-2LAY-3XXW-72CL-6P65-X6CQ
The command returns the value of Alice's Mesh Account fingerprint .
This value is used as a unique identifier that is cryptographically
bound to the signature key used to authenticate the account profile.
Note that the user does not specify the cryptographic algorithms to
use. Choice of cryptographic algorithm is primarily the concern of
the protocol designer, not the user. The only circumstance in which
users would normally be involved in algorithm selection is when there
is a transition in progress from one algorithm suite to another.
4.1.1. Encrypting and Decrypting files.
Having created an account, Alice can use it to encrypt files and
decrypt them on the same machine.
Alice encrypts the text file plaintext.txt to create an encrypted
version readable only by Alice:
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Alice> type plaintext.txt
This is a test
Alice> dare encode plaintext.txt ciphertext.dare /encrypt ^
alice@example.com
Alice> dare verify ciphertext.dare
File: ciphertext.dare
Bytes: 0
Encryption Algorithm: A256CBC
Recipient: MBNX-5MOX-L2P6-6B33-QAU4-V3Y3-3ZM4
Digest Algorithm: S512
Payload Digest:
Alice can recover the file at any time using the decryption command:
Alice> dare decode ciphertext.dare plaintext1.txt
Alice> type plaintext1.txt
This is a test
Although the encrypted file can be accessed by Alice with precisely
the same ease as the plaintext version, the contents of the encrypted
file are not readable by any other user of the machine unless Alice
explicitly grants access. The encrypted file may be stored on a
shared drive, cloud file system or removable storage without
disclosing the contents.
While encrypting and decrypting files using a tool provides the
desired functionality, it does not meet our objectives for usability.
These capabilities should be integrated into applications or the
platform itself.
4.1.2. Catalogs
Every Mesh account is created with a set of catalogs and spools. For
example, the bookmarks catalog maintains a list of the user's Web
bookmarks. The credentials catalog maintains a list of the user's
usernames and passwords for the various network services they use.
As with the file encryption example, these capabilities are clearly
going to be most effective when incorporated into the user's
applications, (i.e. their Web browser).
Alice adds the username and password she uses to access her weather
service account to her credentials catalog:
Alice> password add ftp.example.com alice1 password
alice1@ftp.example.com = [password]
Alice> password add www.example.com alice@example.com newpassword
alice@example.com@www.example.com = [newpassword]
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As with all Mesh Catalogs, the catalog data is encrypted and cannot
be accessed by any unauthorized party including the Mesh Service
Provider.
If needed, she can retrieve the credentials from the catalog by
specifying the network resource to which access is required:
Alice> password get ftp.example.com
alice1@ftp.example.com = [password]
This capability provides a means of preventing one of the most common
causes of enterprise password breach in which a system administrator
encodes the access credentials for a service into a script used to
access the service. A script containing a command to extract the
credentials from a Mesh catalog will only work for a user authorized
to access the credentials in the Mesh.
4.2. Adding devices
Computers have become ubiquitous and inexpensive. Most people living
in affluent countries interact with several dozen computer systems
every day. Every household appliance from the television to the
coffee pot has become or is in the process of becoming a computer.
It is this circumstance that has exposed the critical flaw in
traditional PKI: The lack of practical means of managing private keys
across multiple devices.
The Mesh allows users to connect all their devices together so that
they may be considered part of a single entity whose component parts
communicate and interact seamlessly and securely.
Although any type of network capable device may be connected to a
Mesh profile, some devices are better suited for use with certain
applications than others. Connecting an oven to a Mesh profile could
allow it to be controlled through entries to the user's recipe and
calendar catalogs and alert the user when the meal is ready but
attempting to use it to read emails or manage Mesh profiles. The
Mesh allows the principle of least privilege when connecting a device
granting precisely the set of capabilities required to perform its
intended function.
Multiple connection mechanisms are specified, each of which provides
strong mutual authentication. In each case, the connection request
must be approved by a device provisioned with the Mesh administration
privilege:
Direct The connection request is initiated on the device being
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requested and approved on the administration device.
Authentication of the connection request is performed by comparing
witness values presented on the connecting device and the
administration device.
PIN A PIN code is generated on an administration device and passed
to the connecting device out of band. The connecting device
provides proof of knowledge of this PIN code when making the
connection request allowing an administration device to approve
the request automatically without further user interaction.
Dynamic QR This connection mechanism is a variation of the PIN
connection mechanism in which administration device presents the
PIN code value to the connecting device in the form of a QR code.
This allows a connecting device with a camera to connect with
minimal user effort.
Static QR This connection method is designed to support connection
of constrained IoT devices that lack a camera or display
capability. An administration device equipped with a camera reads
a static QR code printed on the device that provides the
information used to enable the administration device to establish
a local network connection (e.g. WiFi, Bluetooth, strobe, IR)
that can be used to complete the connection.
For example, Alice connects a second device using the direct
connection mechanism:
The connection request is initiated on the device being connected:
Alice2> device request alice@example.com
Device UDF = MCR5-EJWB-KRGF-3SYW-ASKC-DWUP-FIQQ
Witness value = RQUH-LNHP-XVR6-UHQ5-WSCZ-WCZC-Q5PK
Using her administration device, Alice gets a list of pending
requests. Seeing that there is a pending request matching the
witness value presented by the device, Alice accepts it:
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Alice> message pending
MessageID: DGVB-YMZP-LJCN-XY3D-LGWE-2G33-WXFE
Connection Request::
MessageID: DGVB-YMZP-LJCN-XY3D-LGWE-2G33-WXFE
To: From:
Device: MDJ2-URNT-WXPZ-5PLB-J3XM-MJK5-AEWG
Witness: DGVB-YMZP-LJCN-XY3D-LGWE-2G33-WXFE
MessageID: NBAC-LLBY-E4EU-7ZRF-I47O-ZYHZ-PBCW
Confirmation Request::
MessageID: NBAC-LLBY-E4EU-7ZRF-I47O-ZYHZ-PBCW
To: alice@example.com From: console@example.com
Text: start
MessageID: NBKU-OVBZ-YZRN-FEB4-ARMW-VUVI-2JSG
Contact Request::
MessageID: NBKU-OVBZ-YZRN-FEB4-ARMW-VUVI-2JSG
To: alice@example.com From: bob@example.com
PIN: AD6Q-2HLS-M3HL-MYNB-43SW-OXCM-QFSA
Alice> account sync /auto
ERROR - Cannot access a closed file.
Alice> device accept RQUH-LNHP-XVR6-UHQ5-WSCZ-WCZC-Q5PK
ERROR - Cannot access a closed file.
Alice can now synchronize her newly connected device to her account:
Alice2> device complete
These connection mechanisms are described in detail in the Mesh
Protocol Reference [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
4.2.1. Decrypting files on the new device
Having connected a second device and granted it 'Web' rights, Alice
can use it to decrypt files and access her bookmark and password
catalogs in exactly the same fashion as the first. If a password is
changed on one device, all her connected devices receive the update.
For example, Alice can now decrypt the file she encrypted on her
first device and access her credential catalog from the new device:
Alice2> password get ftp.example.com
ERROR - No decryption key is available
Alice2> dare decode ciphertext.dare plaintext2.txt
ERROR - No decryption key is available
Should the new device be lost, stolen or simply broken, Alice can
prevent further use of the device to decrypt her data by
disconnecting it from her Mesh:
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Alice disconnects the new device:
Alice> device delete TBS
ERROR - The feature has not been implemented
The device can no longer access the password catalog:
Alice2> dare decode ciphertext.dare plaintext2.txt
ERROR - No decryption key is available
The use of threshold decryption allows the Mesh Service Provider to
control the use of decryption by Alice's devices without having the
ability to decrypt the content itself.
4.2.2. Applications
Connected devices can also make use of connected applications for
which they are granted the necessary rights.
Alice creates an SSH profile within her Mesh on the administrative
device.
Missing example 1
After configuring an SSH server to accept her new SSH credential, she
can use any of her devices that has been granted the SSH right to
connect to it.
In this case Alice has chosen to use an SSH configuration in which a
single client key is shared across multiple devices. The Mesh is in
principle capable of supporting more sophisticated configurations in
which use of the client key is under control of a threshold service
and/or each device has its own individual private. Consideration of
these configuration modes is currently outside the scope of work for
the Mesh and is probably more usefully considered as part of an
effort to integrate Mesh functionality into the SSH system. This
would also allow support for features such as recording SSH server
key fingerprints in the Mesh Contacts catalog.
Alice could enable use of OpenPGP and S/MIME on her connected devices
that have been granted the "messaging" right in a similar way. All
the network and security configuration data required to use one of
her email accounts is stored in her Mesh applications catalog. The
Mesh client performs all the steps required to obtain and install CA
issued certificates. As with the SSH example, while it is quite
possible to support all the necessary functionality through the Mesh
alone, a better result is likely to be achieved by modifying the SMTP
email clients and Certificate Authority infrastructures.
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4.3. Mesh Messaging
The Mesh Messaging system is a push messaging system analogous to
SMTP, but its purpose is limited to secure exchange of control plane
messages. This leads to some important differences:
* Every message is signed and end-to-end encrypted
* The only communication pattern supported is a four-corner model in
which users exchange messages through their respective MSPs.
* Every message is subject to access control at the inbound and
outbound MSP.
* Message content is limited to 32KB.
This size restriction ensures that exchange of Mesh Messages does not
impose an undue burden on the inbound and outbound MSP. It is not
necessary for a sender to transfer multiple MB message before the
receiver decides to refuse it for some reason. Connected devices may
efficiently synchronize their message spools even over limited
bandwidth connections. A short message is never blocked by a larger
one.
Should exchange of longer messages be desired, a pull model is
employed. A Mesh message is used to send a message advising the
recipient's client of the location from which the full content may be
obtained. This approach has many benefits over the SMTP push model.
There is no longer a need for any limitation on message size. The
same messaging platform can be used to send a short text message, a
spreadsheet or raw video files.
Exchange of certain content types naturally leads to security
concerns. These concerns are mitigated in the Mesh by performing
access control on every message. When accepting Bob as a partner,
Alice can choose the types of Mesh Message and the types of content
she is willing to accept from him. Thus, Alice might be willing to
accept a spreadsheet containing macro code from Bob but not from
Carol or Mallet. And she might not want to accept anything at all
from Susan because of past abuse.
While there are important technical differences between Mesh
Messaging and SMTP, these are not visible to Alice or Bob except
insofar as there is no restriction on message size other than the
storage capacity of the machine they wish to receive the messages on,
there is very little scope for messaging abuse and (unless the Mesh
becomes ubiquitous) they can only use Mesh Messaging to communicate
with other Mesh users. Thus, while Mesh messaging has been designed
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to enable replacement of SMTP in the long term, it is not currently a
focus for the client implementations. Use of Mesh messaging is thus
currently limited to support for applications built on the Mesh
platform. One of those applications is the device connection
protocol describe earlier. Another is the contact exchange protocol
used to acquire contact information from other Mesh users.
4.3.1. Contact exchange
Besides management of private keys across devices, the biggest
obstacle to effective use of existing security protocols such as SSH,
OpenPGP and S/MIME is the difficulty of obtaining the authentic
public keys of the counterparties.
The question of issue and validation of credentials is a complex and
difficult one that does not have a single answer that is valid for
every use case. For certain applications credentials issued by a
Trusted Third Party are appropriate. For others, the Web of Trust
proposed in OpenPGP provides a better fit to the requirements and
constraints. These issues are discussed in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust].
Rather than imposing a single trust model for credential acquisition,
the Mesh allows the use of whatever model is best for validating a
credential for a particular use. It is unlikely Alice would have the
same security concerns for communication with her employer, her
friends, her bank, etc.
For many applications, Trust After First Use provides an adequate
basis for credential acquisition.
Alice wants to exchange Mesh messages with Bob. Although Alice knows
Bob's Mesh address (bob@example.com), she does not (yet) have
permission to send any message to Bob excepting a request to exchange
contact information.
Bob sends Alice a contact exchange request:
Bob> message contact alice@example.com
Alice checks his Mesh messages and approves Bob's request:
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Alice> account sync
Alice> message pending
MessageID: NBKU-OVBZ-YZRN-FEB4-ARMW-VUVI-2JSG
Contact Request::
MessageID: NBKU-OVBZ-YZRN-FEB4-ARMW-VUVI-2JSG
To: alice@example.com From: bob@example.com
PIN: AD6Q-2HLS-M3HL-MYNB-43SW-OXCM-QFSA
Alice> message accept NBKU-OVBZ-YZRN-FEB4-ARMW-VUVI-2JSG
ERROR - Cannot access a closed file.
At this point Alice and Bob can exchange Mesh messages of any type
with seamless end to end security. Every Mesh message is signed and
encrypted without exception. If Alice and Bob have used the Mesh to
configure their email accounts for OpenPGP or S/MIME, they can use
these to exchange end-to-end secure SMTP mail.
Alternatively, Bob might have opted to grant Alice only specific
messaging access. Bob might choose to restrict synchronous messaging
modalities such as instant messaging or voice that interrupt his
workflow to specific colleagues. The fact that Alice wants to speak
to Bob does not necessarily mean she is interested in what he might
say in reply. Thus, messaging access need not be reciprocated.
As with device connection, multiple contact exchange methods are
supported including the use of a QR code printed on a business card
or presented on a mobile device. These methods are also described in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
As a respected figure within the cryptographic community, Alice might
employ a curation service for credential requests advising her that
Bob's credentials appear to be in order while Mallet's are
suspicious. Such services might be offered by her MSP or another
provider. Alice might be willing to accept contact requests from
members of professional associations she is a member of or who have
attended certain conferences in her field. A variety of approaches
might be followed for curation of other requests including Machine
Learning approaches.
4.3.2. Confirmation service
The Mesh confirmation service is an improvement of traditional second
factor authentication techniques offering offers far greater
usability and security.
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Instead of being asked to present a meaningless numeric code, Alice
is presented a request from a named, authenticated source to confirm
a specific action. Alice's response will be signed using a signature
key that is unique to the particular confirmation device she uses,
thus providing a non-repudiable record of her decision.
Alice attempts to log into a secure console in the control room. The
secure console recognizes Alice but a second factor is required. The
console issues a challenge to Alice at her registered account asking
if she would like to log into the secure console:
Console> message confirm alice@example.com start
Alice checks her pending messages and accepts the request:
Alice> message accept NBAC-LLBY-E4EU-7ZRF-I47O-ZYHZ-PBCW
ERROR - The specified message could not be found.
The secure console verifies the response and grants access:
Alice> $message status {confirmResponseID}
ERROR - The command System.Object[] is not known.
In an enterprise environment, tying the confirmation process to a
specific source, a specific action and specific device allows for
confirmation interactions to be used to implement business processes
with attribution and thus accountability.
Using traditional second factor approaches, a system administrator
presents their credentials to authenticate access to the machine at
which point they can perform any action permitted by their current
privileges. This typically includes modification of any access logs
that might be kept. Using the confirmation approach the individual
actions of the system administrator may be authenticated, traced and
logged. If a user account is added to the system, it is known which
administrator is responsible and the device that was used. This
information may then be used if it becomes necessary to unwind the
consequences of a breach or an insider threat.
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4.4. Encryption Groups
As seen earlier, the Mesh allows encrypted files to be shared with
other named users. While this capability is sufficient for simple
messaging type use cases, decades of experience prove that it is
inadequate to meet the needs of protecting data at rest. In the
simple messaging case the list of recipients is known to the sender
at the time a message is sent. In the general case the party
encrypting the data cannot know the list of intended readers because
that will change over time.
Even in the smallest organization, employees join and leave. A new
employee must be granted access to all the information they need for
their work. The access rights of a terminated employee must also
terminate.
Traditional 'Digital Rights Management' product employ key management
techniques originating in the field of copyright enforcement to
control access to content by controlling disclosure of symmetric
decryption keys. This provides the necessary flexibility to control
access to the data but leaves the decryption keys vulnerable to a
server breach. Such systems do not provide 'end-to-end' security in
any useful sense.
Use of threshold techniques allows a threshold service to control
decryption of the data without having the ability to decrypt.
Sharing data through a Mesh group allows access to be controlled
without loss of end-to-end encryption.
Alice creates the recryption group groupw@example.com to share
confidential information with her closest friends:
Alice> group create groupw@example.com
ERROR - Cannot access a closed file.
Bob encrypts a test file but he can't decrypt it because he isn't in
the group:
Alice> dare encode grouptext.txt /encrypt groupw@example.com /out ^
groupsecret.dare
ERROR - The option System.Object[] is not known.
Even though she is the group administrator, Alice can't decrypt the
file either until she adds herself to the group.
Alice> dare decode groupsecret.dare
ERROR - No decryption key is available
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Alice adds Bob to the group:
Missing example 2
Adding Bob to the group gives him immediate access to any file
encrypted under the group key without making any change to the
encrypted files:
Missing example 3
Removing Bob from the group immediately withdraws his access.
Missing example 4
Bob cannot decrypt any more files (but he may have kept copies of
files he decrypted earlier).
Missing example 5
4.5. Escrow and Recovery
While disclosure of sensitive data might cause serious harm to its
owner it is very rarely the case that the consequences of disclosure
are greater than the consequences of loss. Thus, whenever static
data is to be encrypted, the question of key recovery must be
considered.
Alice decides to create a recovery key set. To do this, she
specifies the number of key shares to be created and the number
required for recovery:
Alice> account escrow
Share: SAQN-H7KA-DN7Z-SWGM-NTOL-EBGN-TGJN-UNEA-H4LH-VTYK-P66S-KE3D-JI
FE-NWOY-JRGQ
Share: SAQ5-76L5-SN7F-BMIK-AQRW-DU7F-FDJY-P3C6-DQZE-LOLJ-IGRQ-O2IY-6E
G2-UQ3Z-BCUQ
Share: SARO-X5N3-BN6Q-QCKH-TNVB-DIX4-XAKD-LJB3-7FHB-BI6I-AOEO-TPWO-TA
IQ-3LIZ-YUCQ
Recovery of the key data requires the key recovery record and a
quorum of the key shares:
Alice2> account recover /verify
ERROR - Expected {
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4.6. Future Applications
The Mesh is a Threshold Key Infrastructure and as with any
infrastructure, it is designed as a platform to support as wide a
range of future developments as possible. As shown previously, the
Mesh Messaging system provides an improved superset of the functions
of SMTP. It is also capable of being extended to support every
current communication modality with true end-to-end protection of
data confidentiality.
4.6.1. Synchronous Messaging
Addition of a presence service capability to the MSP would allow Mesh
Messaging to be used to support the full range of synchronous
messaging services from text chat (e.g. xmpp) to video and VOIP.
The main technical issue to be addressed to enable such a service is
specifying a means of layering Mesh Messages direct over UDP
transport. This is currently at the concept phase. While the
precise means of layering audio and video formats onto a network
connection is a complex problem, it is one that has already been
solved by existing standards.
4.6.2. Social Media
One of the chief distinctions between messaging and 'social media'
and is that the former is typically used to describe a synchronous
interaction between a closed group of users while most social media
consists of asynchronous interactions which are frequently (but not
always) public.
The Data At Rest Envelope technology used in the Mesh was originally
designed to support asynchronous social media interactions with full
end-to-end confidentiality. The service hosting a forum or
discussion board need not have access to the content of the messages
to support the complete range of user interactions.
5. Mesh Cryptography
All the cryptographic algorithms used in the Mesh are either industry
standards or present a work factor that is provably equivalent to an
industry standard approach. Since threshold cryptography is not
currently part of the 'canon' from which designers of cryptographic
security protocols work, much of the cryptography used in the Mesh
has been designed for the Mesh. Despite this fact, it is properly
regarded as part of the Internet platform on which the Mesh is built
rather than a part of the Mesh itself.
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Existing Internet security protocols are based on approaches
developed in the 1990s when performance tradeoffs were a prime
consideration in the design of cryptographic protocols. Security was
focused on the transport layer as it provided the best security
possible given the available resources.
With rare exceptions, most computing devices manufactured in the past
ten years offer either considerably more computing power than was
typical of 1990s era Internet connected machines or considerably
less. The Mesh architecture is designed to provide security
infrastructure both classes of machine but with the important
constraint that the less capable 'constrained' devices are considered
to be 'network capable' rather than 'Internet capable' and that the
majority of Mesh related processing will be offloaded to another
device.
For example, Alice uses her Desktop and Laptop to exchange end-to-end
secure Mesh Messages and documents but her Internet-of-Things food
blender and light bulb are limited in the range of functions they
support and the telemetry information they provide. The IoT devices
connect to a Mesh Hub which acts as an always-on point of presence
for the device state and allows complex cryptographic operations to
be offloaded if necessary.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 2
5.1. Best Practice by Default
Except where support for external applications demand otherwise, the
Mesh requires that the following 'best practices' be followed:
Industry Standard Algorithms All cryptographic protocols make use of
the most recently adopted industry standard algorithms.
Strongest Work Factor Only the strongest modes of each cipher
algorithm are used. All symmetric encryption is performed with
256-bit session keys and all digest algorithms are used in 512-bit
output length mode.
Key Hygiene Separate public key pairs are used for all cryptographic
functions: Encryption, Signature and Authentication. This enables
separate control regimes for the separate functions and
partitioning of cryptographic functions within the application
itself.
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Bound Device Keys Each device has a separate set of Encryption,
Signature and Authentication key pairs. These MAY be bound to the
device to which they are assigned using hardware or other
techniques to prevent or discourage export.
No Optional Extras Traditional approaches to security have treated
many functions as being 'advanced' and thus suited for use by only
the most sophisticated users. The Mesh rejects this approach
noting that all users operate in precisely the same environment
facing precisely the same threats.
5.2. Multi-Level Security
All Mesh protocol transactions are protected at the Transport,
Message and Data level. This provides security in depth that cannot
be achieved by applying security at the separate levels
independently. Data level encryption provides end-to-end
confidentiality and non-repudiation, Message level authentication
provides the basis for access control and Transport level encryption
provides a degree of protection against traffic analysis.
5.3. Threshold Decryption
Traditional public key encryption algorithms have two keys, one for
encryption and another for decryption. The Mesh makes use of
threshold cryptography techniques to allow the decryption key to be
split into two or more parts.
For example, if we have a private key _z_, we can use this to perform
a key agreement with a public key _S_ to obtain the key agreement
value A. But if _z_ = (_x+y_) mod _g_ (where g is the order of the
group). we can obtain the exact same result by applying the private
keys _x_ and _y_ to _S_ separately and combining the results:
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 3
The approach to threshold decryption used in the Mesh was originally
inspired by the work of Matt Blaze et. al. on proxy re-encryption.
But the approach used may also be considered a form of Torben
Pedersen's Distributed Key generation which is in turn one form of
threshold cryptography.
This technique is used in the Mesh to allow use of decryption key
held by a user to be controlled by a cloud service without giving the
cloud service the ability to decrypt by itself.
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These techniques are described in detail in
[draft-hallambaker-threshold].
5.4. Threshold Key Generation
The mathematics that support threshold decryption are also the basis
for the multi-party key generation mechanism that is applied at
multiple levels in the Mesh. The basis for the multi-party key
generation used in the Mesh is that for any Diffie-Hellman type
cryptographic scheme, given two keypairs { _x_, _X_ }, { _y_, _Y_ },
we calculate the public key corresponding to the private key _x_+ _y_
using just the public key values _X_and _Y_.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 4
Threshold key generation ensures that keys used to bind devices to a
personal Mesh or within a Mesh account are 'safe' if any of the
contributions to the generation process are safe.
These techniques are also described in detail in
[draft-hallambaker-threshold].
5.5. Threshold Signature
The techniques that support threshold decryption and key generation
are also applicable to signature albeit with some very important
constraints. Incorrect implementation of the techniques used to
create ECDSA signatures can result in disclosure of the private key.
It is therefore essential that a threshold signature algorithm is
rigorously reviewed.
This technique is used in the mesh to partition the use of
administration keys so that the consequences of losing an
administrative device can be mitigated.
These techniques are described in detail in
[draft-hallambaker-threshold-sigs].
5.6. Data At Rest Encryption
The Data At Rest Encryption (DARE) format is used for all
confidentiality and integrity enhancements. The DARE format is based
on the JOSE Signature and Encryption formats and the use of an
extended version of the JSON encoding allowing direct encoding of
binary objects.
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5.6.1. DARE Envelope
The DARE Envelope format offers similar capabilities to existing
formats such as OpenPGP and CMS without the need for onerous encoding
schemes. DARE Assertions are presented as DARE Envelopes.
A feature of the DARE Envelope format not supported in existing
schemes is the ability to encrypt and authenticate sets of data
attributes separately from the payload. This allows features such as
the ability to encrypt a subject line or content type for a message
separately from the payload.
5.6.2. Dare Container
A DARE Container is an append-only sequence of DARE Envelopes. A key
feature of the DARE Container format is that entries MAY be encrypted
and/or authenticated incrementally. Individual entries MAY be
extracted from a DARE Container to create a stand-alone DARE
Envelope.
Containers may be authenticated by means of a Merkle tree of digest
values on the individual frames. This allows similar demonstrations
of integrity to those afforded by Blockchain to be provided but with
much greater efficiency.
Unlike traditional encryption formats which require a new public key
exchange for each encrypted payload, the DARE Container format allows
multiple entries to be encrypted under a single key exchange
operation. This is particularly useful in applications such as
encrypting server transaction logs. The server need only perform a
single key exchange operation each time it starts to establish a new
shared secret for that session. The shared secret is then used to
create fresh symmetric keying material for each entry in the log
using a unique nonce per entry.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 5
Integrity is provided by a Merkle tree calculated over the sequence
of log entries. The tree apex is signed at regular intervals to
provide non-repudiation.
Three types of DARE Containers are used in the mesh
Catalogs A DARE Container whose entries track the status of a set of
related objects which may be added, updated, or deleted.
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Spools A DARE Container whose entries track the status of a series
of Mesh Messages.
Archives A DARE Container used to provide a file archive with
optional confidentiality and/or integrity enhancements.
5.7. Uniform Data Fingerprints.
The Uniform Data Fingerprint (UDF) format provides a compact means of
presenting cryptographic nonces, keys and digest values using Base32
encoding that resists semantic substitution attacks. UDF provides a
convenient format for data entry. Since the encoding used is case-
insensitive, UDFs may if necessary be read out over a voice link
without excessive inconvenience.
The following are examples of UDF values:
NAB6-GXIR-GXA5-AQJO-4CNH-LWOL-EOVQ
7UHC-4YPF-LDY4-2F65-7DYN-UUPC-ZY
SAQF-HCGQ-JTQ5-5YGF-PT4S-QPXL-KOPE-U
MB5S-R4AJ-3FBT-7NHO-T26Z-2E6Y-WFH4
KCM5-7VB6-IJXJ-WKHX-NZQF-OKGZ-EWVN
AABD-4PN3-QGA2-IJU5-RP7H-Z5AV-I3GK
UDF content digests are used to support a direct trust model similar
to that of OpenPGP. Every Mesh Profile is authenticated by the UDF
fingerprint of its signature key. Mesh Friendly Names and UDF
Fingerprints thus serve analogous functions to DNS names and IP
Addresses. Like DNS names, Friendly Names provide the basis for
application-layer interactions while the UDF Fingerprints are used as
to provide the foundation for security.
5.7.1. Friendly Names
Internet addressing schemes are designed to provide a globally unique
(or at minimum unambiguous) name for a host, service or account. In
the early days of the Internet, this resulted in addresses such as
10.2.3.4 and alice@example.com which from a usability point of view
might be considered serviceable if not ideal. Today the Internet is
a global infrastructure servicing billions of users and tens of
billions of devices and accounts are more likely to be
alice.lastname.1934@example.com than something memorable.
Friendly names provide a user or community specific means of
identifying resources that may take advantage of geographic location
or other cues to resolve possible ambiguity. If Alice says to her
voice activated device "close the garage door" it is implicit that it
is her garage door that she wishes to close. And should Alice be
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fortunate enough to own two houses with a garage, it is implicit that
it is the garage door of the house she is presently using that she
wishes to close.
The Mesh Device Catalog provides a directory mapping friendly names
to devices that is available to all Alice's connected devices so that
she may give and instruction to any of her devices using the same
friendly name and expect consistent results.
5.7.2. Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locators
Various schemes have been used to employ QR Codes as a means of
device and/or user authentication. In many of these schemes a QR
code contains a challenge nonce that is used to authenticate the
connection request.
The Mesh supports a QR code connection mode employing the Encrypted
Authenticated Resource Locator (EARL) format. An EARL is an
identifier which allows an encrypted data object to be retrieved and
decrypted. In this case, the encrypted data object contains the
information needed to complete the interaction.
An EARL contains the domain name of the service providing the
resolution service and an encryption master key:
mcu://alice@example.com/ADJ5-4NLV-O7YC-SKR6-EI
The EARL may be expressed as a QR code:
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 6
An EARL is resolved by presenting the content digest fingerprint of
the encryption key to a Web service hosted at the specified domain.
The service returns a DARE Envelope whose payload is encrypted and
authenticated under the specified master key. Since the content is
stored on the service under the fingerprint of the key and not the
key itself, the service cannot decrypt the plaintext. Only a party
that has access to the encryption key in the QR code can decrypt the
message.
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5.7.3. Secure Internet Names
Secure Internet Names bind an Internet address such as a URL or an
email address to a Security Policy by means of a UDF content digest
of a document describing the security policy. This binding enables a
SIN-aware Internet client to ensure that the security policy is
applied when connecting to the address. For example, ensuring that
an email sent to an address must be end-to-end encrypted under a
particular public key or that access to a Web Service requires a
particular set of security enhancements.
alice@example.com Alice's regular email address (not a SIN).
alice@mm--uuuu-uuuu-uuuu.example.com A strong email address for
Alice that can be used by a regular email client.
alice@example.com.mm--uuuu-uuuu-uuuu A strong email address for
Alice that can only used by an email client that can process SINs.
Using an email address that has the Security Policy element as a
prefix allows a DNS wildcard element to be defined that allows the
address to be used with any email client. Presenting the Security
Policy element as a suffix means it can only be resolved by a SIN-
aware client.
5.8. Personal Key Escrow
One of the core objectives of the Mesh is to make data level
encryption ubiquitous. While data level encryption provides robust
protection of data confidentiality, loss of the ability to decrypt
means data loss.
For many Internet users, data availability is a considerably greater
concern than confidentiality. Ten years later, there is no way to
replace pictures of the children at five years old. Recognizing the
need to guarantee data recovery, the Mesh provides a robust personal
key escrow and recovery mechanism. Lawful access is not supported as
a requirement.
Besides supporting key recovery in the case of loss, the Mesh
protocols potentially support key recovery in the case of the key
holder's death. The chief difficulty faced in implementing such a
scheme being developing an acceptable user interface which allows the
user to specify which of their data should survive them and which
should not. As the apothegm goes: Mallet wants his beneficiaries to
know where he buried Aunt Agatha's jewels but not where he buried
Aunt Agatha.
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The Mesh supports use of Shamir/Lagrange secret sharing and recovery
to split a secret key into a set of shares, a predetermined number of
which may be used to recover the original secret. For convenience
secret shares are represented using UDF allowing presentation in
Base32 (i.e. text format) for easy transcription or QR code
presentation if preferred.
To facilitate escrow and recovery, all the public key pairs and key
shares associated with a Mesh profile are generated from a seed value
using a deterministic algorithm. Thus, escrow of the seed value is
sufficient to permit recovery of the private key data.
For example, Alice escrows her Mesh Profile creating three recovery
shares, two of which are required to recover the master secret:
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 7
To recover the master secret, Alice presents the necessary number of
key shares. These are used to recover the master secret which is
used to generate the decryption key:
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 8
A user may choose to store their encrypted recovery record themselves
or make use of the EARL mechanism to store the information at one or
more cloud services using the fingerprint of the master secret as the
locator.
6. Mesh Architecture
The Mesh infrastructure is supported by a compact set of structures
and protocols. These are discussed in detail in the Schema Reference
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema] and Protocol Reference
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol] documents.
The JSON object model and JSON or JSON-B serialization
[draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd] are used for all Mesh data structures.
These include:
Assertions A DARE envelope containing a signed data object.
Assertions include Profiles and Connections.
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Profile A self-signed assertion describing a Mesh principal.
Principals include Accounts, Devices and Services.
Every profile specifies a profile signature key under which it is
signed. The UDF fingerprint of the profile signature key is used
as a unique identifier for the profile. Thus, all attributes
declared in the profile such as authentication keys and encryption
keys are bound to the unique identifier for the profile.
Connection An assertion signed by one principal delegating rights to
another. Connection assertions are used to bind devices to
accounts and hosts to a service.
Activation A DARE envelope encrypted under the encryption key of a
principal that grant rights or capabilities to that principal.
This is typically but not always achieved through use of threshold
key techniques.
Message A DARE envelope signed by the sender that is encrypted under
the encryption key of the intended recipient(s) whose content is a
Mesh messaging object.
Entry An object stored in a catalog that carries an identifier that
is unique for that catalog.
6.1. Actors
Three Mesh actors are defined: Accounts, Devices and Services. Each
of these is described by a specific type of profile.
6.1.1. Account
Two types of Mesh account are currently specified: personal accounts
and group accounts. For concise exposition, this document is limited
to the description of personal accounts. Group accounts are
specified in the Schema Reference [draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema].
A Mesh account is an abstraction which may be loosely regarded as the
thing to which a collection of devices (in the case of a user
account) or a collection of members (in the case of a group account)
belong.
Each personal account profile specifies:
Profile Signature Key Used to authenticate the profile. Updates to
the profile require use of the Profile Signature Key. The Profile
Signature Key cannot be changed but a profile may be replaced by a
new profile.
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Uniform Data Fingerprint The UDF fingerprint of the Profile
Signature Key. This is used as a unique identifier for the
account.
Account Name The account name through which the profile is serviced.
Administration Keys UDF fingerprint of keys that are authorized to
sign device connection assertions and update the Device Catalog.
Signature Key Public parameters of the account signature key. This
is the key that counterparties will use to verify messages sent by
the account holder.
Encryption Key Public parameters of the account encryption key.
This is the key that counterparties will use to encrypt messages
sent to the account holder.
Authentication Key Public parameters of the account authentication
key. This is the key that counterparties will use to establish
authenticated exchanges with the account holder.
The public keys for encryption, authentication and signature
specified in the account profile are the only keys that will (in
normal circumstances) be visible to other Mesh accounts.
6.1.2. Device
A Mesh Device is any device that is connected to a Mesh Account
through a Device profile. A given physical device may have multiple
device profiles associated with it but for the purposes of the Mesh,
these are considered to be separate devices. A given device profile
may be connected to more than one account
The device profile specifies:
Profile Signature Key Used to authenticate the profile. Updates to
the profile require use of the Profile Signature Key. The Profile
Signature Key cannot be changed but a profile may be replaced by a
new profile.
Uniform Data Fingerprint The UDF fingerprint of the Profile
Signature Key. This is used as a unique identifier for the device.
Signature Key Public parameters of the device signature key share.
This key share is used as a contribution to the signature key the
device will use in the context of the account and to authenticate
device connection requests.
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Encryption Key Public parameters of the account encryption key
share. This key share is used as a contribution to the encryption
key the device will use in the context of the account and to
decrypt activation records sent in response to device connection
requests.
Authentication Key Public parameters of the account authentication
key share. This key share is used as a contribution to the
authentication key the device will use in the context of the
account.
Description Optional information describing the device provided by
the manufacturer. E.g. model, serial number, date of manufacture
etc.
A Mesh Device is connected to an account through the creation of an
activation record and a connection record.
The activation record contains key shares that are overlaid on the
corresponding shares specified in the device profile to create the
set of encryption, authentication and signature keys the device will
use in the context of the account. Since the private keys
corresponding to the device profile keys are only used to enable the
connection of the device to an account, these keys are only trusted
to a minimal degree.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 9
In the ideal case, the device profile keys are fixed to the device
such that they may be used to perform private key operations without
the ability to extract the private key data from the device. Since
the device profile is only trusted for the limited purpose of
connecting the device to an account, the device profile may be
created during manufacture without undue concern for either
disclosure of the private key on the part of the account holder or a
reputation attack alleging disclosure of the private key on the part
of the manufacturer.
The device connection record is functionally a certificate that the
device may use to interact with the Mesh Service or to other devices
connected to the same account. Note however that use of threshold
cryptography means that Mesh devices would not normally present their
device connection record to any other party since all communication
with external parties takes place through the keys published in the
account profile.
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6.1.3. Service
A Mesh Service is an abstract network service that is provided by one
or more hosts. The properties of the service are described by the
service profile.
The service profile specifies:
Profile Signature Key Used to authenticate the profile. Updates to
the profile require use of the Profile Signature Key. The Profile
Signature Key cannot be changed but a profile may be replaced by a
new profile.
Uniform Data Fingerprint The UDF fingerprint of the Profile
Signature Key. This is used as a unique identifier for the device.
Signature Key Public parameters of the service signature key. This
is the key that counterparties will use to verify messages sent by
the service.
Encryption Key Public parameters of the service encryption key.
This is the key that counterparties will use to encrypt messages
sent to the service.
Authentication Key Public parameters of the account authentication
key. This is the key that counterparties will use to establish
authenticated exchanges with the service.
Hosts are Mesh Devices that have been granted a Host Activation and
Host Connection by a service administrator. These are used in the
same fashion as the device activation and connection records.
6.2. Stores
Mesh Stores are append-only sequences that are used to represent
collections of objects, messages and data. All Mesh stores are
implemented as DARE Sequences authenticated by means of a Merkle
tree. The payload of each envelope in the sequence is usually
encrypted.
Three types of Mesh store are currently defined:
Catalog A set of Mesh objects, each of which has an identifier that
is unique in the scope of the catalog. Objects may be added,
updated, and deleted.
Spool A sequence of Mesh Messages.
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All the state represented within a Mesh account is contained in Mesh
stores bound to the account. Thus, to synchronize a device to the
state of the account, it is sufficient to synchronize the collection
of stores the device is permitted to read. Since every store is an
append-only sequence, it is sufficient for the Mesh service to return
the envelopes added to each of the stores since the device was last
synchronized.
Rapid synchronization of catalogs and spools is ensured by limiting
the size of entries to each. Implementations may further improve
performance by redacting stores to remove obsolete entries that have
been updated or deleted. Alternatively, a device may maintain a
complete record of the state of the store to allow erroneous changes
to the store to be unwound.
6.2.1. Catalogs
Mesh Catalogs track a collection of entries. Every Mesh account
contains a Threshold Catalog that is used by Mesh services as the
source of access control policy. The Threshold Catalog is unique in
that it is the only catalog whose contents can be read by the Mesh
Service. Every other Mesh Catalog connected to a Mesh account is
end-to-end encrypted so that it can only be read by devices connected
to the account.
The Mesh specifies various catalogs that are used to track
information relevant to a Mesh Account:
Device The devices connected to the corresponding Mesh profile.
Contact Logical and physical contact information for people and
organizations.
Bookmark Web bookmarks and citations.
Credential Username and password information for network resources.
Calendar Appointments and tasks.
Network Network access configuration information allowing access to
wireless networks and VPNs.
Application Configuration information for applications including
mail (SMTP, IMAP, OpenPGP, S/MIME, etc) and SSH.
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Each catalog connected to an account has a unique identifier of the
form "mmm_<<name>". Applications may specify additional catalogs
without risk of collision with future Mesh catalogs by using an
appropriate IANA assigned protocol label.
6.2.2. Spools
Spools are used to track inbound and outbound messages. Three spools
are currently defined:
Inbound Messages that have been received by the service and accepted
for delivery to the account.
Outbound Messages that have been sent from the account through the
service.
Local A spool used to exchange messages with devices connecting to
the device.
6.3. Mesh Service Protocol
Mesh services communicate with Mesh devices and other Mesh Services
through the Mesh Service Protocol. Despite the wide range of Mesh
functionality, the Mesh protocol is remarkably compact. The bulk of
the semantics associated with the Mesh are expressed in the schemas
describing Mesh Messages and Catalogs. The objective of reducing the
degree of trust in the Mesh service to the absolute minimum by
necessity requires that the Mesh Service be extremely simple.
Mesh Service Protocol transactions are divided into the following
groups:
Service Description The Hello transaction returns a description of
the service including information used to authenticate future
interactions with the service.
Account Management The "Create" and "Delete" transactions are used
to bind an account to a service.
Device Connection The "Connect" and "Complete" transactions are used
to connect devices to an account
Synchronization The "Status", "Download" and "Transact" transactions
are used to update stores connected to an account.
Messaging The "Post" transaction is used by one Mesh Service to
transfer a message from one of its users to a different Mesh
Service serving one of the recipients.
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Publication The "Publish", "Claim" and "PollClaim" transactions are
used to publish and retrieve data objects through an account.
Cryptographic The "Operate" transaction requests that the service
performs a cryptographic operation on behalf of the account. This
is used to provide execution of threshold operations on behalf of
the account holder for both internal and external users.
Future versions of the Mesh Service Protocol may support additional
transactions to support features such as providing DNS resolution.
6.3.1. Protocol Interactions
Every Mesh Service Protocol transaction consists of a single request
from a Mesh client followed by a single response. Requests and
responses are authenticated and encrypted under a key established
between the client and the service. This application layer
enhancement is in addition to any transport layer enhancement that
may be employed (e.g. TLS).
Mesh Service Protocol messages may be exchanged through any binding
advertised by the service by means of the Hello transaction.
Currently only one binding is defined, mapping Mesh requests and
responses to the content data of HTTP POST requests and responses
layers over a TLS transport.
While the use of up to three layers of encryption may be regarded as
excessive, each layer provides separate protections:
Transport Layer Provides confidentiality for metadata and limited
traffic analysis protections.
Application Layer Encryption and authentication of requests and
responses using keys bound to the specific device and service
performing the interaction provides the basis for access control.
Data Layer Encryption of stored data (catalog data, device
activations, etc.) provides end to end security between the
devices connected to the account.
6.4. The Threshold Catalog
The Threshold Catalog of a Mesh account provides the basis through
which the service implements the access control policy specified by
the account.
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Each entry in the catalog specifies an operation that the service
will perform when it receives a request that is authenticated and
authorized by the access control policy specified in the entry.
Operations include:
Inbound Message Filtering Messages received by the service that
match the specified criteria will be appended to the inbound
message spool.
Threshold Key Generation Performs a threshold key splitting
operation of a private key held by the service and encrypts one
part under a key known only to the service and encrypts the other
under a public key specified by the party making the request.
Key Agreement Performs a key agreement operation on a private key
held by the service. This may be used as a component in a
threshold key agreement scheme.
Signature Performs a signature operation on a private key held by
the service. This may be used as a component in a threshold
signature scheme.
These operations provide the vocabulary from which a Threshold Key
Infrastructure is built. Keys that are bound to a service using
threshold techniques can only be applied with the co-operation of
that service.
6.5. Mesh Messaging Protocol
Mesh devices connected to an account interact with the Mesh Service
through the Mesh Service protocol. Mesh devices interact with other
Mesh devices through the Mesh Messaging Protocols, each of which
provides a distinct application functionality:
* Connection Protocol
* Confirmation Protocol
* Contact Exchange Protocol
Each of these protocols is described in depth in the Mesh Protocol
Reference [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
Mesh Messages provide a means of communication between Mesh Service
Accounts with capabilities that are not possible or poorly supported
in traditional SMTP mail messaging:
* End-to-end confidentiality and authentication by default.
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* Abuse mitigation by applying access control to every inbound and
outbound message.
* End-to-end secure group messaging.
* Transfer of exceptionally large data sets (Terabytes).
Note that although Mesh Messaging is designed to facilitate the
transfer of very large data sets, the size of Mesh Messages
themselves is severely restricted. The current default maximum size
being 64 KB. This approach allows Mesh
In addition, the platform anticipates but does not currently support
additional cryptographic security capabilities:
* Traffic analysis resistance using mix networks (Chaum).
* Simultaneous contract binding using fair contract signing
(Micali).
While these capabilities might in time cause Mesh Messaging to
replace SMTP, this is not a near term goal. The short-term goal of
Mesh Messaging is to support the Contact Exchange and Confirmation
applications.
Two important classes of application that are not currently supported
directly are payments and presence. While prototypes of these
applications have been considered, it is not clear if these are best
implemented as special cases of the Confirmation and Contact Exchange
applications or as separate applications in their own right.
Messages exchanged between Mesh Users MUST be mediated by a Mesh
Service for both sending and receipt. This 'four corner' pattern
permits ingress and egress controls to be enforced on the messages
and that every message is properly recorded in the appropriate
spools.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 10
For example, to send a message to Alice, Bob posts it to one of the
Mesh Services connected to the Mesh Account from which the message is
to be sent. The Mesh Service checks to see that both the message and
Bob's pattern of behavior comply with their acceptable use policy and
if satisfactory, forwards the message to the receiving service
example.com.
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(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 11
The receiving service uses the recipient's contact catalog and other
information to determine if the message should be accepted. If
accepted, the message is added to the recipient's inbound message
spool to be collected by her device(s) when needed.
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 12
For efficiency and to limit the scope for abuse, all inbound Mesh
Messages are subject to access control and limited in size to 32KB or
less. This limit has proved adequate to support transfer of complex
control messages and short content messages. Transfer of data
objects of arbitrary size may be achieved by sending a control
message containing a URI for the main content which may then be
fetched using a protocol such as HTTP.
This approach makes transfers of exceptionally large data sets (i.e.
multiple Terabytes) practical as the 'push' phase of the protocol is
limited to the transfer of the initial control message. The bulk
transfer is implemented as a 'pull' protocol allowing support for
features such as continuous integrity checking and resumption of an
interrupted transfer.
6.6. Using the Mesh with Applications
The Mesh provides an infrastructure for supporting existing Internet
security applications and a set security features that may be used to
build new ones.
For example, Alice uses the Mesh to provision and maintain the keys
she uses for OpenPGP, S/MIME, SSH and IPSEC. She also uses the
credential catalog for end-to-end secure management of the usernames
and passwords for her Web browsing and other purposes:
(Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15.html for artwork.)
Figure 13
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The Mesh design is highly modular allowing components that were
originally designed to support a specific requirement within the Mesh
to be applied generally.
6.6.1. Future Applications
Since a wide range of network applications may be reduced to
synchronization of sets and lists, the basic primitives of Catalogs
and Spools may be applied to achieve end-to-end security in an even
wider variety of applications.
For example, a Spool may be used to maintain a mailing list, track
comments on a Web forum or record annotations on a document.
Encrypting the container entries under a multi-party encryption group
allows such communications to be shared with a group of users while
maintaining full end-to-end security and without requiring every
party writing to the spool to know the public encryption key of every
recipient.
Another interesting possibility is the use of DARE Containers as a
file archive mechanism. A single signature on the final Merkle Tree
digest value would be sufficient to authenticate every file in the
archive. Updates to the archive might be performed using the same
container synchronization primitives provided by a Mesh Service.
This approach could afford a robust, secure, and efficient mechanism
for software distribution and update.
7. Security Considerations
The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh
services and applications are described in the Mesh Security
Considerations guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security].
8. IANA Considerations
This document does not contain actions for IANA
9. Acknowledgements
Comodo Group: Egemen Tas, Melhi Abdulhayo?lu, Rob Stradling, Robin
Alden.
10. Normative References
[draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Binary Encodings for JavaScript Object
Notation: JSON-B, JSON-C, JSON-D", Work in Progress,
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Internet-Draft Mesh Architecture 3.0 November 2020
Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd-18, 23 October
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-
jsonbcd-18>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VIII:
Cryptographic Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography-06, 27 July
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
cryptography-06>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part III : Data
At Rest Encryption (DARE)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare-08, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare-
08>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-developer-10, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
developer-10>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery]
"[Reference Not Found!]".
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-platform]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Platform
Configuration", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-platform-06, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
platform-06>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part V: Protocol
Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-protocol-06, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
protocol-06>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema
Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-schema-05, 16 January 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
schema-05>.
Hallam-Baker Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft Mesh Architecture 3.0 November 2020
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-security]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII:
Security Considerations", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-05, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
security-05>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part II: Uniform
Data Fingerprint.", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-10, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-
10>.
[draft-hallambaker-threshold]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Modes in Elliptic Curves",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-
threshold-03, 3 September 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-threshold-
03>.
[draft-hallambaker-threshold-sigs]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Signatures in Elliptic
Curves", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-threshold-sigs-04, 3 September 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-threshold-
sigs-04>.
[draft-hallambaker-web-service-discovery]
Hallam-Baker, P., "DNS Web Service Discovery", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-web-service-
discovery-04, 27 July 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-hallambaker-web-service-discovery-04>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7159>.
Hallam-Baker Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft Mesh Architecture 3.0 November 2020
[RFC7231] Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7516>.
11. Informative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VI: The
Trust Mesh", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-trust-06, 27 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust-
06>.
Hallam-Baker Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 48]