Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part XIV: Mesh Name Service
draft-hallambaker-mesh-name-service-00
Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft ThresholdSecrets.com
Intended status: Informational 21 September 2020
Expires: 25 March 2021
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part XIV: Mesh Name Service
draft-hallambaker-mesh-name-service-00
Abstract
A naming service for the Mathematical Mesh is described.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Name Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. Name Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Name syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Name Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Business Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Names do not expire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
The Mesh Name Service allows Mesh users to change Mesh Service
Providers without the switching costs associated with usual naming
schemes.
The Mesh Name System is distinct from the DNS in several important
respects:
* Mesh Names are intended to be the personal property of the
assignee and use of the name MUST NOT require payment of ongoing
rents, fees etc. of any kind.
* The DNS combines the functions of name delegation and discovery of
services provided under those names into a single protocol. The
MNS only supports name delegation.
The limitation on scope allows MNS to provide all the functionality
of a traditional DNS TLD with almost none of the costs. While the
DNS functionality exposed by a DNS TLD is limited to information that
changes very rarely (i.e. discovery of the IP addresses of the
authoritative DNS servers), the protocol used to deliver that
functionality is designed to support real time publication of service
configurations.
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Another costly aspect of the DNS design is that there is no mechanism
for invalidation of cached data. Instead every record has a
predetermined expiry time and TLDs advise relying parties of updates
to DNS records by publishing a new record. As a result, the vast
bulk of (valid) TLD traffic consists of requests to check if the
information has changed since the last time the party making the
request checked. This approach makes the DNS infrastructure
vulnerable to Denial of Service attack. If the DNS were ever to
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