Mesh/Recrypt: Usable Confidentiality
draft-hallambaker-mesh-recrypt-02

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-04-19 (latest revision 2017-08-16)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-hallambaker-mesh-recrypt-02.txt

Abstract

independent A messaging infrastructure providing full end-to end security is presented. Unlike existing approaches such as S/MIME and OpenPGP, Mesh/Recrypt uses proxy re-encryption to preserve full end-to-end security with individual user and device keys in situations such as the user having multiple decryption devices and messages being set to mailing lists. This document shows the use of Mesh/Recrypt to address the principle use cases Mesh/Recrypt is designed to address. These include asynchronous messaging such as mail and controlled documents and synchronous messaging applications such as chat, voice and video. This document is also available online at http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-recrypt.html .

Authors

Phillip Hallam-Baker (philliph@comodo.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)