Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema Reference
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-13
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Phillip Hallam-Baker | ||
| Last updated | 2024-10-14 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
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draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-13
Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft ThresholdSecrets.com
Intended status: Informational 14 October 2024
Expires: 17 April 2025
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema Reference
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-13
Abstract
The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure
infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and
credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of
the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and
reference data.
[Note to Readers]
Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list
(mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.
This document is also available online at
http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema.html.
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Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2. Connection Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Catalogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.1. Access Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1.2. Null Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1.3. Cryptographic Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.4. Publication Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2. Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2.1. Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2.2. SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3. Bookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4. Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.5. Credential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.6. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.7. Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.8. Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.9. Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5. Spools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.1. Outbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2. Inbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.3. Local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.4. Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6. Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7. Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.1. Key Derivation from Seed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2. Message Envelope and Response Identifiers. . . . . . . . 45
7.3. Proof of Knowledge of PIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.4. EARL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8. Mesh Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
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8.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.2. Mesh Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3. Mesh Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.4. Device Pre-configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
9.1. Mesh Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9.1.1. Account Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9.2. Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.2.1. The Device Catalog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.2.2. Mesh Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.3. Mesh Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9.4. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9.4.1. Message Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9.4.2. Four Corner Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
9.4.3. Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10. Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.1. Profile Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.2. Contact Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11. Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.1. Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.1.1. Classes describing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
11.1.2. Structure: KeyData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.1.3. Structure: KeyShare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.1.4. Structure: CompositePrivate . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.2. Assertion classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.2.1. Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11.2.2. Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.2.3. Base Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.2.4. Structure: Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.2.5. Structure: ActivationEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11.2.6. Mesh Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.2.7. Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.2.8. Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.2.9. Structure: ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11.2.10. Structure: ProfileUser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.2.11. Structure: ProfileGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.2.12. Structure: ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.2.13. Structure: ProfileMeshService . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.15. Connection Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.16. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.17. Structure: CallsignBinding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11.2.18. Structure: Accreditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.2.19. Structure: ConnectionStripped . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.2.20. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.2.21. Structure: ConnectionDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.2.22. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.2.23. Structure: ConnectionGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
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11.2.24. Structure: AccountHostAssignment . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.2.25. Structure: ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.2.26. Activation Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.2.27. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.2.28. Structure: ActivationHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.2.29. Structure: ActivationCommon . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.2.30. Structure: ActivationApplication . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.2.31. Structure: ActivationApplicationSsh . . . . . . . . 70
11.2.32. Structure: ActivationApplicationMail . . . . . . . . 70
11.2.33. Structure: ActivationApplicationGroup . . . . . . . 70
11.3. Application Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.3.1. Structure: ApplicationEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.3.2. Structure: ApplicationEntrySsh . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.3.3. Structure: ApplicationEntryGroup . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.3.4. Structure: ApplicationEntryMail . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.4. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.4.1. Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.4.2. Structure: Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.4.3. Structure: TaggedSource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.4.4. Structure: ContactGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.4.5. Structure: ContactPerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.4.6. Structure: ContactOrganization . . . . . . . . . . . 72
11.4.7. Structure: OrganizationName . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
11.4.8. Structure: PersonName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
11.4.9. Structure: NetworkAddress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
11.4.10. Structure: NetworkCredential . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.11. Structure: NetworkProfile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.12. Structure: NetworkCapability . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.13. Structure: NetworkProtocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.14. Structure: Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.15. Structure: Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11.4.16. Structure: Bookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
11.4.17. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
11.4.18. Structure: Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
11.4.19. Structure: WorkTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11.5. Catalog Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11.5.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11.5.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
11.5.3. Structure: DeviceDescription . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
11.5.4. Structure: CatalogedSignature . . . . . . . . . . . 77
11.5.5. Structure: CatalogedDocument . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
11.5.6. Structure: CatalogedPublication . . . . . . . . . . 78
11.5.7. Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . . 78
11.5.8. Structure: CatalogedNetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.5.9. Structure: CatalogedContact . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.5.10. Structure: CatalogedAccess . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.5.11. Structure: Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11.5.12. Structure: NullCapability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
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11.5.13. Structure: AccessCapability . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
11.5.14. Structure: PublicationCapability . . . . . . . . . . 80
11.5.15. Structure: CryptographicCapability . . . . . . . . . 81
11.5.16. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
11.5.17. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial . . . . . . . . 81
11.5.18. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced . . . . . . . . 81
11.5.19. Structure: CapabilitySign . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
11.5.20. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate . . . . . . . . . . 82
11.5.21. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange . . . . . . . . . 82
11.5.22. Structure: NamedService . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
11.5.23. Structure: ServiceAccessToken . . . . . . . . . . . 82
11.5.24. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
11.5.25. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
11.5.26. Structure: CatalogedApplication . . . . . . . . . . 83
11.5.27. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
11.5.28. Structure: CatalogedGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
11.5.29. Structure: CatalogedFeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
11.5.30. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail . . . . . . . . 84
11.5.31. Structure: CatalogedApplicationPkix . . . . . . . . 84
11.5.32. Structure: CatalogedApplicationOpenPgp . . . . . . . 84
11.5.33. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSsh . . . . . . . . . 84
11.5.34. Structure: CatalogedApplicationGit . . . . . . . . . 84
11.5.35. Structure: CatalogedApplicationDeveloper . . . . . . 85
11.5.36. Structure: MessageInvoice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
11.5.37. Structure: CatalogedReceipt . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
11.5.38. Structure: CatalogedTicket . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
11.6. Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
11.6.1. Structure: DevicePreconfigurationPublic . . . . . . 85
11.6.2. Structure: DevicePreconfigurationPrivate . . . . . . 85
11.7. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
11.7.1. Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
11.7.2. Structure: MessageError . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
11.7.3. Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
11.7.4. Structure: MessageValidated . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
11.7.5. Structure: MessagePin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
11.7.6. Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
11.7.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . . 87
11.7.8. Structure: RespondConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
11.7.9. Structure: MessageContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
11.7.10. Structure: GroupInvitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
11.7.11. Structure: MessageMail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
11.7.12. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 88
11.7.13. Structure: ResponseConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . 88
11.7.14. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
11.7.15. Structure: MessageClaim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
11.7.16. Structure: ProcessResult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
11.7.17. Structure: ProcessResultNotSupported . . . . . . . . 89
11.7.18. Structure: ProcessResultNotFound . . . . . . . . . . 89
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12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
15. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
16. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
1. Introduction
This document describes the data structures of the Mathematical Mesh
with illustrative examples. For an overview of the Mesh objectives
and architecture, consult the accompanying _Architecture Guide_
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. For information on the
implementation of the Mesh Service protocol, consult the accompanying
_Protocol Reference_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]
This document has two main sections. The first section presents
examples of the Mesh assertions, catalog entries and messages and
their use. The second section contains the schema reference. All
the material in both sections is generated from the Mesh reference
implementation [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
Although some of the services described in this document could be
used to replace existing Internet protocols including FTP and SMTP,
the principal value of any communication protocol lies in the size of
the audience it allows them to communicate with. Thus, while the
Mesh Messaging service is designed to support efficient and reliable
transfer of messages ranging in size from a few bytes to multiple
terabytes, the near-term applications of these services will be to
applications that are not adequately supported by existing protocols
if at all.
2. Definitions
This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
terms used as requirements language.
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.2. Defined Terms
The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
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2.3. Related Specifications
The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. The Mesh
documentation set and related specifications are described in this
document.
2.4. Implementation Status
The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
3. Actors
The Mesh mediates interactions between three principal actors:
*Accounts*, *Devices*, and *Services*.
Currently two account types are specified, *user accounts* which
belong to an individual user and *group accounts* that are used to
share access to confidential information between a group of users.
It may prove useful to define new types of account over time or to
eliminate the distinction entirely. When active a Mesh account is
bound to a Mesh Service. The service to which an account is bound
MAY be changed over time but an account can only be bound to a single
service at a time.
A Mesh account is an abstract construct that (when active) is
instantiated across one or more physical machines called a device.
Each device that is connected to an account has a separate set of
cryptographic keys that are used to interact with other devices
connected to the account and MAY be provisioned with access to the
account private keys which MAY or MAY NOT be mediated by the current
Mesh Service. A user's Mesh accounts and the devices connected to
them constitute that user's Personal Mesh.
A Mesh Service is an abstract construct that is provided by one or
more physical machines called Hosts. A Mesh Host is a device that is
attached to a service rather than an account.
3.1. Accounts
A Mesh Account is described by a Profile descended from Profile
Account and contains a set of Mesh stores. Currently two account
profiles are defined:
ProfileUser Describes a user account.
ProfileGroup Describes a group account used to share confidential
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information between a group of users.
Both types of profile specify the following fields:
ProfileSignature The public signature key used to authenticate the
profile itself
AccountAddress The account name to which the account is currently
bound. (e.g. alice@example.com, @alice).
ServiceUdf If the account is active, specifies the fingerprint of
the service profile to which the account is currently bound.
AdministratorSignature The public signature key used to verify
administrative actions on the account. In particular addition of
devices to a user account or members to a group account.
AccountEncryption The public encryption key for the account. All
messages sent to the account MUST be encrypted under this key. By
definition, all data encrypted under this account is encrypted
under this key.
User accounts specify two additional public keys, AccountSignature
and AccountAuthentication which allow signature and authentication
operations under the account context.
Every account contains a set of catalogs and spools that are managed
by the service as directed by the contents of the associated Access
catalog.
For example, the personal account profile Alice created in
For example, Alice creates a personal account:
Alice> meshman account create alice@example.com
Account=alice@example.com
UDF=MBQC-7OHA-RNBA-FRDL-R4GI-YQHA-DL36
The account profile created is:
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{
"ProfileUser":{
"CommonSignature":{
"Udf":"MDNT-WT3G-346G-4I5T-YV7F-LTQX-PSNT",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"IMyMo7fEy2vHp8syQ0VU4XivpJEhgQQSX3j8mva4HC_T0
5UnhQYqVZyuvIQEVo2dyMCRm60Q3E0A"}}},
"AccountAddress":"alice@example.com",
"ServiceUdf":"MBQD-ETXU-HZRW-A26O-WDTR-K7GI-X6JD",
"EscrowEncryption":{
"Udf":"MCKD-3MR6-P2TE-M6U4-4LIO-ZTRG-DZVS",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"1vNUAAp3rszIphG8EsfoaO5Y6sZCn0Hc8zCgdQivYpJAc
DtmkSsCeI2gmDTCK6SrS1UgPtuYmTwA"}}},
"AdministratorSignature":{
"Udf":"MD2L-6M7C-Z3Z3-Q3AL-JFYI-ZIUC-BKUR",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"bHoKb0c12F7cibM_3gZcJXMzOOX4snHgPVwOfRYk6ARJO
sGPemsd2Bm0WfmAkRYO3EQ6fj8_NzSA"}}},
"CommonEncryption":{
"Udf":"MAYF-D7LJ-5IMP-EUCG-HSGH-7LSR-AAPZ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"c7oorJ808sc9d40KXDhIHgCTFz39MK3JjO0Q7K_ufDEGD
KiwVKhd3oPQ44PEqGjwkpp7OfbcBbSA"}}},
"CommonAuthentication":{
"Udf":"MAFT-SINA-SFXI-PBDY-WRHE-NXYL-DXVT",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"XcgEz9y2cqsx4ZebGERTjrN-xzN83D-pcx0651x-WUCqY
NrsnzTH40CpoMxuN-FnpT5m_b0MyuKA"}}},
"RootUdfs":["YBJR3jR2PljdYk5qxbWdHY0rTYEaFAkHY3MmsR8zvN1Dr33Rn
LUL3ThrG9DMWBZ3P-8ZyGzyKaQYweco2ZUtcKw"
]}}
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3.2. Device
Every Mesh device has a set of private keys that are unique to that
device. These keys MAY be installed during manufacture, installed
from an external source after manufacture or generated on the device.
If the platform capabilities allow, device private keys SHOULD be
bound to the device so that they cannot be extracted or exported
without substantial effort.
The public keys corresponding to the device private keys are
specified in a ProfileDevice. This MUST contain at least the
following fields:
ProfileSignature The public signature key used to authenticate the
profile itself.
Encryption Public encryption key used as a share contribution to
generation of device encryption keys to be used in the context of
an account and to decrypt data during the process of connecting to
an account.
Authentication Public authentication key used as a share
contribution to generation of device authentication keys to be
used in the context of an account and to authenticate the device
to a service during the process of connecting to an account.
Signature Public signature key used as a share contribution to
generation of device signature keys to be used in the context of
an account.
For example, the device profile corresponding to one of the devices
belonging to Alice is:
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{
"ProfileDevice":{
"Encryption":{
"Udf":"MB5H-7FO4-AZRD-OJHX-OUZG-XHVG-KH2C",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"PhO96KmXS1Sui4SYmM75-4prHdG-am-TnSFcmsc9uKWhw
Vr2RimLPVpI5se5aU1Jeo0s7-dyv_eA"}}},
"Signature":{
"Udf":"MCUP-MUZ6-5D5T-5KWI-HV57-7BDX-TFEI",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"NrPD354a6P1EkIUlaPHdo3PnEmNqY4P7q-UB0LANce0am
Ail6vdx5F7VYGZthntsCBRmO6EzBD2A"}}},
"Authentication":{
"Udf":"MAZI-3SYG-RZ2X-TQDP-SL63-4OHD-5OTW",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"wFMa92pypOQLQPZpZfkUlx6S4OEjJfXsG5i1XBaO7QxZg
zZoIynMpJ8eiqEWr84MHjmXk7U_UVkA"}}},
"RootUdfs":["YOQFOuBha6ISPv3BO5hV5VcCfsP4CPiBYhzK1T2FktsOEtZ_T
TQQIaoOnfMEzFMpnwTMLpEtHQV60gZdRAQ7gwU"
]}}
3.2.1. Activation
The device private keys are only used to perform cryptographic
operations during the process of connecting a device to an account.
During that connection process, a threshold key generation scheme is
used to generate a second set of device keys bound to the account by
combining the base key held by the device with a second device
private key provided by the administration device approving the
connection of the device to the account. The resulting key is
referred to as the device key. The process of combining the base
keys with the contributions to form the device keys is called
Activation.
For example, Alice connects the device whose profile is shown above
to her account:
Alice2> meshman device complete
Device UDF = MBQO-4TTM-QOTS-MKEG-XQTU-XNFM-WUWM
Account = alice@example.com
Account UDF = MBQC-7OHA-RNBA-FRDL-R4GI-YQHA-DL36
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The activation record granting the device rights to operate as a part
of the account is:
{
"ActivationAccount":{
"AccountUdf":"MBQO-4TTM-QOTS-MKEG-XQTU-XNFM-WUWM",
"ActivationKey":"ZAAQ-HGFE-VOLA-P6ZX-JZE4-EZ4C-DXGM-TLP6-TEO2-F
RZG-QWVW-N7KB-NTFB-F2PC"}}
And:
{
"ActivationCommon":{
"Encryption":{
"Udf":"MAYF-D7LJ-5IMP-EUCG-HSGH-7LSR-AAPZ",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"c7oorJ808sc9d40KXDhIHgCTFz39MK3JjO0Q7K_ufDEGD
KiwVKhd3oPQ44PEqGjwkpp7OfbcBbSA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"raIIVpKe7NlAykMg0rPWUHzL9LnCy4ScwprV5eySGKGG
Ab7nyjN8rbDM-opg8xVBV_dXkEKqE3I",
"crv":"X448"}}},
"Authentication":{
"Udf":"MAFT-SINA-SFXI-PBDY-WRHE-NXYL-DXVT",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"XcgEz9y2cqsx4ZebGERTjrN-xzN83D-pcx0651x-WUCqY
NrsnzTH40CpoMxuN-FnpT5m_b0MyuKA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"dXpwcov9RC5WhoBy892-kQjM3MjM0ddEk9sCcjobjwxj
0u9khiVzsHiPqc1ufphftj0Zzv9C05I",
"crv":"X448"}}},
"Signature":{
"Udf":"MDNT-WT3G-346G-4I5T-YV7F-LTQX-PSNT",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"IMyMo7fEy2vHp8syQ0VU4XivpJEhgQQSX3j8mva4HC_T0
5UnhQYqVZyuvIQEVo2dyMCRm60Q3E0A"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"19gC3rbly9Y-D-OtdKPQvar-X7WhDb9IAezvuWotnELc
tO8Ic4BTWq2MSKcAk3lhMOKezRy_s7Y",
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"crv":"Ed448"}}},
"Entries":[{
"Resource":"Contact",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MAYS-HKIQ-VCQL-6MUD-ASPW-Y3OT-BLVW",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"2-LI9YOozzShdL-nfu7WJDsedbsOyRw0nEEor3-xj
UvAxJPS_VptsleZUg7u1jcLy3JMUQCFdGMA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"A3gNBuZ0xVggNIF6G6aftBhIeliF9IZCbn_KURJP
M9srop-v3BfNjvkUDS29iPubM7-_OkrdlXE",
"crv":"X448"}}}},
{
"Resource":"Publication",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MD7I-NZQC-FAUT-EHTA-WQQA-Y4YP-L5YR",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"JwemETcr0SYLj_UWf5focJPoINqhfYxvM7l4Kn9yy
UB6u7avc2WpEkNn6qJQFCYJEtaNR1n8OnaA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"JIVLbaj2PU9KZb6O7HPfR8z9RufcLx8bbIbCgE4h
6aoCqGdrAz8C99i554Kdr6Nrm7K4NrYSCgk",
"crv":"X448"}}}},
{
"Resource":"Inbound",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MBZU-KE6J-TYNI-HXJL-ZW7W-WNLU-MQHF",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"035fQLltWxs7fJYOK4BrmcFTnLwTPhmNnyXBbpuG_
w_jnCJJYjsTi7RExq2idvkJACnj7jz8TfsA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"dNVMbq-Q0aYujHbpGKjqeYlRZJF4dgwlUkGlRNDs
VxQW0BKIPCcWEZVS0_waS8uO_Cv7BqG03Xg",
"crv":"X448"}}}},
{
"Resource":"Outbound",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MAJP-XDZ7-4WK5-CBVG-AAN4-SUVN-FWUT",
"PublicParameters":{
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"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"oMblSsk2vfcnjsSTLBR_17PUMJQlVCnXvRzFzXx7r
tIbEmUj65hHlF6oT54IQJ9IaSQrQlZfNEAA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"8M43qEAlZ1x3j8TTdWxPt4Htt-sB3oWjBd0645wA
dlejcjNiD4UBz8nBVuusYtXln04GEmiFZ4U",
"crv":"X448"}}}},
{
"Resource":"Network",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MARE-FHHS-74PF-LSN2-K4HO-26SC-YDQG",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"IFi9wVeI1vSj_hGcL2Lk0Kv5BWWXITvuy4Qg999aS
K4jPen-E8wqzJPAPaxSzbbD64zAcgKOWzuA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"TXyKjn5pSVgmTawLEQDiudySemfHxHxRboLyPNB3
q2HNysiaDFJT4rpGVijePPApOAWuvyRWtec",
"crv":"X448"}}}},
{
"Resource":"Application",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MDSC-47UI-TFUH-P6V5-QNI7-UW3Y-5YZV",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"3jQ2DNaUz5JkJYCRptcJh_jV2vQm_QCbdHQIoNcxu
42PClekweR9TtQ0oUhP4R3A5irxVIgCPPAA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"N21lQKGlBzcge-0GZudkOmivKiiyxhBlE9-Tloqg
E2JqC-MPyQXXB3o23MjyAyb5lTbxHcqPQ5w",
"crv":"X448"}}}},
{
"Resource":"Credential",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MDFG-UKLG-VUPZ-XAY3-BDMH-FI35-RW3Y",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"kVrnMmX7RDcikA8LCHrX1c8e_TEKo17gvAWpVvh36
bRRf2hIQLdWFb7JG8zbHqjODuMzhTdfLeEA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
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"Private":"wRDSEDUGGiyjK7-uBHoNTCpn6ON6SaUUTEzK1ZUJ
QUP3lqYjP0U816YEk7FInDyNuSD_CSesjHU",
"crv":"X448"}}}},
{
"Resource":"Task",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MALW-PHPA-PCXM-W3DU-WMPU-XCEW-YAM7",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"sbOJcelezmPlW-RNZYyvG0-C4fwxecksenqB8okSK
fiihirXl01I-jtP1MRvN47QdXqzgjKqL9QA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"TOD3L2wkwDHT878UOcZERxcaVVE37UQupHbQU_bY
BB-vcl5uKdMJNVqwwF1_LeG87zYUiOMS9S4",
"crv":"X448"}}}},
{
"Resource":"Bookmark",
"Key":{
"Udf":"MDZV-J4CB-QLA5-K6GU-GGP2-OAXS-3FB6",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"nEw2RAKhuQN2RJUi9_XmVy_aLVGpM7n6dd-rk_I2Q
RmfFZYZRLtab_yRE-5A6HfgfsFndUbnOfQA"}},
"PrivateParameters":{
"PrivateKeyECDH":{
"Private":"QjrRmPp0wcYgC4z-vgyr_BQfbZwCOzwbl2GQZyBe
0RDtHQQuigxURbfpoqcxV0tWJ_p4rkrcBQk",
"crv":"X448"}}}}
]}}
The Mesh protocols are designed so that there is never a need to
export or escrow private keys of any type associated with a device,
neither the base key, nor the device key nor the contribution from
the administration device.
This approach to device configuration ensures that the keys that are
used by the device when operating within the context of the account
are entirely separate from those originally provided by the device
manufacturer or generated on the device, provided only that the key
contributions from the administration device are sufficiently random
and unguessable.
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3.2.2. Connection Assertion
The administration device combines the public keys specified in the
device profile with the public components of the keys specified in
the activation record to calculate the public keys of the device
operating in the context of the account. These public keys are then
used to create at a ConnectionDevice and a ConnectionService
assertion signed by the account administration signature key.
The ConnectionDevice assertion is used by the device to authenticate
it to other devices connected to the account. This connection
assertion specifies the Encryption, Authentication, and Signature
keys the device is to use in the context of the account and the list
of roles that have been authorized for the device..
{
"ConnectionDevice":{
"Roles":["message",
"web"
],
"Signature":{
"Udf":"MBPI-BITH-EPYS-3FYE-E35S-NDB3-VTP4",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"Y46EhbDyrvyXR2rxUE3tdjUjBHow3KIVzJ6K0PxrZDFPE
Qkrna4Q_LG9g3LBwAn9BkyFFszknh0A"}}},
"Encryption":{
"Udf":"MCBL-DEQY-N5WP-FY2B-SGYT-6PH3-LTZV",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"tfB8Ulcsp7A8OuymEMZtCe45ktAJGvnFeATg9n-QB81dU
Zsxc3IGA0Gh7khkNhLBfvd3KH-a95OA"}}},
"ProfileUdf":"MBQC-7OHA-RNBA-FRDL-R4GI-YQHA-DL36",
"Authentication":{
"Udf":"MB7K-AWT2-34F5-TVCT-BV2K-VMRH-JKVS",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"5zHjLDHVNHALaDaO0YyASwifAmiNGTtJG-LrCsA5Oyx6i
UVJ4Xu4WUAN_smNBRg8k85_qaMkHuYA"}}}}}
The ConnectionService assertion is used to authenticate the device to
the Mesh service. In order to allow the assertion to fit in a single
packet, it is important that this assertion be as small as possible.
Only the Authentication key is specified.
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The corresponding ConnectionService assertion is:
{
"ConnectionService":{
"ProfileUdf":"MBQC-7OHA-RNBA-FRDL-R4GI-YQHA-DL36",
"Authentication":{
"Udf":"MB7K-AWT2-34F5-TVCT-BV2K-VMRH-JKVS",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"5zHjLDHVNHALaDaO0YyASwifAmiNGTtJG-LrCsA5Oyx6i
UVJ4Xu4WUAN_smNBRg8k85_qaMkHuYA"}}}}}
The ConnectionDeviceassertion MAY be used in the same fashion as an
X.509v3/PKIX certificate to mediate interactions between devices
connected to the same account without the need for interaction with
the Mesh service. Thus, a coffee pot device connected to the account
can receive and authenticate instructions issued by a voice
recognition device connected to that account.
While the ConnectionDeviceassertion MAY be used to mediate external
interactions, this approach is typically undesirable as it provides
the external parties with visibility to the internal configuration of
the account, in particular which connected devices are being used on
which occasions. Furthermore, the lack of the need to interact with
the service means that the service is necessarily unable to mediate
the exchange and enforce authorization policy on the interactions.
Device keys are intended to be used to secure communications between
devices connected to the same account. All communication between
Mesh accounts SHOULD be mediated by a Mesh service. This enables
abuse mitigation by applying access control to every outbound and
every inbound message.
3.3. Service
Mesh services are described by a ProfileService. This specifies the
encryption, and signature authentication keys used to interact with
the abstract service.
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{
"ProfileService":{
"ServiceAuthentication":{
"Udf":"MDYI-I2BH-HML3-H6YK-GNYW-JJXF-NVDH",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"gH6QMyYx5qfORaNNvsZyR83BM0anEj-VqCoL-6k_BhdFY
Q8Qpro58p0hrTRMTLZrrBdWpjtPKiuA"}}},
"ServiceEncryption":{
"Udf":"MA4L-UE5A-E4VG-UGRK-TVT2-3LHG-Y7NV",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"KPrn6aPtRHGLbI2aEHzI_dtPDgaGMSSLxkD_dWsTBYVE1
KfT3kAOqR29P82C-NrtZapnwxZfFTgA"}}},
"ServiceSignature":{
"Udf":"MC6L-T5P6-UZCQ-RRD7-VMJM-E2KQ-AZHE",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"y5a7XXdof_Azi8ueTddSIZx9fFgD7ZfXBT9-N6e5qeB_p
QtnurylRNxe2w5HrCV9sYz2jr3u4XqA"}}},
"RootUdfs":["YBLkkXVQbdqea81QVIkppp0DOBttJFcoTI7UVewreuMBAJ3z6
nMmf31Fb4hFy-OJjYWh95E0spNUvPjMjw3NopA"
]}}
Since Mesh accounts and services are both abstract constructs, they
cannot interact directly. A device connected to an account can only
interact with a service by interacted with a device authorized to
provide services on behalf of one or more accounts connected to the
service. Such a device is called a Mesh Host.
Mesh hosts MAY be managed using the same ProfileDevice and device
connection mechanism provided for management of user devices or by
whatever other management protocols prove convenient. The only part
of the Service/Host interaction that is visible to devices connected
to a profile and to hosts connected to other services is the
ConnectionHost structure that describes the set of device keys to use
in interactions with that specific host.
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{
"ConnectionService":{
"ProfileUdf":"MBQL-QXMC-6B6G-6RF3-BCJN-CDNU-N2K2",
"Subject":"MC6U-BVUM-RRCG-OM6V-HB63-4BCG-TVRL",
"Authority":"MBQD-ETXU-HZRW-A26O-WDTR-K7GI-X6JD",
"Authentication":{
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"fjAiJJe143FCODQ70z5RT-IT7MJ_SbHqs1sKk8JJ1WjUx
cFyjOsYmG74_UbHIeM7vwZjCQJ2eQ6A"}}}}}
Mesh Services MAY make use of the profile and activation mechanism
used to connect devices to accounts to manage the connection of hosts
to services. But this is optional. It is never necessary for a
device to publish a ProfileHost assertion.
4. Catalogs
Catalogs track sets of persistent objects associated with a Mesh
Service Account. The Mesh Service has no access to the entries in
any Mesh catalog except for the Device and Contacts catalog which are
used in device authentication and authorization of inbound messages.
Each Mesh Catalog managed by a Mesh Account has a name of the form:
<prefix>_<name>
Where <prefix> is the IANA assigned service name. The assigned
service name for the Mathematical Mesh is mmm. Thus, all catalogs
specified by the Mesh schema have names prefixed with the sequence
mmm_.
The following catalogs are currently specified within the
Mathematical Mesh.
Access: mmm_Access Describes access control policy for performing
operations on the account. The Access catalog is the only Mesh
catalog whose contents are readable by the Mesh Service under
normal circumstances.
Application: mmm_Application Describes configuration information for
applications including mail (SMTP, IMAP, OpenPGP, S/MIME, etc) and
SSH and for the MeshAccount application itself.
Bookmark: mmm_Bookmark Describes Web bookmarks and other citations
allowing them to be shared between devices connected to the
profile.
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Contact: mmm_Contact Describes logical and physical contact
information for people and organizations.
Credential: mmm_Credential Describes credentials used to access
network resources.
Device: mmm_Device Describes the set of devices connected to the
account and the permissions assigned to them
Network: mmm_Network Describes network settings such as WiFi access
points, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.
Member: mmm_Member Describes the set of members connected to a group
account.
Publication: mmm_Publication Describes data published under the
account context. The data MAY be stored in the publication
catalog itself or on a separate service (e.g. a Web server).
Task: mmm_CatalogTask Describes tasks assigned to the user including
calendar entries and to do lists.
The Access, and Publication catalogs are used by the service in
certain Mesh Service Protocol interactions. The Device and Member
catalogs are used to track the connection of devices to a user
account and members to a group for administrative purposes. These
interactions are further described below.
In many cases, the Mesh Catalog offers capabilities that represent a
superset of the capabilities of an existing application. For
example, the task catalog supports the appointment tracking functions
of a traditional calendar application and the task tracking function
of the traditional 'to do list' application. Combining these
functions allows tasks to be triggered by other events other than the
passage of time such as completion of other tasks, geographical
presence, etc.
In such cases, the Mesh Catalog entries are designed to provide a
superset of the data representation capabilities of the legacy
formats and (where available) recent extensions. Where a catalog
entry is derived from input presented in a legacy format, the
original data representation MAY be attached verbatim to facilitate
interoperability.
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4.1. Access
The access catalog mmm_Access contains a list of access control
entries providing authorization to devices authenticated by a
particular credential. The access catalog provides information that
is necessary for the Mesh Service to act on behalf of the user. It
is therefore necessary for the service to be able to decrypt entries
in the catalog.
The entries in the catalog have type CatalogedAccess and specify a
capability. The following capabilities are defined:
NullCapability A capability granting no access rights. May be used
to establish a positive statement denying all access.
AccessCapability Authorizes a device authenticated by specified
means to request privileged account operations. For example,
requesting the status of an account catalog. Also used to
provision devices with a copy of their CatalogedDevice entry
encrypted under a key held by the device.
CryptographicCapability Specifies a private key encrypted under the
encryption key of the service and criteria specifying the parties
authorized to request use of the key.
PublicationCapability Authorizes a device authenticated by specified
means to obtain a data item.
The Access catalog plays a central role in all operations performed
by the service on behalf of the user.
Every access capability is gated by a specified set of authentication
criteria. The following authentication criteria are currently
defined:
Profile Authentication Key The account profile authentication key
authorizes any account action without the need for an access
catalog entry. This capability is normally only used during
account binding. Administration devices SHOULD NOT have access to
the account profile authentication key after binding is completed.
Device Authentication Key The service will only perform the
operation if the device making the request presents the specified
authentication key.
This form of authentication is necessary to restrict access to
account operations so that only connected devices can interact
with stores, etc.
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Account Profile Identifier The service will only perform the
operation if the device making the request presents an
authentication key that is credentialed by a connection assertion
to the specified account profile.
This form of authentication is necessary to perform administration
operations on a group account since it is the account rather than
the device that is authorized to perform the operation.
Proof of Knowledge The service will only perform the operation if
proof of knowledge of the identified shared secret is provided.
This form of authentication criteria is used to allow device
connection and contact exchange by means of static (i.e. printed)
QR codes.
Future: Currently, the set of authentication criteria is limited to
direct grants of a single capability to a single specified device or
account. This approach may prove to be unnecessarily verbose
requiring the same information to be repeated multiple times.
4.1.1. Access Capability
The access capability permits a specified service operation on the
account. Optionally, an access capability MAY specify a Data entry
encrypted to a key held by the device.
The access capability specifies the set of rights granted to the
requester and optionally specifies an EnvelopedCatalogedDevice entry
containing the CatalogedDevice entry for the device encrypted under
the base encryption key or account encryption key of the device.
The CatalogedDeviceDigest value serves as a tag for the cached data.
4.1.1.1. Operation Rights
The reference code does not currently implement operation rights
beyond denying all operations to devices that do not have an access
capability entry.
Expansion of the rights handling is planned to permit granular
expression of access rights.
mmm_o_UnbindAccount UnbindAccount
mmm_o_Connect Connect
mmm_o_Complete Complete
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mmm_o_Status Status (of specified catalogs or all catalogs)
mmm_o_Download Download (of specified catalogs or all catalogs)
mmm_o_Transact Transact (of specified catalogs or all catalogs)
mmm_o_Post Post outbound message
4.1.1.2. Messaging
The reference code has limited messaging capabilities at present and
messaging rights are not specified. The following is a list of
possible rights:
mmm_m_Contact Contact messages from the specified subject.
mmm_m_Confirmation Confirmation messages from the specified subject.
mmm_m_Async Asynchronous delivery messages (e.g. mail)
mmm_m_Sync Synchronous delivery messages (e.g. chat)
mmm_m_Presence Forward presence request.
The following media are defined
mmm_c_Text Text that MUST NOT contain links or external references
mmm_c_Linked Text that MAY contain links or external reference
mmm_c_Audio Audio data (e.g. VOIP, voicemail)
mmm_c_Video Video data
mmm_c_Code Content containing active code including macros, scripts
and executables.
4.1.2. Null Capability
The null capability is used to affirmatively deny access to a
function. This allows access requests from previously authorized
devices whose credentials have been revoked to be handled separately
from requests from devices that were never authorized.
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4.1.3. Cryptographic Capabilities
A Mesh Service can perform cryptographic operations on a private key
according to access criteria specified by the user. This capability
is used to support use of threshold cryptography to mitigate
compromise of a particular device or individual. The splitting of a
cryptographic key into two or more parts allows the use of that key
to be split into two or more roles.
Note that this approach limits rather than eliminates trust in the
service. As with services presenting themselves as 'zero trust', a
Mesh service becomes a trusted service after a sufficient number of
breaches in other parts of the system have occurred. And the user
trusts the service to provide availability of the service.
A Mesh Service MAY also offer to perform private key operations for
other purposes. An embargo agent might offer to decrypt data under a
private key but only after a specified date and time. An expiry
agent might offer to decrypt data but only before a specified date
and time. Such services MAY be reserved to the customers of a
specified service or provided to the general public. Users of such
services MAY combine key services provided by multiple service
providers using threshold techniques to achieve separation of roles.
Since a service might not willingly co-operate with an account
transfer request, extension of the Mesh service protocol will be
required to enable threshold sharing of the keys required to effect
account transfer. This would require one administration device to
act as a proxy for threshold signature etc. operations being
requested by another administration device. While implementation of
such a scheme to support this limited function could be achieved with
little difficulty, such a scheme might not support the wider range of
peer-to-peer threshold capabilities that might be useful. For
example, the confirmation protocol might be modified so that instead
of merely providing non-repudiable evidence of the user's response to
a request, the confirmation device served as a policy enforcement
point through control of a necessary threshold share.
The following service cryptographic operations are specified:
4.1.3.1. Threshold Key Share
A private key share s, held by the service is split into key shares
x, y such that a = x + y. One key share is encrypted under a
decryption key held by the service. The other is encrypted under a
public key specified by the party making the request.
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This operation is not currently implemented in the Reference code.
When implemented, it will allow the functions of the administration
device to be threshold shared between the device and the service,
thus allowing the administration capability to be revoked if the
device is lost, stolen or otherwise compromised.
Implementation of this capability is expected to be based on the
scheme described in . [draft-komlo-frost]
4.1.3.2. Key Agreement
A private key share s, held by the service is used to calculate the
value (sl + c).P where l, c are integers specified by the requestor
and P is a point on the curve.
This operation is used
4.1.3.3. Threshold Signature
A private key share s, held by the service is used to calculate a
contribution to a threshold signature scheme.
The implementation of the cryptographic operations described above is
described in [draft-hallambaker-threshold].
Implementation of signatures is not currently covered pending
completion of [draft-irtf-cfrg-frost].
4.1.3.4. Fair Exchange
Perform a Micali Fair Exchange trusted intermediary operation.
On receipt of a signature SIG_B(Z), where Z=E_k(A, B, M), the service
decrypts Z and returns the result to B.
4.1.4. Publication Capability
The publication capability is not currently implemented.
Implementation would allow the Claim/PollClaim mechanism to be
eliminated in favor of a mechanism capable of re-use for other
purposes.
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4.2. Application
The application catalog mmm_Application contains
CatalogEntryApplication entries which describe the use of specific
applications under the Mesh Service Account. Multiple application
accounts for a single application MAY be connected to a single Mesh
Service Account. Each account being specified in a separate entry.
The CatalogEntryApplication entries only contain configuration
information for the application as it applies to the account as a
whole. If the application requires separate configuration for
individual devices, this is specified in the device activation
record.
Two applications are currently defined:
Mail An SMTP email account and associated encryption and signature
keys for S/MIME and OpenPGP.
SSH Secure Shell Client.
Accounts MAY specify multiple instances of each but each application
instance is considered as describing a single application account.
Thus, if Alice has email accounts alice@example.com and
alice@example.net, she will have application entries for each.
Accounts connected to Alice's Mesh account may be authorized to use
either, both or none of the email accounts.
*Note*: The implementation of these features in the current
specification is considered to be a 'proof of concept' rather than a
proposed final form. There are many issues that need to be
considered when integrating a legacy protocol with extensive
deployment into a new platform.
4.2.1. Mail
Mail configuration profiles are described by one or more
CatalogEntryApplicationMail entries, one for each email account
connected to the Mesh profile. The corresponding activation records
for the connected devices contain information used to provide the
device with the necessary decryption information.
Entries specify the email account address(es), the inbound and
outbound server configuration and the cryptographic keys to be used
for S/MIME and OpenPGP encryption.
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{
"CatalogedApplicationMail":{
"AccountAddress":"alice@example.net",
"InboundConnect":"imap://alice@imap.example.net",
"OutboundConnect":"submit://alice@submit.example.net",
"SmimeSign":{
"Udf":"MCCJ-IANC-HEWS-7XZI-OR72-ZFC4-SCQL",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"n":"ujaNN0wJkcUTdJLUHPgHjzIliAMp_6-I1BwqAzaW3zIRto2aRQ
i6oMGjqigiFq4BMt-9Jo4YAYd655FgebcfC82bu2v8kQyNJ3zUdoblMUDOFrTRffc
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"e":"AQAB",
"kid":"MCCJ-IANC-HEWS-7XZI-OR72-ZFC4-SCQL"}}},
"SmimeEncrypt":{
"Udf":"MDO5-36TO-HN5V-6SZ5-MD5B-63BZ-737K",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"n":"rDdENxO4dTXs-G2Esue3P0lym8e-WF3sKyv2eOP5Dn_IBRlJiS
wbPWzfj9gMPE8z0Yx80RUwQ0AmyiACD6nPRHOtVPIzF3OFuwFZjMvDdY4Tkgg60dd
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"e":"AQAB",
"kid":"MDO5-36TO-HN5V-6SZ5-MD5B-63BZ-737K"}}},
"OpenpgpSign":{
"Udf":"MAII-NUGV-FX7P-IAQ2-UXZ3-CP3J-6MKN",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"n":"wgbGU8SvN9kyykGSaAcsOpA9x6m3axF1vnGk1O_sedVRTrK5jB
I-EbVL-nFthAMh1TqO25sh5kJYZTX43pfpEUOeyoNo_U5uQf6n1bskQjkdpjMG3xR
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H-CJF9xnyqFolyZDaAVBWEeDEUEUZPcQ",
"e":"AQAB",
"kid":"MAII-NUGV-FX7P-IAQ2-UXZ3-CP3J-6MKN"}}},
"OpenpgpEncrypt":{
"Udf":"MB74-LYO7-NBVD-EZ3E-7ADE-AR4N-2AY7",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"n":"8Ygw69BbA8aPA2m24HqBfV6o9pJtbx8PoJLIszlROyRQZy_CxY
v0gCsh5oKEVxAdTV5m_u7rgZOuSuwsMe-8HjTfbgBpL1pfuu76Ih-5KBsoJvWH5Ag
dYJV2HrLxuHi4BvVZbD3DckOEtMPU03paGmHF7V6SISGfGLvlmpsIwhw-44EjMVPZ
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GD_Y-4eF6FmN2wVb0SjAmc9pUKUG5pNj6-HmM-d0pGFFjwrGW2L2-NVhPy29z9spZ
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"e":"AQAB",
"kid":"MB74-LYO7-NBVD-EZ3E-7ADE-AR4N-2AY7"}}},
"Key":"mailto:alice@example.net",
"Grant":["web"
],
"EnvelopedEscrow":[[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQI-M6QR-LVYR-SCFV-XSFJ-EJLN-HS7F",
"Salt":"4XORHvoh7KKpsffW8AqIlg",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MCKD-3MR6-P2TE-M6U4-4LIO-ZTRG-DZVS",
"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"olkRv5dHpel7vSLrt0X4_prek7ZL3bXATFnvp
nUw8EtlYvXDko5QBCkPuZeicmBZuFzqo81869-A"}},
"wmk":"f1ztYcg-UkEnjLFN4uHFPxi_pO425ANr3hsI_A-4dp0w
ZHhDfAO1bw"}
]},
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R7Z6q3FNzA9M_kujDZh3ukF5um3PEltaHBjmSMWE9RFvgVqq0UVF1Y1zeVuxcFaqN
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],
[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQD-XY75-2IST-C6DH-KTEU-363I-CWBR",
"Salt":"2AwJI4VHneTLk2UMSbaLAw",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MCKD-3MR6-P2TE-M6U4-4LIO-ZTRG-DZVS",
"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"7wk9t2JK-Gx9ESxA7jAPJXjZ4rRhH2RHUidz8
n5FsDxMQPXtO78_F3d3__RefNRiPoCfTm8D0DmA"}},
"wmk":"N6SgC4MEtbxrHyFLpsETbTsZDgqxnfnxnm7EhGQNpuFX
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]},
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[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQF-IX7C-VHUN-ISB4-RYQT-HJ7O-INMS",
"Salt":"6dSZ908dT3Syo4-z_eEiRw",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MCKD-3MR6-P2TE-M6U4-4LIO-ZTRG-DZVS",
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"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"jYcxhXOF8j1YycxnOuz8yRuSUEZwKwZ9FZCXg
0PvFYuHMfPUr_86-sSWj5hBPrlVrSKg3rZn9jCA"}},
"wmk":"3kUOWUxLusSNPJcEmSU2y7hLEqhp2MDcxyOESqIJMXJn
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]},
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1IKv7ZzV5JJLy6UT5WXc_b8-eqVOK-itOa0x1pDF3EiD1ncsS7463mTJfMWRZY5IT
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],
[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQK-IU54-MJW2-YRQM-SYJU-743K-YTXR",
"Salt":"5RPrUS8eme48PmJoq26bKg",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MCKD-3MR6-P2TE-M6U4-4LIO-ZTRG-DZVS",
"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
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"wmk":"ZMwe3K0dUh4iVBckg5dm-ganKo9sj84Br949or4ncCGN
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]},
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]
]}}
Note that the inbound and outbound server configuration does not
specify the access credentials to be used to access the service.
These are specified in the Credential catalog.
Future: The mail application should support automated means of
credentialling the public key including obtaining an X.509v3
certificate or uploading the key to a key service.
4.2.2. SSH
SSH configuration profiles are described by entries in multiple
catalogs
CatalogedApplicationSsh entries in the Applications catalog. Specify
an SSH client credential or certificate signing credential
CatalogedCredential entries in the Credential catalog. Specify SSH
host keys (i.e. contents of the known hosts file)
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CatalogedContact entries in the Contacts catalog. Specify SSH client
keys (i.e. material from which an authorized_key file entry might
be constructed).
Future: Client and Host certificates are not currently supported.
This is clearly desirable but requires additional implementation
considerations.
Future: Provisioning of SSH host private keys is currently out of
scope. This is best considered as part of the device provisioning
and authorization flow and will lead to entries being created/updated
in the device catalog.
A user may have separate SSH configurations for separate purposes
within a single Mesh Account. This allows a system administrator
servicing multiple clients to maintain separate SSH profiles for each
of her customers allowing credentials to be easily (and verifiably)
revoked at contract termination.
{
"CatalogedApplicationSsh":{
"ClientKey":{
"Udf":"MBR3-LM6K-JRW2-JWYF-JK3C-SIA4-HG77",
"PublicParameters":{
"PublicKeyRSA":{
"n":"6WSR_7MjW1hqpyLC45ZTZRWNKF0MFXN_GNuZw7wHhmZgTQwiAc
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"e":"AQAB",
"kid":"MBR3-LM6K-JRW2-JWYF-JK3C-SIA4-HG77"}}},
"Key":"MBR3-LM6K-JRW2-JWYF-JK3C-SIA4-HG77",
"Grant":["web",
"threshold"
],
"EnvelopedEscrow":[[{
"enc":"A256CBC",
"kid":"EBQO-W5DT-FEGY-CLWB-KZX6-TTGF-JB4S",
"Salt":"n8FIgDGkJ6x9w3zu3ZTKLg",
"recipients":[{
"kid":"MCKD-3MR6-P2TE-M6U4-4LIO-ZTRG-DZVS",
"epk":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"X448",
"Public":"VYUaDmhYI6cy3ltzeLXy5iAiYxDRjzXYlEbIw
PIMcjaZJD998DURwMcqig6cEPAYjQGDfeJ90FWA"}},
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"wmk":"xROBIN5zTCSppVnv0eASxxMZ-bOtAx9qy0O7rxL4C9J-
bUX-D_9J1w"}
]},
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_AIxnhLEWfOFSSFVpdbSaTfIzzeSkjPDU9Tr8OAFbQiATsdbtZVQNM8nV8GAMAWfI
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]
],
"LocalName":"ssh"}}
4.3. Bookmark
The bookmark catalog mmm_bookmark contains CatalogEntryBookmark
entries which describe Web bookmarks and other citations allowing
them to be shared between devices connected to the profile.
The fields currently supported by the Bookmarks catalog are currently
limited to the fields required for tracking Web bookmarks.
Specification of additional fields to track full academic citations
is a work in progress.
{
"CatalogedBookmark":{
"Uri":"http://www.example.com",
"Title":"site1",
"Uid":"NAXG-NNHG-MK3R-SZ73-3TQS-LS6M-M2W3",
"LocalName":"Sites-1"}}
4.4. Contact
The contact catalog mmm_contact contains CatalogEntryContact entries
which describe the person, organization or location described.
The fields of the contact catalog provide a superset of the
capabilities of vCard [RFC2426].
{
"CatalogedContact":{
"Key":"MBQC-7OHA-RNBA-FRDL-R4GI-YQHA-DL36",
"Self":true,
"Contact":{
"ContactPerson":{
"CommonNames":[{}
],
"Id":"MBQC-7OHA-RNBA-FRDL-R4GI-YQHA-DL36",
"Anchors":[{
"Udf":"MBQC-7OHA-RNBA-FRDL-R4GI-YQHA-DL36",
"Validation":"Self"}
],
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"NetworkAddresses":[{
"NetworkProfile":{
"EnvelopedProfileAccount":[{
"EnvelopeId":"MBQC-7OHA-RNBA-FRDL-R4GI-YQHA-DL36",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNQlFD
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{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"ED448",
"kid":"MAJF-DXRU-OY7F-RXLC-JZVM-LNM5-DWGS",
"SignatureKey":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
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Internet-Draft Mesh Schema Reference October 2024
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"9sZGEfYSIoTvVSL0Q5c_Oip_Hi2iO
Tsl4L3iLwhfOv9bA-5nd7PyRooKEsQx-lA7PMAYBewSOmIA"}},
"signature":"6x3k8AC2jkUQv0jzlUVWJDqP7zcNkK
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],
"PayloadDigest":"tXPfbmg_SRmARF_7HLPq-bM6NMO1h1
Oa30f_Ag_TIRzGKMrmTKtV7XH-h3NIBFGxOQYuD0BproKNEg6uhtG0Mw"}
],
"Address":"alice@example.com"}}
],
"Sources":[{
"Validation":"Self",
"EnvelopedSource":[{
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2hYSHNweXcKICBYLVpHTUQ2c29YSklpbE96cmVhdVItX2FpVUU3R3gwZWgzRmplMn
dFQSJ9XSwKICAgICAgICAgICAgICAiUGF5bG9hZERpZ2VzdCI6ICJ0WFBmYm1nX1N
SbUFSRl83SExQcS1iTTZOTU8xaDFPYTMwZl9BZ19USVJ6R0sKICBNcm1US3RWN1hI
LWgzTklCRkd4T1FZdUQwQnByb0tORWc2dWh0RzBNdyJ9XSwKICAgICAgICAgICJBZ
GRyZXNzIjogImFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn19XX19",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"ED448",
"kid":"MDNT-WT3G-346G-4I5T-YV7F-LTQX-PSNT",
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"signature":"XNiZFxlGpuRctoAwDE2M8-E9H1T2YEYj
vvtA3-7IauLyRUyXUmdd84apRaYEtCmjgVZWlurG1ywAAOj9MfFdDkucJ-QGefgtg
mhN5YUI4K6s7p9LjjAheFt3YYRY9TNrcBFgStXVT01OL9NdO4VPyhwA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"O_emyhwHRf9e38XKr7utUgB-gKMyo6qi
v-Hd03Xui8KhZUCyw3LsdqG4OP5vgzJ7RM4uxJei5hOwd6-fn9MISQ"}
]}
]}}}}
The Contact catalog is typically used by the MeshService as a source
of authorization information to perform access control on inbound and
outbound message requests. For this reason, Mesh Service SHOULD be
granted read access to the contacts catalog by providing a decryption
entry for the service.
4.5. Credential
The credential catalog mmm_credential contains CatalogEntryCredential
entries which describe credentials used to access network resources.
{
"CatalogedCredential":{
"Service":"ftp.example.com",
"Username":"alice1",
"Password":"password"}}
Only username/password credentials are stored in the credential
catalog. If public key credentials are to be used, these SHOULD be
managed as an application profile allowing separate credentials to be
created for each device.
4.6. Device
The device catalog mmm_Device contains CatalogEntryDevice entries
which describe the devices connected to the account and the
permissions assigned to them.
Each device connected to a Mesh Account has an associated
CatalogEntryDevice entry that includes the activation and connection
records for the account. These records are described in further
detail in section ???.
4.7. Network
The network catalog contains CatalogEntryNetwork entries which
describe network settings, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.
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{
"CatalogedNetwork":{
"Service":"myWiFi",
"Password":"securePassword"}}
4.8. Publication
[Note, this catalog is obsolete, the functions provided by this
catalog are being merged with the Access catalog]
The publication catalog mmm_Publication contains
CatalogEntryPublication entries which describe content published
through the account.
If the data being published is small, it MAY be specified in the
CatalogEntryPublication entry itself as enveloped data. Otherwise a
link to the external content is required.
The Publication catalog is currently used to publish two types of
data:
Contact Used in the Static QR Code Contact Exchange interaction.
Profile Device Used in the Preconfigured Device Connection
interaction.
The interactions using this published data are described in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
>>>> Unfinished SchemaEntryPublication
Missing example 13
4.9. Task
The Task catalog mmm_Task contains CatalogEntryTask entries which
describe tasks assigned to the user including calendar entries and to
do lists.
The fields of the task catalog currently reflect those offered by the
iCalendar specification [RFC5545]. Specification of additional
fields to allow task triggering on geographic location and/or
completion of other tasks is a work in progress.
{
"CatalogedTask":{
"Title":"SomeItem",
"Uid":"NDQD-6QT7-56MN-ONAG-2NUJ-DADI-BPOA"}}
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5. Spools
Spools are DARE Sequences containing an append only list of messages
sent or received by an account. Three spools are currently defined:
Inbound Messages sent to the account. These are encrypted under the
account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
current at the time the message was sent.
Outbound Messages sent from the account. These are encrypted under
the account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
current at the time the message was sent.
Local Messages sent from the account for internal use. These are
encrypted under the encryption key of the intended recipient
alone. This is either the account administration encryption key
or a device encryption key.
Every Mesh Message has a unique message identifier. Messages created
at the beginning of a new messaging protocol interaction are assigned
a random message identifier. Responses to previous messages are
assigned message identifiers formed from the message identifier to
which they respond by means of a message digest function.
Every Mesh Message stored in a spool is encapsulated in an envelope
which bears a unique identifier that is formed by applying a message
digest function to the message identifier. Each stored message has
an associated state which is initially set to the state Initial and
MAY be subsequently altered by one or more MessageComplete messages
subsequently appended to the spool. The allowable message states
depending upon the spool in question.
5.1. Outbound
The outbound spool stores messages that are to be or have been sent
and MessageComplete messages reporting changes to the status of the
messages stored on the spool.
Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Sent,
Received or Refused:
Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool.
Sent The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to the
Mesh Service of the recipient which accepted it.
Received The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
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the Mesh Service of the recipient and the recipient has
acknowledged receipt.
Refused The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
the Mesh Service of the recipient which refused to accept it.
MessageComplete messages are only valid when posted to the spool by
the service.
5.2. Inbound
The inbound spool stores messages that have been received by the Mesh
service servicing the account and MessageComplete messages reporting
changes to the status of the messages stored on the spool.
Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Read:
Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool.
Read The message has been read.
A message previously marked as read MAY be returned to the unread
state by marking it as being in the Initial state.
5.3. Local
The local spool stores messages that are used for administrative
functions. In normal circumstances, only administrator devices and
the Mesh Service require access to the local spool.
The local spool is used to store MessagePin messages used to notify
administration devices that a PIN code has been registered for some
purpose and RespondConnection messages used to inform a device of the
result of a connection request.
The local spool is used in a device connection operation to provide a
device with the activation and connection records required to access
the service as an authorized client. Servicing these requests
requires that the service be able to access messages stored in the
spool by envelope id.
Messages posted to the outbound spool have the states Initial,
Closed:
Initial The initial state of a message posted to the spool.
Closed The action associated with the message has been completed.
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Future: Redefining the role of the Local spool would allow the Claim/
PollClaim operations used in device connection to be eliminated and
greater consistency achieved between the device connection
interactions.
5.4. Log
The log spo
6. Logs
The logging functions are not currently implemented.
Logs are records of events. Mesh logs SHOULD be encrypted and
notarized.
The following logs are specified:
Service A log written by the Mesh Service containing a list of all
actions performed on the account
Exception A log written by the Mesh Service containing a list of all
exception events such as requests for access that were refused.
Notary A log written by administration devices connected to the
account containing a sequence of status entries and cross
notarization receipts.
The notary log will perform a particularly important role in future
Mesh versions as it provides the ultimate root of trust for the
account itself through cross notarization with the account holder's
MSP which in turn achieves mutual cross notarization with every other
MSP by cross notarizing with the Callsign registry. Thus every Mesh
user is cross notarized with every other Mesh user making use of the
Callsign registry through a graph with a diameter of 4.
7. Cryptographic Operations
The Mesh makes use of various cryptographic operations including
threshold operations. For convenience, these are gathered here and
specified as functions that are referenced by other parts of the
specification.
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7.1. Key Derivation from Seed
Mesh Keys that derived from a seed value use the mechanism described
in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]. Use of the keyname parameter allows
multiple keys for different uses to be derived from a single key.
Thus escrow of a single seed value permits recovery of all the
private keys associated with the profile.
The keyname parameter is a string formed by concatenating identifiers
specifying the key type, the actor that will use the key and the key
operation:
7.2. Message Envelope and Response Identifiers.
Every Mesh message has a unique Message Identifier MessageId. The
MakeID() function is used to calculate the value of Envelope
Identifier and Response identifier from the message identifier as
follows:
static string MakeID(string udf, string content) {
var (code, bds) = Udf.Parse(udf);
return code switch
{
UdfTypeIdentifier.Digest_SHA_3_512 =>
Udf.ContentDigestOfDataString(
bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_3_512),
_ => Udf.ContentDigestOfDataString(
bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_2_512),
};
Where the values of content are given as follows:
application/mmm/envelopeid The proposed IANA content identifier for
the Mesh message type.
application/mmm/responseid The proposed IANA content identifier for
the Mesh message type.
For example:
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MessageID
= NBAM-IBG7-4IM2-UNK6-NQOQ-HFSR-4LBD
EnvelopeID
= MBRN-LSG3-IBIK-2RUK-U4TO-HOZK-7ZJP
ResponseID
= MBB3-YB75-4P67-6YFY-2WWY-AKUA-UHPV
7.3. Proof of Knowledge of PIN
Mesh Message classes that are subclasses of MessagePinValidated MAY
be authenticated by means of a PIN. Currently two such messages are
defined: MessageContact used in contact exchange and
RequestConnection message used in device connection.
The PIN codes used to authenticate MessagePinValidated messages are
UDF Authenticator strings. The type code of the identifier specifies
the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code and the Binary
Data Sequence value specifies the key.
The inputs to the PIN proof of knowledge functions are:
PIN: string A UDF Authenticator. The type code of the identifier
specifies the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code
and the Binary Data Sequence value specifies the key.
Action: string A code determining the specific action that the PIN
code MAY be used to authenticate. By convention this is the name
of the Mesh message type used to perform the action.
Account: string The account for which the PIN code is issued.
ClientNonce: binary Nonce value generated by the client using the
PIN code to authenticate its message.
PayloadDigest: binary The PayloadDigest of a DARE Envelope that
contains the message to be authenticated. Note that if the
envelope is encrypted, this value is calculated over the
ciphertext and does not provide proof of knowledge of the
plaintext.
The following values of Action are currently defined:
Device Action info for device PIN
Contact Action info for contact PIN
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These inputs are used to derive values as follows:
alg = UdfAlg (PIN)
pinData = UdfBDS (PIN)
saltedPINData = MAC (Action, pinData)
saltedPIN = UDFPresent (HMAC_SHA_2_512 + saltedPINData)
PinId = UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData))
The issuer of the PIN code stores the value saltedPIN for retrieval
using the key PinId.
The witness value for a Dare Envelope with payload digest
PayloadDigest authenticated by a PIN code whose salted value is
saltedPINData, issued by account Account is given by PinWitness() as
follows:
witnessData = Account.ToUTF8() + ClientNonce + PayloadDigest
witnessValue = MAC (witnessData , saltedPINData)
For example, to generate saltedPIN for the pin ADE7-U5DR-2YNJ-XKVX-
4RUE-SVL5-5I used to authenticate a an action of type Device:
pin = ADE7-U5DR-2YNJ-XKVX-4RUE-SVL5-5I
action = message.
alg = UdfAlg (PIN)
= Authenticator_HMAC_SHA_2_512
hashalg = default (alg, HMAC_SHA_2_512)
pinData = UdfBDS (PIN)
= System.Byte[]
saltedPINData
= hashalg(pinData, hashalg);
= System.Byte[]
saltedPIN = UDFPresent (hashalg + saltedPINData)
= ABYY-PTS3-HOUO-E3VH-TOCJ-GFJI-XPHS
The PinId binding the pin to the account alice@example.com is
Account = alice@example.com
PinId = UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData))
= ACMS-5CGG-NMBJ-JOPG-MALJ-ZPSP-GDLS
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Where MAC(data, key) is the message authentication code algorithm
specified by the value of alg.
When an administrative device issues a PIN code, a Message PIN is
appended to the local spool. This has the MessageId PinId and
specifies the value saltedPIN in the field of that name.
When PIN code authentication is used, a message of type
MessagePinValidated specifies the values ClientNonce, PinWitness and
PinId in the fields of those names. These values are used to
authenticate the inner message data specified by the
AuthenticatedData field.
7.4. EARL
The UDF Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locator mechanism is used to
publish data and provide means of authentication and access through a
static identifier such as a QR code.
This mechanism is used to allow contact exchange by means of a QR
code printed on a business card and to connect a device to an account
using a static identifier printed on the device in the form of a QR
code.
In both cases, the information is passed using the EARL format
described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf].
8. Mesh Assertions
Mesh Assertions are signed DARE Envelopes that contain one of more
claims. Mesh Assertions provide the basis for trust in the
Mathematical Mesh.
Mesh Assertions are divided into two classes. Mesh Profiles are
self-signed assertions. Assertions that are not self-signed are
called declarations. The only type of declaration currently defined
is a Connection Declaration describing the connection of a device to
an account.
(Artwork only available as svg: see https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-13.html)
Figure 1: Profiles And Connections
8.1. Encoding
The payload of a Mesh Assertion is a JSON encoded object that is a
subclass of the Assertion class which defines the following fields:
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Identifier An identifier for the assertion.
Updated The date and time at which the assertion was issued or last
updated
NotaryToken An assertion may optionally contain one or more notary
tokens issued by a Mesh Notary service. These establish a proof
that the assertion was signed after the date the notary token was
created.
Conditions A list of conditions that MAY be used to verify the
status of the assertion if the relying party requires.
The implementation of the NotaryToken and Conditions mechanisms is to
be specified in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-callsign] at a future date.
Note that the implementation of Conditions differs significantly from
that of SAML. Relying parties are required to process condition
clauses in a SAML assertion to determine validity. Mesh Relying
parties MAY verify the conditions clauses or rely on the
trustworthiness of the provider.
The reason for weakening the processing of conditions clauses in the
Mesh is that it is only ever possible to validate a conditions clause
of any type relative to a ground truth. In SAML applications, the
relying party almost invariably has access to an independent source
of ground truth. A Mesh device connected to a Mesh Service does not.
Thus the types of verification that can be achieved in practice are
limited to verifying the consistency of current and previous
statements from the Mesh Service.
8.2. Mesh Profiles
Mesh Profiles perform a similar role to X.509v3 certificates but with
important differences:
* Profiles describe credentials, they do not make identity
statements
* Profiles do not expire, there is therefore no need to support
renewal processing.
* Profiles may be modified over time, the current and past status of
a profile being recorded in an append only log.
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Profiles provide the axioms of trust for the Mesh PKI. Unlike in the
PKIX model in which all trust flows from axioms of trust held by a
small number of Certificate Authorities, every part in the Mesh
contributes their own axiom of trust.
It should be noted however that the role of Certificate Authorities
is redefined rather than eliminated. Rather than making assertions
whose subject is represented by identities which are inherently
mutable and subjective, Certificate Authorities can now make
assertions about immutable cryptographic keys.
Every Profile MUST contain a SignatureKey field and MUST be signed by
the key specified in that field.
A Profile is valid if and only if:
* There is a SignatureKey field.
* The profile is signed under the key specified in the SignatureKey
field.
A profile has the status current if and only if:
* The Profile is valid
* Every Conditions clause in the profile is understood by the
relying party and evaluates to true.
8.3. Mesh Connections
A Mesh connection is an assertion describing the connection of a
device or a member to an account.
Mesh connections provide similar functionality to 'end-entity'
certificates in PKIX but with the important proviso that they are
only used to provide trust between a device connected to an account
and the service to which that account is bound and between the
devices connected to an account.
A connection is valid with respect to an account with profile _P_ if
and only if:
* The profile _P_ is valid
* The AuthorityUdf field of the connection is consistent with the
UDF of _P_
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* The profile is signed under the key specified in the
AdministrationKey field of _P_.
* Any conditions specified in the profile are met
A connection has the status current with respect to an account with
profile if and only if:
* The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
_P_.
* The profile P is current.
A device is authenticated with respect to an account with profile P
if and only if:
* The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
_P_.
* The device has presented an appropriate proof of knowledge of the
DeviceAuthentication key specified in the connection.
8.4. Device Pre-configuration
The DevicePreconfiguration record provides a means of bundling all
the information used to preconfigure a device for use in the Mesh.
This comprises:
* The Enveloped ProfileDevice.
* A ConnectionDevice assertion credentialing the device to the
configuration provider Mesh Service.
* A ConnectionService assertion credentialing the device to the
configuration provider Mesh Service.
* The secret seed used to create the ProfileDevice data.
The DevicePreconfiguration record MAY be used as the means of
preconfiguring devices to allow connection to a user's account
profile using the Preconfigured/Static QR Code device connection
interaction.
For example, Alice's coffee pot was preconfigured for connection to a
Mesh account at the factory and the following DevicePreconfiguration
record created:
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{
"DevicePreconfigurationPrivate":{
"EnvelopedConnectionDevice":[{
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW
9uRGV2aWNlIiwKICAiY3R5IjogImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL21tbS9vYmplY3QiLAogICJ
DcmVhdGVkIjogIjIwMjQtMTAtMTRUMTM6MTA6NThaIn0",
"dig":"S512"},
"ewogICJDb25uZWN0aW9uRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIlNpZ25hdHVyZSI6IH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",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"ED448",
"kid":"MD66-B7Q7-HWEB-UAF6-PWNM-YVBH-HXE7",
"signature":"T5q8Ygyj3aM5tDzUmjoFMAVdGasi0PF1SZlgFYCl
3kCT5_NZrd5iuGcJetwaq0bINEJHDjUppQuAdbpe8eZPlJBtTo8EBksurd04sqf1U
NIokTq5HA-eXh45bjPkOGjwZmBBO46LlyQDG_kq-6roUw0A"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"CQupHrY2ASmhF8QOcXCnjid4nC6wlVlUk9cxmIUc
MGC1_YLhJwc7wpE-EfoDCcmkTtRCPmwq1tmdX88VClLkSw"}
],
"EnvelopedConnectionService":[{
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW
9uU2VydmljZSIsCiAgImN0eSI6ICJhcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9tbW0vb2JqZWN0IiwKICA
iQ3JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDI0LTEwLTE0VDEzOjEwOjU4WiJ9",
"dig":"S512"},
"ewogICJDb25uZWN0aW9uU2VydmljZSI6IHsKICAgICJBdXRoZW50aWNhdG
lvbiI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNQkZGLUVTUDMtVk5YWS1EWUhMLTVNSkktVjR
LNy1WN1dOIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1
YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgI
CAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJMd2oxNlE3QmNraWU3ZU9jMG85NXJYbGZ6enhrSDFFTGVCMG
xlLURJdklxemVpeHlocjZhCiAgTjRTSV94Vzh6eGwxSGVSclRKN1lhUy1BIn19fX1
9",
{
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"signatures":[{
"alg":"ED448",
"kid":"MD66-B7Q7-HWEB-UAF6-PWNM-YVBH-HXE7",
"signature":"4FkfmdMX6sWMQ5zskF7V_1UsoBTBKVVQtYigF41m
MGOx1_yTQtpDs1lnqxmBt6yAtjfUvv1NsG2AdYx425rJ5-lryqyud6m-MNoTCUeWW
wuO0jGMpaw2PyjFUFh62_k5fGDzZVgqx-larLbwVf6vFQsA"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"z4aP8rSa_WxiufLZcZmhBbJd-3OCz70GX4gIkH0y
U4LCO8QdoX-4iAbwfwylksQDTtNbKmVfxQam4MCT-2oKZw"}
],
"PrivateKey":{
"PrivateKeyUDF":{
"PrivateValue":"ZAAQ-AUKH-YPXV-5NTI-ZVIK-4Q2D-EFAP-UR7Y-5XX
N-EDXE-HX3O-LYFS-BJOU-CMQE",
"KeyType":"MeshProfileDevice",
"RootSignAlgorithms":["ED448"
]}},
"ConnectUri":"mcd://maker@example.com/EBH3-DT6M-G2WA-EF7E-DA42-
DN55-7E",
"EnvelopedProfileDevice":[{
"EnvelopeId":"MBQK-36BF-K7RS-UDWD-PVC3-CVMR-BJCP",
"ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNQlFLLTM2QkYtSz
dSUy1VRFdELVBWQzMtQ1ZNUi1CSkNQIiwKICAiTWVzc2FnZVR5cGUiOiAiUHJvZml
sZURldmljZSIsCiAgImN0eSI6ICJhcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9tbW0vb2JqZWN0IiwKICAi
Q3JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDI0LTEwLTE0VDEzOjEwOjU4WiJ9",
"dig":"S512"},
"ewogICJQcm9maWxlRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIkVuY3J5cHRpb24iOiB7Ci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",
{
"signatures":[{
"alg":"ED448",
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"kid":"MDLZ-G6AG-ZDDZ-LENU-FRBM-T2PJ-RWTM",
"SignatureKey":{
"PublicKeyECDH":{
"crv":"Ed448",
"Public":"WPX0CBEOzgJWHVJqiyTAr4MrieFJQYzdutZML5-
MnHsfF7KfRmGxsUR9eppBIKTFhzLaRhd06XmA"}},
"signature":"s1AVL-omThJqK3LTFXtg58xvRBZoeansc39u4rqT
iKRHKrCQx-11PG9b0Vq-VC_MRWxbCwZenawAo4fBnNnpNvtbNGUaALlFVvLK5nPZV
O6nY6gA_i3ID9ZrUTxYJz0lbj-ZTIt6NZOGxTJX4yxJiC8A"}
],
"PayloadDigest":"OrZNsRzLz7olETFljSpKbdG1bNjj5MBr-ireuPK6
Sn9-ARWs4E3Xk2_HvrHA7cySavkX6anRBSGzQ5uYty0_Ow"}
]}}
The use of the publication mechanism in device connection is
discussed further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
9. Architecture
The Mesh architecture has four principal components:
Mesh Account A collection of information (contacts, calendar
entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) belonging to a user
who uses the Mesh to management.
Mesh Device Management The various functions that manage binding of
devices to a Mesh to grant access to information and services
bound to that account.
Mesh Service Provides network services through which devices and
other Mesh users may interact with a Mesh Account.
Mesh Messaging An end-to-end secure messaging service that allows
short messages (less than 32KB) to be exchanged between Mesh
Accounts and between the Mesh devices connected to a particular
account.
The separation of accounts and services as separate components is a
key distinction between the Mesh and earlier Internet applications.
A Mesh account belongs to the owner of the Mesh and not the Mesh
Service Provider which the user may change at any time of their
choosing.
A Mesh Account May be active or inactive. By definition, an active
Mesh account is serviced by exactly one Mesh Service, an inactive
Mesh account is not serviced by a Mesh Service. A Mesh Service
Provider MAY offer a backup service for accounts hosted by other
providers. In this case the backup provider is connected to the
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account as a Mesh device, thus allowing the backup provider to
maintain a copy of the stores contained in the account and
facilitating a rapid transfer of responsibility for servicing the
account should that be desired. The use of backup providers is
described further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery].
9.1. Mesh Account
Mesh Accounts contains all the stateful information (contacts,
calendar entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) related to a
particular persona used by the owner.
By definition a Mesh Account is active if it is serviced by a Mesh
Service and inactive otherwise. A Mesh user MAY change their service
provider at any time. An active Mesh Account is serviced by exactly
one Mesh Service at once but a user MAY register a 'backup' service
provider to their account in the same manner as adding an advice.
This ensures that the backup service is pre-populated with all the
information required to allow the user to switch to the new provider
without interruption of service.
Each Mesh account is described by an Account Profile. Currently
separate profile Account Profile are defined for user accounts and
group accounts. It is not clear if this distinction is a useful one.
9.1.1. Account Profile
A Mesh account profile provides the axiom of trust for a mesh user.
It contains a Master Signature Key and one or more Administration
Signature Keys. The unique identifier of the master profile is the
UDF of the Master Signature Key.
An Account Profile MUST specify an EscrowEncryption key. This key
MAY be used to escrow private keys used for encryption of stored
data. They SHOULD NOT be used to escrow authentication keys and MUST
NOT be used to escrow signature keys.
A user should not need to replace their account profile unless they
intend to establish a separate identity. To minimize the risk of
disclosure, the Profile Signature Key is only ever used to sign
updates to the account profile itself. This allows the user to
secure their Profile Signature Key by either keeping it on hardware
token or device dedicated to that purpose or by using the escrow
mechanism and paper recovery keys as described in this document.
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9.1.1.1. Creating a ProfileMaster
Creating a ProfileMaster comprises the steps of:
0. Creating a Master Signature key.
1. Creating an Online Signing Key
2. Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key
3. Persisting the ProfileMaster on the administration device to the
CatalogHost.
4. (Optional) Connecting at least one Administration Device and
granting it the ActivationAdministration activation.
9.1.1.2. Updating a ProfileMaster
Updating a ProfileMaster comprises the steps of:
0. Making the necessary changes.
1. Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key
2. Persisting the ProfileMaster on the administration device to the
CatalogHost.
9.2. Device Management
Device management allows a collection of devices belonging to a user
to function as a single personal Mesh. Two catalogs are used to
manage this process:
* The Access catalog is used to instruct the Mesh Service how to
respond to requests from the device.
* The Device catalog records information for use by administration
devices managing the device.
9.2.1. The Device Catalog
Each Mesh Account has a Device Catalog CatalogDevice associated with
it. The Device Catalog is used to manage the connection of devices
to the Personal Mesh and has a CatalogEntryDevice for each device
currently connected to the catalog.
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Each Administration Device MUST have access to an up-to-date copy of
the Device Catalog in order to manage the devices connected to the
Mesh. The Mesh Service protocol MAY be used to synchronize the
Device Catalog between administration devices in the case that there
is more than one administration device.
The CatalogEntryDevice contains fields for the device profile, device
private and device connection.
9.2.2. Mesh Devices
The principle of radical distrust requires us to consider the
possibility that a device might be compromised during manufacture.
Once consequence of this possibility is that when an administration
device connects a new device to a user's personal Mesh, we cannot put
our full trust in either the device being connected or the
administration device connecting it.
This concern is resolved by (at minimum) combining keying material
generated from both sources to create the keys to be used in the
context of the user's personal Mesh with the process being fully
verified by both parties.
Additional keying material sources could be added if protection
against the possibility of compromise at both devices was required
but this is not supported by the current specifications.
A device profile provides the axiom of trust and the key
contributions of the device. When bound to an account, the base keys
specified in the Device Profile are combined with the key data
provided in the Activation device to construct the keys the device
will use in the context of the account.
(Artwork only available as svg: see https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-13.html)
Figure 2: Mapping of Device Profile and Device Private to Device
Connection Keys.
Unless exceptional circumstances require, a device should not require
more than one Device profile even if the device supports use by
multiple users under different accounts. But a device MAY have
multiple profiles if this approach is more convenient for
implementation.
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9.2.2.1. Creating a ProfileDevice
Creating a ProfileDevice comprises the steps of:
0. Creating the necessary key
1. Signing the ProfileDevice using the Master Signature Key
2. Once created, a ProfileDevice is never changed. In the unlikely
event that any modification is required, a completely new
ProfileDevice MUST be created.
9.2.2.2. Connection to a Meh Account
Devices are only connected to a personal Mesh by an administration
device. This comprises the steps of:
0. Generating the PrivateDevice keys.
1. Creating the ConnectionDevice data from the public components of
the ProfileDevice and PrivateDevice keys and signing it using the
administration key.
2. Creating the Activations for the device and signing them using
the administration key.
3. Creating the CatalogEntryDevice for the device and adding it to
the CatalogDevice of the account.
4. Creating an AccessCapability granting the necessary access rights
for the device and adding that to the CatalogAccess of the
account.
These steps are usually performed through use of the Mesh Protocol
Connection mechanism. However, Mesh clients MAY support additional
mechanisms as circumstances require provided that the appropriate
authentication and private key protection controls are provided.
9.3. Mesh Services
A Mesh Service provides one or more Mesh Hosts that support Mesh
Accounts through the Mesh Web Service Protocol.
Mesh Services and Hosts are described by Service Profiles and Host
Profiles. The means by which services manage the hosts through which
they provide service is outside the scope of this document.
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As with a Device connected to a Mesh Account, a the binding of a Host
to the service it supports is described by a connection record:
(Artwork only available as svg: see https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-13.html)
Figure 3: Service Profile and Delegated Host Assertion.
The credentials provided by the ProfileService and ProfileHost are
distinct from those provided by the WebPKI that typically services
TLS requests. WebPKI credentials provide service introduction and
authentication while a Mesh ProfileHost only provides authentication.
Unless exceptional circumstances require, a service should not need
to revise its Service Profile unless it is intended to change its
identity. Service Profiles MAY be countersigned by Trusted Third
Parties to establish accountability.
9.4. Mesh Messaging
Mesh Messaging is an end-to-end secure messaging system used to
exchange short (32KB) messages between Mesh devices and services. In
cases where exchange of longer messages is required, Mesh Messaging
MAY be used to provide a control plane to advise the intended message
recipient(s) of the type of data being offered and the means of
retrieval (e.g an EARL).
All communications between Mesh accounts takes the form of a Mesh
Message carried in a Dare Envelope. Mesh Messages are stored in two
spools associated with the account, the SpoolOutbound and the
SpoolInbound containing the messages sent and received respectively.
This document only describes the representation of the messages
within the message spool. The Mesh Service protocol by which the
messages are exchanged between devices and services and between
services is described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
9.4.1. Message Status
As previously described in section ###, every message stored in a
spool has a specified state. The range of allowable states is
defined by the message type. New message states MAY be defined for
new message types as they are defined.
By default, messages are appended to a spool in the Initial state,
but a spool entry MAY specify any state that is valid for that
message type.
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The state of a message is changed by appending a completion message
to the spool as described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].
Services MAY erase or redact messages in accordance with local site
policy. Since messages are not removed from the spool on being
marked deleted, they may be undeleted by marking them as read or
unread. Marking a message deleted MAY make it more likely that the
message will be removed if the sequence is subsequently purged.
9.4.2. Four Corner Model
A four-corner messaging model is enforced. Mesh Services only accept
outbound messages from devices connected to accounts that it
services. Inbound messages are only accepted from other Mesh
Services. This model enables access control at both the outbound and
inbound services
(Artwork only available as svg: see https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-13.html)
Figure 4: Four Corner Messaging Model
The outbound Mesh Service checks to see that the request to send a
message does not violate its acceptable use policy. Accounts that
make a large number of message requests that result in complaints
SHOULD be subject to consequences ranging from restriction of the
number and type of messages sent to suspending or terminating
messaging privileges. Services that fail to implement appropriate
controls are likely to be subject to sanctions from either their
users or from other services.
(Artwork only available as svg: see https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-13.html)
Figure 5: Performing Access Control on Outbound Messages
The inbound Mesh Service also checks to see that messages received
are consistent with the service Acceptable Use Policy and the user's
personal access control settings.
Mesh Services that fail to police abuse by their account holders
SHOULD be subject to consequences in the same fashion as account
holders.
(Artwork only available as svg: see https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-13.html)
Figure 6: Performing Access Control on Inbound Messages
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9.4.3. Traffic Analysis
The Mesh Messaging protocol as currently specified provides only
limited protection against traffic analysis attacks. The use of TLS
to encrypt communication between Mesh Services limits the
effectiveness of na?ve traffic analysis mechanisms but does not
prevent timing attacks unless dummy traffic is introduced to
obfuscate traffic flows.
The limitation of the message size is in part intended to facilitate
use of mechanisms capable of providing high levels of traffic
analysis such as mixmaster and onion routing but the current Mesh
Service Protocol does not provide support for such approaches and
there are no immediate plans to do so.
10. Publications
Static QR codes MAY be used to allow contact exchange or device
connection. In either case, the QR code contains an EARL providing
the means of locating, decrypting and authenticating the published
data.
The use of EARLs as a means of publishing encrypted data and the use
of EARLs for location, decryption and authentication is discussed in
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare] .
10.1. Profile Device
10.2. Contact Exchange
When used for contact exchange, the envelope payload is a
CatalogedContact record.
Besides allowing for exchange of contact information on a business
card, a user might have their contact information printed on personal
property to facilitate return of lost property.
11. Schema
11.1. Shared Classes
The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile
specifications.
11.1.1. Classes describing keys
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11.1.2. Structure: KeyData
The KeyData class is used to describe public key pairs and trust
assertions associated with a public key.
Udf: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters
X509Certificate: Binary (Optional) List of X.509 Certificates
X509Chain: Binary [0..Many] X.509 Certificate chain.
X509CSR: Binary (Optional) X.509 Certificate Signing Request.
NotBefore: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time instant
that use of the private key is not valid before.
NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time
instant that use of the private key is not valid on or after.
11.1.3. Structure: KeyShare
Inherits: Key
ServiceId: String (Optional) The identifier used to claim the
capability from the service.[Only present for a partial key.]
ServiceAddress: String (Optional) The service account that supports
a serviced capability. [Only present for a partial key.]
11.1.4. Structure: CompositePrivate
Inherits: Key
DeviceKeyUdf: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the bound device
key (if used).
11.2. Assertion classes
Classes that are derived from an assertion.
11.2.1. Structure: Assertion
Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived
Names: String [0..Many] Fingerprints of index terms for profile
retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the
name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other
forms of abuse.
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Updated: DateTime (Optional) The time instant the profile was last
modified.
NotaryToken: String (Optional) A Uniform Notary Token providing
evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was
created.
11.2.2. Structure: Condition
Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.
[No fields]
11.2.3. Base Classes
Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection
classes are derrived.
11.2.4. Structure: Activation
Inherits: Assertion
Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application
running on a specific device
ActivationKey: String (Optional) Secret seed used to derive keys
that are not explicitly specified.
Entries: ActivationEntry [0..Many] Activation of named account
resource activations. These are separate from Application
activations which are
11.2.5. Structure: ActivationEntry
Resource: String (Optional) Name of the activated resource
Key: KeyData (Optional) The activation key or key share
ServiceId: String (Optional) The identifier used to claim the
capability from the service.[Only present for a partial
capability.]
ServiceAddress: String (Optional) The service account that supports
a serviced capability. [Only present for a partial capability.]
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11.2.6. Mesh Profile Classes
Classes describing Mesh Profiles. All Profiles are Assertions
derrived from Assertion.
11.2.7. Structure: Profile
Inherits: Assertion
Parent class from which all profile classes are derived
Description: String (Optional) Description of the profile
RootUdfs: Binary [0..Many] A list of binary UDF fingerprints of
accepted root signature keys for the profile. The profile
finderprint is calculated over the concatenation of the
fingerprint URIs.
11.2.8. Structure: ProfileDevice
Inherits: Profile
Describes a mesh device.
Encryption: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for encryption
keys. Also used to decrypt activation data sent to the device
during connection to an account.
Signature: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for signature
keys.
Authentication: KeyData (Optional) Base key contribution for
authentication keys. Also used to authenticate the device during
connection to an account.
11.2.9. Structure: ProfileAccount
Base class for the account profiles ProfileUser and ProfileGroup.
These subclasses may be merged at some future date.
Inherits: Profile
AccountAddress: String (Optional) The account address. This is
either a DNS service address (e.g. alice@example.com) or a Mesh
Name (@alice).
ServiceUdf: String (Optional) The fingerprint of the service profile
to which the account is currently bound.
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EscrowEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Escrow key associated with the
account.
AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign
connection assertions to the account.
CommonEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key currently used to encrypt
data under this profile
CommonAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
requests made under this user account. This key SHOULD NOT be
provisioned to any device except for the purpose of enabling
account recovery.
11.2.10. Structure: ProfileUser
Inherits: ProfileAccount
Account assertion. This is signed by the service hosting the
account.
CommonSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign data under the
account.
11.2.11. Structure: ProfileGroup
Inherits: ProfileAccount
Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person
who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to
other administrators over time.
Cover: Binary (Optional) HTML document containing cover text to be
presented if a document encrypted under the group key cannot be
decrypted.
11.2.12. Structure: ProfileService
Inherits: Profile
Profile of a Mesh Service
ServiceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
service connections.
ServiceEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to encrypt data under
this profile
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ServiceSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to sign data under the
account.
11.2.13. Structure: ProfileMeshService
Inherits: ProfileService
Profile of a Mesh Service
[No fields]
11.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost
Inherits: ProfileDevice
Profile of a Mesh Host providing one or more Mesh Services.
[No fields]
11.2.15. Connection Assertions
Connection assertions are used to authenticate and authorize
interactions between devices and the service currently servicing the
account. They SHOULD NOT be visible to external parties.
11.2.16. Structure: Connection
Inherits: Assertion
Subject: String (Optional) UDF of the connection target.
Authority: String (Optional) UDF of the connection source.
Authentication: KeyData (Optional) The authentication key for use of
the device under the profile
11.2.17. Structure: CallsignBinding
Inherits: Assertion
Canonical: String (Optional) The canonical form of the callsign.
Display: String (Optional) The display form of the callsign. This
MAY include characters such as whitespace, trademark signifiers,
etc. that are omitted of trranslated in the canonical form.
CharacterPage: String (Optional) Specifies the page to which the
Description"CharacterPageLatin"
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ProfileUdf: String (Optional) The profile to which the name is
bound.
TransferUdf: String (Optional) The profile to which the name has
been transfered.
Services: NamedService [0..Many] List of named services. If
multiple service providers are specified for a given service,
these are listed in order of priority, most preferred first.
ServiceAddress: String (Optional) The Mesh service address.
CommonEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key currently used to encrypt
data under this profile
11.2.18. Structure: Accreditation
Registration of a trusted third party accreditation of a callsign/
profile binding.
Callsign: String (Optional) The callsign to which the accreditation
applies
ProfileUdf: String (Optional) The profile to which the accreditation
applies.
SubjectNames: String [0..Many] The validated names of the subject
SubjectLogos: String [0..Many] Mesh strong URIs from which a
validated logo belonging to the subject MAY be retreived and
validated.
Issued: DateTime (Optional) The time the assertion was issued.
Expires: DateTime (Optional) The time the assertion is due to expire
Policy: String (Optional) The issuing policy under which the
validation was performed.
Practice: String (Optional) The issuing practices under which the
validation was performed.
11.2.19. Structure: ConnectionStripped
Asserts that a profile is connected to an account address.
Inherits: Connection
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Stripped down connection assertion
Account: String (Optional) To be removed
11.2.20. Structure: ConnectionService
Inherits: Connection
Asserts that a device is connected to an account profile
ProfileUdf: String (Optional) The account address
11.2.21. Structure: ConnectionDevice
Inherits: ConnectionService
Asserts that a device is connected to an account profile
Roles: String [0..Many]
Signature: KeyData (Optional) The signature key for use of the
device under the profile
Encryption: KeyData (Optional) The encryption key for use of the
device under the profile
11.2.22. Structure: ConnectionApplication
Inherits: Connection
Connection assertion stating that a particular device is
[No fields]
11.2.23. Structure: ConnectionGroup
Describes the connection of a member to a group.
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
11.2.24. Structure: AccountHostAssignment
Inherits: Assertion
AccountAddess: String (Optional) The account being bound
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HostAddresses: String [0..Many] Host address in Callsign, DNS or IP
format in order of preference.
AccessEncrypt: KeyData (Optional) Encryption key to be used to
encrypt data for the service to use.
CallsignServiceProfile: ProfileAccount (Optional) Profile of the
callsign registry used by the service.
EnvelopedProfileService: Enveloped (Optional) Profile of the
service.
11.2.25. Structure: ConnectionHost
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
11.2.26. Activation Assertions
11.2.27. Structure: ActivationAccount
Contains activation data for device specific keys used in the context
of a Mesh account.
Inherits: Activation
AccountUdf: String (Optional) The UDF of the account
11.2.28. Structure: ActivationHost
Contains activation data for device specific keys used in the context
of a Mesh host
Inherits: ActivationAccount
[No fields]
11.2.29. Structure: ActivationCommon
Inherits: Activation
ProfileSignatures: KeyData [0..Many] Grant access to profile online
signing key used to sign updates to the profile.
AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to Profile
administration key used to make changes to administrator catalogs.
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Encryption: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser account
encryption key
Authentication: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser
account authentication key
Signature: KeyData (Optional) Grant access to ProfileUser account
signature key
11.2.30. Structure: ActivationApplication
Inherits: Activation
[No fields]
11.2.31. Structure: ActivationApplicationSsh
Inherits: ActivationApplication
ClientKey: KeyData (Optional) The SSH client key.
11.2.32. Structure: ActivationApplicationMail
Inherits: ActivationApplication
SmimeSign: KeyData (Optional) The S/Mime signature key
SmimeEncrypt: KeyData (Optional) The S/Mime encryption key
OpenpgpSign: KeyData (Optional) The OpenPGP signature key
OpenpgpEncrypt: KeyData (Optional) The OpenPGP encryption key
11.2.33. Structure: ActivationApplicationGroup
Inherits: ActivationApplication
AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key or capability allowing
account encryption keys to be created for new members.
AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key or capability
allowing account updates, connection assertions etc to be signed.
AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key or capability allowing
administration of the group.
EnvelopedConnectionService: Enveloped (Optional) Signed connection
service delegation allowing the device to access the account.
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11.3. Application Data
11.3.1. Structure: ApplicationEntry
Identifier: String (Optional)
11.3.2. Structure: ApplicationEntrySsh
Inherits: ApplicationEntry
EnvelopedActivation: Enveloped (Optional)
11.3.3. Structure: ApplicationEntryGroup
Inherits: ApplicationEntry
EnvelopedActivation: Enveloped (Optional)
11.3.4. Structure: ApplicationEntryMail
Inherits: ApplicationEntry
EnvelopedActivation: Enveloped (Optional)
11.4. Data Structures
Classes describing data used in cataloged data.
11.4.1. Structure: Contact
Inherits: Assertion
Base class for contact entries.
Id: String (Optional) The globally unique contact identifier.
Local: String (Optional) The local name.
Anchors: Anchor [0..Many] Mesh fingerprints associated with the
contact.
Locations: Location [0..Many] The physical locations the contact is
associated with.
Roles: Role [0..Many] The roles of the contact
Bookmark: Bookmark [0..Many] The Web sites and other online
presences of the contact
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Sources: TaggedSource [0..Many] Source(s) from which this contact
was constructed.
11.4.2. Structure: Anchor
Trust anchor
Udf: String (Optional) The trust anchor.
Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation.
11.4.3. Structure: TaggedSource
Source from which contact information was obtained.
LocalName: String (Optional) Short name for the contact information.
Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation.
BinarySource: Binary (Optional) The contact data in binary form.
EnvelopedSource: Enveloped (Optional) The contact data in enveloped
form. If present, the BinarySource property is ignored.
11.4.4. Structure: ContactGroup
Inherits: Contact
Contact for a group, including encryption groups.
[No fields]
11.4.5. Structure: ContactPerson
Inherits: Contact
CommonNames: PersonName [0..Many] List of person names in order of
preference
11.4.6. Structure: ContactOrganization
Inherits: Contact
CommonNames: OrganizationName [0..Many] List of person names in
order of preference
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11.4.7. Structure: OrganizationName
The name of an organization
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
RegisteredName: String (Optional) The registered name.
DBA: String (Optional) Names that the organization uses including
trading names and doing business as names.
11.4.8. Structure: PersonName
The name of a natural person
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
FullName: String (Optional) The preferred presentation of the full
name.
Prefix: String (Optional) Honorific or title, E.g. Sir, Lord, Dr.,
Mr.
First: String (Optional) First name.
Middle: String [0..Many] Middle names or initials.
Last: String (Optional) Last name.
Suffix: String (Optional) Nominal suffix, e.g. Jr., III, etc.
PostNominal: String (Optional) Post nominal letters (if used).
11.4.9. Structure: NetworkAddress
Provides all means of contacting the individual according to a
particular network address
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
Address: String (Optional) The network address, e.g.
alice@example.com
Protocol: String (Optional) The IANA protocol|identifier of the
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network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the
specified Address.
11.4.10. Structure: NetworkCredential
Inherits: NetworkAddress
Type: String (Optional) The IANA credential type
Credential: Binary (Optional) The credential
11.4.11. Structure: NetworkProfile
Inherits: NetworkAddress
EnvelopedProfileAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The account profile
11.4.12. Structure: NetworkCapability
Inherits: NetworkProfile
[No fields]
11.4.13. Structure: NetworkProtocol
Protocol: String (Optional) The IANA protocol|identifier of the
network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the
specified Address.
11.4.14. Structure: Role
OrganizationName: String (Optional) The organization at which the
role is held
Titles: String [0..Many] The titles held with respect to that
organization.
Locations: Location [0..Many] Postal or physical addresses
associated with the role.
11.4.15. Structure: Location
Appartment: String (Optional)
Street: String (Optional)
District: String (Optional)
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Locality: String (Optional)
County: String (Optional)
Postcode: String (Optional)
Country: String (Optional)
11.4.16. Structure: Bookmark
Uri: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Role: String [0..Many]
11.4.17. Structure: Reference
MessageId: String (Optional) The received message to which this is a
response
ResponseId: String (Optional) Message that was generated in response
to the original (optional).
Relationship: String (Optional) The relationship type. This can be
Read, Unread, Accept, Reject.
11.4.18. Structure: Engagement
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Start: DateTime (Optional)
Finish: DateTime (Optional)
StartTravel: String (Optional)
FinishTravel: String (Optional)
TimeZone: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Description: String (Optional)
Location: String (Optional)
Trigger: String [0..Many]
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Conference: String [0..Many]
Repeat: String (Optional)
Busy: Boolean (Optional)
11.4.19. Structure: WorkTask
Inherits: Engagement
Dependency: String [0..Many]
11.5. Catalog Entries
11.5.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry
Base class for cataloged Mesh data.
Uid: String (Optional) Globaly unique identifier
LocalName: String (Optional) User specified identifier.
Path: String (Optional) The set of labels describing the entry
Description: String (Optional) Description
11.5.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Public device entry, indexed under the device ID Hello
Updated: DateTime (Optional) Timestamp, allows
Udf: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device in the
Mesh
Platform: String (Optional) Device Platform
DeviceUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the offline signature key of the
device
SignatureUdf: String (Optional) UDF of the account online signature
key
EnvelopedProfileUser: Enveloped (Optional) The Mesh profile. Why is
this still here? This is not specific to the device.
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EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device profile
DeviceDescription: DeviceDescription (Optional) Description of the
device
EnvelopedConnectionService: Enveloped (Optional) Slim version of
ConnectionDevice used by the presentation layer
EnvelopedConnectionDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The public assertion
demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh
EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of
the device within the Mesh account
EnvelopedActivationCommon: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of
the device within the Mesh account
11.5.3. Structure: DeviceDescription
Idiom: String (Optional) The device form factor, valid values are
Desktop, Phone, Tablet, TV, Watch
Manufacturer: String (Optional) Manufacturer name
Model: String (Optional) Manufacturer defined model
Name: String (Optional) Name of the device as specified by the user
Platform: String (Optional) The device platform or operating system:
Android / iOS / macOS / Tizen / watchOS / Windows
Version: String (Optional) Platform version in format
Major.Minor.Build.Revision
ImageLocator: String (Optional) EARL specifying an image of the
device.
11.5.4. Structure: CatalogedSignature
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Cataloged Signature
[No fields]
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11.5.5. Structure: CatalogedDocument
A document stored on a service somewhere.
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Udf: String (Optional) Document fingerprint.
Filename: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Version: String (Optional)
URI: String (Optional) Locator to be used to retrieve the data.
ContentType: String (Optional) IANA content type of the encoded
content.
Encoding: String (Optional) Content encoding, typically DARE
envelope.
Created: DateTime (Optional)
Updated: DateTime (Optional)
Length: Integer (Optional) Encoded document length in bytes.
11.5.6. Structure: CatalogedPublication
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
A publication.
Id: String (Optional) Unique identifier code
Authenticator: String (Optional) The witness key value to use to
request access to the record.
EnvelopedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Dare Envelope containing the
entry data. The data type is specified by the envelope metadata.
NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) Epiration time (inclusive)
11.5.7. Structure: CatalogedCredential
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
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Protocol: String (Optional)
Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
ClientAuthentication: KeyData [0..Many] Specifies the client
identification key
HostAuthentication: KeyData [0..Many] Means of authenticating the
host key
11.5.8. Structure: CatalogedNetwork
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Protocol: String (Optional)
Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
11.5.9. Structure: CatalogedContact
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Self: Boolean (Optional) If true, this catalog entry is for the user
who created the catalog.
11.5.10. Structure: CatalogedAccess
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
[No fields]
11.5.11. Structure: Capability
Id: String (Optional) The identifier of the capability. If this is
a cryptographic capability, this is the KeyIdentifier of the
primary key that was shared. If this is an access capability,
this is the KeyIdentifier of the authentication key being
authorized for access.
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Active: Boolean (Optional)
Issued: Integer (Optional)
Mode: String (Optional) The authentication mode: Device, Account,
PIN
Udf: String (Optional) Identifies the authentication credential.
For a device, this is the authentication key identifier, for an
account, the profile identifier, for a PIN, the locator value of
the PIN.
Witness: String (Optional) The verification value used to perform
proof of knowledge of the secret.
11.5.12. Structure: NullCapability
Inherits: Capability
[No fields]
11.5.13. Structure: AccessCapability
Inherits: Capability
Rights: String [0..Many] Access rights associated with the key
EnvelopedCatalogedDevice: Enveloped (Optional)
CatalogedDeviceDigest: String (Optional) Digest value used to signal
updates to envelope
11.5.14. Structure: PublicationCapability
Inherits: Capability
Identifier: String (Optional) Selector allowing a specific document
to be requested.
Digest: String (Optional) Document digest, this allows a status/
claim request to request an update to be returned only if the
document has changed.
Data: Binary (Optional) The published document.
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11.5.15. Structure: CryptographicCapability
Inherits: Capability
KeyData: KeyData (Optional) The key that enables the capability
GranteeAccount: String (Optional)
GranteeUdf: String (Optional)
EnvelopedKeyShare: Enveloped (Optional) One or more enveloped key
shares.
11.5.16. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a decryption key
[No fields]
11.5.17. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial
Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt
The corresponding key is an encryption key
[No fields]
11.5.18. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced
Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt
The corresponding key is an encryption key
AuthenticationId: String (Optional) UDF of trust root under which
request to use a serviced capability must be authorized. [Only
present for a serviced capability]
11.5.19. Structure: CapabilitySign
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is an administration key
[No fields]
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11.5.20. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a key that may be used to generate key
shares.
[No fields]
11.5.21. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a decryption key to be used in accordance
with the Micali Fair Electronic Exchange with Invisible Trusted
Parties protocol.
[No fields]
11.5.22. Structure: NamedService
Prefix: String (Optional) The IANA service name (e.g. dns)
Mapping: String (Optional) Optional name mapping, (e.g.
alice@example.com -> alice.mesh)
Endpoints: String [0..Many] The service endpoints. This MAY be
specified as a callsign (@alice), a DNS address (example.com), an
IP address (10.0.0.1) or a fully qualified URI.
11.5.23. Structure: ServiceAccessToken
Inherits: NamedService
Token: Binary (Optional) Session initiation token
SharedSecret: Binary (Optional) Session shared secret
11.5.24. Structure: CatalogedBookmark
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Uri: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Comments: String [0..Many] User comments on bookmark entry
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11.5.25. Structure: CatalogedTask
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Title: String (Optional)
EnvelopedTask: Enveloped (Optional)
11.5.26. Structure: CatalogedApplication
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Default: Integer (Optional)
Key: String (Optional)
Grant: String [0..Many]
Deny: String [0..Many]
EnvelopedCapabilities: DareEnvelope [0..Many] Enveloped keys for use
with Application
EnvelopedEscrow: Enveloped [0..Many] Escrow entries for the
application.
11.5.27. Structure: CatalogedMember
ContactAddress: String (Optional)
MemberCapabilityId: String (Optional)
ServiceCapabilityId: String (Optional)
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
11.5.28. Structure: CatalogedGroup
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
EnvelopedConnectionAddress: Enveloped (Optional) The connection
allowing control of the group.
EnvelopedProfileGroup: Enveloped (Optional) The Mesh profile
EnvelopedActivationCommon: Enveloped (Optional) The activation of
the device within the Mesh account
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11.5.29. Structure: CatalogedFeed
Inherits: CatalogedBookmark
Protocol: String (Optional)
11.5.30. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
AccountAddress: String (Optional)
InboundConnect: String (Optional)
OutboundConnect: String (Optional)
SmimeSign: KeyData (Optional) The S/Mime signature key
SmimeEncrypt: KeyData (Optional) The S/Mime encryption key
OpenpgpSign: KeyData (Optional) The OpenPGP signature key
OpenpgpEncrypt: KeyData (Optional) The OpenPGP encryption key
11.5.31. Structure: CatalogedApplicationPkix
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
11.5.32. Structure: CatalogedApplicationOpenPgp
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
11.5.33. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSsh
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
ClientKey: KeyData (Optional) The S/Mime encryption key
11.5.34. Structure: CatalogedApplicationGit
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
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11.5.35. Structure: CatalogedApplicationDeveloper
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
11.5.36. Structure: MessageInvoice
Inherits: Message
[No fields]
11.5.37. Structure: CatalogedReceipt
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
[No fields]
11.5.38. Structure: CatalogedTicket
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
[No fields]
11.6. Publications
11.6.1. Structure: DevicePreconfigurationPublic
EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device profile
Hailing: String [0..Many] A list of URIs specifying hailing
transports that may be used to initiate a connection to the
device. This allows a device to specify that it can be reached by
WiFi transport to a particular private SSID, or by Bluetooth, IR
etc. etc.
11.6.2. Structure: DevicePreconfigurationPrivate
Inherits: DevicePreconfigurationPublic
A data structure that is passed
EnvelopedConnectionDevice: Enveloped (Optional) The device
connection
EnvelopedConnectionService: Enveloped (Optional) The device
connection
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ConnectUri: String (Optional) The connection URI. This would
normally be printed on the device as a QR code.
11.7. Messages
11.7.1. Structure: Message
MessageId: String (Optional) Unique per-message ID. When
encapsulating a Mesh Message in a DARE envelope, the envelope
EnvelopeID field MUST be a UDF fingerprint of the MessageId value.
Sender: String (Optional)
Recipient: String (Optional)
11.7.2. Structure: MessageError
Inherits: Message
ErrorCode: String (Optional)
11.7.3. Structure: MessageComplete
Inherits: Message
References: Reference [0..Many]
11.7.4. Structure: MessageValidated
Inherits: Message
AuthenticatedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Enveloped data that is
authenticated by means of the PIN
ClientNonce: Binary (Optional) Nonce provided by the client to
validate the PIN
PinId: String (Optional) Pin identifier value calculated from the
PIN code, action and account address.
PinWitness: Binary (Optional) Witness value calculated as KDF
(Device.Udf + AccountAddress, ClientNonce)
11.7.5. Structure: MessagePin
Account: String (Optional)
Inherits: Message
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Expires: DateTime (Optional)
Automatic: Boolean (Optional) If true, authentication against the
PIN code is sufficient to complete the associated action without
further authorization.
SaltedPin: String (Optional) PIN code bound to the specified action.
Action: String (Optional) The action to which this PIN code is
bound.
Roles: String [0..Many] The set of rights bound to the PIN grant.
11.7.6. Structure: RequestConnection
Connection request message. This message contains the information
Inherits: MessageValidated
AccountAddress: String (Optional)
11.7.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection
Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a
valid MessageConnectionRequestClient
Inherits: Message
EnvelopedRequestConnection: Enveloped (Optional) The client
connection request.
ServerNonce: Binary (Optional)
Witness: String (Optional)
11.7.8. Structure: RespondConnection
Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the
connection request.
Inherits: Message
Result: String (Optional) The response to the request. One of
"Accept", "Reject" or "Pending".
CatalogedDevice: CatalogedDevice (Optional) The device information.
MUST be present if the value of Result is "Accept". MUST be
absent or null otherwise.
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11.7.9. Structure: MessageContact
Inherits: MessageValidated
Reply: Boolean (Optional) If true, requests that the recipient
return their own contact information in reply.
Subject: String (Optional) Optional explanation of the reason for
the request.
PIN: String (Optional) One time authentication code supplied to a
recipient to allow authentication of the response.
11.7.10. Structure: GroupInvitation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
11.7.11. Structure: MessageMail
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
11.7.12. Structure: RequestConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
11.7.13. Structure: ResponseConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Request: Enveloped (Optional)
Accept: Boolean (Optional)
11.7.14. Structure: RequestTask
Inherits: Message
[No fields]
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11.7.15. Structure: MessageClaim
Inherits: Message
PublicationId: String (Optional)
ServiceAuthenticate: String (Optional)
DeviceAuthenticate: String (Optional)
Expires: DateTime (Optional)
11.7.16. Structure: ProcessResult
Report result of message processing.
Inherits: Message
Success: Boolean (Optional)
ErrorReport: String (Optional) The error report code.
11.7.17. Structure: ProcessResultNotSupported
The message type is not supported.
Inherits: ProcessResult
[No fields]
11.7.18. Structure: ProcessResultNotFound
Inherits: ProcessResult
[No fields]
12. Security Considerations
The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh
services and applications are described in the Mesh Security
Considerations guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security].
13. IANA Considerations
All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in
this document
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14. Acknowledgements
A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is
presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
15. Normative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I:
Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-22, 28 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-architecture-22>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-callsign]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Mesh
Callsign Service", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-callsign-03, 28 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-callsign-03>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part III : Data
At Rest Encryption (DARE)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare-17, 28 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-dare-17>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VI: Mesh
Discovery Service", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery-01, 13 January 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-discovery-01>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part V: Protocol
Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-protocol-15, 28 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-protocol-15>.
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-security]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IX Security
Considerations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-security-09, 20 April 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-security-09>.
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[draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part II: Uniform
Data Fingerprint.", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-18, 28 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-udf-18>.
[draft-hallambaker-threshold]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Modes in Elliptic Curves",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-
threshold-09, 28 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
threshold-09>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
16. Informative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-developer-11, 28 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
mesh-developer-11>.
[draft-irtf-cfrg-frost]
Connolly, D., Komlo, C., Goldberg, I., and C. A. Wood,
"Two-Round Threshold Schnorr Signatures with FROST", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-frost-15, 18
September 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-irtf-cfrg-frost-15>.
[draft-komlo-frost]
Komlo, C. and I. Goldberg, "FROST: Flexible Round-
Optimized Schnorr Threshold Signatures", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-komlo-frost-00, 7 August 2020,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-komlo-frost-
00>.
[RFC2426] Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile",
RFC 2426, DOI 10.17487/RFC2426, September 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2426>.
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[RFC5545] Desruisseaux, B., "Internet Calendaring and Scheduling
Core Object Specification (iCalendar)", RFC 5545,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5545, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5545>.
Author's Address
Phillip Hallam-Baker
ThresholdSecrets.com
Email: phill@hallambaker.com
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