Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Security Considerations
draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-03
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draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-03
Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft 16 January 2020
Intended status: Informational
Expires: 19 July 2020
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Security Considerations
draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-03
Abstract
The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure
infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and
credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of
the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and
reference data.
[Note to Readers]
Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list
(mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.
This document is also available online at
http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-security.html.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 July 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5.1. Classes describing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5.2. Structure: PublicKey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5.3. Structure: KeyComposite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5.4. Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5.5. Structure: KeyOverlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5.6. Structure: EscrowedKeySet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6. Assertion classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.1. Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.2. Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.3. Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.4. Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.5. Structure: ProfileMesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6.6. Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6.7. Structure: ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6.8. Structure: ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.9. Structure: ProfileGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.10. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.11. Connection Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.12. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.13. Structure: Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.14. Structure: ConnectionDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.15. Structure: ConnectionAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.16. Structure: ConnectionGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.17. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.18. Structure: ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.19. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.20. Activation Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.21. Structure: Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.22. Structure: ActivationDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.23. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.24. Structure: ActivationGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.7. Cataloged items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.7.1. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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2.7.2. Structure: ContactMesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.7.3. Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.7.4. Structure: Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7.5. Structure: Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7.6. Structure: Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7.7. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7.8. Structure: Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.8. Catalog Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.8.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.8.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.8.3. Structure: AccountEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.8.4. Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.8.5. Structure: CatalogedNetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.8.6. Structure: CatalogedContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.8.7. Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption . . . . . . . . 16
2.8.8. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.8.9. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.8.10. Structure: CatalogedApplication . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.8.11. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.8.12. Structure: CatalogedGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.8.13. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH . . . . . . . . . 17
2.8.14. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail . . . . . . . . . 17
2.8.15. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork . . . . . . . 17
2.9. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.9.1. Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.9.2. Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.9.3. Structure: MessagePIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.9.4. Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.9.5. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.9.6. Structure: OfferGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.9.7. Structure: RequestContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.9.8. Structure: ReplyContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.9.9. Structure: GroupInvitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.9.10. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.9.11. Structure: ResponseConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.9.12. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3. Mesh Portal Service Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1. Request Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.1. Message: MeshRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2. Response Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.1. Message: MeshResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3. Imported Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4. Common Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4.1. Structure: KeyValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4.2. Structure: SearchConstraints . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5. Transaction: Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.6. Transaction: ValidateAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.6.1. Message: ValidateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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3.6.2. Message: ValidateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.7. Transaction: CreateAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.7.1. Message: CreateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.7.2. Message: CreateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.8. Transaction: DeleteAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.8.1. Message: DeleteRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.8.2. Message: DeleteResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.9. Transaction: Get . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.9.1. Message: GetRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.9.2. Message: GetResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.10. Transaction: Publish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.10.1. Message: PublishRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.10.2. Message: PublishResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.11. Transaction: Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.11.1. Message: StatusRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.11.2. Message: StatusResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.12.1. Message: ConnectStartRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.12.2. Message: ConnectStartResponse . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.13.1. Message: ConnectStatusRequest . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.13.2. Message: ConnectStatusResponse . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.14. Transaction: ConnectPending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.14.1. Message: ConnectPendingRequest . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.14.2. Message: ConnectPendingResponse . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.15.1. Message: ConnectCompleteRequest . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.15.2. Message: ConnectCompleteResponse . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.16. Transaction: Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.16.1. Message: TransferRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.16.2. Message: TransferResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4. Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2. Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3. Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3.1. Outbound Messaging Abuse () . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5. Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.2. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.3.1. Data loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.3.2. Partial data survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.4. Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1. End point Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7. Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1. Cryptographic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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7.1.1. Triple lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.2. Key Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.3. Key and Nonce Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.4. Key Escrow and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.5. Profile Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.6. Identity Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1.7. Trust Broker Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2.1. Ingress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2.2. Egress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2.3. Security Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2.4. Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.1. DNS Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.2. TLS Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.3. TLS Service Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.4. Request Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.5. Response Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.2. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.2.1. Side Channel Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.2.2. Session Key Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Introduction
2. Definitions
This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
terms used as requirements language.
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.2. Defined Terms
The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
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2.3. Related Specifications
The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. The Mesh
documentation set and related specifications are described in this
document.
2.4. Implementation Status
The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
2.5. Shared Classes
The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile
specifications.
2.5.1. Classes describing keys
2.5.2. Structure: PublicKey
The PublicKey class is used to describe public key pairs and trust
assertions associated with a public key.
UDF: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters/
X509Certificate: Binary (Optional) List of X.509 Certificates
X509Chain: Binary [0..Many] X.509 Certificate chain.
X509CSR: Binary (Optional) X.509 Certificate Signing Request.
2.5.3. Structure: KeyComposite
Service: String (Optional) Service holding the additional
contribution
2.5.4. Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey
UDF: String (Optional) The fingerprint of the encryption key
Contact: Contact (Optional) The User's Mesh contact information
RecryptionKey: PublicKey (Optional) The recryption key
EnvelopedRecryptionKeyDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The decryption
key encrypted under the user's device key.
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2.5.5. Structure: KeyOverlay
UDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint of the resulting composite key
(to allow verification)
BaseUDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint specifying the base key
2.5.6. Structure: EscrowedKeySet
A set of escrowed keys.
[No fields]
2.6. Assertion classes
Classes that are derived from an assertion.
2.6.1. Structure: Assertion
Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived
Names: String [0..Many] Fingerprints of index terms for profile
retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the
name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other
forms of abuse.
Updated: DateTime (Optional) The time instant the profile was last
modified.
NotaryToken: String (Optional) A Uniform Notary Token providing
evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was
created.
2.6.2. Structure: Condition
Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.
[No fields]
2.6.3. Profile Classes
Profiles are self signed assertions.
2.6.4. Structure: Profile
Inherits: Assertion
Parent class from which all profile classes are derived
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KeyOfflineSignature: PublicKey (Optional) The permanent signature
key used to sign the profile itself. The UDF of the key is used
as the permanent object identifier of the profile. Thus, by
definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change
under any circumstance. The only case in which a
KeysOnlineSignature: PublicKey [0..Many] A Personal profile contains
at least one OSK which is used to sign device administration
application profiles.
2.6.5. Structure: ProfileMesh
Inherits: Profile
Describes the long term parameters associated with a personal
profile.
KeysMasterEscrow: PublicKey [0..Many] A Personal Profile MAY contain
one or more PMEK keys to enable escrow of private keys used for
stored data.
KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data
to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry
2.6.6. Structure: ProfileDevice
Inherits: Profile
Describes a mesh device.
Description: String (Optional) Description of the device
KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data
to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry
KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate
requests made by the device.
2.6.7. Structure: ProfileService
Inherits: Profile
Profile of a Mesh Service
KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate
service connections.
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2.6.8. Structure: ProfileAccount
Inherits: Profile
Account assertion. This is signed by the service hosting the
account.
ServiceIDs: String [0..Many] Service address(es).
MeshProfileUDF: String (Optional) Master profile of the account
being registered.
KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to encrypt data under
this profile
2.6.9. Structure: ProfileGroup
Inherits: Profile
Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person
who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to
other administrators over time.
ServiceIDs: String [0..Many] Service address(es).
KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) Key currently used to encrypt
data under this profile
2.6.10. Structure: ProfileHost
Inherits: Profile
KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) Key used to authenticate
service connections.
2.6.11. Connection Classes
2.6.12. Structure: Connection
Inherits: Assertion
SubjectUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the connection target.
AuthorityUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the connection source.
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2.6.13. Structure: Permission
Name: String (Optional)
Role: String (Optional)
Capabilities: DareEnvelope (Optional) Keys or key contributions
enabling the operation to be performed
2.6.14. Structure: ConnectionDevice
Inherits: Connection
Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the
device has been granted.
KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional) The signature key for use of the
device under the profile
KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) The encryption key for use of
the device under the profile
KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) The authentication key for
use of the device under the profile
2.6.15. Structure: ConnectionAccount
Inherits: Connection
ServiceID: String [0..Many] The list of service identifiers.
Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the
device has been granted.
KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional) The signature key for use of the
device under the profile
KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional) The encryption key for use of
the device under the profile
KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional) The authentication key for
use of the device under the profile
2.6.16. Structure: ConnectionGroup
Describes the connection of a member to a group.
Inherits: Connection
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KeyEncryption: KeyComposite (Optional) The decryption key for the
user within the group
2.6.17. Structure: ConnectionService
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
2.6.18. Structure: ConnectionHost
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
2.6.19. Structure: ConnectionApplication
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
2.6.20. Activation Classes
2.6.21. Structure: Activation
Inherits: Assertion
Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application
running on a specific device
[No fields]
2.6.22. Structure: ActivationDevice
Inherits: Assertion
EnvelopedAssertionDeviceConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional) The
signed AssertionDeviceConnection.
KeySignature: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to generate
the account signature key from the device signature key
KeyEncryption: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to
generate the account encryption key from the device encryption key
KeyAuthentication: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to
generate the account authentication key from the device
authentication key
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2.6.23. Structure: ActivationAccount
Inherits: Activation
AccountUDF: String (Optional) The UDF of the account
KeyGroup: KeyComposite (Optional) The key contribution for the
decryption key for the device. NB this is NOT an overlay on the
device signature key, it is an overlay on the corresponding
recryption key.
KeyEncryption: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to
generate the account encryption key from the device encryption key
KeyAuthentication: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to
generate the account authentication key from the device
authentication key
KeySignature: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay used to generate
the account signature key from the device signature key
2.6.24. Structure: ActivationGroup
Inherits: Activation
GroupUDF: String (Optional) The UDF of the group
KeyEncryption: KeyOverlay (Optional) The key overlay that
compliments the member's group decryption key.
2.7. Cataloged items
2.7.1. Data Structures
Classes describing data used in cataloged data.
2.7.2. Structure: ContactMesh
UDF: String (Optional)
ServiceID: String [0..Many]
2.7.3. Structure: Contact
Inherits: Assertion
MeshAccounts: DareEnvelope [0..Many] The Mesh Account Connection -
the main event really
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Email: String (Optional)
Identifier: String (Optional)
FullName: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
First: String (Optional)
Middle: String (Optional)
Last: String (Optional)
Suffix: String (Optional)
Labels: String [0..Many]
AssertionAccounts: ProfileAccount [0..Many]
Addresses: Address [0..Many]
Locations: Location [0..Many]
Roles: Role [0..Many]
2.7.4. Structure: Role
CompanyName: String (Optional)
Addresses: Address [0..Many]
Locations: Location [0..Many]
2.7.5. Structure: Address
URI: String (Optional)
Labels: String [0..Many]
2.7.6. Structure: Location
Appartment: String (Optional)
Street: String (Optional)
District: String (Optional)
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Locality: String (Optional)
County: String (Optional)
Postcode: String (Optional)
Country: String (Optional)
2.7.7. Structure: Reference
MessageID: String (Optional) The received message to which this is a
response
ResponseID: String (Optional) Message that was generated in response
to the original (optional).
Relationship: String (Optional) The relationship type. This can be
Read, Unread, Accept, Reject.
2.7.8. Structure: Task
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Start: DateTime (Optional)
Finish: DateTime (Optional)
StartTravel: String (Optional)
FinishTravel: String (Optional)
TimeZone: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Description: String (Optional)
Location: String (Optional)
Trigger: String [0..Many]
Conference: String [0..Many]
Repeat: String (Optional)
Busy: Boolean (Optional)
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2.8. Catalog Entries
2.8.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry
Base class for cataloged Mesh data.
[No fields]
2.8.2. Structure: CatalogedDevice
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Public device entry, indexed under the device ID
UDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device in the
Mesh
DeviceUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device
EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The device profile
EnvelopedConnectionDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The public
assertion demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh
EnvelopedActivationDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The activations
of the device within the Mesh
Accounts: AccountEntry [0..Many] The accounts that this device is
connected to
2.8.3. Structure: AccountEntry
AccountUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the account profile
EnvelopedProfileAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The account profile
EnvelopedConnectionAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The connection
of this device to the account
EnvelopedActivationAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The activation
data for this device to the account
2.8.4. Structure: CatalogedCredential
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Protocol: String (Optional)
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Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
2.8.5. Structure: CatalogedNetwork
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Protocol: String (Optional)
Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
2.8.6. Structure: CatalogedContact
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Self: Boolean (Optional) If true, this catalog entry is for the user
who created the catalog. To be valid, such an entry MUST be
signed by an administration key for the Mesh profile containing
the account to which the catalog belongs.
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the
contact has been granted.
EnvelopedContact: DareEnvelope (Optional) The (signed) contact data.
2.8.7. Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption
Inherits: CatalogedContact
[No fields]
2.8.8. Structure: CatalogedBookmark
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Uri: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
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Path: String (Optional)
2.8.9. Structure: CatalogedTask
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
EnvelopedTask: DareEnvelope (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
2.8.10. Structure: CatalogedApplication
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Key: String (Optional)
2.8.11. Structure: CatalogedMember
UDF: String (Optional)
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
2.8.12. Structure: CatalogedGroup
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
Profile: ProfileGroup (Optional)
2.8.13. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
2.8.14. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
2.8.15. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
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2.9. Messages
2.9.1. Structure: Message
MessageID: String (Optional)
Sender: String (Optional)
Recipient: String (Optional)
References: Reference [0..Many]
2.9.2. Structure: MessageComplete
Inherits: Message
[No fields]
2.9.3. Structure: MessagePIN
Account: String (Optional)
Inherits: Message
Expires: DateTime (Optional)
PIN: String (Optional)
2.9.4. Structure: RequestConnection
Connection request message. This message contains the information
Inherits: Message
ServiceID: String (Optional)
EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) Device profile of
the device making the request.
ClientNonce: Binary (Optional)
PinUDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint of the PIN value used to
authenticate the request.
2.9.5. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection
Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a
valid MessageConnectionRequestClient
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Inherits: Message
EnvelopedRequestConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional) The client
connection request.
ServerNonce: Binary (Optional)
Witness: String (Optional)
2.9.6. Structure: OfferGroup
Inherits: Message
[No fields]
2.9.7. Structure: RequestContact
Inherits: Message
Reply: Boolean (Optional)
Subject: String (Optional)
Self: DareEnvelope (Optional) The contact data.
2.9.8. Structure: ReplyContact
Inherits: RequestContact
[No fields]
2.9.9. Structure: GroupInvitation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
EncryptedPartDecrypt: DareEnvelope (Optional)
2.9.10. Structure: RequestConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
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2.9.11. Structure: ResponseConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Request: RequestConfirmation (Optional)
Accept: Boolean (Optional)
2.9.12. Structure: RequestTask
Inherits: Message
[No fields]
3. Mesh Portal Service Reference
HTTP Well Known Service Prefix: /.well-known/mmm
Every Mesh Portal Service transaction consists of exactly one request
followed by exactly one response. Mesh Service transactions MAY
cause modification of the data stored in the Mesh Portal or the Mesh
itself but do not cause changes to the connection state. The
protocol itself is thus idempotent. There is no set sequence in
which operations are required to be performed. It is not necessary
to perform a Hello transaction prior to a ValidateAccount, Publish or
any other transaction.
3.1. Request Messages
A Mesh Portal Service request consists of a payload object that
inherits from the MeshRequest class. When using the HTTP binding,
the request MUST specify the portal DNS address in the HTTP Host
field.
3.1.1. Message: MeshRequest
Base class for all request messages.
Portal: String (Optional) Name of the Mesh Portal Service to which
the request is directed.
3.2. Response Messages
A Mesh Portal Service response consists of a payload object that
inherits from the MeshResponse class. When using the HTTP binding,
the response SHOULD report the Status response code in the HTTP
response message. However the response code returned in the payload
object MUST always be considered authoritative.
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3.2.1. Message: MeshResponse
Base class for all response messages. Contains only the status code
and status description fields.
[No fields]
3.3. Imported Objects
The Mesh Service protocol makes use of JSON objects defined in the
JOSE Signatgure and Encryption specifications.
3.4. Common Structures
The following common structures are used in the protocol messages:
3.4.1. Structure: KeyValue
Describes a Key/Value structure used to make queries for records
matching one or more selection criteria.
Key: String (Optional) The data retrieval key.
Value: String (Optional) The data value to match.
3.4.2. Structure: SearchConstraints
Specifies constraints to be applied to a search result. These allow
a client to limit the number of records returned, the quantity of
data returned, the earliest and latest data returned, etc.
NotBefore: DateTime (Optional) Only data published on or after the
specified time instant is requested.
Before: DateTime (Optional) Only data published before the specified
time instant is requested. This excludes data published at the
specified time instant.
MaxEntries: Integer (Optional) Maximum number of data entries to
return.
MaxBytes: Integer (Optional) Maximum number of data bytes to return.
PageKey: String (Optional) Specifies a page key returned in a
previous search operation in which the number of responses
exceeded the specified bounds.
When a page key is specified, all the other search parameters
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except for MaxEntries and MaxBytes are ignored and the service
returns the next set of data responding to the earlier query.
3.5. Transaction: Hello
Request: HelloRequest
Response: HelloResponse
Report service and version information.
The Hello transaction provides a means of determining which protocol
versions, message encodings and transport protocols are supported by
the service.
3.6. Transaction: ValidateAccount
Request: ValidateRequest
Response: ValidateResponse
Request validation of a proposed name for a new account.
For validation of a user's account name during profile creation.
3.6.1. Message: ValidateRequest
Inherits: MeshRequest
Describes the proposed account properties. Currently, these are
limited to the account name but could be extended in future versions
of the protocol.
Account: String (Optional) Account name requested
Reserve: Boolean (Optional) If true, request a reservation for the
specified account name. Note that the service is not obliged to
honor reservation requests.
Language: String [0..Many] List of ISO language codes in order of
preference. For creating explanatory text.
3.6.2. Message: ValidateResponse
Inherits: MeshResponse
States whether the proposed account properties are acceptable and
(optional) returns an indication of what properties are valid.
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Note that receiving a 'Valid' responseto a Validate Request does not
guarantee creation of the account. In addition to the possibility
that the account namecould be requested by another user between the
Validate and Create transactions, a portal service MAY perform more
stringent validation criteria when an account is actually being
created. For example, checking with the authoritative list of
current accounts rather than a cached copy.
Valid: Boolean (Optional) If true, the specified account identifier
is acceptable. If false, the account identifier is rejected.
Minimum: Integer (Optional) Specifies the minimum length of an
account name.
Maximum: Integer (Optional) Specifies the maximum length of an
account name.
InvalidCharacters: String (Optional) A list of characters that the
service does not accept in account names. The list of characters
MAY not be exhaustive but SHOULD include any illegal characters in
the proposed account name.
Reason: String (Optional) Text explaining the reason an account name
was rejected.
3.7. Transaction: CreateAccount
Request: CreateRequest
Response: CreateResponse
Request creation of a new portal account.
Unlike a profile, a mesh account is specific to a particular Mesh
portal. A mesh account must be created and accepted before a profile
can be published.
3.7.1. Message: CreateRequest
Request creation of a new portal account. The request specifies the
requested account identifier and the Mesh profile to be associated
with the account.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Account: String (Optional) Account identifier requested.
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3.7.2. Message: CreateResponse
Inherits: MeshResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Create transaction.
[No fields]
3.8. Transaction: DeleteAccount
Request: DeleteRequest
Response: DeleteResponse
Request deletion of a portal account.
Deletes a portal account but not the underlying profile. Once
registered, profiles are permanent.
3.8.1. Message: DeleteRequest
Request deletion of a new portal account. The request specifies the
requested account identifier.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Account: String (Optional) Account identifier to be deleted.
3.8.2. Message: DeleteResponse
Inherits: MeshResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Delete transaction.
[No fields]
3.9. Transaction: Get
Request: GetRequest
Response: GetResponse
Search for data in the mesh that matches a set of properties
described by a sequence of key/value pairs.
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3.9.1. Message: GetRequest
Describes the Portal or Mesh data to be retreived.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Identifier: String (Optional) Lookup by profile ID
Account: String (Optional) Lookup by Account ID
KeyValues: KeyValue [0..Many] List of KeyValue pairs specifying the
conditions to be met
SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search
to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total
size of data records returned.
Multiple: Boolean (Optional) If true return multiple responses if
available
Full: Boolean (Optional) If true, the client requests that the full
Mesh data record be returned containing both the Mesh entry itself
and the Mesh metadata that allows the date and time of the
publication of the Mesh entry to be verified.
3.9.2. Message: GetResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Get transaction. If a Mesh entry
matching the specified profile is found, containsthe list of entries
matching the request.
Inherits: MeshResponse
DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] List of mesh data records matching the
request.
PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number
and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the
SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server
limits.
3.10. Transaction: Publish
Request: PublishRequest
Response: PublishResponse
Publish a profile or key escrow entry to the mesh.
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3.10.1. Message: PublishRequest
Requests publication of the specified Mesh entry.
Inherits: MeshRequest
[No fields]
3.10.2. Message: PublishResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Publish transaction.
Inherits: MeshResponse
[No fields]
3.11. Transaction: Status
Request: StatusRequest
Response: StatusResponse
Request the current status of the mesh as seen by the portal to which
it is directed.
The response to the status request contains the last signed
checkpoint and proof chains for each of the peer portals that have
been checkpointed.
[Not currently implemented]
3.11.1. Message: StatusRequest
Inherits: MeshRequest
Initiates a status transaction.
[No fields]
3.11.2. Message: StatusResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Status transaction.
Inherits: MeshResponse
LastWriteTime: DateTime (Optional) Time that the last write update
was made to the Mesh
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LastCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional) Time that the last Mesh
checkpoint was calculated.
NextCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional) Time at which the next Mesh
checkpoint should be calculated.
CheckpointValue: String (Optional) Last checkpoint value.
3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart
Request: ConnectStartRequest
Response: ConnectStartResponse
Request connection of a new device to a mesh profile
3.12.1. Message: ConnectStartRequest
Inherits: MeshRequest
Initial device connection request.
SignedRequest: SignedConnectionRequest (Optional) Device connection
request signed by thesignature key of the device requesting
connection.
AccountID: String (Optional) Account identifier of account to which
the device is requesting connection.
3.12.2. Message: ConnectStartResponse
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStart transaction.
Inherits: MeshRequest
[No fields]
3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus
Request: ConnectStatusRequest
Response: ConnectStatusResponse
Request status of pending connection request of a new device to a
mesh profile
3.13.1. Message: ConnectStatusRequest
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Inherits: MeshRequest
Request status information for a pending request posted previously.
AccountID: String (Optional) Account identifier for which pending
connection information is requested.
DeviceID: String (Optional) Device identifier of device requesting
status information.
3.13.2. Message: ConnectStatusResponse
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStatus transaction.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional) The signed
ConnectionResult object.
3.14. Transaction: ConnectPending
Request: ConnectPendingRequest
Response: ConnectPendingResponse
Request a list of pending requests for an administration profile.
3.14.1. Message: ConnectPendingRequest
Inherits: MeshRequest
Specify the criteria for pending requests.
AccountID: String (Optional) The account identifier of the account
for which pending connection requests are requested.
SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search
to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total
size of data records returned.
3.14.2. Message: ConnectPendingResponse
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectPending transaction.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Pending: SignedConnectionRequest [0..Many] A list of pending
requests satisfying the criteria set out in the request.
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PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number
and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the
SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server
limits.
3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete
Request: ConnectCompleteRequest
Response: ConnectCompleteResponse
Post response to a pending connection request.
3.15.1. Message: ConnectCompleteRequest
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional) The connection result to
be posted to the portal. The result MUST be signed by a valid
administration key for the Mesh profile.
AccountID: String (Optional) The account identifier to which the
connection result is posted.
3.15.2. Message: ConnectCompleteResponse
Inherits: MeshRequest
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction.
[No fields]
3.16. Transaction: Transfer
Request: TransferRequest
Response: TransferResponse
Perform a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction
identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization
[Not currently implemented]
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3.16.1. Message: TransferRequest
Request a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction
identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization
Inherits: MeshRequest
SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search
to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total
size of data records returned.
3.16.2. Message: TransferResponse
Inherits: MeshResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Transfer transaction. If
successful, contains the list of Mesh records to be transferred.
DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] List of mesh data records matching the
request.
PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number
and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the
SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server
limits.
4. Assets
4.1. Data
4.2. Credentials
4.3. Reputation
4.3.1. Outbound Messaging Abuse ()
5. Risks
5.1. Confidentiality
Is a regulatory requirement GDPR/HIPPA
5.1.1. Privacy
Stronger requirement, given data but with restrictions on use
Unintended use within an organization may put it in default
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GDPR
HIPPA
5.2. Integrity
Modification of data enables control breaches
5.3. Availability
5.3.1. Data loss
Loss of the pictures of the kids at 5
5.3.2. Partial data survivability
Where they buried Aunt Agatha's jewelry but not where they buried
Aunt Agatha.
5.4. Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam)
6. Threats
6.1. End point Compromise
7. Controls
7.1. Cryptographic
7.1.1. Triple lock
7.1.1.1. Transport Security
Traffic analysis protection
7.1.1.2. Message Security
Access control
Authentication / Integrity
7.1.1.3. Data Level Security
Data Confidentiality
Non-Repudiation
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7.1.2. Key Protection
Use of platform provided facilities to bind private keys in the
Device profile to the device is highly desirable. Ideally, private
keys should be protected against extraction by hardware techniques
presenting a high degree of resistance.
7.1.2.1. Windows
Use encrypted key store
Preferably use BitLocker
7.1.2.2. OSX
Use Key Ring
7.1.2.3. iOS
Use ???
7.1.2.4. Linux
Use the DBUS mechanism
7.1.2.5. Android
Hope and prayers.
7.1.3. Key and Nonce Generation
Use strong mechanisms as described in RFC???
Use of key co-generation as described in part 8 is advised
7.1.4. Key Escrow and Recovery
Master profile keys should be escrowed
Escrow strategies for DARE should take account of the fact that users
may want some but not all their data assets to survive them.
7.1.5. Profile Verification
Check that the device credential has been signed by an administration
device and that the administration device was properly authorized by
the master profile.
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Device catalog MUST be signed by the admin device.
Future ? provide protection against rollback attacks.
7.1.6. Identity Validation
See the separate document on the trust model
7.1.7. Trust Broker Accountability
Cert transparency type techniques
7.2. Mesh Messaging
7.2.1. Ingress Control
Every message is subject to access control
Mesh Services should perform abuse filtering on inbound mail
Mesh Services MUST apply user specified ingress control as specified
in their contacts catalog.
7.2.2. Egress Control
Some applications may require egress control
For example, classified environments
Mail too stupid to send
7.2.3. Security Signal
Confirmation messages requiring payments
Need Accountability
Need to know the source of the accountability assertions
Should be distinguished from sender controlled part of a message
7.2.3.1. Brand
If messages are being sent on behalf of a corporate entity, this
should be signaled to both sender and receiver
Sender ? remind them that they are speaking on behalf of another
party
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Receiver ? establish who is speaking by the familiar technique.
7.2.4. Accountability
Authentication and consequences
8. Security Considerations
This document comprises the security considerations for the use and
implementation of the Mathematical Mesh.
8.1. Integrity
8.1.1. DNS Spoofing
8.1.2. TLS Downgrade
8.1.3. TLS Service Impersonation
8.1.4. Request Replay Attack
8.1.5. Response Replay Attack
8.2. Confidentiality
8.2.1. Side Channel Attack
8.2.2. Session Key Leakage
9. IANA Considerations
All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in
this document
10. Acknowledgements
A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is
presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
11. Normative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I:
Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12, 16 January 2020,
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<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
architecture-12>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
12. Informative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-developer-09, 23 October 2019,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
developer-09>.
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