Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Security Considerations
draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-05
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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| Author | Phillip Hallam-Baker | ||
| Last updated | 2020-07-27 | ||
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draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-05
Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft ThresholdSecrets.com
Intended status: Informational 27 July 2020
Expires: 28 January 2021
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Security Considerations
draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-05
Abstract
The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure
infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and
credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of
the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and
reference data.
[Note to Readers]
Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list
(mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.
This document is also available online at
http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-security.html.
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Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5.1. Classes describing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5.2. Structure: KeyData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5.3. Structure: KeyComposite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5.4. Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5.5. Structure: EscrowedKeySet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6. Assertion classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.1. Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.2. Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6.3. Base Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6.4. Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6.5. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6.6. Structure: Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6.7. Structure: Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.8. Mesh Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.9. Structure: ProfileMesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.10. Mesh Device Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.11. Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.12. Structure: ActivationDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.13. Structure: ConnectionDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.14. Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.15. Structure: CatalogedPublication . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.16. Mesh Account Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.17. Structure: ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.18. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6.19. Structure: ConnectionAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.20. Structure: AccountEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.21. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.22. Mesh Group Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.23. Structure: ProfileGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.24. Structure: ActivationGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6.25. Structure: ConnectionGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6.26. Mesh Service Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6.27. Structure: ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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2.6.28. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6.29. Mesh Host Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6.30. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6.31. Structure: ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7. Cataloged items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7.1. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7.2. Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7.3. Structure: Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7.4. Structure: TaggedSource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.7.5. Structure: ContactGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.7.6. Structure: ContactPerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.7.7. Structure: ContactOrganization . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.7.8. Structure: OrganizationName . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.7.9. Structure: PersonName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.7.10. Structure: NetworkAddress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.7.11. Structure: NetworkProtocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.7.12. Structure: Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7.13. Structure: Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7.14. Structure: Bookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7.15. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7.16. Structure: Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.8. Catalog Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.8.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.8.2. Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.8.3. Structure: CatalogedNetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.8.4. Structure: CatalogedContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.8.5. Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption . . . . . . . . 19
2.8.6. Structure: CatalogedCapability . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.8.7. Structure: CryptographicCapability . . . . . . . . . 19
2.8.8. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.8.9. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial . . . . . . . . . 20
2.8.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced . . . . . . . . 20
2.8.11. Structure: CapabilitySign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.8.12. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.8.13. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.8.14. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.8.15. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.8.16. Structure: CatalogedApplication . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.8.17. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8.18. Structure: CatalogedGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8.19. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork . . . . . . . 22
2.9. Static Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.9.1. Structure: DevicePreconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.10. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.10.1. Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.10.2. Structure: MessageError . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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2.10.3. Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.10.4. Structure: MessagePinValidated . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.10.5. Structure: MessagePIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.10.6. Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.10.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.10.8. Structure: RespondConnection . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.10.9. Structure: RequestContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.10.10. Structure: ReplyContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.10.11. Structure: GroupInvitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.10.12. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.10.13. Structure: ResponseConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.10.14. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.10.15. Structure: MessageClaim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3. Mesh Portal Service Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1. Request Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1.1. Message: MeshRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2. Response Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.1. Message: MeshResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3. Imported Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4. Common Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.1. Structure: KeyValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.2. Structure: SearchConstraints . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.5. Transaction: Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6. Transaction: ValidateAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6.1. Message: ValidateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6.2. Message: ValidateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.7. Transaction: CreateAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.7.1. Message: CreateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.7.2. Message: CreateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.8. Transaction: DeleteAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.8.1. Message: DeleteRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.8.2. Message: DeleteResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.9. Transaction: Get . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.9.1. Message: GetRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.9.2. Message: GetResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.10. Transaction: Publish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.10.1. Message: PublishRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.10.2. Message: PublishResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.11. Transaction: Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.11.1. Message: StatusRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.11.2. Message: StatusResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.12.1. Message: ConnectStartRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.12.2. Message: ConnectStartResponse . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.13.1. Message: ConnectStatusRequest . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.13.2. Message: ConnectStatusResponse . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.14. Transaction: ConnectPending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
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3.14.1. Message: ConnectPendingRequest . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.14.2. Message: ConnectPendingResponse . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.15.1. Message: ConnectCompleteRequest . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.15.2. Message: ConnectCompleteResponse . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.16. Transaction: Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.16.1. Message: TransferRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.16.2. Message: TransferResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4. Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2. Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3. Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3.1. Outbound Messaging Abuse () . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5. Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3.1. Data loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3.2. Partial data survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.4. Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1. End point Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7. Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.1. Cryptographic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.1.1. Triple lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.1.2. Key Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.1.3. Key and Nonce Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.1.4. Key Escrow and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.1.5. Profile Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.1.6. Identity Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.1.7. Trust Broker Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.2. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.2.1. Ingress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.2.2. Egress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.2.3. Security Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.2.4. Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1.1. DNS Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1.2. TLS Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1.3. TLS Service Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1.4. Request Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1.5. Response Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2.1. Side Channel Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2.2. Session Key Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
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10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Introduction
2. Definitions
This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
terms used as requirements language.
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.2. Defined Terms
The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
2.3. Related Specifications
The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh
Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. The Mesh
documentation set and related specifications are described in this
document.
2.4. Implementation Status
The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].
2.5. Shared Classes
The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile
specifications.
2.5.1. Classes describing keys
2.5.2. Structure: KeyData
The KeyData class is used to describe public key pairs and trust
assertions associated with a public key.
UDF: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters/
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X509Certificate: Binary (Optional) List of X.509 Certificates
X509Chain: Binary [0..Many] X.509 Certificate chain.
X509CSR: Binary (Optional) X.509 Certificate Signing Request.
NotBefore: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time instant
that use of the private key is not valid before.
NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) If present specifies a time
instant that use of the private key is not valid on or after.
2.5.3. Structure: KeyComposite
Service: String (Optional) Service holding the additional
contribution
2.5.4. Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey
UDF: String (Optional) The fingerprint of the encryption key
RecryptionKey: KeyData (Optional) The recryption key
EnvelopedRecryptionKeyDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The decryption
key encrypted under the user's device key.
2.5.5. Structure: EscrowedKeySet
A set of escrowed keys.
[No fields]
2.6. Assertion classes
Classes that are derived from an assertion.
2.6.1. Structure: Assertion
Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived
Names: String [0..Many] Fingerprints of index terms for profile
retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the
name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other
forms of abuse.
Updated: DateTime (Optional) The time instant the profile was last
modified.
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NotaryToken: String (Optional) A Uniform Notary Token providing
evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was
created.
2.6.2. Structure: Condition
Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.
[No fields]
2.6.3. Base Classes
Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection
classes are derrived.
2.6.4. Structure: Profile
Inherits: Assertion
Parent class from which all profile classes are derived
KeyOfflineSignature: KeyData (Optional) The permanent signature key
used to sign the profile itself. The UDF of the key is used as
the permanent object identifier of the profile. Thus, by
definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change
under any circumstance. The only case in which a
KeysOnlineSignature: KeyData [0..Many] A Personal profile contains
at least one OSK which is used to sign device administration
application profiles.
2.6.5. Structure: Connection
Inherits: Assertion
SubjectUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the connection target.
AuthorityUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the connection source.
2.6.6. Structure: Activation
Inherits: Assertion
Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application
running on a specific device
EnvelopedConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional) The signed AssertionDev
iceConnection.
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ActivationKey: String (Optional) The master secret from which all
the key contributions are derrived.
2.6.7. Structure: Permission
Name: String (Optional)
Role: String (Optional)
Capabilities: DareEnvelope (Optional) Keys or key contributions
enabling the operation to be performed
2.6.8. Mesh Profile Classes
A Mesh profile does not have activation or connection classes
associated with it.
It might be more consistent to represent administation devices as
activations on the ProfileMesh class though.
2.6.9. Structure: ProfileMesh
Inherits: Profile
Describes the long term parameters associated with a personal
profile.
KeysMasterEscrow: KeyData [0..Many] A Personal Profile MAY contain
one or more PMEK keys to enable escrow of private keys used for
stored data.
KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data to
the device such as a DeviceUseEntry
2.6.10. Mesh Device Classes
2.6.11. Structure: ProfileDevice
Inherits: Profile
Describes a mesh device.
Description: String (Optional) Description of the device
KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to pass encrypted data to
the device such as a DeviceUseEntry
KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
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requests made by the device.
2.6.12. Structure: ActivationDevice
Inherits: Activation
[No fields]
2.6.13. Structure: ConnectionDevice
Inherits: Connection
Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the
device has been granted.
KeySignature: KeyData (Optional) The signature key for use of the
device under the profile
KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) The encryption key for use of the
device under the profile
KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) The authentication key for use
of the device under the profile
2.6.14. Structure: CatalogedDevice
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Public device entry, indexed under the device ID
UDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device in the
Mesh
EnvelopedProfileMesh: DareEnvelope (Optional) The Mesh profile
DeviceUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device
EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The device profile
EnvelopedConnectionDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The public
assertion demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh
EnvelopedActivationDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The activations
of the device within the Mesh
Accounts: AccountEntry [0..Many] The accounts that this device is
connected to
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2.6.15. Structure: CatalogedPublication
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
A publication.
ID: String (Optional) Unique identifier code
Authenticator: String (Optional) The witness key value to use to
request access to the record.
EnvelopedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Dare Envelope containing the
entry data
NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) Epiration time (inclusive)
2.6.16. Mesh Account Classes
2.6.17. Structure: ProfileAccount
Inherits: Profile
Account assertion. This is signed by the service hosting the
account.
AccountAddresses: String [0..Many] Service address(es).
MeshProfileUDF: String (Optional) Master profile of the account
being registered.
KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to encrypt data under
this profile
KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
requests made by the device.
EnvelopedProfileService: DareEnvelope (Optional) The service profile
2.6.18. Structure: ActivationAccount
Inherits: Activation
AccountUDF: String (Optional) The UDF of the account
KeyAccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to encrypt data
under this profile
KeyAccountSignature: KeyData (Optional) Key used to encrypt data
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under this profile
2.6.19. Structure: ConnectionAccount
Inherits: Connection
AccountAddresses: String [0..Many] The list of service identifiers.
Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the
device has been granted.
KeySignature: KeyData (Optional) The signature key for use of the
device under the profile
KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) The encryption key for use of the
device under the profile
KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) The authentication key for use
of the device under the profile
2.6.20. Structure: AccountEntry
Contains the Account information for an account with a
CatalogedDevice.
AccountUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the account profile
EnvelopedProfileAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The account profile
EnvelopedConnectionAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The connection
of this device to the account
EnvelopedActivationAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The activation
data for this device to the account
2.6.21. Structure: ConnectionApplication
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
2.6.22. Mesh Group Classes
2.6.23. Structure: ProfileGroup
Inherits: Profile
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Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person
who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to
other administrators over time.
AccountAddresses: String [0..Many] Service address(es).
KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key currently used to encrypt data
under this profile
2.6.24. Structure: ActivationGroup
Inherits: Activation
GroupUDF: String (Optional) The UDF of the group
2.6.25. Structure: ConnectionGroup
Describes the connection of a member to a group.
Inherits: Connection
KeyEncryption: KeyComposite (Optional) The decryption key for the
user within the group
2.6.26. Mesh Service Classes
2.6.27. Structure: ProfileService
Inherits: Profile
Profile of a Mesh Service
KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
service connections.
KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional) Key used to encrypt data under
this profile
2.6.28. Structure: ConnectionService
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
2.6.29. Mesh Host Classes
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2.6.30. Structure: ProfileHost
Inherits: Profile
KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional) Key used to authenticate
service connections.
2.6.31. Structure: ConnectionHost
Inherits: Connection
[No fields]
2.7. Cataloged items
2.7.1. Data Structures
Classes describing data used in cataloged data.
2.7.2. Structure: Contact
Inherits: Assertion
Base class for contact entries.
Id: String (Optional) The globally unique contact identifier.
Anchors: Anchor [0..Many] Mesh fingerprints associated with the
contact.
NetworkAddresses: NetworkAddress [0..Many] Network address entries
Locations: Location [0..Many] The physical locations the contact is
associated with.
Roles: Role [0..Many] The roles of the contact
Bookmark: Bookmark [0..Many] The Web sites and other online
presences of the contact
Sources: TaggedSource [0..Many] Source(s) from which this contact
was constructed.
2.7.3. Structure: Anchor
Trust anchor
UDF: String (Optional) The trust anchor.
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Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation.
2.7.4. Structure: TaggedSource
Source from which contact information was obtained.
LocalName: String (Optional) Short name for the contact information.
Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation.
BinarySource: Binary (Optional) The contact data in binary form.
EnvelopedSource: DareEnvelope (Optional) The contact data in
enveloped form. If present, the BinarySource property is ignored.
2.7.5. Structure: ContactGroup
Inherits: Contact
Contact for a group, including encryption groups.
[No fields]
2.7.6. Structure: ContactPerson
Inherits: Contact
CommonNames: PersonName [0..Many] List of person names in order of
preference
2.7.7. Structure: ContactOrganization
Inherits: Contact
CommonNames: OrganizationName [0..Many] List of person names in
order of preference
2.7.8. Structure: OrganizationName
The name of an organization
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
RegisteredName: String (Optional) The registered name.
DBA: String (Optional) Names that the organization uses including
trading names and doing business as names.
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2.7.9. Structure: PersonName
The name of a natural person
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
FullName: String (Optional) The preferred presentation of the full
name.
Prefix: String (Optional) Honorific or title, E.g. Sir, Lord, Dr.,
Mr.
First: String (Optional) First name.
Middle: String [0..Many] Middle names or initials.
Last: String (Optional) Last name.
Suffix: String (Optional) Nominal suffix, e.g. Jr., III, etc.
PostNominal: String (Optional) Post nominal letters (if used).
2.7.10. Structure: NetworkAddress
Provides all means of contacting the individual according to a
particular network address
Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
use.
Address: String (Optional) The network address, e.g.
alice@example.com
NetworkCapability: String [0..Many] The capabilities bound to this
address.
EnvelopedProfileAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) Optional enveloped
profile for the Address
Protocols: NetworkProtocol [0..Many] Public keys associated with the
network address
2.7.11. Structure: NetworkProtocol
Protocol: String (Optional) The IANA protocol|identifier of the
network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the
specified Address.
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2.7.12. Structure: Role
OrganizationName: String (Optional) The organization at which the
role is held
Titles: String [0..Many] The titles held with respect to that
organization.
Locations: Location [0..Many] Postal or physical addresses
associated with the role.
2.7.13. Structure: Location
Appartment: String (Optional)
Street: String (Optional)
District: String (Optional)
Locality: String (Optional)
County: String (Optional)
Postcode: String (Optional)
Country: String (Optional)
2.7.14. Structure: Bookmark
Uri: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Role: String [0..Many]
2.7.15. Structure: Reference
MessageID: String (Optional) The received message to which this is a
response
ResponseID: String (Optional) Message that was generated in response
to the original (optional).
Relationship: String (Optional) The relationship type. This can be
Read, Unread, Accept, Reject.
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2.7.16. Structure: Task
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Start: DateTime (Optional)
Finish: DateTime (Optional)
StartTravel: String (Optional)
FinishTravel: String (Optional)
TimeZone: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Description: String (Optional)
Location: String (Optional)
Trigger: String [0..Many]
Conference: String [0..Many]
Repeat: String (Optional)
Busy: Boolean (Optional)
2.8. Catalog Entries
2.8.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry
Base class for cataloged Mesh data.
Labels: String [0..Many] The set of labels describing the entry
2.8.2. Structure: CatalogedCredential
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Protocol: String (Optional)
Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
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2.8.3. Structure: CatalogedNetwork
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Protocol: String (Optional)
Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)
2.8.4. Structure: CatalogedContact
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
Self: Boolean (Optional) If true, this catalog entry is for the user
who created the catalog.
Permissions: Permission [0..Many] List of the permissions that the
contact has been granted.
2.8.5. Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption
Inherits: CatalogedContact
[No fields]
2.8.6. Structure: CatalogedCapability
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
[No fields]
2.8.7. Structure: CryptographicCapability
Id: String (Optional) The identifier of the capability. If this is
a user capability, MUST match the KeyData identifier. If this is
a serviced capability, MUST match the value of ServiceId on the
corresponding service capability.
KeyData: KeyData (Optional) The key that enables the capability
EnvelopedKeyShares: DareEnvelope [0..Many] One or more enveloped key
shares.
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SubjectId: String (Optional) The identifier of the resource that is
controlled using the key.
SubjectAddress: String (Optional) The address of the resource that
is controlled using the key.
2.8.8. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a decryption key
[No fields]
2.8.9. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial
Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt
The corresponding key is an encryption key
ServiceId: String (Optional) The identifier used to claim the
capability from the service.[Only present for a partial
capability.]
ServiceAddress: String (Optional) The service account that supports
a serviced capability. [Only present for a partial capability.]
2.8.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced
Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt
The corresponding key is an encryption key
AuthenticationId: String (Optional) UDF of trust root under which
request to use a serviced capability must be authorized. [Only
present for a serviced capability]
2.8.11. Structure: CapabilitySign
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is an administration key
[No fields]
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2.8.12. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a key that may be used to generate key
shares.
[No fields]
2.8.13. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange
Inherits: CryptographicCapability
The corresponding key is a decryption key to be used in accordance
with the Micali Fair Electronic Exchange with Invisible Trusted
Parties protocol.
[No fields]
2.8.14. Structure: CatalogedBookmark
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Uri: String (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Path: String (Optional)
2.8.15. Structure: CatalogedTask
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
EnvelopedTask: DareEnvelope (Optional)
Title: String (Optional)
Key: String (Optional) Unique key.
2.8.16. Structure: CatalogedApplication
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
Key: String (Optional)
EnvelopedCapabilities: DareEnvelope [0..Many] Enveloped keys for use
with Application
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2.8.17. Structure: CatalogedMember
ContactAddress: String (Optional)
MemberCapabilityId: String (Optional)
ServiceCapabilityId: String (Optional)
Inherits: CatalogedEntry
2.8.18. Structure: CatalogedGroup
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
Profile: ProfileGroup (Optional)
2.8.19. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
2.8.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
2.8.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork
Inherits: CatalogedApplication
[No fields]
2.9. Static Assertions
2.9.1. Structure: DevicePreconfiguration
A data structure that is passed
EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The device profile
ConnectUri: String (Optional) The connection URI. This would
normally be printed on the device as a QR code.
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2.10. Messages
2.10.1. Structure: Message
MessageID: String (Optional) Unique per-message ID. When
encapsulating a Mesh Message in a DARE envelope, the envelope
EnvelopeID field MUST be a UDF fingerprint of the MessageID value.
Sender: String (Optional)
Recipient: String (Optional)
References: Reference [0..Many]
2.10.2. Structure: MessageError
Inherits: Message
ErrorCode: String (Optional)
2.10.3. Structure: MessageComplete
Inherits: Message
[No fields]
2.10.4. Structure: MessagePinValidated
Inherits: Message
AuthenticatedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Enveloped data that is
authenticated by means of the PIN
ClientNonce: Binary (Optional)
PinUDF: String (Optional) Fingerprint of the PIN value used to
authenticate the request.
PinWitness: Binary (Optional) Witness value calculated as KDF
(Device.UDF + AccountAddress, ClientNonce)
2.10.5. Structure: MessagePIN
Account: String (Optional)
Inherits: Message
Expires: DateTime (Optional)
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Automatic: Boolean (Optional) If true, authentication against the
PIN code is sufficient to complete the associated action without
further authorization.
SaltedPIN: String (Optional) PIN code bound to the specified action.
Action: String (Optional) The action to which this PIN code is
bound.
2.10.6. Structure: RequestConnection
Connection request message. This message contains the information
Inherits: MessagePinValidated
AccountAddress: String (Optional)
2.10.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection
Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a
valid MessageConnectionRequestClient
Inherits: Message
EnvelopedRequestConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional) The client
connection request.
ServerNonce: Binary (Optional)
Witness: String (Optional)
2.10.8. Structure: RespondConnection
Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the
connection request.
Inherits: Message
Result: String (Optional) The response to the request. One of
"Accept", "Reject" or "Pending".
CatalogedDevice: CatalogedDevice (Optional) The device information.
MUST be present if the value of Result is "Accept". MUST be
absent or null otherwise.
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2.10.9. Structure: RequestContact
Inherits: Message
Reply: Boolean (Optional)
Subject: String (Optional)
PIN: String (Optional) One time authentication code.
Self: DareEnvelope (Optional) The contact data.
2.10.10. Structure: ReplyContact
Inherits: MessagePinValidated
Subject: String (Optional)
2.10.11. Structure: GroupInvitation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
2.10.12. Structure: RequestConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Text: String (Optional)
2.10.13. Structure: ResponseConfirmation
Inherits: Message
Request: DareEnvelope (Optional)
Accept: Boolean (Optional)
2.10.14. Structure: RequestTask
Inherits: Message
[No fields]
2.10.15. Structure: MessageClaim
Inherits: Message
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PublicationId: String (Optional)
ServiceAuthenticate: String (Optional)
DeviceAuthenticate: String (Optional)
Expires: DateTime (Optional)
3. Mesh Portal Service Reference
HTTP Well Known Service Prefix: /.well-known/mmm
Every Mesh Portal Service transaction consists of exactly one request
followed by exactly one response. Mesh Service transactions MAY
cause modification of the data stored in the Mesh Portal or the Mesh
itself but do not cause changes to the connection state. The
protocol itself is thus idempotent. There is no set sequence in
which operations are required to be performed. It is not necessary
to perform a Hello transaction prior to a ValidateAccount, Publish or
any other transaction.
3.1. Request Messages
A Mesh Portal Service request consists of a payload object that
inherits from the MeshRequest class. When using the HTTP binding,
the request MUST specify the portal DNS address in the HTTP Host
field.
3.1.1. Message: MeshRequest
Base class for all request messages.
Portal: String (Optional) Name of the Mesh Portal Service to which
the request is directed.
3.2. Response Messages
A Mesh Portal Service response consists of a payload object that
inherits from the MeshResponse class. When using the HTTP binding,
the response SHOULD report the Status response code in the HTTP
response message. However the response code returned in the payload
object MUST always be considered authoritative.
3.2.1. Message: MeshResponse
Base class for all response messages. Contains only the status code
and status description fields.
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[No fields]
3.3. Imported Objects
The Mesh Service protocol makes use of JSON objects defined in the
JOSE Signatgure and Encryption specifications.
3.4. Common Structures
The following common structures are used in the protocol messages:
3.4.1. Structure: KeyValue
Describes a Key/Value structure used to make queries for records
matching one or more selection criteria.
Key: String (Optional) The data retrieval key.
Value: String (Optional) The data value to match.
3.4.2. Structure: SearchConstraints
Specifies constraints to be applied to a search result. These allow
a client to limit the number of records returned, the quantity of
data returned, the earliest and latest data returned, etc.
NotBefore: DateTime (Optional) Only data published on or after the
specified time instant is requested.
Before: DateTime (Optional) Only data published before the specified
time instant is requested. This excludes data published at the
specified time instant.
MaxEntries: Integer (Optional) Maximum number of data entries to
return.
MaxBytes: Integer (Optional) Maximum number of data bytes to return.
PageKey: String (Optional) Specifies a page key returned in a
previous search operation in which the number of responses
exceeded the specified bounds.
When a page key is specified, all the other search parameters
except for MaxEntries and MaxBytes are ignored and the service
returns the next set of data responding to the earlier query.
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3.5. Transaction: Hello
Request: HelloRequest
Response: HelloResponse
Report service and version information.
The Hello transaction provides a means of determining which protocol
versions, message encodings and transport protocols are supported by
the service.
3.6. Transaction: ValidateAccount
Request: ValidateRequest
Response: ValidateResponse
Request validation of a proposed name for a new account.
For validation of a user's account name during profile creation.
3.6.1. Message: ValidateRequest
Inherits: MeshRequest
Describes the proposed account properties. Currently, these are
limited to the account name but could be extended in future versions
of the protocol.
Account: String (Optional) Account name requested
Reserve: Boolean (Optional) If true, request a reservation for the
specified account name. Note that the service is not obliged to
honor reservation requests.
Language: String [0..Many] List of ISO language codes in order of
preference. For creating explanatory text.
3.6.2. Message: ValidateResponse
Inherits: MeshResponse
States whether the proposed account properties are acceptable and
(optional) returns an indication of what properties are valid.
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Note that receiving a 'Valid' responseto a Validate Request does not
guarantee creation of the account. In addition to the possibility
that the account namecould be requested by another user between the
Validate and Create transactions, a portal service MAY perform more
stringent validation criteria when an account is actually being
created. For example, checking with the authoritative list of
current accounts rather than a cached copy.
Valid: Boolean (Optional) If true, the specified account identifier
is acceptable. If false, the account identifier is rejected.
Minimum: Integer (Optional) Specifies the minimum length of an
account name.
Maximum: Integer (Optional) Specifies the maximum length of an
account name.
InvalidCharacters: String (Optional) A list of characters that the
service does not accept in account names. The list of characters
MAY not be exhaustive but SHOULD include any illegal characters in
the proposed account name.
Reason: String (Optional) Text explaining the reason an account name
was rejected.
3.7. Transaction: CreateAccount
Request: CreateRequest
Response: CreateResponse
Request creation of a new portal account.
Unlike a profile, a mesh account is specific to a particular Mesh
portal. A mesh account must be created and accepted before a profile
can be published.
3.7.1. Message: CreateRequest
Request creation of a new portal account. The request specifies the
requested account identifier and the Mesh profile to be associated
with the account.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Account: String (Optional) Account identifier requested.
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3.7.2. Message: CreateResponse
Inherits: MeshResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Create transaction.
[No fields]
3.8. Transaction: DeleteAccount
Request: DeleteRequest
Response: DeleteResponse
Request deletion of a portal account.
Deletes a portal account but not the underlying profile. Once
registered, profiles are permanent.
3.8.1. Message: DeleteRequest
Request deletion of a new portal account. The request specifies the
requested account identifier.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Account: String (Optional) Account identifier to be deleted.
3.8.2. Message: DeleteResponse
Inherits: MeshResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Delete transaction.
[No fields]
3.9. Transaction: Get
Request: GetRequest
Response: GetResponse
Search for data in the mesh that matches a set of properties
described by a sequence of key/value pairs.
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3.9.1. Message: GetRequest
Describes the Portal or Mesh data to be retreived.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Identifier: String (Optional) Lookup by profile ID
Account: String (Optional) Lookup by Account ID
KeyValues: KeyValue [0..Many] List of KeyValue pairs specifying the
conditions to be met
SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search
to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total
size of data records returned.
Multiple: Boolean (Optional) If true return multiple responses if
available
Full: Boolean (Optional) If true, the client requests that the full
Mesh data record be returned containing both the Mesh entry itself
and the Mesh metadata that allows the date and time of the
publication of the Mesh entry to be verified.
3.9.2. Message: GetResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Get transaction. If a Mesh entry
matching the specified profile is found, containsthe list of entries
matching the request.
Inherits: MeshResponse
DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] List of mesh data records matching the
request.
PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number
and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the
SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server
limits.
3.10. Transaction: Publish
Request: PublishRequest
Response: PublishResponse
Publish a profile or key escrow entry to the mesh.
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3.10.1. Message: PublishRequest
Requests publication of the specified Mesh entry.
Inherits: MeshRequest
[No fields]
3.10.2. Message: PublishResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Publish transaction.
Inherits: MeshResponse
[No fields]
3.11. Transaction: Status
Request: StatusRequest
Response: StatusResponse
Request the current status of the mesh as seen by the portal to which
it is directed.
The response to the status request contains the last signed
checkpoint and proof chains for each of the peer portals that have
been checkpointed.
[Not currently implemented]
3.11.1. Message: StatusRequest
Inherits: MeshRequest
Initiates a status transaction.
[No fields]
3.11.2. Message: StatusResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Status transaction.
Inherits: MeshResponse
LastWriteTime: DateTime (Optional) Time that the last write update
was made to the Mesh
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LastCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional) Time that the last Mesh
checkpoint was calculated.
NextCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional) Time at which the next Mesh
checkpoint should be calculated.
CheckpointValue: String (Optional) Last checkpoint value.
3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart
Request: ConnectStartRequest
Response: ConnectStartResponse
Request connection of a new device to a mesh profile
3.12.1. Message: ConnectStartRequest
Inherits: MeshRequest
Initial device connection request.
SignedRequest: SignedConnectionRequest (Optional) Device connection
request signed by thesignature key of the device requesting
connection.
AccountID: String (Optional) Account identifier of account to which
the device is requesting connection.
3.12.2. Message: ConnectStartResponse
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStart transaction.
Inherits: MeshRequest
[No fields]
3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus
Request: ConnectStatusRequest
Response: ConnectStatusResponse
Request status of pending connection request of a new device to a
mesh profile
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3.13.1. Message: ConnectStatusRequest
Inherits: MeshRequest
Request status information for a pending request posted previously.
AccountID: String (Optional) Account identifier for which pending
connection information is requested.
DeviceID: String (Optional) Device identifier of device requesting
status information.
3.13.2. Message: ConnectStatusResponse
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStatus transaction.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional) The signed
ConnectionResult object.
3.14. Transaction: ConnectPending
Request: ConnectPendingRequest
Response: ConnectPendingResponse
Request a list of pending requests for an administration profile.
3.14.1. Message: ConnectPendingRequest
Inherits: MeshRequest
Specify the criteria for pending requests.
AccountID: String (Optional) The account identifier of the account
for which pending connection requests are requested.
SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search
to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total
size of data records returned.
3.14.2. Message: ConnectPendingResponse
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectPending transaction.
Inherits: MeshRequest
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Pending: SignedConnectionRequest [0..Many] A list of pending
requests satisfying the criteria set out in the request.
PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number
and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the
SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server
limits.
3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete
Request: ConnectCompleteRequest
Response: ConnectCompleteResponse
Post response to a pending connection request.
3.15.1. Message: ConnectCompleteRequest
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction.
Inherits: MeshRequest
Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional) The connection result to
be posted to the portal. The result MUST be signed by a valid
administration key for the Mesh profile.
AccountID: String (Optional) The account identifier to which the
connection result is posted.
3.15.2. Message: ConnectCompleteResponse
Inherits: MeshRequest
Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction.
[No fields]
3.16. Transaction: Transfer
Request: TransferRequest
Response: TransferResponse
Perform a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction
identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization
[Not currently implemented]
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3.16.1. Message: TransferRequest
Request a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction
identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization
Inherits: MeshRequest
SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search
to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total
size of data records returned.
3.16.2. Message: TransferResponse
Inherits: MeshResponse
Reports the success or failure of a Transfer transaction. If
successful, contains the list of Mesh records to be transferred.
DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] List of mesh data records matching the
request.
PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number
and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the
SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server
limits.
4. Assets
4.1. Data
4.2. Credentials
4.3. Reputation
4.3.1. Outbound Messaging Abuse ()
5. Risks
5.1. Confidentiality
Is a regulatory requirement GDPR/HIPPA
5.1.1. Privacy
Stronger requirement, given data but with restrictions on use
Unintended use within an organization may put it in default
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GDPR
HIPPA
5.2. Integrity
Modification of data enables control breaches
5.3. Availability
5.3.1. Data loss
Loss of the pictures of the kids at 5
5.3.2. Partial data survivability
Where they buried Aunt Agatha's jewelry but not where they buried
Aunt Agatha.
5.4. Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam)
6. Threats
6.1. End point Compromise
7. Controls
7.1. Cryptographic
7.1.1. Triple lock
7.1.1.1. Transport Security
Traffic analysis protection
7.1.1.2. Message Security
Access control
Authentication / Integrity
7.1.1.3. Data Level Security
Data Confidentiality
Non-Repudiation
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7.1.2. Key Protection
Use of platform provided facilities to bind private keys in the
Device profile to the device is highly desirable. Ideally, private
keys should be protected against extraction by hardware techniques
presenting a high degree of resistance.
7.1.2.1. Windows
Use encrypted key store
Preferably use BitLocker
7.1.2.2. OSX
Use Key Ring
7.1.2.3. iOS
Use ???
7.1.2.4. Linux
Use the DBUS mechanism
7.1.2.5. Android
Hope and prayers.
7.1.3. Key and Nonce Generation
Use strong mechanisms as described in RFC???
Use of key co-generation as described in part 8 is advised
7.1.4. Key Escrow and Recovery
Master profile keys should be escrowed
Escrow strategies for DARE should take account of the fact that users
may want some but not all their data assets to survive them.
7.1.5. Profile Verification
Check that the device credential has been signed by an administration
device and that the administration device was properly authorized by
the master profile.
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Device catalog MUST be signed by the admin device.
Future ? provide protection against rollback attacks.
7.1.6. Identity Validation
See the separate document on the trust model
7.1.7. Trust Broker Accountability
Cert transparency type techniques
7.2. Mesh Messaging
7.2.1. Ingress Control
Every message is subject to access control
Mesh Services should perform abuse filtering on inbound mail
Mesh Services MUST apply user specified ingress control as specified
in their contacts catalog.
7.2.2. Egress Control
Some applications may require egress control
For example, classified environments
Mail too stupid to send
7.2.3. Security Signal
Confirmation messages requiring payments
Need Accountability
Need to know the source of the accountability assertions
Should be distinguished from sender controlled part of a message
7.2.3.1. Brand
If messages are being sent on behalf of a corporate entity, this
should be signaled to both sender and receiver
Sender ? remind them that they are speaking on behalf of another
party
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Receiver ? establish who is speaking by the familiar technique.
7.2.4. Accountability
Authentication and consequences
8. Security Considerations
This document comprises the security considerations for the use and
implementation of the Mathematical Mesh.
8.1. Integrity
8.1.1. DNS Spoofing
8.1.2. TLS Downgrade
8.1.3. TLS Service Impersonation
8.1.4. Request Replay Attack
8.1.5. Response Replay Attack
8.2. Confidentiality
8.2.1. Side Channel Attack
8.2.2. Session Key Leakage
9. IANA Considerations
All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in
this document
10. Acknowledgements
A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is
presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].
11. Normative References
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[draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I:
Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-13, 9 March 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
architecture-13>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
12. Informative References
[draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
hallambaker-mesh-developer-09, 23 October 2019,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
developer-09>.
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