Mitigating Neighbor Discovery Based Denial of Service Attacks
draft-halpern-6man-nddos-mitigation-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Joel M. Halpern | ||
| Last updated | 2012-04-19 (Latest revision 2011-10-17) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
It has been observed that with the large space of IPv6 addresses within a subnet, remote attackers can send packets that saturate a rotuers ND cache, and potentially saturate a subnet with ND Soliciation messages as well. Some operational techniques and small protocol adjustments have been proposed that can help alleviate this problem. This draft proposes a slightly more drastic optional behavior for routers, which can nearly eliminate this problem.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)