J-PAKE: Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling
draft-hao-jpake-02

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Network Working Group                                        F. Hao, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                 Newcastle University (UK)
Intended status: Informational                          January 26, 2016
Expires: July 29, 2016

        J-PAKE: Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling
                           draft-hao-jpake-02

Abstract

   This document specifies a Password Authenticated Key Exchange by
   Juggling (J-PAKE) protocol.  This protocol allows the establishment
   of a secure end-to-end communication channel between two remote
   parties over an insecure network solely based on a shared password,
   without requiring a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or any trusted
   third party.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 29, 2016.

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   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  J-PAKE Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Protocol setup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Two-round key exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Three-pass variant  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  Key confirmation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.5.  Computational cost  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) is a technique that aims
   to establish secure communication between two remote parties solely
   based on their shared password, without relying on a Public Key
   Infrastructure or any trusted third party [BM92].  The first PAKE
   protocol, called EKE, was proposed by Steven Bellovin and Michael
   Merrit in 1992 [BM92].  Other well-known PAKE protocols include SPEKE
   (by David Jablon in 1996) [Jab96] and SRP (by Tom Wu in 1998) [Wu98].
   SRP has been revised several times to address reported security and
   efficiency issues.  In particular, the version 6 of SRP, commonly
   known as SRP-6, is specified in [RFC5054].

   This document specifies a PAKE protocol called Password Authenticated
   Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE), which was designed by Feng Hao and
   Peter Ryan in 2008 [HR08].

   There are a few factors that may be considered in favor of J-PAKE
   over others.  First, J-PAKE has security proofs, while equivalent
   proofs are lacking in EKE, SPEKE and SRP-6.  Second, J-PAKE is not
   patented.  It follows a completely different design approach from all
   other PAKE protocols, and is built upon a well-established Zero
   Knowledge Proof (ZKP) primitive: Schnorr NIZK proof [I-D-Schnorr].
   Third, J-PAKE is efficient.  It adopts novel engineering techniques
   to optimize the use of ZKP so that overall the protocol is
   sufficiently efficient for practical use.  Fourth, J-PAKE is designed

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