Intentionally Temporarily Insecure
draft-hardaker-dnsop-intentionally-temporary-insec-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Wes Hardaker 
Last updated 2021-02-21
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Network Working Group                                        W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft                                                   USC/ISI
Intended status: Best Current Practice                 February 21, 2021
Expires: August 25, 2021

                   Intentionally Temporarily Insecure
         draft-hardaker-dnsop-intentionally-temporary-insec-00

Abstract

   Performing DNSKEY algorithm transitions with DNSSEC signing is
   unfortunately challenging to get right in practice without decent
   tooling support.  This document weighs the correct, completely secure
   way of rolling keys against an alternate, significantly simplified,
   method that takes a zone through an insecure state.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Hardaker                 Expires August 25, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Intentionally Temporarily Insecure      February 2021

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Transitioning temporarily through insecurity  . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Operational considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix B.  Github Version of this document  . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   Performing DNSKEY [RFC4035] algorithm transitions with DNSSEC
   [RFC4033] signing is unfortunately challenging to get right in
   practice without decent tooling support.  This document weighs the
   correct, completely secure way of rolling keys against an alternate,
   significantly simplified, method that takes a zone through an
   insecure state.

   Section 4.1.4 of [RFC6781] describes the necessary steps required
   when a new signing key is published for a zone that uses a different
   signing algorithm than the currently published keys.  These are the
   steps that MUST be followed when zone owners wish to have
   uninterrupted DNSSEC protection for their zones.  The steps in this
   document are designed to ensure that all DNSKEY records and all DS
   [RFC4509] records (and the rest of a zone records) are properly
   validatable by validating resolvers throughout the entire process.

   Unfortunately, there are a number of these steps that are challenging
   to accomplish either because the timing is tricky to get right or
   because current software doesn't support automating the process
   easily.  For example, the second step in Section 4.1.4 of [RFC6781]
   requires that a new key with the new algorithm (which we refer to as
   K_new) be created, but not yet published.  This step also requires
   that both the old key (K_old) and K_new sign and generate signatures
   for the zone, but with only the K_old key is published even though
   signatures from K_new are included.  After this odd mix has been
   published for a sufficient time length, based on the TTL, can K_new
   be safely introduced and published into the zone as well.

   Although many DNSSEC signing solutions may automate the algorithm
   rollover steps (making operator involvement unnecessary), many other
   tools do not support automated algorithm updates.  In these
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