Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations-04
Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(dnsop WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Wes Hardaker , Warren "Ace" Kumari | ||
Last updated | 2017-03-29 (Latest revision 2017-02-17) | ||
Replaced by | draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
Document shepherd | Tim Wicinski | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations | |
Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes the math behind the minimum time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait before using a new DNSKEY to sign records when supporting the RFC5011 rollover strategies.
Authors
Wes Hardaker
Warren "Ace" Kumari
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)